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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis has theoretical as well as empirical goals. Theoretically, it develops a working 
conceptual framework of an African development regime – an institutional configuration of 
modern power harnessed by leaders and technocrats ideologically committed to progress. 
Historically, ‘Africa’ has been an ‘invention’, objectified as a continent in crisis and designated 
the object of external developers. Africans have re-imagined their continent as a distinct 
geopolitical space, a lived reality of struggles in which unifying discourses of ‘Pan-Africanism’, 
‘United States of Africa’ and ‘African renaissance’ project an alternative African geography of 
power. In this regime, institutional complexes of expertise – Western-trained African experts, 
their institutions and interactions – play a pivotal role in advancing the hegemony of dominant 
development ideas. In the process, it is argued, they have the potential to reconfigure power 
asymmetries and secure expanded policy space towards pursuing a development agenda 
considered more authentically ‘African’. The thesis undertakes a historiographical analysis of 
Africa’s development regime, locating the sub-hegemonic role played by the Economic 
Commission for Africa, the continent’s premier institutional complex of expertise on economic 
development issues, from 1958 to 2005. Drawing on life histories of key respondents, critical 
light is shed on how these experts deploy their ‘African-ness’ alongside recognition as world-
class technocrats to create increased room for manoeuvre. The thesis also examines the African 
Peer Review Mechanism, a sub-hegemonic political technology advancing the globally 
hegemonic discourse of ‘good governance’ that, it is argued, holds the potential to re-order the 
balance of power.  
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Introduction:  
Africa – Invention and Lived Reality 
 
Preamble 
Addressing a summit of African leaders in Tunis in June 1994, Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s 
first post-apartheid head of state, recounted how – despite Africa’s major contribution to the 
founding of civilisation – the Roman Empire had destroyed Carthage, an African city, and carted 
off the children of Africa as slaves. This act of aggression, he said, marked the start of a long 
interregnum during which Africans: 
 
“…were held out as the outstanding example of the beneficiaries of charity, because we 
became the permanent victims of famine, of destructive conflicts and of the pestilence 
of the natural world. On our knees because history, society and nature had defeated us, 
we could be nothing but beggars. What the Romans had sought with the destruction of 
Carthage had been achieved” (Mandela 1994, p.1).  
 
Many centuries later, with the end of apartheid in 1991 marking the achievement of the total 
liberation of Africa from white rule, neither Carthage nor Africa had been irreparably destroyed 
– thanks to the struggles and deeds of prominent African heroes and heroines. These struggles 
ended the long interregnum, and signalled the beginning of the task of rebuilding the African 
city of Carthage. Decrying the prevalent image of Africa as a continent wracked by conflict, that 
would never experience development and growth, whose children would forever be 
condemned to poverty and dehumanisation, and which would perpetually beg for aid, Mandela 
added: 
 
“We know it is a matter of fact that we have it in ourselves as Africans to change all this. 
We must, in action, assert our will to do so. We must, in action, say that there is no 
obstacle big enough to stop us from bringing about a new African renaissance” (ibid, 
p.3, emphasis added). 
 
In a speech to U.S. business leaders in Chantilly, Virginia in April 1997, Thabo Mbeki, Mandela’s 
successor, unveiled the key pillars of the ‘African renaissance’ concept: socio-cultural, political 
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and economic regeneration, and the improvement of Africa’s geopolitical standing in world 
affairs.  
 
“Africa’s time has come”, he declared. “We should no longer allow the situation where 
the world records growth and development and Africa communicates a message of 
regression and further underdevelopment. The new century must be an African 
century” (Mbeki 1997, p.6, emphasis added)
1
.  
 
Within South Africa, Mbeki’s advocacy gave rise to a flurry of activity
2
 and excitement
3
. Outside 
South Africa, the ‘African renaissance’ discourse was harnessed towards a dual purpose: 
helping to reposition South Africa as an emerging player in world affairs (Habib and Selinyane 
2006); and rallying African leaders behind the vision of a united Africa that could command a 
larger share of global power and trade.  
 
From ‘African Renaissance’ to NEPAD 
In July 2000, with Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and Algerian President Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika, Mbeki attended the summit of the Group of Eight (G8) industrialised nations in 
Okinawa, Japan. Mbeki and Bouteflika had been mandated by the OAU in 1999 to “engage with 
African creditors on our behalf on the issue of Africa’s external indebtedness, with a view to 
securing the total cancellation of Africa’s debt, as a matter of urgency” (OAU 1999). They made 
a case for a new debt relief initiative that would benefit African as well as other developing 
nations, and promised that, in return, Africa would manage its affairs in a more accountable 
manner. The G8 response was to request a workable plan on the basis of which negotiations 
                                                  
1
 In many speeches featuring the African renaissance, Mbeki regularly cited Roman, Greek and other ‘ideas’ of 
Africa.  
2
 This included the establishment of an African Renaissance Movement and the inauguration of an African 
Renaissance Institute in 1999 as a coordinating body of country-based chapters in the movement. At its 50
th
 
National Conference, the African National Congress (ANC) adopted the African renaissance as a key ideological 
component. An African Renaissance and International Cooperation Bill was drafted and sent to parliament in 2000 
(Maloka 2000).  
3
 Vusi Mavimbela, Mbeki’s political adviser, described the ‘African renaissance’ as a “third moment” in Africa’s 
postcolonial history, after decolonisation and the democratic transitions of the 1990s. To others, the ‘African 
renaissance’ was Africa’s response to globalisation (Maloka 2000).  
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towards a new era of reciprocal relations between Africa and the international community 
could begin. 
 
Mbeki took the lead in developing the plan, and soon unveiled the ‘Millennium Partnership for 
the Africa Recovery Programme’ (MAP), a document that emphasised African ownership of a 
development that was to be achieved in the context of globalisation (Griggs 2003). Meanwhile, 
Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade unveiled his OMEGA Plan, arguing that the key to 
developing Africa was to invest heavily in infrastructure. In April 2001, sensing an opportunity 
to influence these high-level policy debates, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), a 
continental ‘think tank’ headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, proposed a twin compact – 
between African leaders and Africa’s peoples, and between Africa and the international 
community – underpinned by ideas of good governance, mutual accountability and policy 
coherence (ECA 2001).  
 
At a tense conference attended by African finance ministers in Algiers in May 2001, the ECA 
brokered a compromise between the competing Senegalese and South African initiatives. The 
‘New African Initiative’, which resulted from the subsequent merger of the MAP and OMEGA, 
soon became the ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development’ (NEPAD). Hinged on promises that 
Africa’s leaders will improve governance in their countries, in exchange for additional aid from 
the developed world, NEPAD is the latest in a long line of continental plans to develop Africa. Its 
arrival rekindled hope among many that Africa would finally develop. At the same time, its 
critics despaired that NEPAD would serve only to ease Africa’s insertion into an unequal global 
order.  
 
Development as Public Action 
Whether viewed as a nineteenth-century project aimed at creating order from the disorder of 
rapid urbanisation, poverty and unemployment (Cowen and Shenton 1995), a deliberate 
mission aimed at remaking the colonial world and restructuring relations between colonies and 
the metropole (Escobar 1995, p.26), or part of an inevitable historical process of capitalist 
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expansion built on exploitation of the masses, ‘development’ has implied some form of 
intervention to bring about a transition from traditional to modern. The provision of welfare 
through governmental public action has long constituted a powerful legitimising ideology. In 
the late 1950s, at the dawn of decolonisation, development held open the possibility that all, 
regardless of race, history or colonial subjugation, could have a better life (Cooper and Packard 
1997).  
 
Africans have long been ideologically wedded to progress. Yet after two decades of postcolonial 
rule, state-led development strategy under the rubric of ‘African socialism’ fell short of 
delivering on the promise postcolonial leaders had invoked to legitimise their rule (Ferguson 
1995). Oil-price rises in the early 1970s had provided a ready source of new money for some 
African states and elites, fuelling new hopes of an industrialised Africa. However, these hopes 
soon faded as a drastic contraction in global money supply led to higher interest rates, leaving 
many African countries with huge debts they could not service. By 1980, many African 
economies were on the brink of collapse. This marked a turning point in the welfare of Africans, 
and for Africa’s world standing: it was the beginning of the ‘African crisis’ (Arrighi 2002).  
  
Faced with this unprecedented crisis, and disillusioned with how the development project had 
turned out, African leaders drafted the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, a “… classic dependency 
interpretation of the African dilemma” (Owusu 2003, p.1657) which blamed the international 
community for historical injustices suffered by the continent. In 1985, as their economies 
continued to decline, African leaders chose the path of compromise, speaking of ‘shared 
responsibilities’ and ‘genuine partnership’ and agreeing to implement World-Bank-proposed 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in return for new funds. By the late 1980s, SAPs had 
failed to deliver the promised trickle-down growth, registering a high social cost in the process. 
While questioning SAPs and market-led development, and insisting on the need to rebuild state 
capacity as the key to restructuring economies, Africa conceded the importance of ‘good 
governance’ and ‘democracy’, key Western conditions for continued aid. By 2001, Africa had 
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moved away from outright opposition to internationally imposed prescriptions for 
development, towards a new partnership in the context of globalisation. 
 
‘Idea’ and Lived Reality 
Africa
 
has long been an ‘idea’, an invention of Western scholarship dating back to Greek times 
(Mudimbe 1994). Centuries of ‘imaginings’ have constituted and shaped it in a particular way, 
its territory, people and economy designated as objects of intervention4. The invented Africa 
has served as a metaphor of absence, a ‘dark continent’ against which the lightness and 
whiteness of ‘Western civilisation’ can be pictured (Ferguson 2006). The agent of this invention 
is akin to Said’s (1978) ‘Orientalism’ – a Western style of thought, or discourse, for dominating, 
restructuring, and exercising authority over the Orient (as ontologically and epistemologically 
distinct from the Occident).  
 
Yet while ‘Africa’ is a historically and socially constructed category through which today’s world 
is structured, it is simultaneously “…a category that is ‘real’, that is imposed, that is imposed 
with force, that has a mandatory quality; a category within which, and according to which, 
people must live” (Ferguson 2006, p.5). This constructed African “geo-body” is at once 
dubiously artificial and powerfully real, and there is ample evidence of how negative 
perceptions of ‘Sub-Saharan’ or ‘black’ Africa as a category can shape social reality (ibid).  
 
In rejecting the ‘idea’ of Africa as an entity devoid of agency and in need of external public 
action, Africans have re-imagined their continent as a distinct ‘geopolitical space’ (Escobar 
1995)5, ‘geographic bloc’ (Peer 2002) or ‘single historical postcolonial bloc’ (Bayart 1993)6. 
                                                  
4
 In nineteenth-century Egypt, for example, the development challenge is defined in neo-Malthusian terms as a 
problem of too many people and not enough land to feed them, and Egypt, its land and its people are rationalised 
into objects of development (Mitchell 1995). 
5
 Escobar (1995) identifies this will to spatial power as an essential feature of development, implicit in expressions 
such as First and Third World, North and South, centre and periphery. In his view, the social production of space 
implied by these terms is bound with the production of differences, subjectivities and social orders. For him, 
despite the correctives introduced to this geopolitics – the decentring of the world, the demise of the Second 
World, the emergence of a network of world cities, the globalisation of cultural production, and so on – they 
continue to function imaginatively in powerful ways. 
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Africa has long aspired to the modernity of the developed world – albeit on the basis of a 
politically distinct and culturally specific vision7. This vision can be seen in Pan-Africanism8, 
which originated in the Caribbean and North America in the nineteenth century as a reaction to 
slavery and the oppression of black people and later evolved to contest colonialism and inspire 
the fight for Africa’s independence. Indeed, the notion of ‘African renaissance’ has existed in 
African political discourse since the colonial period, with Senegalese historian Cheik anta Diop 
first using the term in the context of the struggle against colonial rule to capture the dreams 
and aspirations of Africa’s peoples as they fought for self-determination (Cheru 2002). ‘African 
renaissance’ is a powerful imaginary symbolising the shared aspiration for a peculiarly African 
identity. It constitutes an appeal, strongly articulated by intellectuals, for a new future for Africa 
(Vale and Maseko 1998).  
 
After independence, African political leaders and intellectuals promoted a distinct view of 
economic development: oriented less towards a generic ‘developed economy’ and more 
towards the communitarian roots of African economies (Cooper and Packard 1997, p.12). As I 
discuss in Chapter 2, newly independent nations prioritised the training of a generation of 
African development experts, many of whom were sent to Western universities. At the 
continental level, Ghana’s first postcolonial leader, Kwame Nkrumah advocated for a ‘United 
States of Africa’, a master plan to consolidate Africa’s independence and achieve sustainable 
economic development, predicated on a recognition of ‘Africa’ as a geopolitical bloc. The 
imperative of achieving development thus constituted an overarching preoccupation of early 
African self-rule. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
6
 As Bayart (1993, p.195) explains, “…we do not wish to suggest that, country by country, Africa represents a 
collection of historic blocs, each one articulated with the west, and each one having a different degree of 
actualisation. On the contrary, we argue that Africa should be seen as being engaged in the edification of one 
postcolonial historic bloc whose degree of actualisation varies from country to country and region to region, and 
which integrates sub-Saharan states in diverse ways” (original emphasis).  
7
 The Pan-African ‘idea’ of Africa resonates with Shore’s (2000) notion of ‘imagined communities’, developed to 
look more closely how Europe is being constructed as a symbolic and political entity – and therefore as a more 
knowable and governable space.  
8
 E. Wilmot Blyden in the 1850s and Marcus Garvey in the 1920s both advocated the geopolitics of a united Africa 
bloc as the ultimate freedom from oppression for all Africans, whether in the Diaspora or on the continent (Griggs 
2003). 
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Two important points emerge from the above discussion. First, Africa as a continent has in past 
centuries suffered the most extreme forms of objectification, with its discourses sidelined (Cox 
1994, p.xxiii). Second, in reaction to this objectification, Africa’s intellectuals and leaders have 
deployed emancipatory discourses (‘Pan-Africanism’, ‘United States of Africa’, ‘African 
renaissance’) to project spatial power. As the excerpts from Mandela’s and Mbeki’s speeches 
show, and as will be further seen, the ability to create a discursive domain of representation 
that then provides the rationale for intervention holds the key to development’s power. This 
demonstrates the significance of language, narratives and representations in the production of 
new politico-territorial arrangements – in this case, an alternative African geography of power 
(Griggs 2003).  
 
As much as ‘Africa’ may be ‘invention’, a discursively imagined object of developers, I contend 
that it is simultaneously a ‘lived reality’, a dynamic and complex terrain of politics involving 
multiple social actors who deploy strategies to reach their various goals. In this ‘geopolitical 
space’, development operates as a regime, or institutionalised configuration of power (Ludden 
1992). Development’s hegemonic intent marks it as a key site of struggle over how to progress, 
and according to whose agenda. 
 
My reference to ‘Africa’, rather than ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’
9
, relates to the discursive 
construction of ‘Africa’ highlighted above. Whether as external objectification or postcolonial 
‘geopolitical bloc’, the discursive ‘Africa’ has power, and this power has effects. This 
dissertation is devoted to the task of unearthing how this power is deployed, and to what 
effect. I am not by any means suggesting that African identity – what it means to be ‘African’ – 
is a purely geographical or even racial representation. As I intend to show through my study of 
African development experts, African expert identity is not offered in opposition to, or as a 
corrective to, a European worldview on development. It is a socially constructed identity that is 
                                                  
9
 Although many development agencies (including UNDP, World Bank and IMF) distinguish between ‘Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ and ‘North Africa and the Middle East’, references to ‘Africa’ in this paper reflect the African Union’s 
membership of 53 countries, including North African member states.  
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continuously being negotiated in ways that are fluid, complex and co-contingent. This is 
elaborated in Chapter 1. 
 
Teleological Globalism, Dubious Culturology 
Too often, the academic literature has failed to capture the complexity of struggles over Africa’s 
development. In identifying neo-liberal globalisation
10
 
as the dominant development ideology 
of the day, analysts have cast Third World development-policy agents as powerless small-time 
players in a game whose outcome is pre-determined in Washington (cf. Soederberg 2004, 
Petras 2005). Such accounts tend to reify neo-liberal globalisation as omnipotent, irresistible 
and therefore inevitable. Conceptions of this nature have represented countries, regions and 
people as ‘objects’ of developers. While it can be argued that capital is seeking to achieve 
global hegemony, there is ample evidence of resistance worldwide to the neo-liberal ‘Project’, 
leading it to modify and moderate its prescriptions.  
 
Political science tends to cast African leaders as kleptocratic elites in a neo-patrimonial game of 
hide and deceit (cf. Chabal 2009, Chabal 2002, Chabal and Daloz 1999, Bayart, Hibou and Ellis 
2000). For example, “… it is in the interplay between the formal and informal that the kernel of 
politics is to be found on the continent”, with this neo-patrimonial form of government resting 
on “… well-understood, if unequal, forms of political reciprocity which link patrons with their 
clients along vertical social lines” (Chabal, 2000, pp.450-51). Chabal (2009) attempts to state 
the case more elegantly, arguing that “… indigenous socio-economic and cultural features have 
determining influence over the exercise of power in Africa” (ibid, p.6). Yet the bottom line for 
this school is that Africa’s ‘traditions’ and ‘culture’ are the sole determinants of how politics, 
and indeed public action, is pursued. Small wonder that neo-patrimonialism has been dismissed 
as “dubious culturology” (Ferguson 2006, p.5).  
 
                                                  
10
 Neo-liberal globalisation has two dimensions: worldwide market liberalisation and the construction of a new 
legal and regulatory superstructure for the global economy; and the internal restructuring and global integration of 
each national economy. Sklair (1995) writes of the “globalisation of capitalism in the economic, political and 
culture-ideology spheres”, manifested by three institutions – transnational corporations, transnationalist capitalist 
classes and the culture-ideology of consumerism (ibid, p.340). 
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Underlying such theories is the view that the African state is institutionally dysfunctional. This 
resonates with the ‘state failure’ analysis in the so-called ‘Berg Report’ (World Bank 1981) that 
directly led to the market fundamentalism that underpinned SAPs (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
From a political economy perspective, van de Walle (2001) argues that, in the aftermath of 
independence, African political systems became neo-patrimonial, combining an external façade 
of modern rational-legal administration with an internal patrimonial logic of dyadic exchange, 
prebendalism, and the private appropriation of public resources by state elites. These 
dynamics, he asserts, conditioned the African state’s response to crisis in the 1970s. Initially, 
Africa’s political leadership sought to evade SAP reforms, as they feared these would dilute 
their command of state resources. As the crisis progressed, it is argued, leaders have 
implemented only enough reform to unlock new flows of donor resources.  This is dubbed 
‘partial reform syndrome’ (ibid). 
 
Jean-Francois Bayart (1993) has attempted to paint a more historically and socially grounded 
picture of an informal and informalised Africa. His assertion that “… in Africa, as elsewhere, 
politics is produced ‘from the bottom up’” (Bayart 1993, p.209) at least reflects an attempt to 
ascribe agency to subjects the neo-patrimonialists have characterised as devoid of agency and 
dependent on patrons. However, casting Africa as a study in ‘extroversion’ serves only to 
reinforce the notion that Africans consider the outside world as their primary agent of progress. 
In a very real sense, therefore, neo-patrimonialism reifies the age-old ‘idea’ of Africa as devoid 
of agency. My thesis is at odds with such essentialist views. 
 
Rationale for this Study 
Africa remains the world’s most intractable development challenge, with more than 34 of its 53 
countries classified as least-developed countries (UNCTAD 2005). Development agencies have 
labelled African countries as ‘failed states’, ‘crisis states’, and ‘low-income countries under 
stress’, among other categories11 – with this deployment of the language of crisis preparing the 
ground for corrective expert intervention. Historically, expertise has played a pivotal role in 
                                                  
11
 In Chapter 3, I explain how African experts have come up with a new categorisation, distinguishing between 
‘enhanced partnership’, ‘limited partnership’ and ‘post-conflict’ countries (ECA 2001).  
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sustaining the ideology of science that underpins and legitimises technocratic development (cf. 
Ludden 2005, Mitchell 2002, Cooper and Packard 1997). Yet, little has been written about the 
role of African development experts in this process of legitimisation. Indeed, the assumption 
that Africa has lacked sufficient expertise in development fields has fuelled the perception that 
external technical assistance is critical to ‘helping Africa develop’.  
 
This explains the presence of large numbers of expatriate advisers in African countries over the 
years
12
. Of all the developing regions of the world, Africa has had the highest density of 
technical assistance (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999)13. In some countries, the presence of such 
a high number of foreign experts has not only imposed a high transaction cost on nascent 
African bureaucracies, but also made the learning curve extremely costly. In many ways, SAPs 
compounded the problem as they created the justification for the introduction of even more 
external expertise. In the 1980s and 1990s, and on the basis of their superior power, the 
Bretton Woods institutions were able to foreclose the debate – forcing African intellectuals to 
assume reactive positions on the basis of Washington’s superior power (ibid). 
 
More than two decades after SAPs were introduced, African scholars are increasingly of the 
view that Africa should re-enter the debate and assume the leading role in defining the 
continent’s development agenda (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). This growing assertion of 
African expert agency finds resonance in NEPAD which asserts the primacy of African ownership 
and leadership of its own development agenda. The notion that Africa should assume a lead 
role in charting its future has been consistent in African development plans from the 1970s 
onwards. Yet the significance of NEPAD is that it coincided with an emerging paradigm shift in 
the aid relationship between Africa and its development partners. This shift is reflected in the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), which 
                                                  
12
 Gutto (2006) argues that in the 1980s, through its advocacy of structural adjustment programmes, the World 
Bank played a key role in “[creating] space for the deployment in Africa of so-called experts, consultants and 
advisors from the North, at considerable cost to the continent” (ibid, p.310). 
13
 According to former World Bank Africa Vice-President, Kim Jaycox: “The extraordinary fact is that there are more 
expatriate advisers in Africa today than there were at the end of the colonial period” (Jaycox 1993, p.9, cited in 
Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). 
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confirm both the centrality of African ownership and leadership, and the imperative of mutual 
accountability14.  
 
For the first time, donor countries have agreed that they should follow Africa’s lead rather than 
dictating the terms of its development. Yet beyond rhetorical declarations, what has actually 
changed in the relationship between Africa and the developed world? Does the advent of the 
‘ownership’ discourse signal a decisive shift in power relations, in the direction of greater 
African agency? Or is Africa’s emerging development regime merely helping to reinforce the 
modified project of neo-liberal globalisation? My hypothesis is that the discursive consensus 
around ‘ownership’ could provide increasing room for manoeuvre for Africa’s policy community 
in charting what may be a more authentically ‘African’ development agenda. As will be shown, 
African development experts are important actors vying for this expanded policy space. 
 
The demise of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and birth of the African Union (AU) in 
2001 sparked a resurgence of Pan-Africanist aspirations to continental government. This has led 
to a revival of interest in continentally directed development. A growing body of work is now 
focusing on the AU and continental government, with particular emphasis on political issues 
including democracy, elections, peace and security and the role of civil society (cf. AfriMAP, 
AFRODAD and Oxfam 2007). The birth of NEPAD in 2001 generated considerable response, 
often critical (see Chapters 3 and 5). A few scholars (cf. Arrighi 2001, Owusu 2003, Nabudere 
2002) have attempted to situate the new aspiration to trans-national, continental development 
in historical perspective – even if the Bretton Woods institutions tend to draw attention at the 
expense of analysis of African internal dynamics.  
 
African economists (cf. Ndulu et al 2008, Mkandawire and Soludo 1999) have sought to move 
Africa beyond the ‘crisis’ by providing critical context on why it happened, and suggesting ways 
forward. These writings have been useful in informing the extent and limits of expert agency. In 
                                                  
14
 Further evidence of this paradigm shift can be seen in the Millennium Summit and Declaration (2000), 
Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development (2002), and the G8 
Gleneagles Summit (2005).  
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the process, they have highlighted the growing clamour for African solutions to African 
problems, indicating a strong desire among African experts to take the lead in engineering 
Africa’s exit from poverty and underdevelopment. And yet, despite the growing currency of 
regional or continental approaches, there remains a dearth of scholarship interrogating the 
workings of development’s power in Africa.  
 
Research Topic 
The growing demand for indigenous expertise signifies a shift from the colonial and early 
postcolonial period when Western experts were dominant in driving national planning, and the 
capacity of indigenous national and trans-national ‘think tanks’ was relatively weak. However, 
the dynamics of African expertise have rarely received adequate academic study. Therefore, to 
contribute to addressing this gap, I set out to explore expert agency and agendas in Africa’s 
development regime.  
 
Drawing on insights gathered during fieldwork, I interrogate the role of African economists and 
other social scientists working trans-nationally – in the African continental space – in generating 
and giving authority to development ideas. My aim is to explain how experts, their institutions 
and interactions shape policy discourses, and how they both reaffirm and contest dominant 
development thinking.  
 
While the idea of indigenous African expertise is considered an important prerequisite to 
advancing ‘African ownership’ – an increasingly insistent discourse in the aftermath of several 
decades of development failure – disaggregating ‘African’ expertise from the wider global pool 
of experts that has ‘professionalised’ development (cf. Cooper and Packard 1997, Chabbott 
1999) may be considered futile. This is because so many experts working on development in 
Africa, whether African or not, trained in many of the same universities and share a common 
epistemology.  
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On the face of it, African experts harness the techniques learned in universities in the 
metropole to adapt dominant global development ideas and approaches to local African 
realities. In translating the global into forms that can readily be applied and accepted in local 
contexts, African experts are therefore ‘sub-hegemonic’ – meaning they support the hegemony 
of external development ideas. According to this reading of ‘ownership’, the role of African 
expertise in the global division of labour is to adapt and retail policies crafted externally, in the 
process making these policies more acceptable to African governments.  
 
The Politics of Identity 
While I agree that the menu of policies implemented in Africa from independence to the 
present day has largely originated outside the continent, and share the view that ‘ownership’ 
may under certain circumstances signify consent, my hypothesis is significantly more nuanced. I 
read ‘African ownership’ as a discourse with the potential to create space for expanded agency 
by experts in Africa’s development regime.  
 
At the heart of my inquiry is the notion of ‘African-ness’ as a socially constructed identity 
among experts. My focus on Africa’s trans-national development regime is aimed at elucidating 
the ongoing process of identity construction, evident in the deployment of Pan-Africanist 
discourses as well as in the emergence of expert-led continental initiatives and arrangements. 
My claim is not that African experts working trans-nationally are asserting their African identity 
as a contrast to Western or global models of development. Rather, a key plank of my argument 
is that, in as much as experts may deploy their African origin as a device to assert their 
legitimacy in leading the quest for technocratic solutions to African development challenges, 
the education of these experts in Western academies plays no small role in conferring 
legitimacy on these African experts. As such, ‘African-ness’ is deployed in tandem with the 
assertion of another identity, that of membership of a global community of accredited 
development experts. 
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Theoretical Propositions 
To signpost the empirical inquiry described above, I develop a working conceptual framework 
that makes explicit key characteristics of Africa’s development regime. In addition to the ideas 
above, which draw on postcolonial studies, I incorporate Foucauldian governmentality, related 
understandings of hegemony, and Ludden’s (1992) theorisation of development regimes as key 
building blocks of this framework
15
. This is underpinned by the following theoretical 
propositions:  
 
1. Views that see development’s power as monolithic and deny the objects/ subjects of 
development any room to resist or articulate alternatives do not paint an accurate 
picture of reality. As much as development is an ideology that possesses power, the 
development regime is a ‘field of power’ (Sinha 2002, Bourdieu 1993), a terrain of live 
politics. In such a field, multiple agents challenge domination and disrupt hegemonic 
claims to power.  
 
2. In reaction to these challenges, the hegemonic ‘Project’ deploys a survival strategy of 
incorporating dissenting views. Yet, far from easing the advance of hegemony, this 
device of accommodating dissent triggers further contestation. At each turn, the power 
of the hegemonic apparatus is weakened and the force of its ideas diluted. As a result, 
no hegemonic project ever fully succeeds. 
 
3. The contestation and disruption of hegemony and the multidimensional nature of 
struggle ensure that the outcomes of the hegemonic process are usually not those 
intended. 
 
4. Domination and resistance are therefore mutually constitutive. As such, resisting the 
hegemonic development ‘Project’ implies an engagement with the very political 
                                                  
15
 In previous work (da Costa 2004) I have argued that conceptualising development in Africa as a regime makes 
possible a detailed and nuanced account of the myriad struggles by multiple agents over development underway in 
the geopolitical space of postcolonial Africa. 
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rationalities (ideas) and political technologies (mechanisms or tools) harnessed by the 
apparatus to advance its hegemonic intent. As such, it is hard for resisters to position 
themselves ‘outside’ the field of power. They are actors in it and resist from within. 
 
5. The key to resistance lies in the sub-hegemonic process, during which development 
experts ‘translate’ or ‘hybridise’ the hegemonic development discourse to facilitate its 
reception in different localities. It is in this process of sub-hegemony that possibilities 
may open up for a recalibration of asymmetries of power. 
 
Research Questions 
Informed by the above, the following research questions guided my fieldwork: 
 
 Historically, how have African institutional complexes of expertise (ICEs) informed and 
engaged with the development discourse, and how has that discourse changed over time?  
 How do ICEs in Africa’s contemporary development regime conduct the business of sub-
hegemony? What strategies and tactics are deployed? 
 In what ways does sub-hegemony open up the possibility for increased African policy space? 
 How do the influences, belief systems and motivations of African experts working in ICEs 
interact in informing expert-identity politics and how does this politics enable the 
possibilities for expanded agency? 
 What are some of the forms of knowledge and power exercised in Africa’s development 
regime? 
  
Object of Study 
Cooper and Packard (1997) argue that, while deconstructing the modes of discursive power is 
relatively unproblematic, it is much harder to discover how discourse operates within 
institutions. In their view, little is known about how institutions operate – from small NGOs to 
the World Bank.  
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To elicit responses to the above questions as a means of addressing the dearth of knowledge 
about agency and agendas in Africa’s development regime, I have selected the Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) as my case study. The ECA functions as the continent’s premier 
expert community on economic development issues, including economic and corporate 
governance (de Waal 2002). It was established in 1958 with the mandate of providing technical 
advice and options to fledgling African nations planning their development strategy. The 
Commission came into being despite sustained resistance from a number of colonial powers, 
who did not deem it necessary for Africa to have a dedicated regional economic commission 
since several African countries were still under colonial rule (Berthelot 2004, D’Sa 1983). Since 
then, and over several decades, it has played a pivotal role in developing the technocratic 
discourse on the basis of which Africa’s leaders – through the OAU and latterly the AU – have 
issued collective pronouncements spelling out continental development strategy.  
 
The Commission works on diverse issues such as economic and social policy, gender, trade and 
regional integration, governance, civil society and development management. The ECA’s 
development experts are Western-trained economists, some with general expertise and others 
specialising in specific sub-disciplines. As a UN agency, and in the early years, the ECA staff 
consisted of equal numbers of Africans and non-Africans. As a result of an explicit policy to 
recruit more Africans, a majority of the ECA’s experts today are either African nationals or of 
African origin. These experts, their interactions, and their institution, have been the focus of 
study.  
 
My decision to study the ECA in no way implies that it is the sole institutional complex of 
expertise operating in Africa’s development regime. Expertise coalesces around a number of 
key institutional or organisational hubs, among them the African Union Commission (AUC), 
African Development Bank (AfDB) and regional economic communities (RECs) – which 
aggregate and pursue the collective interests of the continent’s various sub-regional groupings. 
Furthermore, vibrant expert complexes operate within and around the state, as government 
bureaucracies, civil society organisations and policy research institutes, and in the private 
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sector. My intention has been to shed critical light on discursive strategies of rule and 
resistance deployed by experts in the continental policy space that forms a key dimension of 
Africa’s trans-national development regime. While I do address relationships between the ECA 
and AU in particular, and while intersections between national and continental expert agendas 
reverberate throughout the thesis, it was never my intention to conduct a detailed inquiry into 
national expert agency and agendas.  
 
Unit of Analysis  
Discourse serves as my main unit of analysis. Discourse as a concept applies to both oral and 
written material, and embraces all aspects of linguistic organisation at, or above, the phrase 
level (Shore and Wright 1997). Discourses are ways of thinking that may overlap and reinforce 
each other and close off other possible ways of thinking. In defining discourses as 
“configurations of ideas which provide the threads from which ideologies are woven”, Shore 
and Wright (1997) stress that language is socially constituted and not an autonomous domain, 
and that anthropological interest in discourse concerns the ‘politics of discursive practice’.  
 
Following from this, “… a key concern is who has the ‘power to define’: dominant discourses 
work by setting up the terms of reference and by disallowing or marginalising alternatives. 
Policies enable this to happen by setting up a political agenda and giving institutional authority 
to one or a number of overlapping discourses” (ibid, p.18). Indeed, and as Seidel and Vidal 
(1997) point out in the same volume, discourses are not purely symbolic resources and 
arguments, but resources that may be politically invested by social actors to particular ends. In 
their view, “[c]ertain discourses, when translated and mobilised through forms of action, 
including through policy, lead to political and ideological battles, fought through discourse as 
well as in extra-discursive activity” (ibid, p.59). 
 
Over time, a series of powerful discourses have structured and provided stability to the various 
iterations of Africa’s development regime. As will be seen, these have included ‘self-reliance 
and self-sustainment’, ‘shared responsibility’, ‘African ownership’, ‘mutual accountability’, and 
22 
 
‘enhanced partnership’. In particular, the idea that Africans should own and lead their quest for 
development has reverberated in successive decades. ‘African ownership’ constitutes the 
mantra of the contemporary development regime. Along with ownership, Africans are insisting 
on ‘mutual accountability’, a symmetrical form of accountability that would require the 
conditions applying to the donors to be spelt out in more detail, with enforcement mechanisms 
and penalties applying equally to donors and recipients (Maxwell and Christiansen 2002)
16
.  
 
The dissertation assumes a critical nexus between discourses, policy as a form of action, and 
material effects of policy (Shore and Wright 1997, p.60). In contrast to studies on ‘policy-as-
political technology’ that focus on the impact of policy in specific development locations (cf. 
Ferguson 1990, Brigg 2001, Mosse 2005), my research has isolated for detailed study the 
‘upstream’ stage in the nexus: the process of discourse generation, translation and adaptation. I 
explore how discourses are imagined and harnessed to assert stronger African agency. As will 
be seen, in development regimes, discourses as political rationalities of power work in concert 
with political technologies (tools, mechanisms or policies) to advance the process of hegemonic 
construction.  
 
Methodology 
Exploring agency and agendas, as opposed to attributing social change to structure, has thus 
been central to my approach. To this end, my research strategy was qualitative – although 
selective use has been made of quantitative data from primary as well as secondary sources. 
Qualitative research strategy embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting emergent 
property of individuals’ creation, and is predicated on “… an inductive approach to the 
relationship between theory and research, in which the emphasis is placed on the generation of 
theories” (Bryman 2004, p.7)17. Such a strategy is sceptical of the natural-scientific method and 
                                                  
16
 This concept is central to NEPAD, which proposes a multi-layered institutional arrangement to ensure that both 
sides are equally accountable for their actions (NEPAD, 2001). ‘Partnership’ has gradually become the order of the 
day, at least discursively, between Africa and the international community. However, traditional partnerships tend 
to be asymmetrical – applying more to recipient than donor (Maxwell and Christiansen 2002). 
17
 Bryman (2004) defines qualitative research strategy as one that “… usually emphasises words rather than 
quantification in the collection and analysis of data” (ibid, pp.19-20). 
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of positivism in particular, and emphasise the ways in which individuals interpret their social 
world. My approach has been social constructionist18, beginning from the ontological premise 
that “…social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction, but 
… are in a constant state of revision” (ibid).  
 
In terms of research design, social constructionist approaches imply, to a greater or lesser 
extent, that “… the observer is part of what is being observed” (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Lowe 2002, p.30). In Mosse (2005), the author is a project actor like others, with policies and 
points of views and analyses that stand with those of other project staff. At the same time, he is 
a researcher studying a particular set of institutional relations and practices, and so is “part-
insider/part-outsider” (p.13). Having worked as a senior adviser to the ECA Executive Secretary 
from 1997 to 2003, my proposed research is grounded on intimate knowledge of the terrain, as 
well as its actors. As such, while I cannot be seen as an ‘insider’, I have nonetheless had access 
to privileged knowledge. I am therefore part-participant as well as observer. This ‘dual 
positionality’ has provided a degree of insider-level access to my objects of study, while 
guaranteeing me the space to conduct my research with the required detachment.  
 
Post-structuralist critiques of anthropology developed in the mid-1980s have revolutionised 
how anthropologists conduct fieldwork. The recognition of power asymmetry in development 
discourses has: generated new fieldwork ethics, methods and stances; challenged operative 
distinctions between ‘local’ and ‘global’ as spatial and theoretical frames; and blurred 
commonsense conceptions of activism and academic analysis as epistemologically distinct. 
Researchers have had to expand their objects of study to recognise trans-national actors and 
global networks and institutions as critical sites of cultural production and debate (Leve and 
Karim 2001).  
 
                                                  
18
 In interrogating an institutional complex of experts working continentally and generating trans-national 
discourses, I have been mindful of the need to transcend the state-centricity of ‘constructivist’ approaches in the 
analysis of ‘epistemic communities’ (Boli and Thomas 1999).  
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Informed by this methodological shift, and in light of my interest in a development regime that 
works below, through and above states and is geographically as well as politically bounded, I 
sought to harness fieldwork methods that could help me pursue the slippery fluidity and co-
complicity of domination and resistance in a discursive regime of power. Anthropology of 
policy19, discourse analysis, and ethnography are the three methodological disciplines that most 
influenced my approach – although I have also made selective use of international political 
economy.  
 
Ethnography20 implies both a particular set of methods used to produce a range of qualitative 
data, and the end product or ethnographic text constructed from such interactions (Smith 
2002). To research a continental development regime, traditional anthropological means of 
inquiry must give way to methods that capture social relations in a multiplicity of sites of 
observation. Mosse (2005) refers to “the new ethnography of development” (p.11) as a multi-
positioned as well as multi-sited phenomenon. Multi-sited research involves a number of 
techniques, among them tracking movements of people, following a specific material object of 
study such as a commodity, following stories or narratives, conducting life histories or 
biographies, following conflicts, or conducting strategically situated single-site ethnography 
(Marcus 1995, pp.106-113).  
 
I employed three main methods to gather and review data – discourse analysis, participant 
observation and life histories21. Drawing on these techniques, I have traced the progression of a 
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 As Shore and Wright (1997) have pointed out, policy, or more precisely the policy process, constitutes an 
important object of study, because it has become an increasingly central concept and instrument in the 
organisation of contemporary societies.  
20
 The key ethnographic methods are participant observation and oral testimony: the first emphasising the 
legitimacy of a researcher’s interpretation of observed cultural phenomena from their participation and immersion 
in these phenomena, and the second emphasising a researcher’s ability to allow people to ‘speak for themselves’. 
Overall, ethnographic approaches aim to be ‘actor-oriented’ in their attempts to convey reality from a subject’s 
‘point of view’, increasingly including those of the researcher as final author and editor of the ethnographic text 
(Scheyvens and Storey 2003).  
21
 Life-history methodology relates to the collection and interpretation of personal histories or testimonies. For 
some, life-history research reflects a turn away from objectivity and a privileging of subjectivity and positionality. 
For others, life histories provide a rich source of data enabling researchers to examine relationships between cause 
and effect, agency and structure (Ojermark 2007).  
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number of critical discourses in Africa’s development regime. Discourse analysis was conducted 
on key African development plans, institutional documents, interview transcripts and a large 
number of other primary and secondary documentary sources. Textual analysis is also deployed 
throughout the dissertation. As a participant for nearly seven years in some of this story, I have 
been able to glean a number of insights that have informed and shaped this dissertation. This 
has been possible through my involvement and attendance in key gatherings, including 
conferences of African Ministers of Finance, OAU and AU summits, and other major meetings.  
 
Interviews 
To explore my hypotheses, I conducted over 60 hours of interviews with more than 40 experts 
(see Annex I). Key respondents were economists, demographers or experts in other social-
science disciplines relevant to the ECA programme of work, and were either serving or former 
members of staff. The purpose of the interviews was three-fold: to elicit life histories including 
first-hand perspectives on key moments in the evolution of the continental development 
regime; to gather evidence related to my hypothesis on the policy space opening as the 
engagement around a new development partnership unfolds, as seen in the discursive 
consensus around ‘African ownership’; and to understand the dynamics, markers and limits of 
African expert agency.  
 
To this end, I targeted two generations of ECA experts of African origin: those who had joined 
the Commission in its early years (1960s and 1970s); and a younger generation recruited 
around 2000, mainly from the Diaspora. These two groups were selected to identify 
generational differences in epistemology, strategies and tactics, as well as to identify evolving 
markers of ‘African-ness’ over time.  
 
Sikkink (1997) identifies generational shifts within institutions as a key factor in the evolution of 
ideas. In her study of the transformation of ECLA (now ECLAC, the Latin American counterpart 
of the ECA), from structuralism to neo-liberalism, she notes that the ECLA shift happened partly 
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because of the retirement of the ‘old guard’ and its replacement by a new group of staff less 
personally interested in maintaining classic ECLA positions, and more likely to have trained in 
U.S. universities and to have more mathematical and technical training. Given the tendency of 
many staff in the regional commissions to remain in the same institution for their entire 
careers, ECLA staff recruited in the 1950s would have spent up to 20 years, and in some cases 
longer, in the Commission, retiring two or three decades later, in the 1980s. At the ECA, the 
longest-serving staff members typically joined the Commission in the 1970s and retired in the 
1990s or after 2000.  
 
Interviews with ECA respondents were mostly conducted during three field visits to Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia in March, May and October 2006. Interview respondents were chosen 
randomly. Each interview lasted for an average of one hour. A questionnaire (see Annex II for a 
sample) was developed and administered in each of the interviews, which were open-ended. 
On the basis of a thorough examination of the interview transcripts, follow-up interviews were 
conducted in 2008 and 2009 by electronic means (e-mail or VOIP phone). A number of non-ECA 
experts actively engaging with the ECA ICE were also interviewed on questions relevant to the 
dissertation. Access to field sites was made possible by a series of consulting assignments for a 
variety of development agencies, involving travel to Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Uganda, the Gambia and other countries. This allowed me to gain insights from a range of 
experts who were not available in my primary field site.  
 
Road Map 
Following this introduction, the rest of the dissertation consists of five substantive chapters and 
a conclusion.  Each chapter performs a specific set of tasks in relation to the overall objective. 
Data gathered from interviews are featured throughout the thesis, and in particular in Chapters 
2 to 5. Much of the data appear in the form of discursive content, and I reproduce excerpts of 
direct quotations as much as possible. Data gathered from interviews are also consistently 
paraphrased, cited as evidence and appropriately attributed.  
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The purpose of Chapter 1, Conceptualising Africa’s Development Regime, is to introduce the 
theories informing my exploration of expert agency and agendas. It includes an extensive, 
critical review of inter-connected bodies of literature relating to development’s power. The 
chapter details a conceptual framework for Africa’s development regime. 
 
Chapter 2, From ‘Self-Reliance’ to ‘Adjustment with Transformation’: Africa’s Development 
Regime in Historical Perspective, traces the evolution of ideas that influenced trans-national 
development policy from the late 1950s to 1995. The chapter identifies and discusses key 
discursive structural shifts in Africa’s development regime, presenting compelling evidence in 
support of my hypothesis. The crucial role of the ECA in the generation of key ideas emerges 
clearly in this chapter, which cross-references and triangulates evidence from secondary 
material with discursive content gained from interviews with key African thinkers and experts, 
past and present.  
 
In Chapter 3, His Master’s Voice or ‘Manufacturer of Minimal Hegemony’? The ECA’s Tactical 
Shift (1995-2005), I provide evidence supporting my main theoretical argument about the 
articulation between sub-hegemony and expanded African expert agency. I explore the sub-
hegemonic role of the ECA of the new millennium in ‘translating’ the globally dominant 
development discourse into palatable African variants and show how the ICE simultaneously 
pushed to expand African policy space. This chapter locates the ECA’s pivotal role in the 
emergence of NEPAD and the APRM. 
 
Chapter 4, ‘African-ness’ and ‘the West’: Identity as Techno-Politics in the Quest for Expanded 
Expert Agency, unpacks key explanatory variables underlying claims by African experts to 
expanded agency. The chapter features extensive discursive content gathered from interviews 
to illustrate how experts invoke their ‘African-ness’ alongside their technocratic credentials, 
gained in the West, to assert their claims.  
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In Chapter 5, The APRM: A Political Technology of African Power, I examine a key expert-led tool 
and process in Africa’s development regime whose origins can be traced back to the ECA of 
1995 to 2005. I show how the APRM, ostensibly a sub-hegemonic political technology 
conceived to advance the globally hegemonic development discourse of ‘good governance’, 
holds significant potential to expand African ownership and leadership of its own development 
agenda. I show how, by opening space within and above the African state, the APRM is enabling 
a plurality of voices to influence the outcome of peer review as well as the policies of 
governments.  
  
This dissertation is structured to tell a coherent story. Chapters 2 to 5 provide an account of 
Africa’s evolving development regime from 1960 to the present day, charting the historical 
evolution of ideas. In the process, the remarkable stability of the African development 
discourse over these years, amidst profound change, is evident. Underpinning this evolution, 
and the continuity as well as shifts, has been the ECA, the continent’s premier institutional 
complex of expertise. As such, the ECA is more than an object of study: it is at the heart of 
Africa’s development regime. 
 
Conclusion 
The research outlined in the preceding pages aims to make an original contribution on 
theoretical as well as empirical counts. Part of the task at hand has been to unpack the 
theoretical attributes of a new concept, that of an African development regime. Guided by the 
conceptual framework and working hypothesis developed in Chapter 1, I set about unearthing a 
rich body of evidence on how development ideas have been shaped, and continue to be 
shaped, by the lived reality that is Africa. As will be seen when the conceptual framework is 
revisited in the Conclusion to this dissertation, the process has been constructionist and 
inductive, in the sense that my research findings have led me to revisit and revise my initial 
theoretical thinking.  
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In undertaking this study, my intention has not been to claim that my account of Africa’s 
development regime is definitive. My goal is explanatory. I seek to illuminate aspects that have 
hitherto failed to attract the attention of Africanists. Furthermore, I am neither arguing in 
favour of the universal applicability of my theoretical framework, nor claiming to provide a 
comprehensive account of institutional complexes of expertise operating in different spaces in 
Africa’s development regime. If I have achieved anything, it will have been simply to table a 
potentially interesting way of looking at the workings of development’s power in Africa.  
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Chapter 1 
Conceptualising Africa’s Development Regime  
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop theoretical tools for my inquiry into expert agency and 
agendas in Africa’s development regime. I set out to accomplish two preliminary tasks. First, 
through a review of relevant literature, I will detail how development regimes seek to 
dominate, how development as hegemony is contested, and how new forms of knowledge and 
power potentially emerge. Second, I will isolate some key arguments related to development’s 
power, and elaborate a working conceptual framework of an African development regime. 
 
Three distinct but inter-connected bodies of literature are reviewed in this chapter: 
1. relating to development regimes, governmentality, the hegemonic process, and trans-
nationality;  
2. addressing the role of institutional complexes of expertise in generating the discourse, 
developing the policy and mediating the practice of development;  
3. focusing on a body of theory seeking to explain agency as a complex of human and 
nonhuman elements.  
 
Additionally, and to establish further the theoretical basis for my inquiry, I review literature 
from postcolonial studies relating to African identity. 
 
At the outset, I should clarify my understanding and use of ‘hegemony’, which owes its origins 
to Antonio Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony. This is the subject of much critical appraisal 
by scholars (cf. Cox 1981, 1983, 1987 and 1989; Bieler and Morton 2003; Morton 2008) who 
have grappled with the applicability of Gramsci’s body of theory to international political 
economy, international relations, postcolonial theory and other disciplines. I do not presume to 
follow in the footsteps of these and other distinguished neo-Gramscians, nor do I apply cultural 
hegemony rigidly in my work. I am influenced by the Gramscian view that power, far from being 
31 
 
achieved through coercion, is advanced through consent. However, my understanding is closer 
to Roseberry’s (1994) interpretation that hegemony should be seen “not as a finished and 
monolithic ideological formation but as a problematic, contested political process of 
domination and struggle” (ibid, p.358)22. For me, hegemony is neither stable nor solid, but 
always a process that involves continuous renegotiation, including incorporation of subordinate 
perspectives (Salskov-Iversen et al 2000).  
 
I have deployed hegemony alongside Michel Foucault’s ‘governmentality’, which theorises a 
complex form of power that acts on the ‘self’, from within – as opposed to being externally 
imposed.  Together, hegemony and governmentality are central to my theoretical account of 
the process through which development regimes seek to dominate, and how this domination is 
advanced as well as disrupted. Ultimately, I present a theoretical account that is considerably 
more open-ended than other formulations or interpretations of governmentality and 
hegemony would accommodate.  
 
Deriving from my particular understanding and use of ‘hegemony’, here are some key concepts 
used in this thesis and an explanation of what I mean when I use them:  
 
‘Sub-hegemony’: This is a central concept in my work, describing the process of hybridisation or 
translation of globally hegemonic political rationality of power (idea or ideology) into forms 
consonant with the reality in different localities, so as to ease the universal acceptance or 
adherence (and thus hegemony) of the rationality. Peet (2002, 2007) theorises three distinct 
stages of the process of hegemonic construction: hegemony, sub-hegemony and counter-
hegemony. While I agree broadly with his categorisation, I argue that theorising the hegemonic 
process as one in which there is considerable fluidity and interplay between the three stages 
provides a more accurate account than one in which each stage is treated as distinct. Further, 
and according to my theorisation, it is possible to conceive of the sub-hegemonic process 
                                                  
22
 Furthermore, hegemony understood as domination (or intention to dominate) results not from an all-controlling 
centre, but from processes of contestation and change in multiple arenas, including locations outside or at the 
margins of national centres and formal politics (Salskov-Iversen et al 2000). 
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(which I often refer to as ‘classic sub-hegemony’) as accommodating not only creative 
adaptation to ease hegemony, but also as a process in which the very act of hybridisation has 
the potential to restrict, blunt and potentially roll back hegemony.  
 
‘Minimal hegemony’: Moore and Schmitz (1995) use this term to describe the outcome of 
struggles by sub-hegemonic agents, or ‘translational agents’ (Sinha 2011) to limit the regulatory 
depth and extent of hegemony. My theorisation accommodates the possibility that there is 
clear intentionality on the part of the sub-hegemonic agents to pursue alternative projects 
within the Project. They recognise the weakness of their position in relation to the dominant 
rationality. Yet, at the same time, they are able to act to minimise its hegemonic intent. Thus, 
when I suggest that the ECA of 1995-2005 (Chapter 3) may have been a ‘manufacturer of 
minimal hegemony’, the evidence I provide in that chapter points to the development of a 
strategic set of political technologies aimed at minimising the hegemony of the international 
development discourse and creating increased policy space for greater African ownership.  
 
The effects of re-ordering power emanating from sub-hegemony are by no means exclusively 
the outcome of intentional struggles; the indeterminacy of the hegemonic process opens up 
the possibility of a myriad of unintended outcomes. Given the ‘radical indeterminacy’ of actor 
networks (discussed later in this chapter), reality is a messy mixture and nothing is ever sewn 
up.  In line with Mitchell (2002), ‘minimal hegemony’ can therefore result from intentional 
‘techno-politics’ (the deployment by expertise of political technologies), or manifest itself as 
unintended outcome of such techno-politics. In describing sub-hegemony as a messy process 
involving a host of actors with different valences of power, acting simultaneously in support of 
the globally dominant rationality while at the same time changing it in ways that may ultimately 
have repercussions on its hegemonic intent, I occasionally use the term ‘modified sub-
hegemony’.  
 
My focus is on sub-hegemony and how it simultaneously embodies both faithful hybridisation 
and the incorporation of elements of oppositional agendas that may ultimately ensure that 
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hegemony never fully succeeds. My approach is guided by Foucault’s assertion that future 
power struggles over development will be waged with political technologies rather than 
political rationalities (Foucault 1980). Therefore, my focus is squarely on the discursive 
techniques and technologies deployed by continental experts in Africa’s development regime. 
To this end, I concentrate on the possibilities opened up by ‘modified’ or ‘minimal’ sub-
hegemony for subaltern actors to increase their room for manoeuvre or policy space.  
 
I do not presume in this thesis to address the thorny question of whether sub-hegemonic 
struggles lead to paradigm shift – in the sense that the content of the dominant political 
rationality, whether opposed directly or adapted beyond recognition, is liable to give way to 
alternative ideologies and policy constructs.  To do so would be to suggest that Africa’s 
development regime is at a moment of Gramscian ‘interregnum’ – one in which the old 
development paradigm is dying and the new is yet to be born (Gibson 2001). My limited 
ambition precludes an exploration of alternative political rationalities, whether actually existing 
or nascent. Doing so would necessitate a formal engagement with Gramscian ‘counter-
hegemony’, something that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Foucault’s Governmentality 
Inspired by Michel Foucault, a now significant body of literature has sought to demonstrate the 
nature of development’s power, and the hegemonic way in which it seeks to universalise a 
particular version of truth. Foucauldian governmentality is the art or conduct of government. It 
is a “complex form of power”, with: population, territory and economy as objects of its control; 
the monopoly of government (the bureaucracy as well as governmental forms of knowledge) 
over sovereignty and discipline; and the historical process through which the state becomes 
‘governmentalised’ (Foucault 1991, pp.102-103).  
 
Modern government’s new preoccupation with ‘society’ marks a fundamental shift in the sense 
that the governmental state is no longer defined purely in relation to its physical surface area, 
but in relation to its social geography, its population and economy (Barry et al 1996). Foucault’s 
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‘society of government’ is therefore based on a sovereignty–discipline–government triangle 
that involves the use of security apparatuses to maintain the order needed to ensure progress. 
Yet despite the threat of violence, this modern regime of power works mainly through 
apparently neutral, scientific forms of knowledge applied in the public interest. Modern 
government thus considers the delivery of public action as a key function of its legitimacy. It 
involves a symbiotic relationship between ruler and the ruled, who are simultaneously subjects 
and objects of state power – subjects because improving their welfare confers legitimacy on the 
government, and objects because they passively accept state power as being in their interest.  
 
Governmentality harnesses three key elements. First is a set of political rationalities – the 
thoughts and discursive representations (or meanings) involved when authorities define their 
planned field of intervention. Second is a set of technologies to deal with problems defined by 
political rationality. Rationalities are embedded in governmental discourse, while technologies 
involve various tools and forms of knowledge, promulgated and managed by experts and 
institutions (Salskov-Iversen et al 2000).  These tools include disciplines and sub-disciplines 
within science. For Foucault, political rationalities are not simply ideologies, but “… constitute a 
part of the fabric of our ways of thinking about and acting upon one another and ourselves” 
(Barry et al 1996, p.7). Deployed in concert, political rationalities and technologies are 
harnessed to create the third element, a new type of subjectivity, whereby externally imposed 
discipline is superseded by discipline of the self.  
 
Escobar (1995), characterising development as “… a historically singular experience, the 
creation of a domain of thought and action”, usefully describes governmentality’s three 
elements, or axes:  
 
“...the forms of knowledge that refer to it and through which it comes into being and is 
elaborated into objects, concepts, theories, and the like; the system of power that 
regulates its practice; and the forms of subjectivity fostered by this discourse, those 
through which people come to recognise themselves as developed or underdeveloped” 
(ibid, p.10, emphasis added).   
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It is the ensemble of forms found along these three axes that constitutes the development 
discourse and gives rise to development as a knowledge-power apparatus (ibid).  
 
As Lemke (2001), interpreting Foucault, points out, the neo-liberal agenda for state withdrawal 
can be read as a technique of government, to diminish the function of the state and shift its 
regulatory responsibility to individuals operating on the basis of rational choice. When read 
through the lens of governmentality, neo-liberalism is more than simply ideological rhetoric or 
political-economic reality. It is a political project aimed at creating a social reality it suggests 
already exists, a political rationality that seeks to render the social domain economic.  
 
Mitchell (1988) unpacks the notion of subjectivity as an effect of modern power, noting that, far 
from constituting an external restriction on social action, this power “… works not from the 
outside but from within, not at the level of an entire society but at the level of detail, and not 
by restricting individuals and their actions, but by producing them” (ibid, p.xi, emphasis added). 
At the same time as power relations become internal to the self, a second effect of modern 
power is that it appears to take the form of external structures – producing a two-dimensional 
effect that reduces the reality of the world, a complex set of social practices, into a chimerical 
binary order23. In this way, the street-pattern of nineteenth-century Cairo is designed by 
experts to convey a sense of order and discipline then internalised by citizens (ibid). As another 
example of this two-dimensionality, Mitchell (1988) also argues that representing the Orient as 
‘uncivilised’ (compared to ‘civilised’ Europe) renders it a knowable object, thereby providing the 
rationale for its colonisation.  
 
Foucault’s governmentality thus constitutes “… a way of thinking about how … societies … can 
be regulated, and it becomes the basis of modern forms of political thought and intervention” 
(Salskov-Iversen et al 2000). In the process, it emerges as a useful analytical tool for 
understanding the rationale of ruling and its techniques, one that has been used to explain how 
                                                  
23
 According to Mitchell (1988, p.xii), the appearance of power as an external apparatus is an aspect of his theory 
Foucault did not fully develop before his death.  
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development has endured in different contexts, including colonialism, postcolonial self-rule, 
and more recently globalisation. 
 
Subjectivity (Mis)understood? 
Ferguson’s (1990) application of Foucault’s theory of power sets out to show how development 
as a discursive regime ordered the conceptual apparatus of official thinking and planning about 
development in Lesotho. He finds that “… planned interventions may produce unintended 
outcomes that end up, all the same, incorporated into anonymous constellations of control – 
authorless ‘strategies’… that turn out in the end to have a kind of political intelligibility” (ibid, 
p.20). Thus, while outcomes may appear as mere ‘side effects’ of a failed development plan, 
they “become legible in another perspective as unintended yet instrumental elements in a 
resultant constellation that has the effect of expanding the exercise of a particular sort of state 
power while simultaneously exerting a powerful depoliticising effect” (ibid, p.21). He calls this 
constellation ‘the anti-politics machine’24.  
 
The indeterminate nature of development calls into question the explanatory power of 
Foucauldian governmentality, which has left itself open to charges of rendering a “totalising 
view of history” (Rossi 2004, p.22) leaving little, if any, room for subject agency. It has tended to 
assume a coherent governmental programme that reduces “… the real subjects of self-
regulating governmental practice to mere pawns in an overarching and determining 
governmental project” (Rankin 2001, p.30). This flaw stems from interpretations of Foucault’s 
theory of power that fail to explain two orders of questions central to development: first, the 
relationship between different categories of actors and a particular kind of discourse; and 
second, the strategies and negotiations for control of discourses conducted by differently 
positioned groups (Rossi 2004).  
 
                                                  
24
 Ferguson’s study interrogates the assumed symmetry between development blueprints and project outcomes, 
suggesting that the process set in train by the conceptual apparatus ultimately fails to achieve the desired 
hegemony. Mosse (2005) makes this gap between policy intentionality and project outcome the subject of a study 
of a development project in India, and concludes that policy ideas do not shape project outcomes. 
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Ferguson (1990) is correct in: (a) identifying a discursive development regime in Lesotho; and 
(b) pointing out that the transformations brought about by the project were “… in no way 
congruent with the transformations that the conceptual apparatus planned (ibid, pp.275-276). 
However, his assertion that the unintended outcomes are incorporated into anonymous 
‘strategies’ with political intelligibility undermines the credibility of his account. His pre-eminent 
focus on the external apparatuses of development-as-power gives the overwhelming 
impression that the beneficiaries of the Thaba-Tseka project passively accept its imposition on 
their way of life. His implication is that power rests more or less solely with the state, experts 
and the development ‘apparatus’. His application of Foucault’s governmentality is almost too 
literal, with the result that structure is monolithic, and agency is thin or absent.  
 
While the failure of the Thaba-Tseka project may indeed have provided the state with the 
rationale to deploy expertise to try and iron out the problems in future interventions, and while 
‘development’ may certainly have entrenched and reproduced itself, to imply – as Ferguson 
does – that the apparatus is so powerful and coherent that project failure is part of its master-
plan of control is to reify the totalising power of development. In the same volume, Ferguson 
demonstrates how the ‘beneficiaries’ of the Thaba-Tseka project succeed in subverting its 
means to their own ends in a number of ways: far from being irresistible, development is 
resisted.  
 
This interplay between domination and resistance is what makes the outcomes of development 
interventions so indeterminate. Anthropological studies of development have consistently 
shown that subaltern groups, including so-called ‘project beneficiaries’, harness myriad 
strategies and forms of negotiation or resistance to advance their own ‘projects in the Project’ 
(Rossi 2004, pp.3-4). There is also evidence of how elites have been able to make a difference 
to policy, as well as actor-oriented approaches that see agency as dependent on the capability 
of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to pre-existing circumstances (ibid., p.4)25.   
                                                  
25
 Worby (2000) and Munro (1998) clearly show how development’s power play is fractured. In the former case, 
resettlement in Sanyati is fiercely contested and has to be imposed by force. In the latter, at the level of central 
state policy formation, entrenched economic structures, class interests and political fears of party leadership and 
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Like Rossi (2004), Escobar (1995) is also concerned that viewing power as monolithic does not 
do justice to the struggles of those cast as powerless subjects. He suggests that Third World 
correctives to Eurocentric anthropological methods make possible a “discursive insurrection” 
by Third World people to free themselves from the rationality-based system of thought of 
European science (ibid, p.17). I agree with the possibility of a ‘discursive insurrection’ in the 
Third World. However, I beg to differ with Escobar’s view that the aim of this would be to 
escape rationality-based Western science. As this dissertation intends to show, the application 
by experts of scientific techniques underpinned by rationality is as pivotal to the pursuit of 
development in Africa as elsewhere. Furthermore, I contend that the nature of this ‘discursive 
insurrection’ does not position the relevant actors ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ development. On the 
contrary, such actors are firmly situated within the regime and challenge it from within. This 
provides the context for my focus on African inter-governmental expertise as the main object of 
study in this dissertation.  
 
Interrogating Resistance 
In conceptualising resistance from ‘below’, Ferguson and Gupta (2002) manage to escape the 
view of development’s power as teleological and incontestable, but in doing so posit another 
binary, common to post-modernist views: that resistance can happen only outside 
development. As I intend to show, a key locus of resistance to the dominant development 
discourse is within the apparatus itself. More often than not, challenges emerge from within 
the dominant school of scientific thought, in some cases leading to the emergence of new 
paradigms (Kuhn 1962). A critical challenge is therefore to move beyond binaries and develop a 
more realistic theory of resistance in governmental regimes of power. 
 
Rossi (2004) elucidates the relationship between agency and hierarchy by asserting that 
acceptance of more powerful discourses may be a pragmatic strategy by weaker discourses to 
‘resist from within’. While some discourses are more dominant than others, she argues, the 
                                                                                                                                                                
divergent institutional interests of development ministries hampered state–peasant negotiations on agrarian 
development.  
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weaker ones are not necessarily powerless. Recognising that the more powerful discourses 
have greater influence, actors in weaker bargaining positions make a strategic decision to ‘buy 
into’ these dominant discourses, in so doing leaving room to influence outcomes. In a world of 
discursive plurality, some discourses take on the appearance of a configuration while others 
remain marginal (ibid, also see Moore and Schmitz 1995). Nevertheless, it is conceivable that 
dominant discourses may be strategically manipulated by different actors driven by different 
agendas. As such, “… discursive conformity (‘wearing the same uniform’) should not be 
automatically taken as evidence of […] convergence” (Rossi 2004, p.23).  
 
Can governmental regimes therefore be subverted by these weaker actors, or does ‘wearing 
the same uniform’ merely serve to reaffirm the regime’s power? While some may argue that a 
hierarchy of discourses with different valences of power reifies the Foucauldian dichotomy 
(powerful versus powerless), Rossi (2004) concedes that Foucault’s notion of ‘strategic 
reversibility’ – ‘counter-conducts’ or ‘dissenting conducts’ interwoven throughout the ‘conduct 
of conduct’ (or ‘history of government’) – shows that he accounted for resistance to 
governmental regimes of power. However, in her view, because Foucault equates power and 
knowledge, it is difficult to read the extent to which knowledge can be manipulated in a 
situation where different discourses have different valences of power. Therefore, Rossi prefers 
Bourdieu’s notion of a ‘field’ opened by a development intervention (ibid, p.7).  
 
As Sinha (2002) has also elaborated, viewing development as arriving in a pre-existing ‘field of 
power’ allows for more meaningful and insightful interrogation of the discourse and practice of 
development. In my view, this is best achieved by juxtaposing a nuanced reading of Foucault’s 
governmentality with neo-Gramscian theorisations of the hegemonic process. Bourdieu’s 
argument that the ‘field of power’ is the exercise of politics adds value to the analysis of 
development’s power – since struggles over development are clearly political struggles. 
However, his characterisation of this ‘field of power’ as the dominant or pre-eminent field in 
any society, and the source of hierarchical power relations which structures all other fields 
(Jenkins 2002), risks bringing us back to square one. While I agree that discursive hierarchy is 
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given, and that different valences of power exist and interact, I reject the lack of a theory of 
resistance implied by Bourdieu’s account. It is this flaw that provides the basis for the criticism 
that Bourdieu “… is revealed as working with an impoverished, two-dimensional model of 
individuals and agency” (Jenkins 2002, p.93). 
 
A related question then arises. From which position are dominant discourses resisted –outside 
or inside the apparatus? Whether or not Foucault’s concept of ‘strategic reversibility’ appears 
to leave open the possibility of resistance, or ‘dissenting conducts’, it is clear that 
interpretations of governmentality as the top-down exercise of power fall short, and that much 
greater interpretative flexibility is needed. Also, does dissidence happen from outside or inside? 
Indeed, is it possible to be on the ‘outside’? Foucault’s focus on bio-power as a modern form of 
power than acts on the self can be read as implying that there can be no ‘outside’. Individuals 
are reconstituted as subjects, accepting the rule of modern government as being in their 
interest. By embodying self-discipline they internalise self-government. Since bio-power acts on 
the self, it follows logically that even ‘dissenting conduct’ emanates from and operates within 
the same regime of government, not outside it. As such, subjects of modern government 
cannot situate themselves outside the ‘apparatus’, meaning that any ‘counter-conduct’ or 
counter-governmental struggle necessarily takes place within the apparatus. 
 
I assert the ‘inside versus outside’ dichotomy to be false in that it constitutes too simplistic a 
theorisation of the positionality of resistance. Challenging the dominant discourse from within 
the apparatus does not preclude room for struggle in what is a dynamic engagement between 
development’s claim to dominate and the myriad actors in the pre-existing ‘field of power’ in 
which it seeks to advance its intent. However, the crux of my argument is not that resistance to 
development’s power can only happen from within. Indeed, the plurality of discourses, and the 
proliferation of weaker actors seeking change create many ‘withins’ to be unpacked. This is 
further complicated by the overlapping nature of multiple regimes, (to which I will return), and 
the fluidity of strategies of resistance adopted by a multitude of diverse actors with different 
agendas.  
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I take the argument further, asserting that engagement with the ‘apparatus’, in a field of 
power, simultaneously involves reaffirmation and resistance, and often implies the use of the 
same techniques and tools. For example, Indian nationalists harnessed many of the rationalities 
and technologies of colonial power in their resistance to the continuation of centuries of 
domination (cf. Ludden 1992). Reaffirmation and resistance are mutually conditioning and 
mutually constitutive. I therefore beg to differ from globalisation theorists and post-
development advocates who argue that there is life beyond development or alternatives to it. 
Both resisting development and proposing alternatives imply being somehow ideologically 
wedded to development-as-progress, albeit interpreted in different ways.  
 
At the same time, I do not necessarily agree that “[r]elative ‘distance’ from the sources of 
development rationality increases the room for manoeuvre available to the actors involved” 
(Rossi 2004, p.26). This argument may work well when neo-Foucauldian approaches are applied 
to development projects with community-level beneficiaries, such as the Thaba-Tseka project 
or Rossi’s own IRDP. It may also be the case that social movements, such as the Anti-
Privatisation Forum
26
 in Johannesburg, South Africa, are able to resist moves to neo-liberalise 
power supply to communities precisely because they are local and far from the centre of 
power. However, it is hard to establish causality between relative distance from development 
planners and room for manoeuvre to resist. Rather, the strength of each resister’s power 
should be considered on the basis of the extent to which its modes and strategies are able to 
affect the dominant discourse. 
 
Furthermore, if forms of knowledge promulgated and managed by experts are deployed as key 
technologies of power, as Foucault has argued, then it becomes necessary to move beyond 
simplistic ‘inside–outside’ binaries and interrogate the role in fracturing power of actors 
instrumental in the reproduction of the development regime itself. In Africa’s development 
                                                  
26
 See http://apf.org.za/  
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regime, this is evident in how civil society ‘counter-experts’
27
 – educated in the same 
universities as experts developing and promoting hegemonic development  ideas – are 
contesting dominant ideas and proposing policy alternatives. While Peet (2007) characterises 
this ‘counter-expertise’ as ‘counter-hegemony’, that is diametrically opposed to neo-liberal 
globalisation, my view is that many experts operate much more pragmatically and may not 
necessarily be in total opposition to globalisation, only to aspects of it.  
 
Following from this, a key argument in this dissertation is that the experts who generate, 
articulate, ‘translate’ and disseminate modified versions of the dominant development 
mainstream in Africa’s development regime can also often be key agents in contesting 
asymmetries of power.  Whether in reaffirming or resisting, these experts invoke their ‘African-
ness’ towards legitimising their claim to expanded agency. As discussed in the Introduction to 
this dissertation, and further explored in Chapter 4, African expert identity is anything but 
static. Rather, it reflects of the ongoing evolution within Africa’s development regime, 
manifested by discursive power struggles over the meaning of ‘ownership’ as well as by 
concrete actions to expand African policy space. 
 
Having addressed the two orders of questions above (whether development can be resisted by 
‘wearing the same uniform’ and whether this resistance happens from outside or inside), a 
third set of questions arises on the nature of the struggles taking place in the ‘field of power’. 
Are resisters condemned to marginality? To what extent can weaker actors change the content 
and trajectory of the dominant discourse? What happens when some actors comply and others 
resist? How can the complexity of power struggles be accurately accounted for? Answers to 
these essentially theoretical questions can found only by sifting through the evidence of real-
life power struggles, as attempted in subsequent chapters. Here, it is sufficient to note that 
these questions signal the complexity involved in unpacking the notion of resistance as 
‘projects within the Project’.  
 
                                                  
27
 I discuss the role of civil society expertise in the APRM in Chapter 5 and the Conclusion.  
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Much of the literature on power has failed to reflect adequately the complexity and co-
complicity of domination and resistance discussed above. Brigg (2001), for example, in 
deconstructing microcredit as a means through which non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
as ‘political technology’ create new neo-liberal subjects, also falls prey to the tendency to view 
neo-liberalism as a hegemonic imposition that cannot be contested. As Guha (1997) has 
correctly argued, it is not possible to think of dominance and subordination without each other, 
as they are mutually co-implicated.   
 
Development Regimes 
In mainstream international relations theory, regimes are defined as “… sets of ‘principles’, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a 
given issue-area of international relations” or “… rules of the game agreed upon by actors in the 
international arena (usually nation states) and delimiting, for these actors, the range of 
legitimate or admissible behaviour in a specified context of activity” (Rittberger, 1993, p.xii). 
There are two distinct lines of argument on international regimes. The first, deriving from 
rational choice theory, new institutionalism and liberal co-operation theory, addresses the 
challenge for states of overcoming market failure. The second, characterised as ‘realism’, 
focuses on power and distribution rather than information and joint gains, whereby regime 
creation and maintenance are a function of the distribution of power and interests among 
states (Krasner 1993, pp.139-40). Both explanations are state-centric, rendering them less than 
useful when exploring development regimes that transcend borders. In addition, realist 
conceptions of power, even when they transcend inter-state relations, tend to point to a zero-
sum game, with some actors vested with absolute power and others completely powerless.  
 
From a new institutionalist perspective, Hyden (cited in Moore and Schmitz 1995) describes a 
regime as determining “who has access to political power, and how those who are in power 
deal with those who are not” (ibid). However, it “is not a set of political actors… but rather a set 
of fundamental rules about the organisation of the public realm [which] provides the structural 
framework within which resources are authoritatively allocated…” (ibid). The emphasis here on 
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‘rules of the game’ again implies a certain functionalism that is not entirely helpful to the quest 
to understand the complex workings of development’s power. 
 
More interpretative flexibility is implied by Samhat’s (1997) view, still from an international 
relations perspective, that certain types of regimes – such as environmental, human rights and 
arms control regimes – are forms of international political community that can be fostered 
through rules, norms and principles agreed by both state and non-state actors. In this 
theorisation, there is more room for engagement by different agents across spaces and scales. 
However, the assertion that regimes as political community are universal in their application 
and “… seek to promote emancipatory ends” (ibid, pp.369-70) paints too utopian a picture of a 
global community devoid of conflict when, in reality, such regimes are subject to ongoing 
contestation.  
 
The sense in which I apply the ‘regime’ concept is quite different. After Ludden (1992), 
development is clearly manifesting itself as “an institutionalised configuration of power within a 
[…] system ideologically committed to progress that draws its material sustenance from the 
conduct of development” (ibid, pp.251-52). More recently, Ludden (2005) described a 
development regime as “…an institutional configuration of effective power over human 
behaviour, and that also has legitimate authority to make decisions that affect the wealth and 
well-being of whole populations” (ibid, p.2, emphasis added). In addition to an official state 
apparatus, the development regime includes institutions of education, research, media, 
technology, science and intellectual influence that constitute a development policy mainstream 
(ibid).  
 
For Ludden, as for Foucault, the regime’s power and authority reside not only in government 
but also in “… physical instruments of power over nature and in cultural instruments of 
authority over people’s minds and morality” (ibid.) In other words, the rule of modern 
government combines the monopoly of violence with the arguably more powerful ability to 
produce subjectivity. Within the regime, the development process is directed by experts, who 
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ensure that the regime constitutes a documented historic formation, generating ideas and 
empirical knowledge compelling to leading development actors in specific places and times of 
history (ibid). This theoretical understanding of the role of expertise further validates my choice 
of the ECA, which I consider a key ICE in Africa’s development regime.  
 
Trans-national Development Regimes 
I rely heavily on Ludden’s conception in identifying the key underpinnings of Africa’s 
development regime, detailed at the end of this chapter. However, while Ludden’s more recent 
conception theorises a global development regime that operates in concert with state regimes, 
his original characterisation is state-centric. My assertion, to which I now turn, is that 
development has long operated trans-nationally.  
 
Gupta (1998) questions the view of a sub-set of Foucauldians that development acts 
monolithically on its objects as subjects, and enters the debate from a subaltern perspective – 
focusing on the objects of development, those the development discourse seeks to reconstitute 
as global subjects. In rural Northern India, for example, underdevelopment serves as a form of 
identity, with “… a pervasive feeling of being underdeveloped, of being behind the West, 
articulated with other identities of caste, class, region, gender, and sexuality”, producing 
“people’s sense of their selves” (ibid, p.x). This complex articulation of ‘backwardness’ 
constitutes “the postcolonial condition”, a condition Gupta argues gives the lie to development 
as a “singular or monolithic ‘apparatus’ that imposes itself on the rural poor” (ibid).  
 
According to Gupta (1998), the advent of neo-liberal globalisation as a new, trans-national 
mode of government means the nation-state is no longer the sole mediator between its citizens 
and the world economy. For him, trans-national forms of knowledge, embedded in global 
treaties such as Agenda 21, the outcome of the Earth Summit, represent new forms of 
governmentality that mark a significant departure from the projects of colonialism and 
nationalism, which both shared the nation-state as their basis. The dichotomy between 
impositional ‘global’ discourses of development and receptive or resisting ‘local’ cultures 
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therefore no longer applies, and Indian farmers should be viewed as “… part of intermestic 
(international/domestic) coalitions that are attempting to resist forces of governmentality 
which are operating across and through the spaces of nation-states” (ibid, p.337).  
 
Two areas of difference are worth noting here. First, Gupta (1998) does not entirely succeed in 
debunking the idea of development as monolithic: the same global development discourses 
that identify poor Indian farmers as ‘underdeveloped’ work to constitute a subaltern identity 
that could be viewed as subjectivity in the face of power. Second, Indian farmers do not simply 
reject the development discourse – they use its logic productively to pursue their own projects. 
While they complain about fertiliser negatively affecting the taste of their crop, and over-
working the soil, they also welcome biotechnology and scientific methods that increase yield. 
Such “impure, hybrid, incommensurable modes of thinking and being” (ibid, p.6) call for close 
attention to the interconnections between divergent discourses and structural forces28.  
 
Trans-nationality poses problems for theories predicated on the state as a unit of analysis. As 
Ludden (2005) correctly argues, South Asian countries inhabit at least two development 
regimes – state and international. Further, “… national development regimes can also be 
understood realistically as officially but not operationally independent territories in a global 
development regime” (ibid, p.13). According to this view, this global development regime, while 
underpinned by imperial histories, has become significantly more coherent and integrated over 
the past two decades, manifested by the increasing impact of globalisation and growing World 
Bank and IMF disciplinary power. This global regime gains coherence through the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which ascribe unprecedented powers of surveillance to 
international agencies and target the ‘poor’ as global objects of development. As a result, 
national regimes still operate, but each has various local and regional sub-units with distinctive 
rules of operation, and each must also abide by international rules (ibid). NGOs and 
                                                  
28
 For instance, Gupta (1998) argues that ‘local’ understandings of agriculture in Alipur were profoundly shaped by 
global and national discourses of development: “… farmers were as likely to draw on – and contest – hegemonic 
meanings of development as they were to employ – or resist – dominant (that is, indigenous) understandings of 
agriculture” (ibid, p.6). 
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government agencies, such as DFID, serve as “...articulating institutions that knit together local, 
national and global regimes with cross-border activities to connect rich and poor capital cities 
with ‘target’ sites and populations throughout Bangladesh” (ibid). Thus, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to delimit populations served by development regimes in purely geographic terms. 
 
This holds true for Africa, where state regimes interact and overlap with the continental 
‘African’ development regime and ‘international’ or ‘global’ development regimes29, resulting in 
a multiplicity of regimes operating across some of the same spaces and scales. The articulation 
of these regimes is simultaneously trans-national, geo-spatial, and socially and politically 
geographic
30
. In referring to an African development regime, I am theorising a regime that 
manifests itself and has effects in different spaces and at different scales, whether sub-national, 
national, sub-regional, continental or global31.  
 
In line with my assertion, Ferguson (1995) argues that, since many important political processes 
on the continent are taking place at sub-national and trans-national levels, assessing Africa’s 
political situation must transcend the ‘Eurocentric’ state-centred framework. In earlier writing 
(1990) he points to the uniformity and standardisation of many aspects of ‘development’ 
interventions, implying the existence of discursive, planning and programmatic commonalities 
across countries. Emblematic of this one-size-fits-all commonality is structural adjustment, with 
some 241 SAPs initiated by 36 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1980 and 1989 (Owusu 
2003). While the details of the programmes were tailored according to the specificities of each 
country, the template consisted of the same menu of prescriptions – a combination of short-
term stabilisation measures and longer-term adjustment policies. Today’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper, developed by the World Bank and IMF, has been identified as fulfilling a similar 
function as SAPs.  
                                                  
29
 There are also sub-national development regimes (cf. Sinha 2005 on India’s community-development regime), 
and regimes of power that are not developmental. 
30
 One example of this is the co-contingency (discussed in Chapter 2), between Africa’s development regime and 
the international development regime. 
31 In that its power can be felt across and through spaces and scales, it is a ‘trans-national’ regime – as opposed to 
simply ‘African multilateralism’ (Bischoff 2008) or ‘neo-patrimonial trans-state regionalism’ (Bøås 2002).  
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The trans-nationality argument is further developed by Ferguson and Gupta (2002), who argue 
that modes of government operate on a global scale – including new neo-liberal strategies of 
discipline and regulation as well as “… trans-national alliances forged by activists and grassroots 
organisations supported by complex networks of international and trans-national funding and 
personnel” (p.990). The authors are correct in theorising a trans-national mode of government, 
although (pace Sinha 2005) I assert that development has always been trans-national, and 
question the idea of trans-nationality as an emerging system. While new dimensions of trans-
nationality may be emerging in the context of globalisation, the phenomenon dates back to the 
dawn of development as public action. Emerging in the nineteenth century in response to 
disorder brought about by the industrial revolution, development took on a distinctly 
intentional and ideological aspect after World War II. 
 
Crisis, Claims and Unintended Outcomes 
Development regimes inevitably arise out of, and are ‘imagined’ by, discourses of crisis or 
conflict. Perceptions of an African ‘crisis’ around 1980 – fuelled by a contraction in global 
money supply as a result of oil shocks, and exacerbated by widespread drought and famine 
(Chapter 2) – triggered separate proposals for public action by Africa’s leaders and by the 
Bretton Woods institutions. Successive African development plans have internalised the 
perception of crisis to mobilise a continent-wide response or seek external assistance. 
 
Development regimes also derive their legitimacy from their ability to meet claims. As Worby 
(2000) shows, the development regime in post-war Rhodesia emerged in response to two 
conflicting sets of demands: those of white settlers for market protection and a reliable 
depoliticised labour supply, and those of black nationalists for a meaningful share of political 
power and economic equity (ibid, p.102). ‘Development’ (as a response to the conflict) was 
conceived as a fairly coherent and consistent set of narratives, policies and strategies “carefully 
intertwined in order to address the complex contradictions of racially-distributed relations of 
property and rule” (ibid). In another study of the same country, now postcolonial Zimbabwe, 
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and in similar vein, Munro (1998) argues that “… state formation occurs not only in arenas of 
‘political struggles and discourses’ but in the construction, legitimation, and implementation of 
policies through which states try to shape the social order”.  
 
Both studies are consistent with Mitchell’s (1988) view that “disciplines can break down, 
counteract one another, or overarch… offer spaces for manoeuvre and resistance, and can be 
turned to counter-hegemonic purposes” (ibid, p.xii). Negotiations over development are 
therefore struggles over power or, to borrow Munro’s (1998) characterisation, “… capillary 
negotiations over domination, identity, and culture” (ibid, p.xxiii). These power struggles 
condition another important characteristic of development regimes: they rarely, if ever, achieve 
their intended purpose.  
 
In other words, the outcomes of development interventions are more often than not largely 
unintended. As Worby (2000) finds, despite attaining a degree of coherence in its moral 
objectives and policy discourse, the Rhodesian development regime fragmented into a variety 
of more idiosyncratic practices as its policies were implemented across the colony. Similarly, 
Munro (1998) concludes that the hegemonic agenda of the Zimbabwean state in formation, 
manifested in agrarian development strategies that tried to establish a stable, productive 
middle peasantry, failed to achieve its objective because different interests, and at times 
authoritative ideas, subverted the emergence of a common understanding of the meaning of 
community membership or citizenship32.  
 
Material Heterogeneity, Radical Indeterminacy 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT), emanating from technology studies, validates the above 
theorisation on the workings of power and sheds light on the idea of unintended outcomes. 
Latour (1984) argues that power, far from operating through individual agency, works through 
the actions of actor-networks made up of human and nonhuman agents. Society, or the social, 
                                                  
32
 The failure of latter-day efforts by French and British colonial experts to stifle dissent in West Africa, leading to 
renewed claims ultimately leading to the end of colonial rule, is another example of the tendency of hegemonic 
regimes to fail. 
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“is nothing other than patterned networks of heterogeneous materials… composed not only of 
people, but also of machines, animals, texts, money, architectures” (Law 1992, p.2). Agency is 
therefore not a function of individuals. Rather, an actor is a patterned network of 
heterogeneous relations, or an effect produced by such a network (ibid, p.4).  
 
This is consistent with Foucault’s heterogeneous apparatus of power, the dispositif. For some 
ANT theorists, human and nonhuman agents in actor-networks are equivalent and there is no 
hierarchy. What is important is that:  
 
“…they are all renegotiating what the world is made up of, who is acting in it, who 
matters, and who wants what. They are all creating …new sources of power and new 
sources of legitimacy, which are irreducible to those that hitherto coded the so-called 
political space…” (Latour 1984, p.40, emphasis added).  
 
Just as machines and texts are heterogeneous networks, so too are institutions and 
organisations. Such networks sometimes take on the appearance of single, coherent objects 
because they constitute a ‘punctualisation’ or simplification of routine (Law 1992, p.4). 
Punctualised resources, managed by experts, offer a way of aggregating interests without 
having to deal with endless complexity. Yet punctualisation is always precarious. 
Punctualisation faces resistance and may degenerate into a failing network (Law 1992, p.4). 
Resistance is defined as not wanting to be incorporated, ‘enrolled’ or ‘ordered’, in a network. 
 
Law’s recognition of hierarchy in a network is consonant with my earlier discussion on the 
different valences of power, and constitutes a challenge to Latour’s (1984) view that all sub-
components are equal in an actor-network. Actor-networks are precarious precisely because 
networks are not equal, because some discourses have more power than others. ‘Enrolment’, a 
key concept in ANT, implies hierarchy, as originators of an idea try to ‘overcome resistance’ by 
convincing others to follow their lead. This supports my view that different network members 
have differential power, and the need to ‘enrol’ supporters clearly implies that not all power 
resides with the apparatus. Where resistance to enrolment prevails, the actor-network is 
weakened and may fail. On the other hand, a successful network is one that is able to overcome 
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resistance. The movement of the 1990s to ban landmines, for example, achieved its objective 
by successfully enrolling supporters to the point at which it achieved critical mass.  
 
However, ‘social ordering’ – the process of overcoming resistance and creating the effect of 
‘punctualisation’ and its effects, including power – is contestable and contested. Therefore, 
“science, far from being founded on rational methods, reveals a disorderly, indeterminate 
mixture” (Latour 1987, p.15). Specific actions cannot in advance guarantee certain results. The 
effects and outcomes generated by actor-networks may be random, and are radically 
indeterminate. Thus, hegemonic projects can be disrupted without necessarily being 
overthrown or replaced by alternative paradigms or ideological constructs. Often, the outcome 
of resistance to ordering is a reconfiguration of the balance of power, and yet more radical 
indeterminacy. 
 
Discourse and its Material Effects 
This dissertation assumes a critical nexus between discourses, policy as a form of action, and 
material effects of policy (Shore and Wright 1997). While my focus is largely on discourse 
generation, translation and adaptation, I devote significant space to exploring the material 
effects of discursive power – as for example in Chapter 5, in a detailed assessment of the 
African Peer Review Mechanism, a key form of knowledge and political technology of power in 
Africa’s development regime. Therefore, it is worth briefly reflecting on the distinction between 
discourse and its material effects, and the relationship between the two concepts. 
 
Largely following Foucault, an extensive body of literature has identified discourse, its 
production and circulation as an integral component of power
33
. A sub-set of this literature has 
sought to explain how development discourses in particular seek to ‘colonise’ localities (cf. 
Mitchell 1988), and how these discourses become hegemonic and are reaffirmed or resisted
34
. 
Escobar (1995) has argued that “… the development discourse … has created an extremely 
                                                  
33
 cf. Shore and Wright (1997), Escobar (1988, 1995), Mitchell (1988, 1995, 2002), and Said (1995), among others. 
34
 See also Moore (in Moore and Schmitz 1995) on the similarities and differences between academic-development 
discourse and development-agency discourse. 
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efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third 
World” (ibid, p.9). The authoritarian character of development-as-apparatus is reproduced by 
metaphors of practice (Porter 1995). This explains why, across the different development 
approaches since the end of World War II, the overt markers of political power have 
consistently been replaced by “… more covert and subtle ways in which established 
international interests have been maintained” (ibid, p.84). By operating through discourse, 
power works to incorporate its subjects, as objects, by appearing as ‘authorless’, by hiding its 
intent. Understanding development’s discourse is therefore a key to understanding its power. 
 
Foucault defines discourses in functional terms, as combinations of speech acts, or statements. 
To him, a discourse is a specific instance of language use: a letter, a speech, a book, an 
argument, a conversation (Sawyer 2002). A central Foucauldian concept is the ‘discursive 
formation’35, a grouping of statements that can be delimited and individualised, and that must 
satisfy four criteria: they must refer to the same object, be enunciated in the same way, share a 
system of conceptual organisation, and share similar themes and theories, or strategies (ibid).  
 
While he focused almost exclusively on discursive practices in his earlier work, Foucault later 
came to emphasise “an institutional field, a set of events, practices and political decisions, a 
sequence of economic processes” (Foucault 1969/72, p.157, cited in Sawyer 2002, p.441). For 
Foucault, discourse was only one of many elements of his ‘dispositif’, which he defined as “…a 
thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements” (Foucault 1980, 
p.194). As much as his earlier concepts of ‘discursive formation’, ‘episteme’ or ‘archive’, it is 
Foucault’s extra-discursive concepts such as power–knowledge relations, technologies of 
power, apparatuses and the ‘politics of the body’ (Sawyer 2002, p.441) that make his theory of 
power all the more relevant to my inquiry.  
                                                  
35
 ‘Discursive formations’ include internal systems of rules determining what statements are taken seriously, and 
what objects are included in discussions deemed important or responsible. Foucault thought these regularities of 
presence and absence could be analysed archaeologically (identifying the relations that bind statements into 
whole arguments) and genealogically (how discourses were formed within institutions claiming power) (Peet 2007, 
p.15). 
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As Peet (2007) points out, discourses can assume the shape of policies designed by experts for 
governing bodies, who use them as instruments, or political technologies, of power. These 
technologies rephrase essentially social, cultural or political problems in the apparently neutral 
language of science to gain the adherence of people convinced that science benefits humanity. 
The effectiveness of this manoeuvre depends on a combination of external objectification, 
typical of science, and internal subjectification (ibid, p.16). A given discourse has behind it a set 
of labelled concepts or theories with a set of analytical terms that the discourse employs as a 
‘social imaginary’. This is promulgated by experts who originate a system of discursive and 
imaginary power. This translates into hegemony, produced as “…dominant theoretical 
imaginaries in disciplines claiming power by presuming to the status of science” (ibid).  
 
The Process of Hegemonic Construction 
Salskov-Iversen et al (2000) examine how hegemonic discourses are mediated locally, produce 
hybridity and thus become embedded in local practice. They dispute the conventional wisdom 
that the global New Public Management (NPM) discourse constructs a unity of identities, 
arguing that, on the contrary, local actors ‘translate’ the discourse, making its reproduction 
contingent on local context and reality. In their examination of two municipalities – Tijuana, 
Mexico and Newham, UK – they find local authorities to be active agents in a field of power that 
pre-dates the arrival of the NPM discourse. The local is therefore not simply accepting of 
globally hegemonic discourses, but is generative of new political rationalities and technologies 
of government (ibid).  
 
Informed by Foucauldian understandings of discourse, Peet (2002, 2007) develops a ‘geography 
of power’ to account for his assertion that global institutions of governance deploy strategies 
and mechanisms of ideological power somewhat different from the governments of nation-
states that Marx had in mind. Globally hegemonic discourses have two attributes: ‘hegemonic 
depth’, or intensive regulatory power, which emanates from the discourse’s ability to specify 
the parameters of the practical, realistic, and sensible debate among linked groups of 
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theoreticians, policy-makers, and practitioners; and ‘hegemonic extent’ or regulatory space, 
which comes from its ability to impose uniformity over diversity in wide spaces of territory. 
Discourses with hegemonic depth originate in so-called “political and economic command 
centres” and achieve hegemonic extent by extending persuasion, coercion, and power over 
spatial fields of influence (Peet 2002, pp.60-61). Mutually reinforcing combinations of depth 
with extent create ‘geographic blocs’ of states and institutions exercising power through 
globally hegemonic discourses. These geographic blocs arise out of an interdependent process 
of articulation between global hegemonic discourses, regional sub-hegemonic discourses, and 
alternative discourses.  
 
To fit local contexts, hegemony conceived in global centres of persuasion must be creatively 
‘translated’ or hybridised. This process of hegemonic construction involves sub-hegemony, 
defined as the semi-autonomous strata and locations that translate broad hegemonic ideals 
into particular ideologies suited to more discrete audiences (Peet 2007), a process involving 
“…rewriting and modification, but also independent discovery and creative adaptation” (ibid, 
p.22). Making a hegemonic discourse context-specific can be thought of in terms of class, as 
with priests translating the Pope’s Latin encyclicals for the Catholic faithful, or in terms of space 
and ethnicity – local intellectuals translating Northern ideas into languages and terms that can 
be understood locally (ibid). However, the process of hegemonic construction and translation is 
anything but smooth and predictable. Hegemony becomes a site of conflict; as ANT would have 
it, structure becomes a site of struggle. In Peet’s theorisation, just as intellectuals play leading 
roles in hegemony, they emerge at the forefront of counter-hegemony, or the creation of 
alternatives. According to this view, both global and regional discourses are confronted by 
alternatives deriving more directly from different interpretations of the varying experiences of 
oppressed peoples (Peet 2002).  
 
Peet’s ‘geography of power’ provides useful insights into how global and regional discourses 
continually interact and shape each other, and is consistent with my argument, as well as with 
Salskov-Iversen et al’s (2000) assertion, that hegemonic global discourses are continuously 
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subject to local interpretation, leading to unintended outcomes. These outcomes arise from the 
complex working of the sub-hegemonic process. A difference in nuance between my 
theorisation and Peet’s is that whereas he gives prominence to ‘counter-hegemonies’ as the 
creation of alternative ideologies, my emphasis is on the possibilities the sub-hegemonic 
process opens up for expanded African expert agency. I do not presume in this study to provide 
evidence of actually existing ‘counter-hegemonies’. Rather, I demonstrate how African experts 
working within the parameters of the apparatus exercise technocratic pragmatism as a tactic to 
carve out increased African policy space. Hegemonic development regimes cede power in order 
for the dominant ideology to survive. This results in less powerful actors gaining increased room 
to manoeuvre.  
 
This discussion raises important conceptual issues that help advance my arguments about the 
role of expertise in Africa’s development regime. One is the notion of ‘translation’, which serves 
as a key element of ‘sub-hegemony’ – for me the most critical stage in the hegemonic process 
that involves adapting a global discourse to ease its acceptance in different localities. As will be 
unpacked further in the discussion on expertise below, this ‘translation’ function is undertaken 
by local actors (in this case African experts schooled in the epistemology of Western science 
and ideologically committed to development). In the process of ‘translation’, the global 
discourse is transformed and appropriated by these very same sub-hegemonic local agents, and 
becomes hybridised36.  
 
A hybrid discourse is one that has been ‘translated’. Depending on the extent to which it has 
been transformed, such a discourse may be harnessed towards the original goal of achieving 
hegemony, towards influencing the trajectory of the globally hegemonic discourse, or as an 
agent of ‘counter-hegemony’. In the first and second scenarios, hegemony will have been 
advanced – albeit with the discourse having had to take on local perspectives that it had not 
originally embodied. In the third scenario, and according to Peet’s (2002, 2007) theorisation, 
                                                  
36
 I use ‘hybridisation’ as shorthand for ‘translation’. I am not referring to the various meanings of ‘hybridisation’ as 
explored by different authors in relation to globalisation – cf. Appadurai (1996) on cultural hybridity, Slater (2003) 
on hybrid democracy, and de Sousa Santos (2006) on hybrid legal systems.  
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the act of ‘translation’ may have counter-hegemonic potential, opening space for new types of 
social and spatial differentiation, struggles that lead to a reconfiguration of power relations. 
While I engage fully with the idea that sub-hegemony opens up the possibility of power 
relations being recalibrated, I do not engage with ‘counter-hegemony’ read as paradigm shift. 
 
A second important conceptual issue is the definition of hegemony as “…merely indicating 
some form of dominance and ubiquitousness: the simple transmission of a pattern of 
dominance” (Salskov-Iversen et al 2000, p.20). Hegemony, it is never stable or solid, but always 
a process that involves a constant renegotiation of interpretations and incorporates 
subordinate perspectives (ibid). This is consistent with Sinha’s (2001) argument that domination 
as hegemony and governmentality is fragile and fluid, both contingent and indeterminate, and 
therefore constantly restated in new idioms. It is this slipperiness of domination that makes it 
possible for elements of it to be used in the constitution of oppositional agendas and identities 
(ibid). As such, domination as hegemony remains a claim, not so much an ideological consensus 
as an intention to create it (Roseberry 1994).  
 
With reference to global capitalism, Moore and Schmitz (1995) demonstrate how this 
‘slipperiness’ of domination, a key dimension of the hegemonic process, involves lifting the 
language of development’s opponents into the dominant discourse while maintaining the same 
ideology and basic practices. This process of constructing and maintaining hegemony “…takes 
on as many guises as the multitudinous manifestations of capitalism can support; as many 
strands of oppositional discourse as it can co-opt” (ibid, p.1). The discourses are sufficiently 
ambiguous and loose that they can simultaneously embody varying, even opposing, 
interpretations. Attempting to unravel these discourses, as will be done in subsequent 
chapters, thus necessitates “… paying special attention to the struggles for and against ‘reform’ 
within the dominant discourses of development, because both reform and reaction are born of 
clear challenges to orthodoxy and thus imply, in their own ways, revolution” (ibid, p.7).  
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With the above in mind, I contend that Africa’s development regime is sub-hegemonic. It is a 
heterogeneous apparatus that includes institutions, experts and networks whose assigned role 
in the international division of labour is to advance the hegemony of certain ideas and 
ideologies by ‘translating’ the globally hegemonic development discourse into ‘regional’ 
discourses. These are context-specific and tailored to different localities, while retaining the key 
epistemological tenets of the parent discourse. Yet, because these ideas and ideologies are 
appropriated, adapted and ultimately transformed, the hegemonic process is disrupted. In 
making this point about the fluidity of the sub-hegemonic process, I differ slightly from Peet 
(2007), who views sub-hegemony as somewhat separate from counter-hegemony – which he 
describes as “offering alternative ideas” (ibid). For Peet, ‘translation’ of the dominant ideology 
into acceptable local forms can only aid and abet hegemony. For me, the hegemonic process is 
dynamic, highly complex and its outcome radically indeterminate. Ostensibly sub-hegemonic 
‘centres of translation’ (such as the Economic Commission for Africa, my case study) may 
develop new discursive styles and ideas of their own. Paradoxically, therefore, the very act of 
‘translation’ can thus create the conditions for sub-hegemonic agents of a hegemonic 
development regime to assume greater agency.  
 
Institutionalised Development 
Along with discourses as ways of thinking that shape action, forms of knowledge have 
historically been critical to the exercise of power in development regimes. The colonial period 
was significant in the formation and practice of social theory, and instrumental in the 
emergence of new forms of knowledge, not least the modern social sciences (Mitchell 2002, 
pp.6-7). In particular, the discipline of economics37 formalised a series of domestic 
arrangements
38
 as ‘market practice’, abstracting these arrangements and categories and 
presenting them as a general standard for both scientific knowledge and social practice. This 
standard could then be exported overseas and applied everywhere, regardless of cultural 
                                                  
37
 Other disciplines created and harnessed by development include health, demography, urban planning, 
education, and nutritional anthropology (Escobar 1988). 
38
 These included certain forms of social exchange, contract law, disposition of property, corporate powers, 
methods of calculation, dispossession of labour, relationship between public and private, organisation of 
information, and government regulation (Mitchell 2002, p.7). 
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context (ibid.). In this way, and as a worldwide project involving colonial government, the 
colleges of the East India Company, American academic visitors’ programmes, metropolitan 
universities, intergovernmental organisations, the Ford Foundation and other agencies, 
economics was transformed into a global form of knowledge (ibid).  
 
Along with these new universal standards came new forms of (Western) technical expertise 
that made development an institutional field “… in which, and from which, discourses and 
techniques are produced, recorded, stabilised, modified, and put into operation” (Escobar 
1988, p.430) by a large network of trans-national, national, regional and local development 
institutions. By using certain forms of knowledge and producing specific forms of intervention, 
these institutions organise visibilities and enable the exercise of power.  
 
This institutionalisation of development helped operationalise a rationalised discourse and 
international activity around development that originally emerged in the twentieth century and 
became a fully fledged project after World War II (Chabbott 1999, pp.222-23). International 
development professionals used their concerns – often distinct from those of their funders – to 
entrench a larger role for international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) over time. 
While experts recruited by inter-governmental organisations after the war tended to include 
former colonial officers, military personnel, and veterans of INGOs, in the 1960s and 1970s they 
either emerged from development studies programmes in major Western universities funded 
by liberal, private philanthropies, or from voluntary work in humanitarian and emergency 
operations.  
 
The outcome of this professionalisation is today’s specialised cadre of development 
professionals, somewhat detached from their countries of origin, with sufficient autonomy 
from funders of their organisations to make independent decisions. It is these professionals, 
rather than national politicians or diplomats, who have generated the international 
development discourse, and carved out technical domains of specialisation. They share a 
common culture and belief system that “…includes a belief in the centrality of development to 
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human progress, in the responsibility of governments to promote it, in the imperative for 
international-development assistance to support it, in the definition of development in ‘human’ 
rather than strictly economic terms, and so on” (Chabbott 1999, p.245). Because they are 
schooled in the episteme of the international development regime, Third World experts act as 
pivotal agents in the exercise of sub-hegemony, by translating the globally hegemonic 
development discourse into forms that facilitate its domination across spaces and scales.  
 
Cooper and Packard (1997) identify two types of expertise in the development industry – an 
industry in the academic social sciences, and a cadre of Third World experts who have studied 
economics or public health in European or American universities, worked in international 
organisations, attended international conferences and managed NGOs or government 
departments back home. These combine to form overlapping networks of communication 
within which ideas and theories of development have emerged, circulated, and been 
appropriated within a wide variety of institutional settings (ibid, p.2). Cemented by a 
development language that is “simultaneously universalistic and pliable”, these networks 
facilitate a conversation about development that gives rise to epistemic linkages across 
developed and developing countries (ibid, p.6). 
 
As will be seen, economists and other social scientists working at the ECA clearly fall into the 
second category. In today’s African development regime and in the wake of the growing 
assertion of African ‘ownership’, there is an increasing premium on indigenous expertise. After 
independence, many Africans benefited from scholarships administered by Western 
governments and U.S. foundations to study abroad. Many of these African students pursued 
degrees in economics, demographics or other ‘hard’ social sciences. With the advent of 
structural adjustment in the 1980s, the resulting ‘brain drain’ robbed Africa of some of its 
brightest minds – with a large number of highly skilled Africans now living and working outside 
the continent39. The ECA consciously targeted African experts in the Diaspora and successfully 
                                                  
39
 According to the ECA (2000a), the brain drain began well before the 1980s. It estimates that 27,000 high-level 
Africans left the continent for the West between 1960 and 1975, with the number increasing to an estimated 
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recruited from them. This appeal to experts of African origin speaks to the recognition and 
strategic deployment of identity politics as a tactic for creating increased policy space.  
 
Expertise and Techno-Politics 
In light of the pivotal role of experts in the reproduction of development regimes, I now briefly 
explore the dynamics of what Mitchell (2002) calls ‘techno-politics’. Consistent with ANT, 
Mitchell (2002) argues that certain outcomes associated with the building of the Aswan Dam at 
the turn of the twentieth century – such as political tensions surfacing in the wake of the 
technical, environmental and social problems associated with the dam – exceed human 
intention. Nonhuman elements, such as mosquitoes, the Nile, the Second World War, and so 
on, were also key actors in specific outcomes. He further asserts that demand for more 
scientific expertise to solve problems associated with the dam, along with the accompanying 
national politics, far from being causal, were produced as outcomes, whether intended or 
otherwise. New ideas and political technologies such as cost-benefit analysis did not precede 
nature, or social arrangements such as the Nile. They were manufactured from and emerged 
out of the real world, and as such cannot claim to stand apart from nature (ibid).  
 
Precisely by trying to simplify complexity and counterpose expertise against nature, argues 
Mitchell (2002), ‘techno-politics’ produces and re-produces itself, in this way representing the 
exercise of modern power as a neutral, objective technical field that sits apart from reality. Two 
outcomes are produced from this tension between expertise and nature: politics and more 
scientific expertise. For instance, the rationale provided for creating a Ministry of Public Health 
in Egypt in 1936 was that the increasing numbers of poor people – a direct result of capitalism 
and industrialisation, fuelled by science – needed to be ‘helped’. Policy-makers, fearful of social 
unrest, accordingly developed welfare policies to legitimise their continued tenure in office40. 
                                                                                                                                                                
40,000 between 1975 and 1984 and then almost doubling by 1987 – representing 30 per cent of the highly skilled 
lworkforce.  
40 
Another example invoked in support of this assertion is a U.S.-funded demonstration project to build ‘improved’ 
brick houses, even though Egyptians had been doing this for millennia. As with the dam, there were three 
significant features: a concentration and reorganisation of existing (indigenous) knowledge, rather than an 
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Social science mimics this form of power, by relating particular events to a universal reason and 
by treating human agency as a given. It “helps to format a world resolved in this binary order, 
and thus to constitute and solidify the experience of agency and expertise” (ibid, p.52).  
 
In this way, expertise is harnessed in a self-perpetuating cycle of legitimation, with failed 
policies ‘producing’ the rationale for more expertise, more calculation and more argument. 
Thus, expertise creates the conditions for its own survival, accommodates dissent, ‘learns’ from 
policy and project failures, and comes back with new fields or disciplines, forms of knowledge 
that turn out to be forms of power. In the next chapter, and with reference to the so-called 
African ‘crisis’, I will discuss how nonhuman factors, such as the famine of 1980, combined with 
human-initiated phenomena such as the oil and debt crises to provide the justification for the 
World Bank’s ‘Berg Report’, the OAU’s Lagos Plan of Action, and subsequent ideas and policies 
designed by African as well as international experts.  
 
Thus, expertise ensures the reproduction of development regimes. As argued above, 
development regimes emerge from discourses of crisis generated by experts to provide the 
basis for reasoned intervention. Expertise then re-produces itself by evolving new forms of 
knowledge as lessons are ‘learned’ from each development ‘failure’. Experts seek to represent 
science as being apart from reality, when in fact the technical and the political cannot be 
separated (Mitchell 2002). Indeed, ‘technical’ terms such as ‘apparatus’, ‘machine’ or ‘network’ 
convey a sense of the complex relays and linkages between the techniques or technologies of 
ruling and the objects of power (Barry et al 1996). Projecting the world in terms of binaries 
(‘good’ versus ‘bad’, ‘uncivilised’ versus ‘civilised’, etc) serves only to create further space in 
which this expertise can operate and flourish.  
 
Institutional Complexes of Expertise 
A key element of my conceptual framework is that, within development regimes, expertise 
operates as part of a heterogeneous ‘ensemble’. Conceptually, and drawing on Peet’s (2002, 
                                                                                                                                                                
introduction of expertise where there had been none before; continuous practical difficulties, leading to the failure 
of each pilot; and the systematic overlooking or covering up of the problems and failures (Mitchell 2002, pp.36-37).  
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2007) concept of ‘complexes of institutions’ or ‘institutional complexes’, I identify this 
ensemble as an institutional complex of expertise (ICE) – a composite of experts, institutions 
and networks of relations among and between them. Peet (2002) highlights institutional-media 
(AIM) complexes, which produce “…policy prescriptions, position papers, press releases, 
popular columns, commentaries and programmes, news bites, expert interviews, and a vast 
panoply of well written, illustrated books, reports, and articles” (ibid, p.59). These ‘institutional 
complexes’ concentrate resources (capital, ideas, expertise) from a broader ‘field of power’ – 
which may be physically contiguous in the sense of a hinterland, may consist of networks 
among widely separated centres, or may be ‘virtual’ in the sense of position in a worldwide web 
(Peet 2007, p.22)
41
.  
 
Peet’s notion of ‘institutional complexes’ is consonant with my concept of ICEs, which in turn 
form part of the broader, heterogeneous development ‘dispositif’ or ‘apparatus’. Sub-
hegemonic regional ICEs are instrumental in advancing the process of discursive ‘translation’, 
by projecting modified hegemonic discourses into practice via regional consciousnesses (Peet 
2002, p.61). The ICE construct I apply in this dissertation describes institutional complexes of 
development expertise that operate trans-nationally in the African geo-political space, 
networking with various complexes of expertise in different spaces and scales, including 
globally. Understanding the role of these ICEs in sub-hegemony constitutes a key goal of this 
dissertation.  
 
Minimal Hegemony, Passive Revolution 
Earlier in this chapter, I discussed the variable geometry of different discourses in a given field 
of power. Cooper and Packard (1997) agree that different ideas have held different valences or 
power, pointing to broad convergence of thinking about development, at certain moments and 
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 Such institutional complexes may be: hegemonic, meaning that “they produce ideas and policies with sufficient 
theoretical depth and financial backing that they dominate thought over wide fields of power” (ibid); sub-
hegemonic, in that from the periphery of the ‘field of power’ they translate received discourses, modify and add to 
ideas, and provide evidence of their validity through regional practice (ibid); or counter-hegemonic, meaning 
“centres, institutions and movements founded on opposing political beliefs that contend against the conventional, 
and advocate policy alternatives” (ibid). 
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in specific places, around certain models or theories. While some of these convergences have 
had long lives, others “…have been more fleeting, emerging at one moment as orthodoxy and 
then losing support to a new paradigm” (ibid, p.19). Finnemore (1997) validates this view in her 
analysis of the World Bank’s role in hegemonising discourses of ‘poverty reduction’ and 
‘sustainable development’.  
 
Similarly, Sikkink (1997) attributes an ideational shift at the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA, now ECLAC) from dependency-influenced approaches to neo-liberal economic 
policy prescriptions between 1980 and 1990 to have been a function of power, learning and 
institutional change. She finds that “[b]y 1990, ECLA was trying to correct both what it saw as 
the main errors of the [import substitution industrialisation] approach and of neo-liberalism” 
(ibid, p.233). ECLA’s latter-day emphasis on ‘an integrated approach’ which emphasises the 
compatibility of growth, social equity, and democracy, she argues, transcends and defies any 
analysis that it has become neo-liberal. This evolution of ideas is attributed to factors including: 
(i) the onset of crisis, with policy failures or crises leading to a search for new ideas; (ii) the 
power of development institutions, in which “a team of like-minded people transforms their 
individual ideas into institutional purpose” (ibid, p.236); and (iii) generational shifts within 
institutions – such as replacement of the ‘old guard’42 with a new group more likely to have 
trained in U.S. universities, and to have more mathematical and technical training.  
 
This account of the shift in ECLA coheres with my interpretation of sub-hegemony discussed 
earlier. ECLA, a sub-hegemonic ‘centre of translation’ established as part of an array of 
worldwide UN regional think-tanks, is staffed by a new generation of economists trained in the 
use of highly complex technologies who conduct a debate within the institution that is also 
influenced by external ideas. This debate created “an intellectual energy and dynamism that 
contributed to the later paradigm shift” (Sikkink 1997, p.248). While Sikkink goes as far as 
classifying the new ‘integrated approach’ as a new paradigm, my view is that it may not 
necessarily constitute a new rationality of power as distinct from the old. However, I agree that 
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 Mostly hired at the inception of ECLA in the 1950s, and reaching retirement age in the 1980s. 
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the ‘integrated approach’ developed by ECLAC sets the Latin American development regime of 
the 1990s apart from both the dependency-led regime of previous decades. As such, and 
applying my theoretical arguments on sub-hegemony to this case, what emerges is the way in 
which the ECLAC experts embodied pragmatism and freed themselves from the constraints of 
ideological labels (‘neo-liberal or not’) in order to develop an ‘integrated approach’ that 
resulted in stronger agency for these experts in charting the future development path of Latin 
American countries. 
 
Moore (1995) identifies ECLAC and its African counterpart, the ECA, as key agencies in the study 
of the proximity of development agencies to imperial power, arguing that the two agencies  
 
“…are bound by their political-geographical situation to be in a relationship of at least 
some antagonism to institutions emanating from the metropole. To deny this would be 
to make the baseless assertion that all intellectuals on the periphery are compradors. To 
assert it is only to suggest that a very large part of the project of western development 
discourse is to bring third world intellectuals on side” (ibid, p.10).  
 
The ECLAC case is therefore highly relevant to my examination of the ECA, which was 
established in 1958 with terms of reference similar to those of ECLAC. The two ICEs play a 
similarly pivotal role in advancing as well as metamorphosing sub-hegemonic processes in their 
respective regions. 
 
Sub-Hegemony and Identity Politics 
In my theorisation of the sub-hegemonic process I have highlighted the pivotal role that Third 
World experts play in translating or hybridising the globally dominant development discourse 
into forms that ease the rationality’s reception in different localities. I have asserted that the 
process of hybridisation may lead to changes in the rationality and ultimately to shifts in the 
asymmetry of power between hegemonic agents and sub-hegemonic agents. Here, I take the 
theorisation further, arguing that sub-hegemonic experts in Africa’s development regime 
appeal to two constructed identities to legitimise their quest for expanded policy space: one is 
their ‘African-ness’ and another is their membership of the global community of Western-
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trained development experts. In my view, this constitutes a critical dynamic of the complex 
process of hegemonic construction deserving of further study.  
 
My discussion in the Introduction to this thesis on Africa as ‘invention’ and ‘lived reality’, the 
deployment of emancipatory Pan-Africanist discourses and the emergence of expert-led 
continental initiatives and arrangements in Africa’s trans-national development regime, all 
point to the pivotal nature of the question of African identity. The discourse on ‘African 
Renaissance’ associated with the emergence of NEPAD has further animated the debate. Gutto 
(2006), for example, has argued that, since the concept of ‘Renaissance’ is historically 
associated with the European Renaissance, “it is important to take account of the motivating 
forces that propelled the European Renaissance and its manifestations, products and 
consequences, and then to appreciate what makes the quest for African Renaissance different” 
(ibid, p.313). At the heart of the debates has been the question of African identity, which has 
been constructed and reconstructed over time, and which in reality does not exist as a fixed 
category (Ikpe 2009).  
 
My assertion is that experts in Africa’s trans-national development regime strategically deploy 
their ‘African-ness’, along with other perceived attributes, as a tactic towards carving out 
increased policy space. The genealogy of expert ‘African-ness’ clearly owes its origins to the 
discourses of ‘Pan-Africanism’, ‘African nationalism’ and ‘African renaissance’. And yet, in 
contrast to those that theorise African identity as a fixed category limited to racially indigenous 
Africans (cf. Hountondji 1983), I contend that it is a socially constructed identity firmly situated 
in Africa’s postcolonial historical and social context. It is an identity that is fluid and continually 
under construction. Given the growing appeal to Africa’s Diasporas, ‘African-ness’ is also an 
identity that is by no means exclusively a function of race or geography. With specific reference 
to my case, for example, many of the experts interviewed returned from the Diaspora
43
 to work 
at the ECA. Furthermore, and as Gutto (2006) suggests, Africanists from other parts of the 
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 Indeed, Africa’s Diaspora has contributed arguably more to forging intellectual, cultural and political links 
between the continent and the 200 million or so world citizens of African descent. In addition the AU reserves 
special status for the African Diaspora (Gutto 2006). 
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world are also actors in Africa’s development regime, and they should not be discounted simply 
on the basis that they are not racially ‘African’. 
 
Shore (2000) has harnessed Anderson’s (1983) notion of the ‘imagined community’ to look 
more closely at how Europe is being constructed as a symbolic and political entity – and 
therefore as a more knowable and governable space. His intent is to show how ‘culture’ has 
been appropriated as a political instrument for the construction of Europe. As part of this 
process, he highlights the way in which bureaucrats working for the European Community are 
coalescing around a nascent expert identity. In Shore’s theorisation ‘European experts’ see 
themselves as no longer nationals of individual countries, but as a new community of supra-
national experts who occupy pride of place in building Project Europe. In the same way, 
‘African-ness’ as an ‘imagined’ identity is key to the pursuit of sub-hegemonic expert politics. 
 
As will be seen in Chapter 4, ‘African-ness’ emerges as a legitimising identity, harnessed by 
African experts to pursue their claim as the technocrats most credibly positioned to craft 
workable solutions to Africa’s development problems. It is an identity replete with 
consistencies as well as contradictions. It is a construct that renders problematic the idea of 
African nationalism and European imperialism as totalising narratives counter-posed to each 
other. ‘African-ness’ is an identity born of pragmatism and grounded in the idea of ‘Africa’ not 
as ‘Other’, but as an important and inalienable category through which the world should be 
viewed. In the process, my understanding of African expert identity also gives the lie to 
essentialist views that characterise ‘Africa’, in all its complexity, as either being captured by or 
rejecting in their entirety, externally conceived and imposed models of development. 
 
A second dimension of my hypothesis on expert identity politics is the invocation by African 
experts of credentials afforded by the West as a key legitimising attribute in asserting agency. 
Indeed, my claim is not that African experts working trans-nationally are asserting their African 
identity in contrast to Western or global models of development. On the contrary, a key plank 
of my argument is that – inasmuch as experts may deploy their ‘African-ness’ as a device to 
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assert their legitimacy in leading the quest for technocratic solutions to African development 
challenges – the education of these experts in Western academies plays no small role in 
conferring legitimacy on the quest of African experts for greater agency in helping overcome 
Africa’s development challenges.  
 
Like their Western counterparts, African experts are ideologically committed to 
‘developmentalism’ and dedicate their lives to pursuing it. However, one constructed identity 
(‘African-ness’) is not counter-posed to the other (‘global development expert’); both are 
deployed simultaneously and in concert, and are mutually reinforcing. They stand out as key 
tactics harnessed in the pursuit of ‘techno-politics’, identified by Mitchell (2002) as holding the 
key to the reproduction of development regimes. Thus, sub-hegemony is about not only 
‘hybridisation’ or ‘translation’ but also the ‘techno-politics’ of identity.  
 
Important lessons emerge from this discussion. One is that the power of Western science can 
be felt even if the institution doing the work is located in a Third World region. Another is that 
the act of collecting indigenous knowledge to contextualise global ideas is by its nature 
transformative, leading to hybrid forms of knowledge (Moore and Schmitz 1995). Following 
from this, and as argued above, the process of ‘hybridisation’ or ‘translation’ may result in the 
transformation of the dominant discourse and the recalibration of power asymmetries. Third 
World experts, working in ICEs, hold the key to these power shifts.  
 
In many cases, development-agency experts “must maintain their masters’ legitimacy” (Moore 
and Schmitz 1995, p.11.) and cannot openly dissent from the dominant discourse, meaning that 
the extent and nature of their agency remains hidden. Nevertheless, they are “…the purveyors 
of passive revolution, the manufacturers of minimal hegemony” (ibid). Revealing how this 
‘minimal hegemony’ is manufactured, how the process of passive revolution takes place in 
Africa’s development regime, is a key goal of the research reported in this dissertation. 
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If it is agreed that trans-national institutions such as ECLA, ECA and the World Bank have played 
important roles in the transmission of ideas (Sikkink 1997), this gives rise to a number of 
questions that call for equally serious consideration of the institutions as well as discursive 
mechanisms that make the trans-national conversation possible:  
 
“Who is excluded from a [development] conversation, and on what grounds? How are 
rhetorics defined historically, and what processes within communities of experts 
determine which rhetorics are deemed convincing and which are not? […] Is there a 
clearly definable ‘mainstream’ of meanings and representations and an established 
repertoire of actions… that developers consistently draw upon? How does the 
professionalisation of a discipline and the creation of institutions engaged with 
development distinguish the persons and ideas included within acceptable practice 
from those labelled as marginal, as pedants or as quacks?” (Cooper and Packard 1997, 
p.6).  
 
Subsequent chapters will seek to shed critical light on these important questions. 
 
Towards a Conceptual Framework 
Drawing on the arguments discussed in the literature review above, this final section articulates 
elements of a conceptual framework intended to signpost my inquiry into expert agency and 
agendas in Africa’s development regime.  
 
So far, I have argued that:  
1. A development regime is an ‘apparatus’ that constitutes a shifting coagulation of 
heterogeneous elements (both human and nonhuman), as well as systems of relations 
established between these elements. 
2. Development regimes emerge from perceived crises, which create the constituency for 
external corrective intervention. 
3. Development operates as a trans-national regime or institutionalised configuration of 
hegemonic power.  
4. Development regimes project their power discursively on the basis of a chimerical 
sleight of hand that projects neutral, technical, rational science as standing above and 
apart from the world whose problems it claims the ability to solve.  
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5. Although discourse is a key weapon in advancing hegemony, development regimes are 
not discursive alone: they deploy extra-discursive elements – including political 
technologies such as policies and mechanisms – to advance their hegemonic agenda.  
6. Hegemonic processes do not happen in a vacuum, but in a pre-existing ‘field of power’ 
in which dominant ideas and ideologies are translated, reaffirmed, contested and 
countered in multiple sites of struggle.  
7. Historically, the professionalisation and institutionalisation of development has been 
critical in the exportation to the Third World of a hegemonic scientific discourse 
originating in the West.  
8. Many Third World ICEs are officially cast in a sub-hegemonic role: their primary function 
is to facilitate the universal acceptance of dominant global development ideas and 
policies by ‘translating’ them into locally digestible variants.  
9. Yet sub-hegemony can simultaneously serve to compromise the claim to absolute 
power of hegemonic development regimes, as sub-hegemonic agents become more 
authoritative and powerful within and beyond their localities. 
10. Because the outcomes and effects of the sub-hegemonic process are ‘radically 
indeterminate’ (i.e. contingent on the exercise of politics and therefore not predictable 
in advance), development regimes can only claim hegemony – they can never fully 
achieve it. 
 
These arguments are the basis of my conceptual framework of an African development regime. 
Next, I state this framework, in five points, relying on important characteristics of a 
development regime as identified by Ludden (1992, 2005).  
 
First, the African development regime is a ‘techno-regime with a discursive regimen’, 
directed by institutional complexes of expertise that generate new forms of knowledge 
which constitute forms of power. Since independence, Africa has sought to establish modern 
institutions, and to promote scientific and technologically driven development. As in India 
beforehand, planning has been at the centre of development efforts launched by newly 
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independent African states – not only at state level but trans-nationally, as evidenced by the 
large number of sub-regional and continental organisations and initiatives. These centres 
generate ideas with a view to influencing or informing national as well as supra-national policy. 
The existence at the secretariat of the African Union (the continent’s highest political body) of 
directorates for economic affairs, infrastructure, trade and industry, social affairs, peace and 
security, and the historic issuance of continental plans, treaties, standards and norms, reflects 
the centrality of ‘techno-development’ to Africa and Africans. African experts invoke their 
‘African-ness’, along with their Western educational and professional credentials, to assert 
their claim to primacy in directing the African development regime. 
 
Second, Africa’s development regime involves ruling powers that claim progress as a goal, 
and self-declared ‘enlightened’ leaders who compete for power with claims of their ability to 
effect development. Africa’s leaders routinely invoke the challenge of developing Africa and 
liberating its people from the shackles of poverty as a justification for their continued rule. This 
happens in multi-party democracies as well as in autocracies. Inspired by the vision of Kwame 
Nkrumah, the postcolonial history of Africa is littered with exhortations to regional integration 
and political union. Trans-national projects (dams, trans-continental highways, and so on) 
provide ripe opportunities for national leaders to invoke visions of the development of the 
continent as evidence of their efforts to develop their respective countries. This is evident in 
the multiple commitments by African countries to membership of sub-regional economic 
communities (ECOWAS, SADC, etc), as well as the AU.  
 
Third, the objects of Africa’s development regime are Africa’s geographic territory, the 
African economy, and the African population – a ‘people’ whose condition must be improved. 
Elsewhere (da Costa 2007), I have documented the demise of the OAU, a state-led continental 
project, and the birth of the AU in 2001. The OAU’s founding fathers left no room for subject 
agency in the construction of the continental development project, assuming their citizens’ full 
support in the aftermath of colonialism. The effective absence of an African ‘civil society’ during 
this early period served to reinforce the state’s hegemony over the national development 
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project. African intellectuals largely acquiesced and failed to contest the national project, even 
as it began to unravel (Mkandawire 2005). It was only with the adoption of the African Charter 
for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation in February 1990 that ‘people’s 
participation’ officially entered the lexicon of the continental project (see Chapter 2). This 
culminated in the 2001 Constitutive Act establishing the AU, which promised to build “…an 
integrated Africa, a prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing 
a dynamic force in the international arena” (AU 2004, p.6). Despite this commitment to a 
people-led Union, and despite the steady growth of civil society organisations and coalitions 
from the early 1990s onwards, continental development remains largely a leadership-driven 
aspiration. 
 
Fourth, Africa’s development regime embodies an ideology of science that controls principles 
and techniques to effect and measure progress. From infrastructure-driven approaches via 
dependency theory and basic needs, to structural adjustment, structural adjustment with a 
human face, and poverty reduction strategies, African countries have continuously adopted 
and adapted scientific approaches to development – as evidenced by the large number of 
technical organisations established by the ECA and OAU over time (see Chapters 3 and 4). 
Technical co-operation, largely paid for with aid money, has helped African countries 
internalise and implement policies underpinned by these ideas and ideologies. Today’s primary 
means of advancing and measuring global development are the MDGs, which spell out targets 
the world’s countries must meet by 2015 in order to reduce poverty. African countries, 
particularly the 30 or so classified as ‘Least Developed Countries’, now measure their progress 
in key areas against the MDGs. A key ‘political technology’ (discussed in Chapter 5) is the 
APRM, designed by African leaders to measure their countries’ progress against key 
development indicators.  
 
Fifth, the rule of Africa’s development regime is enforced by physical and cultural 
apparatuses of security and control. In the early years of the OAU, Africa’s leadership was 
divided over whether to fast-track a continental union or to pursue a more incremental 
72 
 
approach from the bottom up. Nkrumah, who led the fast-track group, proposed the 
establishment of an African High Command or continental army. Today, the African Union has 
revived this idea. As part of the Constitutive Act, a Peace and Security Council (PSC) was 
established in 2002 to enable African troops to intervene to restore peace and security in 
specific circumstances – genocide, gross violations of human rights, national instability with 
cross-border ramifications, and unconstitutional changes of government. The advent of the PSC 
marked an end to the principle of non-interference and non-aggression that defined the OAU. 
AU forces have already intervened in a number of countries – notably Burundi, Sudan, the 
Comoros and most recently Somalia. The AU is now actively collaborating with the European 
Union and UN to establish an Africa Standby Force, effectively a standing African army ready to 
mobilise at any time in situations of conflict.  
 
These five characteristics, drawing on the ten arguments summarised above, constitute key 
elements of a conceptual framework for Africa’s development regime – a ‘geopolitical space’ 
(Escobar 1995) that is discursively ‘imagined’ or constructed by African leaders and Africa’s 
people. This ‘geopolitical bloc’ (Peet 2002) or ‘single historical postcolonial bloc’ (Bayart 
1993)
44
, while varying between countries or regions, integrates Africa in diverse ways (ibid). 
Mamdani (1997) asserts the specificity of the African experience and the historical legitimacy of 
Africa as a unit of analysis. The conceptual framework outlined above is intended to contribute 
to wider understanding of this ‘geopolitical bloc’.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to contribute to a nuanced theoretical understanding of the workings 
of development’s power. Beyond this, the theoretical ideas discussed have served to signpost 
the inquiry into expert strategies for carving out policy space that is presented in subsequent 
chapters. It is not my intention to follow every single one of the conceptual twists and turns laid 
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 As Bayart (1993, p.195) explains: “…we do not wish to suggest that, country by country, Africa represents a 
collection of historic blocs, each one articulated with the west, and each one having a different degree of 
actualisation. On the contrary, we argue that Africa should be seen as being engaged in the edification of one 
postcolonial historic bloc whose degree of actualisation varies from country to country and region to region, and 
which integrates Sub-Saharan states in diverse ways” (original emphasis).  
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out here, since matching every aspect of the theory with substantial evidence is well beyond 
the scope of this dissertation.  
 
The theoretical issues of interest in the rest of this dissertation relate to sub-hegemony in 
Africa’s development regime. I will focus on explaining how sub-hegemony works in practice 
and will unearth the sub-hegemonic strategies and tactics deployed by a key ICE in this regime. 
I will show how, over time, the ECA has resisted as well as reaffirmed the globally hegemonic 
development discourse. I will reveal the ways in which the ECA of 1995 to 2005 was on the face 
of it classically sub-hegemonic whilst exploiting the growing clamour for ‘African ownership’ to 
pursue a strategy aimed at minimising hegemony and in the process opening up space for 
expanded African agency in developing technocratic solutions to Africa’s development 
problems. In doing so, I will illustrate the ongoing constitution of African expert identity as a 
manifestation as well as an outcome of the sub-hegemonic process.  
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Chapter 2 
From ‘Self-Reliance’ to ‘Adjustment with Transformation’:  
Africa’s Development Regime in Historical Perspective 
 
 
Introduction 
In a discussion of the ‘developmental state’, Mkandawire (2001a) lists a number of reasons why 
many suggest that Africa cannot replicate the Asian development experience. One is the 
inaccuracy of economic histories. Much of the ‘impossibility’ literature, he argues, is based on a 
misreading of the economic history of Africa. What makes these ‘impossibility arguments’ all 
the more significant, he adds, is that “…the discursive framework they have engendered has 
produced a knowledge that has been acted upon by key policy-makers in a self-fulfilling 
manner” (ibid p.306). Adesina (2005) argues that the construction of a hegemonic project is not 
always only about affirming the validity of its stated objectives and the pattern of relationships 
embedded in it, but is also a selective reading of history (ibid p.1). 
 
In broad agreement with the above, I contend that much of the literature codifying the history 
of Africa’s postcolonial quest for economic development falls short – on grounds of 
misrepresentation, amnesia or lack of analytical depth. Further, I concur that how history is 
recounted, and the extent to which a particular version of the truth is given the stamp of 
credibility and universalised, can have power effects. To explore the nature of these effects, this 
chapter will interrogate key discursive moments in the evolution of Africa’s development 
regime. My intention is not simply to revisit and re-present the debates of the past. Rather, it is 
to undertake a critical analysis of Africa’s development strategies and plans in order to locate 
the key discursive underpinnings and shifts and to identify some of the key agents and 
relationships influencing these.  
 
As I argued in the previous chapter, after Ludden (2005), experts are key agents in development 
processes. By generating ideas and empirical knowledge compelling to leading development 
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actors in specific places and times, they ensure the regime constitutes a documented historical 
formation. Consistent with this argument, all key African plans and policy documents analysed 
in this chapter emanated from expert-led initiatives – attesting to the power inherent in 
‘techno-politics’. As such, much of the evidence referred to in the pages that follow relates to 
historical texts. Added context is provided by insights gleaned from fieldwork interviews and 
interactions with key experts involved in the processes in question.  
 
The rest of this chapter focuses on nearly four decades that marked a critical period in the 
evolution of Africa’s postcolonial development regime. I begin by locating the origin of ideas of 
continental development, and then chart the continuity between colonial and postcolonial 
approaches to development in the first 10 to 15 years after many African states achieved self-
rule. I then highlight the influence of external ideas on African development strategy in these 
early years, and highlight the impact of the Cold War on development thinking. Next, I explore 
the disillusionment among African technocrats with so-called ‘inherited theories of 
development’ around 1970, and the process to develop alternatives.  
 
I then chart the deterioration of Africa’s economic performance in the late 1970s, discuss the 
so-called ‘African crisis’, and highlight African strategies of reaffirmation and resistance of the 
1980s. Through a detailed deconstruction of ECA and World Bank documents, and drawing on 
my conceptualisation of the process of hegemonic construction presented in Chapter 1, I 
unearth African expert strategies of resistance as well as the tactics of legitimation employed by 
the international development regime to extend its rule over Africa’s economies from 1980 to 
1990. I then show how Africa’s development regime, while retaining its core structural 
underpinnings of ‘collective self-reliance’ and ‘self-sustainment’, evolved over time to take on 
‘human-centred development’, ‘structural transformation’ and ‘social justice’. I argue that these 
new concepts embodied as well as influenced the latter-day international development 
consensus on ‘good governance’.  
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Pan-Africanist Development Visions 
Before a detailed reflection on this period, I briefly locate the origins of the notion of 
continental African ‘economic development’. The first Pan-African Conference, held in London, 
England in July 1900, marked the institutionalisation of a movement with Africa as its object, 
yet imagined and nurtured outside Africa in opposition to slavery. At the 1945 Pan-African 
Congress in Manchester, African countries articulated their twin desire to be independent from 
colonial rule and to achieve continental unity. The rationale was to enable Africa to achieve 
faster economic growth and development and ultimately catch up with the industrialised 
countries, and to create an Africa that was strong within the international system (Bujra 2002).  
 
Key in all this was the re-imagining of Africa as a geopolitical entity that could transcend and 
indeed reverse the fragmentation created by the formalisation of European colonisation in the 
late nineteenth century. Along with this edifying idea of Africa came the conviction that 
economic development was likely to be achieved only if steps were taken to aggregate the 
multiplicity of national markets, many of them unviable, into an expanded economic space. The 
power of this idea of Africa as a politically independent, democratic, economically self-reliant 
space for all its peoples provided ideological sustenance to nationalist movements across the 
continent as they mobilised for the struggle against colonial rule.  
 
In 1959, two years after Ghana became the first black African country to gain its independence, 
an All-Africa Conference was convened in the capital Accra. The first time that nationalists from 
all over the continent were brought together on African soil, the Accra meeting cemented the 
importance of states working in concert to fight colonialism. Four years later, by which time a 
number of other African countries had become independent, this awareness led to the 
founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. At that point, the 
move to liberate Africa’s remaining colonies and forge a multi-state political union evolved from 
Pan-Africanism as a mass movement into an ideology driving a state-based continental 
organisation (Bujra 2002).  
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In Africa Must Unite, published on the eve of the summit that created the OAU, Ghana’s leader 
Kwame Nkrumah highlighted the interdependence of politics and economics:  
 
“Just as I was convinced that political freedom was the essential forerunner of our 
economic growth and that it must come, so I am equally convinced that African union 
will come and provide that united, integrated base upon which our fullest development 
can be secured” (Nkrumah 1963, p.170).  
 
Nkrumah’s speech in Addis Ababa on 24 May 1963 included a number of proposals to advance 
Africa’s economic development – among them a commission to work on a continent-wide plan 
for a unified or common economic and industrial programme for Africa that should include 
proposals for setting up a common market for Africa, an African currency, an African monetary 
zone, an African Central Bank, and a continental communications system (Nkrumah 1963).  
 
Two opposing blocs of African states emerged in the period before the founding of the OAU. 
One was the Casablanca Group of seven countries45, which was radical in its orientation and 
adopted Nkrumah’s vision of the future that emphasised rapid continental political unity, self-
reliance and equity, with socialism being the main path to development (Bujra 2005). The 
second bloc, known as the Monrovia Group46 (including 12 states that had founded the 
francophone African and Malagasy Union in 1960 in Brazzaville47), de-emphasised issues of 
equity and self-reliance, instead advocating “nation-building and a development path through 
laissez faire and the open market” (ibid p.2). Some have described it as following a neo-colonial 
line (cf. Amin 1998).  
 
Nkrumah’s proposals influenced several African development plans – from the Lagos Plan of 
Action to the Constitutive Act establishing the African Union (2001). This speaks to a 
remarkable continuity between Pan-Africanist ideas of development and subsequent 
declarations, strategies and programmes developed at continental level. Nonetheless, it was 
                                                  
45
 Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Morocco. 
46
 In addition to the 12 Brazzaville Group countries, the Monrovia Group included Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia and Congo (Kinshasa). 
47
 These were Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d’lvoire, Dahomey (later Benin), Gabon, Upper Volta (later 
Burkina Faso), Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, the Central African Republic, Senegal and Chad. 
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the Monrovia Group’s gradualist approach to building African unity that won the day, as 
evidenced by the passing of a resolution at the 1964 OAU summit in Cairo, influenced by 
Nyerere’s lobbying, to accept the colonial borders as permanent, recognised frontiers of the 
OAU member states (Chachage 2009).  As Mazrui (2005) notes, the OAU’s gradualist mandate 
indicated the diminishing idealism and growing pragmatism of Africans as cautious post-
coloniality replaced the vigour of anti-colonialism (ibid p.58). This pragmatism has steadily 
manifested itself not only in the political domain, but increasingly in engagement around 
African development strategy.  
 
Postcolonial Optimism (1960-1970)  
In the run-up to independence, black nationalists had criticised the extractive nature of 
colonialism, which robbed the African peoples of the fruits their labour. At independence, 
‘development’ constituted a central preoccupation for most of the first generation of African 
leaders, most of whom by political commitment and social origins were deeply committed to 
“…the eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease, […]an ‘unholy trinity’ against which 
nationalist swords were drawn in the post-colonial era” (Mkandawire 2001a, pp.295-296). 
‘Developmentalism’ became part of a nationalist postcolonial ideology which saw nation-
building and the provision of welfare as two sides of the same coin (ibid)48.  
 
Hutchful (1995) highlights three themes common to the political discourses of independent 
African states: nationalism (national ownership of the means of production and direction of 
development); statism (the state as playing a major role in development); and welfare (ibid 
p.58). To a greater or lesser degree, these themes are common to all the African development 
plans. Overall, they have provided an inhospitable ideological environment for market-oriented 
reforms, and have furnished the basis of a ‘discourse of resistance’ to structural adjustment 
reforms (ibid). However, the first 10 to 15 years of independence showed considerable 
continuity with colonial approaches to development. Bujra (2002) attributes this to a wave of 
                                                  
48
 Mkandawire’s view, with which I concur, contrasts with the conviction held by a number of African academics 
(cf. Ake 1996) that African leaders did not have development on their agenda because they were generally 
consumed by survival and accumulation and maintenance of power.  
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optimism brought about by healthy foreign currency reserves, economies performing 
reasonably well, and the emergence of an indigenous capitalist class benefiting from state-led 
development efforts and therefore happy with the pre-independence structure of their 
economies as well as policies recommended by colonial advisers.  
 
Another important factor in this continuity was the dearth of trained African technocrats. In the 
colonies, there had been scant exposure to alternative approaches to development, with many 
of the so-called radical leaders with alternative visions eliminated in the course of the anti-
colonial struggle (Senghor 2009). In the immediate aftermath of World War II, and as part of a 
prolonged gradualist strategy of decolonisation, the British, French and to a lesser extent 
Belgians, had sought to train a cadre of collaborative elites drawn from educated business as 
well as traditionally prominent families (Allen 1995)49. After independence, former colonial 
powers actively sought to maintain an influential presence in African countries, through experts 
sent to provide technical assistance, grants in aid and strong political links with African political 
leadership (Bujra 2005). Indeed, the enduring role of foreign expertise during the 1960s and 
1970s in developing and implementing policy was an important feature of the postcolonial 
African state (Mkandawire 2001a).  
 
This was largely because fledgling African states found they had a shortfall of development 
planning capacity. In the run-up to independence and thereafter, a critical mass of promising 
Africans were sent abroad to study, many benefitting from Western government or 
philanthropic foundation funding. In 1959, 81 Kenyan students were flown to the U.S. to attend 
universities, funded by the African American Students Association, Joseph P. Kennedy 
Foundation and others. The following year chartered planes flew a further 288 Kenyan students 
to the U.S. in what was the first large-scale American scholarship programme related to Africa 
(Chideya 1981).  
 
                                                  
49
 Faced with pressure from radical nationalists in West Africa in the late 1940s and later in East and Central Africa, 
the colonial powers resorted to a policy of repressing the radicals and offering rapid decolonisation to conservative 
elements (Allen 1995). 
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In Nigeria, which invested heavily in tertiary education in the first two decades after 
independence (Sibisi 1993) the best students were funded by their originating university or U.S. 
foundations to pursue Masters and PhD degrees in the U.K. or U.S. (Teriba 2006). One such 
programme began in 1959 at the request of the then Nigerian Federal Minister of Education 
who raised the question of the scarcity of highly skilled personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa with 
the Director of Admissions at Harvard College. This marked the start of a pilot Nigerian–
American Scholarship Programme. Twenty-four students were sent to participating U.S. 
universities which provided tuition scholarships whilst the Nigerian Government covered travel 
costs. The programme’s success led to the establishment of scholarship programmes funded by 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and administered by the African-
American Institute (Chideya 1981)50.  
 
Ideology was a key driver for U.S. funding of African scholarship. By the late 1950s the U.S. and 
Russia, neither of which had been colonisers, had already begun to vie for influence on the 
African continent. The U.S. intention was to expose African students to American values so that 
on their return home to positions of influence they would help counteract Communist 
influences there (Chideya 1981). Soviet Union scholarships offered to African students 
beginning in the late 1950s were aimed at cultivating relations with newly independent African 
nations and scoring a Cold War propaganda coup (Matusevich 2008)
51
.  
 
The provision of funding for Africans to study in Western academies formed part of a wider 
strategy of support, from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, by a range of bilateral donors and 
philanthropist agencies. Much of this support was aimed at developing high-level capacity 
                                                  
50
 These included the African Scholarship Programme of American Universities (1960), the African Graduate 
Fellowship Programme (1963), and the Inter-African Universities Programme (1967) (Chideya 1981). 
51
 In 1959, an African Institute was set up, followed in 1960 by the founding of the Friendship University (also 
known as the Lumumba University) as a flagship institution of higher learning devoted to the education of Third 
World cadres. Between 1959 and 1961 the number of African students in the Soviet Union increased from 75 to 
500, and to 5,000 by the end of the decade. By 1990, on the eve of Soviet collapse, African student numbers in the 
USSR had risen to 30,000, or 24% of the total student body (Matusevich 2008). 
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through university expansion, with crucial roles played by three American foundations – 
Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie (King 1991)52.  
 
Outside the realm of government, African intellectuals debated the shape and direction of the 
postcolonial project. Centres of learning such as the University of East Africa (bringing together 
the campuses of Makerere, Uganda, Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania) were at the 
vanguard of African intellectualism (Mazrui 2005)53. This intersected with an active engagement 
with African socialism by several African leaders developing an intellectual foundation to their 
national projects54. In many cases, external ideology (mainly socialism) was adapted to suit 
continental and national contexts, and served to advance leadership agendas. While Pan-
Africanism did not aspire to be as ‘scientific’ as Marxism, it extended beyond political economy 
to encompass African culture, aesthetics, poetry and philosophy (Mazrui 2005).  
 
This intellectual engagement by Africa’s fledgling leadership served to usher in one-party states, 
with rising political authoritarianism leading to declining academic freedom, as in the case of 
Uganda where academics were abducted and killed by the incoming military regime of Idi Amin 
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 The Ford Foundation helped establish a series of education research centres in the developing world. The 
Rockefeller Foundation supported agriculture, health and social sciences in selected African universities, and 
sought to transfer and nurture to maturity new traditions of scholarship, such as social science research in East 
Africa (King 1991). Part of the agenda was indigenisation, which happened more quickly in arts and social sciences 
than in science, medicine and agriculture. As a result these ‘hard’ fields of study remained much longer as fields 
requiring external support (ibid) 
53
 Ironically, and by the early 1970s, donors (notably Sweden, Britain and Rockefeller) had begun to criticise African 
universities for being too preoccupied with urban development in the modern sectors of the economy. In sectors 
such as health, transport, housing and education it was felt that “the high-cost western ideal was distorting the 
more ordinary requirements of the majority of the population” (ibid p.242). One study, funded by Rockefeller, 
suggested that African universities had become the preserve of privileged elites, who were soon blamed for the 
failure of African countries to achieve economic take-off. World Bank President Robert McNamara was quoted in a 
1974 Education Sector working paper as writing: “The education policies themselves are not always at fault; they 
have tended to serve only too well the basically irrelevant development strategies they were intended to uphold 
and sustain” (McNamara 1974, cited in King 1991, p.243). 
54
 Among them was Ghana’s Nkrumah, who wrote extensively on ‘Consciencism’, ‘Scientific Socialism’ and the 
‘African Personality’; Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta, his country’s first black social anthropologist, who developed 
Harambee, a nationalist political manifesto founded on self-help; and philosopher-president Nyerere, who 
developed Ujamaa, a Tanzanian variant of African socialism. For a detailed comparison of Nkrumah’s and 
Nyerere’s versions of ‘African socialism’ see Metz (1982). 
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Dada (Mazrui 2005)
55
. Another important factor in the decline of African intellectualism was the 
Cold War. Because African nationalists chose ‘positive neutralism’, no full-blooded liberal or 
communist regimes emerged – with vanguard Marxist-Leninist parties in only Egypt, Sudan and 
South Africa (Mkandawire 2003). However, African intellectuals paid the price for being 
associated with one or other tendency. As Mazrui (2005) notes with reference to Kenya, the 
result of the government being co-opted into the Western camp was all too often that 
intellectuals associated with socialist or left-wing literature were regarded by the state as 
subversives and detained. In Uganda, Transition
56
 magazine, launched by liberal elements at 
Makerere University in 1961, had links with the CIA through its front organisation, the Congress 
of Cultural Freedom – this eroded the magazine’s credibility (Mkandawire 2003) and helped 
bring about its demise in 1976. 
 
Ideological Continuity
57
 
Active state intervention in agrarian reform was emphasised at independence for helping 
African countries to overcome some of the continent’s structural economic weaknesses and 
became a pivotal aspect of postcolonial development strategy. Several countries moved from 
an externally directed neo-colonialist pattern towards radical nationalist populism with a 
socialist rhetoric and in some cases social transformations (Amin 1998). Some variants of the 
’developmental’ state, influenced by various brands of socialism, sought to press this 
interventionist model even further (Saul and Leys 1999).  
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 Despite this repression, the 1970s saw a vigorous blossoming of the spread of Marxist perspectives, of left 
intellectual debate and radical perspectives in Africa (Cliffe et al 1995). 
56
 According to http://www.transitionmagazine.com/history.htm, “The original Transition got its start in Kampala, 
Uganda in 1961. The brainchild of a twenty-one-year-old writer of Indian descent named Rajat Neogy, it quickly 
became Africa’s leading intellectual magazine, publishing such diverse figures as Tanzanian president Julius 
Nyerere, Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe, and Americans such as James Baldwin, Paul Theroux, Langston Hughes, 
and a then-unknown graduate student who signed himself “Skip Gates.” Edited in the early 1970s by the Nigerian 
playwright Wole Soyinka (who would later win the Nobel Prize for Literature), Transition continued to make a 
name – and enemies – for itself until its demise in 1976”. 
57
 In the 1950s and 1960s, a number of other theories held sway in and on Africa. These included the Target 
income/Backward-Bending Labour Supply hypothesis, which held that colonial (and later independent African) 
labourers would stop working once they had earned their target income, creating vacancies that could not be filled 
(Sibisi 1993); and the Cultural Barrier hypothesis which argued that social and cultural factors in Africa were 
insurmountable barriers to the adoption of innovations needed to achieve African social change and development 
(ibid).  
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Development policies in fledgling postcolonial states were largely influenced by ideas of 
development prevalent during the colonial period58. One important influence was Rostow’s 
Stages of Economic Growth (1960), a manifesto for capitalist development that justified 
colonialism as a necessary precursor to a process of postcolonial modernisation of ‘stages’ on 
the road to a fully fledged capitalist system. This process of moving a given country from 
traditional society to ‘developmental state’ was to be led by modernising indigenous elites, 
bolstered by foreign aid and training (Mkandawire 2001a). ‘Stagism’, as Rostow’s theory was 
known, was so widespread in the 1950s and 1960s that many of the first generation of 
postcolonial ‘development plans’ reflected the desire to move economies from the ‘pre-take-
off stage’ towards the ‘take-off stage’ (ibid p.296)59.  
 
Most early national development plans borrowed from one or the other of the existing external 
perspectives, with the result that they implicitly assumed an increased degree of external 
dependence. Consequently, African national development strategies and policies, like those in 
other developing regions of the world, tended to concentrate on economistic questions such as 
increases in GDP, capital formation through increases in investments, savings, foreign aid, and 
incentives for attracting foreign direct investment, with external trade as the engine of growth 
(Adedeji and Shaw 1985).  
 
Cold War, Dependency Theory and NIEO 
The 1970s saw the Cold War at its ideological height, with African countries deeply divided 
between Socialist, Marxist and Capitalist blocs. As these ideas competed for hegemony in 
Africa, the prevailing orthodoxy of modernisation – which equated development with economic 
growth and took trends in per capita income as the primary indicator of the rate of progress – 
began to be questioned on logical, moral, political and historical grounds (Asante 1991). 
                                                  
58
 While space does not allow for a detailed discussion of the postcolonial state literature in this chapter, it has 
been alluded to in Chapter 1. 
59 Hollis Chenery, World Bank vice president for development policy from 1972 to 1982, and a leading figure in 
crafting the Bank’s Africa strategy, reflected this linear view of development in much of his and his associates’ 
work (ibid). 
84 
 
Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987), a leading Congolese scholar, for example, wrote that 
“modernisation theory is ahistorical, astructural and ethnocentric” (ibid p.15). The critique was 
largely inspired by the Dependency School, emanating from Latin America and led by André 
Gunder Frank. An African school of dependistas soon emerged, rejecting capitalism’s claim to 
be able to bring development to the periphery.  
 
Amin (1974) attacked the colonial regime as being anything but developmental, arguing that 
the role of colonies in this division of labour was as permanent producers of raw materials 
intended to fuel metropolitan growth. Colonial economies, dominated by the production of one 
primary product, were structurally linked to the economy of the metropole – which determined 
both the availability of a market for the raw materials, and their price (ibid). This left the 
colonies mired in a ‘development of underdevelopment’60. Thus, the international division of 
labour bequeathed a legacy of raw material production and export to the colonies without any 
infrastructural base for processing them, with the result that “…the colonies produced what 
they did not consume and consumed what they did not produce” (Danso 1990, p.1).  
 
Samir Amin stood out as the leading African dependista
61
. His contribution to the debate 
included his theorisation of the differing modes of capital accumulation in the centre and 
periphery, his conclusion that this leads to marginalisation, and his advocacy of ‘self-reliance’ 
(Amin 1974), ‘autocentred development’ or ‘delinking’, a notion considered by some as autarkic 
(cf. Cooper 1981)62. A self-described “independent Marxist” (Amin 2005), he advocated a 
transition to socialism at the world system level as the only way forward, influencing the work 
of other Dependency theorists (cf. Wallerstein 1974, 1980). During his time as Director of the 
                                                  
60
 It is worth noting here that experiences in Latin America, Asia and Africa in the 1970s and 1980s with ‘associated 
dependent development’ showed that some form of capitalist development in the periphery was actually possible 
– something that André Gunder Frank had considered impossible in his original theorisation (Mkandawire 2001). 
61
 Claude Ake, a Nigerian political scientist who died in a plane crash on 7 November 1996, is often cited as another 
dependency-influenced scholar. Another is Issa Shivji, a Tanzanian legal scholar who has written expansively on his 
country.  
62
 Amin (1985) saw his ‘delinking’ thesis as embracing four propositions: the necessity of delinking as a logical 
political outcome of the unequal character of the development of capitalism; delinking as a necessary condition for 
any socialist advance; the need to recognise delinking as a means to the end of socialism, and not as an end in 
itself; and the need to discuss the options for delinking in political terms (ibid p.xiv).  
85 
 
UN Institute for Economic Planning and Development (IDEP) in Dakar, Senegal (1970-1980), 
Amin nurtured a group of African scholars63 with whom he co-published several volumes. Amin 
was also keen to stimulate a dialogue across the Third World as a means of breaking Africa’s 
isolation. In 1972 he organised an encounter between intellectuals from Africa and Latin 
America in Dakar, the first time that many of the Latin American dependistas64 had travelled to 
Africa. Two years later, a second meeting took place in Madagascar between African and 
Southeast Asian scholars65.  
 
The analysis underpinning the ECA’s efforts to design an African development strategy was 
strongly influenced by Dependency approaches, as were African development ideas more 
broadly – spelling a loss of dominance for ‘stagism’. Socialist governments in several countries, 
including Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mozambique, Kenya and Tanzania, adopted statist 
development strategies that were to some extent informed by Dependency Theory. Of these 
countries, however, only Tanzania adopted Dependency as an explicit basis for policy as part of 
a broader socialist agenda (Leys 1996). For the most part, these strategies were equally 
informed by neo-Stalinist ideas about development, contributed by East European aid 
personnel (ibid)
66
. Nonetheless, Dependency Theory played a significant role in the 1970s 
because it provided a powerful political-economic as well as moral critique of existing 
development policy in and on Africa
67
.  
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 These scholars included Cadman Atta-Mills, a Ghanaian economist who published extensively on dependency 
approaches and industrialisation, and later joined the World Bank; Anthony Obeng (Ghana); Fawzy Mansour 
(Egypt); and Jagdish Saigal (India). For a full list, see Amin 2005, pp.202-203. 
64
 Latin American participants included Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Ruy Mario Marini, Theotonio Dos Santos, 
Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Andre Gunder Frank, Anibal Quijano and Gerard Pierre-Charles (Amin 2005). 
65
 While at IDEP, Amin also exploited his connections with Latin America to establish two organisations – the 
Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA, 1973), which was modelled on the 
Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO); and the Third World Forum (1975), an organising platform for 
African, Asian and Latin American intellectuals seeking development alternatives.  
66
 This demonstrates how development was instrumentalised to advance Cold War agendas. As Singh (1995) has 
highlighted, the contention between the U.S. and Soviet Union worked in favour of developing countries, just as it 
had done in the early post-war period for West European countries and Japan. His argument is that during this 
period of contention between the U.S. and Soviet systems, many developing countries benefited from technical 
and economic aid from both sides. 
67
 Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s books – notably Petals of Blood (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1971) and Devil on 
the Cross (London: Heinemann, 1982) – are held up by Leys (1996) as representing perhaps the deepest popular 
impact of Dependency Theory as a populist moral discourse.  
86 
 
 
The Dependency critique of mainstream development also helped fuel the rise of new external 
ideas. One of these was the ‘basic needs’ approach, first unveiled in 1969 by the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO). A reflection of the concern among development experts that the 
fruits of rapid economic growth were not being equitably redistributed, ‘basic needs’ sought to 
ensure a baseline for the fight against poverty
68
. In the same vein, the World Bank published its 
‘Redistribution with Growth’ report in 1974. Authored by a team led by Hollis Chenery, Vice 
President for Development Policy, the report sought to bolster the shift in development 
thinking called for by ILO69.  
 
Meanwhile, proposals for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) – tabled at a meeting of 
the Nonaligned Movement in Algiers (September 1973) and adopted by the UN General 
Assembly the following year – signalled the escalation of an ideological stand-off between 
South and North, influenced by structuralist ideas over divergent paths to development. The 
‘Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order’ and associated 
documents included a series of proposals aimed at restructuring the global economic system to 
ensure increased participation by, and benefits for, developing countries.  
 
Mixed Performance Raises Concerns 
As Mkandawire (2001a) has argued, many African nations qualified as successful 
‘developmental states’ throughout the 1970s: ten African countries experienced a growth rate 
of 6% between 1967 and 1980. These included not only mineral-rich countries such as Gabon, 
Botswana, Congo and Nigeria, but also such countries as Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire, who did 
marginally better than both Indonesia and Malaysia during that period (ibid p.303). By the early 
1970s, however, African policymakers and development experts alike had begun to express 
                                                  
68
 The approach hinged on two key elements. The first was the provision of minimum requirements for a family’s 
private consumption: adequate food, shelter and clothing, as well as some household equipment and furniture. 
The second was the provision of essential services for and by the community, such as safe drinking water, 
sanitation, public transport and health, education and cultural facilities (Meeting Basic Needs: Strategies for 
Eradicating Mass Poverty and Unemployment, ILO 1977). 
69
 According to Leys (1996), neither the ILO nor World Bank acknowledged the influence of Dependency Theory on 
their thinking.  
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concern that the performance was not consistently good enough to bring about accelerated 
development. In their view, the theories and concepts underpinning the first 25 years of African 
independence were failing to set Africa on a sustainable development path.  
 
On the tenth anniversary of the OAU, in May 1973, African heads of state passed their first 
resolution on economic development. The ‘African Declaration on Cooperation, Development 
and Economic Independence’ expressed concern at the “…ever-deteriorating economic and 
social position of the developing countries in relation to the developed countries”, and 
lambasted the:  
 
“…ineffectiveness of measures adopted during the past decade to combat under 
development [as well as] the inability of the international community to create 
conditions favourable for the development of Africa” (OAU 1973, pp.1-2).  
 
As a political statement, the Declaration did not include an empirical analysis of the 
deteriorating situation. However, it proposed a series of actions for all OAU member countries, 
to arrest the downward slide70. The 1973 Declaration signalled the OAU’s growing 
preoccupation with the state of the continent’s economies. It also marked the start of a 
tradition of leadership pronouncements that constituted collective positions of African 
countries on how the continent should pursue its own development
71
.  
 
In 1975, the UN reviewed and assessed development progress since 1960 in its five world 
regions. Overall, developing countries fared poorly – both against the UN growth rate target of 
6%, and against associated targets of average annual expansion of 4% in agricultural output and 
8% in manufacturing output. An ECA study of Africa’s macro-economic performance from 1960 
to 1975 found that Africa had failed to meet most of the targets laid down by the UN Second 
Development Decade. Africa’s GDP annual growth rate was 4.5%, compared to the target of 
                                                  
70
 The manifesto covered mobilisation of Africa’s human and material resources, agriculture, transport and 
infrastructure, telecommunications and communications, industrialisation, the environment, tourism, monetary 
and fiscal policy, intra-African trade, international trade, development financing and international co-operation 
(OAU 1973).  
71
 By 1997, the OAU had issued 12 Resolutions on economic development, roughly one every two years (Bujra 
2004a). 
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6%; exports were at 2.8%, against a target of 7%; at 1.6% the continent’s aggregate agricultural 
growth rate was way below the targeted 4%; and manufacturing grew at 6% instead of the 
targeted 8%. Only in one area did performance exceed target: aggregate macroeconomic 
performance, which recorded an actual growth rate per annum of 10% as compared to the 
target of 7%. Of all five UN regions, Africa’s performance was the worst (ECA 1977). Ironically, 
and in retrospect, the period turned out to be Africa’s ‘golden era’; from 1975 to 2000, the 
continent’s performance deteriorated (Adedeji 2002). 
 
The Search for Alternatives 
As African policy-makers digested the sobering news of Africa’s deteriorating economic 
performance and prospects, interest grew in finding an indigenous African development 
strategy. According to one policy-maker attending the ECA’s 10th Session in 1968: 
 
“What I think is necessary for the future is for the Economic Commission for Africa to 
give us an African Plan for Development... The focus... should be on the development 
objectives appropriate in the African context and the necessity for mutual cooperation 
among member States. The Commission would thus be helping the world to have a 
better appreciation of the development process in Africa. We need a better articulation 
of the real obstacles to economic and social development in our continent. Through 
such a master plan, we can evolve the much-needed African philosophy of economic 
growth and social change” (cited in Asante 1991, p.37).  
 
In response to demands such as these, African intellectual and political resources were 
mobilised to work towards an indigenous strategy for African development (Asante 1991). The 
ECA set out to “…[lead] the attack on inherited colonial and neo-colonial economic policies and 
[assume] a vanguard role in the search of an alternative strategy to such policies being 
perpetuated by independent African countries” (Adedeji and Shaw 1985, p.12). 
 
The ECA’s Preliminary Assessment, annual economic surveys, biennial reviews and appraisals 
showed clearly that Africa’s economic performance had been on the downward slide since 
1971. The ECA also insisted that prospects for the future would be: 
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“… dim if the mix of public policies were to persist and if the existing international 
economic order, in which Africa was at the periphery of the international community, to 
continue” (ibid p.13). 
 
The ECA sought to challenge the conventional wisdom of the inherited theories of development 
and economic growth, to persuade African governments to accept the need for a fundamental 
change in approach and strategy (ibid pp.13-14). It argued that while Africa welcomed the NIEO 
proposals, its current state meant it was the least-prepared for such an order and would not 
benefit unless its national, sub-regional and continental economies were in order
72
. Instead, it 
argued for an internally focused African economic strategy.  
 
The ECA’s ‘Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International 
Economic Order in Africa, 1976-1981’ was discussed and endorsed at the ECA Conference of 
Ministers in Kinshasa, Zaire in February 1977 and approved by the OAU later that year. It is 
considered to have provided the “…main intellectual and theoretical foundation for the 
preparation of a new development strategy for Africa” (Asante 1991, p.44). The Revised 
Framework argued that a credible and appropriate development strategy for Africa must satisfy 
four fundamental principles – self-reliance, self-sustainment, the democratisation of the 
development process. and a fair and just distribution of the fruit of development through the 
progressive eradication of unemployment and mass poverty (ECA 1976).  
 
Beyond the corridors of inter-governmental conferencing, these four principles appeared to 
resonate in the wider African political and development discourse of the time. On the notion of 
‘self-reliance’, there appears to have been a keen debate73.  
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 That most of the NIEO proposals would not benefit Africa in the short-to-medium term seems to have been the 
consensus, with some suggesting that a ‘basic needs’ approach would be much more appropriate as a 
development strategy for Africa (cf. Arnold 1980). 
73
 See Ake’s (1996) definition of ‘self-reliance’ as the responsibility for producing a development project as well as 
for financing it (ibid p.40). 
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Which Way Africa? The Monrovia Strategy 
In July 1979, building on the ‘Revised Framework’, African leaders meeting in Monrovia 
signalled their intent to push for the increased self-reliance that Nkrumah has advocated two 
decades earlier. The summit was preceded by a symposium convened by then OAU Secretary-
General, Edem Kodjo in February 1979, ‘The Monrovia Symposium on the Future Development 
Prospects of Africa Towards the Year 2000’, which brought together leading African policy-
makers and intellectuals74. The Symposium concluded that Africa was mired in 
underdevelopment and must break with the past to create “a material and cultural 
environment that is conducive to self-fulfilment and creative participation” (OAU 1979, p.15). 
Participants proposed a new programme of action based on four main elements: African unity – 
manifested by an African common market, free movement of persons and goods, and a public 
sensitisation campaign on the need for African unity; an education manifesto underpinned by 
African values and culture; a series of technical instruments including planning; and enhanced 
co-operation between Third World countries (ibid).  
 
The Monrovia Declaration, which derived from the Symposium, committed signatories to 
promoting social and economic development and integration: 
 
“…with a view to achieving an increasing measure of self-reliance and self-sustainment, 
and encourage an endogenous and self-sustaining development to facilitate and 
strengthen our social and economic relations, to erect on the national, sub-regional and 
regional level a dynamic and inter-dependent African economy, and to establish each 
year specific programmes to materialise this sub-regional, regional and continental 
economic cooperation” (OAU 1977, emphasis added). 
 
The Monrovia Declaration and Strategy, aimed at achieving modern economies by the year 
2000, were underpinned by two subsequently pivotal concepts to Africa’s evolving 
development regime. The first was ‘national and collective self-reliance’. This referred to: (i) 
the internalisation of the forces of demand which determine the direction of development and 
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 Aside from leading figures from international agencies (such as the ECA’s Adedeji and UNCTAD Secretary-
General Kenneth Dadzie), participants at the Monrovia Symposium included radical African academics such as 
Joseph Ki-Zerbo and Ali Mazrui. 
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economic growth processes and patterns of output; (ii) increasing substitution of factor inputs 
derived from within the system as opposed to those from the outside; and (iii) increasing 
participation of the mass of the people in the production and consumption of the social product 
(Asante 1999, p.9).  
 
The second concept was ‘self-sustainment’, related to: 
 
“the deliberate installation of patterns and processes of development and economic 
growth in which different components support and reinforce each other so that, when 
related to the internalisation of the forces determining demand and supply, the whole 
system develops its own internal dynamics” (Asante 1991, p.9).  
 
The key message emanating from the Monrovia Strategy was that Africa would look to build 
from within, in the process reducing its outward orientation and reliance on external sources of 
finance to fuel its development. The OAU Secretary-General and ECA Executive Secretary were 
asked to develop a plan realise these objectives. The idea that Africa could adopt an inward-
looking development strategy sparked major controversy, with opponents later dubbing such 
ideas ‘autarkic’. 
 
Onset of the African ‘Crisis’ 
1980 has been identified as the start of what became known as the ‘African crisis’, marked by a 
dramatic downturn in Africa’s economic prospects and its standing in the world at large (Arrighi 
2002). In Chapter 1, I identified an important characteristic of development regimes as being 
the way they arise out of perceptions of crisis. It was the ‘crisis’ of latter-day colonialism that 
led African leaders to espouse an ideology of ‘developmentalism’, in the process legitimising 
their stewardship of the newly independent former colonies. Two decades later, Africa’s 
growing economic difficulties were deemed by experts to have become a ‘crisis’, again paving 
the way for intervention.  
 
While Africa’s leaders largely attributed the ‘crisis’ to a hostile external environment, the World 
Bank blamed internal African shortfalls. In reality, the reasons for the economic downturn are 
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complex, interlinked and difficult to attribute to any one set of factors or policies. However, it is 
worth briefly reviewing the main factors commonly cited as having precipitated or contributed 
to the African ‘crisis’. First, despite periods of strong growth, the postcolonial African economy 
remained more or less as dependent, vulnerable and mono-cultural in 1980 as it had been in 
1960 (Jespersen, p.10 in Cornia et al, 1991). Second, the Sudano-Sahelian drought of the 1970s 
led to food stocks being at their lowest levels for 20 years. 
  
A third factor was the oil-price rises of 1973/73 and 1978/79. What began as a political stand-
off between the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the U.S., in October 
1973, led to a 400% rise in the price of oil. This had devastating impacts on oil-importing 
countries, including many African nations that had not planned for such an eventuality. Worse 
was to come with the second oil shock in 1978/79. Although the resulting 200% price increase 
was smaller than in the first shock, the dollar effects were much greater, primarily because the 
increase started at a much more elevated level, at roughly $13 per barrel in 1978, as opposed 
to $3 per barrel in 1973 (Danso 1990). 
 
Linked to this, the global management of the economy suddenly shifted when on 15 August 
1971 the U.S. withdrew from the Bretton Woods Accord, and left the Gold Standard, allowing 
the dollar to float. OPEC countries were now getting fewer dollars for their oil and reacted by 
pricing oil against gold, precipitating the 1973/74 oil shock. This led to the emergence of the 
Eurodollar market, which enabled international banks to hold dollar deposits and issue dollar 
loans while remaining outside the jurisdiction of U.S. financial regulations (Danso 1990).  
 
The growing debt owed by African countries
75
, mostly to the multilateral development banks 
but also to unregulated private banks, was an important fourth factor. The post-independence 
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 Africa was to become the most indebted region in the world – as a percentage of GNP, total external debt rose 
from 39.6% in 1980 to 78.7% in 1994; and as a percentage of the value of experts it went up from 97% in 1980 to 
324% in 1990 (Saul and Leys 1999, p.4).  
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investments by African governments in public infrastructure projects
76
, and growth of 1974 to 
1980, had been enabled largely by borrowing, including from Eurodollar-rich banks in OPEC 
countries. At that time, the debt being accumulated was considered to be sustainable, as long 
as commodity prices maintained an upward trajectory and the impressive economic growth 
registered in the 1960s and early 1970s continued. However, the oil shocks largely put paid to 
this optimism. Between 1975 and 1979, Africa’s debt grew by 25% annually, as set against a 
22% annual rise in exports (Danso 1990).  
 
Deteriorating terms of trade for Africa’s commodities are commonly cited as a fifth reason for 
the ‘crisis’. Prices of commodities (which had initially rallied alongside the increase in oil prices 
in 1973/74) subsequently crashed, forcing many African countries to borrow Eurodollars to 
cover the increased cost of oil imports and finance public projects (Danso 1990). By the late 
1970s, the terms of trade had turned significantly against African agricultural products, 
reflecting a deepening recession in Europe and North America.  
 
The combination of these five related factors had significant effects in many African countries 
throughout the second half of the 1970s. Among these, and directly linked to the economic 
difficulties, was social unrest, manifested by food riots and the outbreak of military coups 
d’état
77
. Outside Africa the ‘crisis’ registered worldwide impact, leading to attacks on the 
reformist and globalist inclinations of the international system – from both mercantilist 
nationalists in the North and dependistas in the South (Adedeji and Shaw 1985, p.271).  
 
So far, I have argued that Africa’s development strategy in the first two decades of 
independence was largely influenced by dominant international theories, and later by 
ideological strands emanating from the Cold War. These external ideas were seized upon by 
African leaders and technocrats, many trained in the West, seeking a coherent theoretical basis 
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 Among these projects was the construction in Nigeria of a new federal capital, Abuja, which is estimated to have 
cost more than the country’s sovereign debt at the time; and the expansion of Dodoma to become Tanzania’s 
national capital (Danso 1990). 
77
 McGowan (2003) chronicles 22 successful African coups d’état in the 1970s alone.  
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for nationalist ‘developmentalism’ amidst a profound lack of capacity
78
. Confronted by poor 
economic performance policymakers commissioned continental experts to develop alternatives 
to ‘inherited’ development theories. As I have argued in Chapter 1, criticising external ideas 
considered to have failed does not necessarily lead to paradigm shift. My reading of the search 
for ‘alternatives’ is that it reflected African ambitions to engage in power struggles over policy 
space.  
 
Strategies of Reaffirmation and Resistance (1980-1990) 
The effects of the downturn of the 1970s were so profound that many subsequently 
characterised the 1980s as ‘the lost decade’. This spoke to a growing Afro-pessimism, implicit in 
which “…was the core idea that the African people – their societies, cultures, mindset and 
structures – are incapable of running their states and their economies and therefore they will 
remain in a permanent state of crisis – stagnation and negative growth” (Bujra 2005, p.6). Thus, 
Africa was again objectified as a hopeless continent.  
 
On the basis of the ideas contained in the ‘Revised Framework’, at the request of African 
leaders at their Monrovia meeting, the ECA began a four-year process of research, seminars, 
workshops and ministerial meetings to plan for a development effort based on African thinking. 
To secure political buy-in at the highest level, the initial idea had been to convene a meeting of 
like-minded Heads of State, in effect a sub-set of the OAU membership. However, the ECA 
argued that unless every African country signed up to the proposed plan, it would be easy for 
external interests to divide and rule Africa. The idea of a summit of all African countries finally 
won the day, with the caveat that what was agreed would be a compromise plan based on 
consensus (Adedeji 2006).  
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 Nyerere’s Ujamaa in Tanzania and Zambian Humanism  are examples of how socialism was adapted to national 
African realities – although both Nyerere and Kaunda were at pains to distinguish their brands of African socialism 
from Marxism-Leninism and orthodox socialism (Grey 1984). In the mid-1980s, some 20 out of 52 independent 
African states were governed by socialist regimes (Sklar 1988).  
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A number of tensions were at play. One was a manifestation of the periodic tension between 
continental and national development exemplified two decades earlier by the Monrovia and 
Casablanca fault line. This was further complicated by the diverse political belief systems of 
Africa’s leaders, ranging from neo-Marxist to ultra-conservative. As Adedeji (2006) explained:  
 
“In those days you had [Marxist-influenced Ethiopian leader] Mengistu at one extreme, 
and the King of Morocco at the other, so for them to be able to agree on the proposals 
in the Lagos Plan of Action was really a mega-breakthrough” (ibid p.9)79.  
 
Possibly the most significant tension was between ECA and OAU experts. In parallel to the ECA 
initiative, the OAU Secretariat, also based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, had drafted a separate 
document – developed after a consultation in Addis Ababa in December 1979 – which was 
presented to Planning and Finance Ministers in Lagos
80
. However, the policy-makers rejected 
the OAU version and asked that the ECA’s proposals for a ‘Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic 
Development of Africa 1980-2000’ (LPA) be tabled for discussion. (I revisit the (O)AU-ECA rivalry 
in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4). 
 
The Lagos Plan of Action 
The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and Final Act of Lagos (FAL) were endorsed by the Second OAU 
Extraordinary Session of Heads of State and Government, held in Lagos, Nigeria in July 1980. 
The LPA constituted a detailed elaboration of the general principles and objectives arrived at in 
Monrovia in 1979. It included sector-by-sector proposals for accelerated economic and social 
development in Africa in the last two decades of the twentieth century. The FAL provided a 
blueprint for regional integration, committing African governments to establishing at African 
Economic Community by 2000 and laying out steps towards this goal.  
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 Shaw (in Adedeji and Shaw 1985) notes that although some leaders and regimes had serious reservations about 
certain aspects of the LPA their apprehension about the political consequences of further economic stagnation or 
decline led them to endorse it. He identifies the dissenters as a growing ‘radical’ coalition within the OAU and an 
established ‘conservative’ bloc, citing splits between these groups as leading to disagreements over Chad, the Horn 
of Africa, the Sahara, and Libya. Elsewhere, Shaw (1982) notes that self-reliance was adopted at national level by a 
group of “more radical and peripheral states” – including Angola, Benin, Mali, Somalia and Tanzania – and was “… 
avoided assiduously by those countries and regimes at the semi-periphery which still hope to benefit from 
continued incorporation into the world system – Algeria, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Nigeria”(ibid p.115). 
80
 For a detailed account of this incident, see D’Sa (1983).  
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Never before had Africa’s leadership been so frank and unequivocal about what it deemed to 
be the causes of Africa’s economic problems. In the LPA preamble, leaders lamented the fact 
that, despite a rich endowment of natural resources, Africa remained the least developed 
continent, with 21 of the world’s 30 least developed countries at that time. They placed the 
lion’s share of the blame on external factors, notably racism, colonialism and neo-colonialism
81
. 
Detailed deconstruction of the 13 substantive chapters of the LPA, spanning 90 pages, is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is worth noting here that the Plan included 
detailed proposals for:  
 promoting food self-sufficiency as well as reviving agriculture;  
 galvanising internally focused sub-regional and continental industrialisation;  
 managing Africa’s natural-resource endowment to the benefit of the continent and its 
peoples;  
 establishing sub-regional and regional energy initiatives;  
 strengthening Africa’s human-resource capacity;  
 investing in science and technology;  
 building a transport and communications infrastructure across the continent;  
 taking measures to protect the environment; and  
 improving the status of women (LPA 1980).  
 
Critically, the LPA’s credo of ‘collective self-reliance’ and ‘self-sustained development’ was 
advocated not only at the continental level, but also at national, sub-regional, and international 
levels – particularly in the context of industrialisation, trade and finance. The LPA was 
underpinned by a collective African nationalism, which combined Dependency Theory, 
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 Although moderate African leaders in the Monrovia Group ensured that the OAU adopted an incrementalist 
vision of African unity (as opposed to the Casablanca Group’s more radical approach), the continental 
organisation’s definition of neo-colonialism was no different from Nkrumah’s. For Nkrumah (1965), the neo-
colonialism of the immediate post-independence period represented “imperialism in its final and perhaps its most 
dangerous stage” (ibid p. ix). For him, the essence of neo-colonialism lay in the external domination of the political 
polity and economic systems of ostensibly sovereign nations. While a degree of military coercion was involved, 
neo-colonialist control was more often than not exercised through economic or monetary means, including unfair 
terms of exchange (ibid). The views of radical African scholars were consistent with this reading of neo-colonialism. 
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environmentalism and basic human needs with indigenous and long-standing African priorities 
(Adedeji and Shaw 1985). While it marked a definitive departure from orthodox development 
theories, it could not be categorised as entirely ‘radical’ as it combined mainstream ideas (on 
environmentalism, for example) with elements of Dependency Theory and other external ideas 
– illustrating the hybrid nature of African development thinking. 
 
This resonates with a foundational argument in this thesis: from seeing itself as separate, Africa 
has always considered itself as an integral part of the wider world. Thus, the pursuit of African 
development has always involved the fusion of indigenous and external ideas, adapted and 
tailored to fit the local context. This ‘hybridisation’ argument is at odds with a major critique of 
the LPA – that its underlying intention was to separate Africa from the rest of the world. 
Countering this, Adedeji and Shaw (1985) argue that, far from advocating autarky, the LPA 
sought to balance Africa’s overly outward-looking postcolonial development strategy with 
relative introversion. This speaks to the strategic ‘pragmatism’ I argue is central to 
understanding the workings of power in Africa’s development regime. Although there was a 
clear appeal to ‘alternatives’, what the ECA set out to deliver was essentially a ‘home-grown’ 
set of policies, drawing on external rationalities, informed by local realities. The intention was 
that pursuing an internally focused and African-led search for a development strategy would 
ensure outcomes considered legitimate by African states – whether or not the content of the 
policies was authentically African. 
 
In addition to the charge of ‘autarky’, critics of the LPA pointed to a number of faults that in 
their view rendered the Plan suspect. One charge, common to African and external critics, was 
that the LPA’s diagnosis of the African ‘crisis’ focused overwhelmingly on exogenous factors 
that created and sustained ‘dependent capitalism’. One commentator has highlighted the LPA’s 
lack of focus on the endogenous agency aspects of the crisis of ‘dependent capitalism’ as an 
enduring weakness, with the Plan “offering little reflection on the extent to which several of the 
leaders sitting around the conference hall where it was adopted in Lagos in 1980 were 
fundamentally liable for adumbrating the crisis of colonial political economy” (Adesina 2005, 
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p.13)
82
. According to this view, a number of African countries were at least partially responsible 
for the ‘crisis’ because they invested in expensive prestige projects, using money borrowed to 
advance national development.  
 
A second criticism was that the LPA was utopian and failed to specify practical policy measures 
that might make a realistic contribution towards the attainment of its long-term objectives. 
Ravenhill (1986) dubs the LPA a “mammoth shopping list” with no ranking or preferences, no 
price-tag and no assessment of trade-offs (ibid p.88). Third, the LPA was seen as naïve, as its 
assumption that international donors would foot the bill for implementing the Plan meant it did 
not address the potential incompatibility between self-reliant development and increased 
dependence on aid (Ravenhill 1986). Fourth, critics lambasted the proposal for an African 
Economic Community hinged on preferential trade as ‘outmoded’ (ibid). A fifth critique was 
that the LPA’s adoption of the African continent as its unit of analysis called into question the 
applicability of its proposals to any given country (cf. Ravenhill 1986).  
 
This speaks to the tension referred to earlier in this chapter: for political purposes, and to fight 
the anti-colonial struggle, Pan-Africanism sees the continent as a ‘geopolitical bloc’. At the 
same time there is a strong reaction against the objectification of Africa as an undifferentiated 
mass. The LPA, like all development-related plans issued by African leaders, harnesses Pan-
African unity as an essentially political device, that does not preclude the experts who drafted 
these plans from later arguing for differentiation and context-specificity while countering the 
idea of ‘one-size-fits-all’. Thus, African policy-makers see no incompatibility between agreeing 
on continent-wide principles as a basis for negotiation, whilst recognising that the reality in 
each country may necessitate context-specific strategies. 
 
Ravenhill (1986) is also critical of the lack of discussion in the plan of the need for increased 
exports. Indeed, the LPA is clear on its intent to move Africa away from the export-orientation 
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 A number of other African experts, including Asante (1991) and Anyang’ Nyong’o (2004) have argued that the 
LPA failed to get to grips with the poor internal governance of African states as a critical factor that may have 
affected implementation of development policy in the first two decades of independence. 
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trap highlighted by the dependistas, towards developing an industrial base. Doing so would 
involve considerable technological inputs in the early stages, as had been the case in Latin 
America. This would require foreign exchange, which could most readily be acquired through 
export of raw materials or a combination of aid and technology transfer. However, its 
supporters argue that the LPA did not go into this detail because African leaders were trying to 
make a political statement about reliance on external sources as the antithesis of ‘self-reliance’ 
(Shaw 1982). Furthermore, the key to the LPA was industrialisation as the sine qua non for 
development, hence its designation of 1980-1990 as the ‘United Nations Industrial 
Development Decade in Africa’ (ibid). 
 
Adedeji and Shaw (1985) hit back at charges that the Monrovia Strategy and LPA were not 
sufficiently substantive, insisting that the two documents were intended as a political 
declaration, a development strategy, a set of priorities, sectoral programmes of action, and a 
blueprint for regional and sub-regional integration. They point to the ‘Revised Framework’ and 
various ECA staff papers as having provided the intellectual and theoretical substance that 
informed the LPA. They also highlight a number of fundamental assumptions and principles 
underpinning both the Monrovia Strategy and LPA
83
. 
 
Adedeji and Elliot Berg 
Before discussing the fall-out over ‘Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda 
for Action’ (World Bank 1981) – commonly referred to as the ‘Berg Report’ – it is pertinent to 
highlight some little-known but important facts.  
 
The lead author of ‘Accelerated Development’, Elliot Berg, at the time Director of the Centre for 
Research on Economic Development (CRED) at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor in the 
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 These are listed as : a) The deliberate promotion of an increasing measure of national self-reliance; b) the 
acceleration of internally located and relatively autonomous processes of growth and diversification and the 
achievement of a self-sustained development process; c) the democratisation of the development process; d) the 
progressive eradication of mass poverty and unemployment and a fair and just distribution of income and the 
benefits of development among the populace; and e) the acceleration of the process of regional economic 
integration through co-operation (Adedeji and Shaw 1985, p.15). 
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U.S., had in 1969 invited Adebayo Adedeji to spend two years as a visiting professor at CRED. 
Adedeji recalls that, despite knowing and having great respect for Berg, he could not take up 
the offer because he was appointed a Minister by the Nigerian Government (Adedeji 2006). 
Owodunmi Teriba, a fellow Nigerian economist who later came to work with Adedeji at the 
ECA, himself spent a year at the CRED (1972-1973) as an associate professor, at the invitation of 
Berg. In an interview, he recalls an incident involving Berg, who had wanted to travel to Nigeria 
to undertake wage review studies with a local researcher: 
 
“Shortly after my return to Ibadan, Berg was going to do a wages review study in 
Nigeria, I think funded by the World Bank. While in Michigan I remember he came to 
talk to me, and asked me if I’d like to work with him on this study when I got back to 
Nigeria. It was Professor H.M.A. Onitiri [then Director of the Nigerian Institute of Social 
and Economic Research] and Professor Ojetunji Aboyade [then Chairman of the 
Department of Economics at Ibadan University] who put their foot down, saying: ‘You 
don’t need to bring an American to come and do wage reviews here’. On the basis of 
their objection, Berg’s mission to Nigeria was cancelled” (Teriba 2006). 
 
This is significant because it shows that underlying the well-documented fall-out between the 
ECA and the World Bank over the Berg Report was a history of intellectual engagement 
between Berg, then at Michigan University, and Nigeria’s top post-independence development 
experts. According to Teriba (2006), the reluctance of Nigeria’s leading planners to allow a 
Western academic to conduct a study in their country was emblematic of the fierce 
contestation between African and international experts over whose ideas should determine the 
national development policy of independent African nations
84
.  
 
Adedeji, who had honed his combative skills as Minister of Economic Planning and 
Reconstruction in Nigeria, took this nationalism to a continental stage when he moved to Addis 
Ababa to head the ECA (ibid). And as will be seen below, Berg’s engagement with Adedeji was 
to have a direct bearing on the intellectual stewardship and orientation of ECA for more than 
two decades.  
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 Nigeria’s post-independence education policy was highly ambitious. By 1967 the state was overinvesting in 
university education and university-oriented secondary education, compared to other sectors of the economy 
(Sibisi 1993).  
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The Berg Report Stand-off 
The Berg Report was prepared by the World Bank in response to a formal request of 1979 by 
African Executive Directors at the Bank to its President Robert McNamara. They called for a 
review of the causes and potential cures of the dim economic prospects they believed 
confronted their economies (Green and Allison 1986). Elliot Berg was appointed co-ordinator of 
a task force named the ‘African Strategy Review Group’, with the mandate of developing an in-
depth study. It was put together from memoranda from a range of invited commentators, a 
basic consultancy draft by Berg and a series of in-house papers and review committee meetings 
(ibid). It was released in late 1981. 
 
Among the Berg Report’s key findings were the attribution of Africa’s economic stagnation 
primarily to internal factors, notably poor governance and state failure. It rejected the industrial 
policy that many African countries had sought to pursue, arguing that Africa’s problem was one 
of under-production and proposing a return to export-oriented agriculture as the way forward. 
Berg advocated a rolling back of the state, arguing that the market should be unfettered to 
allow it to allocate welfare. Short-term prescriptions included: eliminating state subsidies and 
controls on imports, wages and prices; floating previously pegged African currencies (effectively 
devaluing them); and allowing the market to determine the price of commodities for export 
(World Bank 1981). 
 
In a chapter of a book written five years later, Berg revisited and restated the main arguments 
in the 1981 Report. The 1986 diagnosis characterises the African economic downturn as four 
‘crises’ rolled into one: a crisis of stagnant or declining production; a crisis in internal and 
external economic balance; an agricultural crisis; and an institutional crisis. Three sets of factors 
were said to explain the complex ‘crisis’: ‘structural’ factors (historical, geographical, political 
and climactic); external factors (the oil and food shocks of the early 1970s; and unfavourable 
terms of trade); and domestic policy deficiencies (manifested by over-valued exchange rates, 
inappropriate agricultural policies, and an excessive public-sector role in the economy).  
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In terms of policy prescriptions, Berg (1986) urged African governments to: address the 
exchange rate problem and the need for economic stabilisation to which it is related; give 
agricultural development renewed priority; and ensure better economic management in the 
short-term, at a time when new sources of public revenue will be hard to find. For aid donors, 
Berg conceded that:  
 
“[since] donor technical assistance drew up plans, designed projects (directly or 
indirectly) and implemented many of them on the ground, Africa’s economic failures are 
therefore also donor failures” (ibid p.53).  
 
This recognition of donor culpability represents a difference in emphasis from the 1981 Report, 
which highlighted state failure as the main reason for the ‘crisis’. Nevertheless, and despite 
having been a significant player in Africa’s early development efforts, the World Bank escapes 
direct censure. 
 
The Berg Report was undeniably produced as a response to the LPA, to provide an intellectual 
basis for the World Bank’s intervention to initiate structural adjustment programmes in African 
countries. For one commentator, the Report as stood out as “the definitive document on 
adjustment for 17 years” (Mkandawire 2001, p.292).  
 
Divergences and Critiques 
Commentators have highlighted major differences in emphasis between the LPA and Berg 
Report. A key point of divergence was on the identification of the principal causes of the ‘crisis’. 
While the Berg Report was deemed to have adopted a revisionist developmentalist perspective 
within the modernisation genre in emphasising internal factors as the primary cause of Africa’s 
underdevelopment, the LPA’s emphasis on colonial and neo-colonial exploitation fell squarely 
within the dependencia tradition (Shaw 1982, p.117).  
 
Another notable point of divergence is that while the LPA presented longer-term and radically 
different two-decade strategic proposals, it was deemed to have failed to address the 
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immediate ‘crisis’, to have been unable to put together an articulate set of principles, and to 
have failed to follow an empirical approach. In contrast, the Berg Report was touted by many as 
the only major policy-oriented analysis of Africa’s economic crisis, including short-term policy 
prescriptions to address it (Green and Allison 1986).  
  
Patrick Bugembe, a Ugandan econometrist who had joined the ECA in 1978 and served as a 
member of Adedeji’s core team of experts, agreed that the Berg Report addressed issues not 
dealt with in the LPA – among them questions of poor African governance and issues of 
macroeconomic policy: “The LPA had not looked at the macro issues. It was a more structural 
document, based on notions of self-reliance” (Bugembe 2006). However, the Berg Report also 
advanced a different agenda:  
 
“By inserting the word ‘accelerated’ in the title of the Berg Report, the Bank was saying 
to African countries: ‘you’re OK – you just need to run a bit faster’. The LPA was saying: 
‘you are not OK – you need to restructure’. ‘Acceleration’ implies you are already on the 
road – which was not what the LPA was saying” (ibid). 
 
As Shaw (1982) noted, the two plans were not only antithetical in intellectual association and 
policy direction; they are also advocated by two mutually exclusive coalitions – the more 
‘Africanist’ coalition of the OAU under the leadership of Adedeji which consisted of indigenous 
and progressive academics, advisers and leaders; and the more ‘internationalist’ World-Bank-
led grouping which was “…less cohesive, more conservative and less indigenous: bankers, 
bureaucrats and economists” (ibid pp.117-118).  
 
On publication, the Berg Report was undeniably the most controversial document on Africa’s 
development, drawing fire from a wide range of critics on grounds of both its substance and its 
style85. It was also found to contain sweeping generalisations, inconsistencies and 
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 A widespread critique was that the Report’s basic doctrine was one of economic and political neo-liberalism, 
advocating as it did an expanded role for the market in allocating welfare and effective state withdrawal from the 
business of development. One commentator identified strong similarities between the Report’s prescriptions and 
late colonial approaches to development (Green and Allison 1986). Helleiner (1983) dubbed the original thrust of 
the report as ‘productionist’ and noted that a constantly stated concern was ‘efficiency’ in the narrowest sense, 
stating: “One must strain to discover signs of the World Bank’s recent preoccupation with distribution, absolute 
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contradictions, reflecting the fact that disagreements among the task force led parts of the text 
to be re-edited prior to its release86. There appears to have been an internal battle within the 
task force over the content and pitch of the Report. K.Y. Amoako, the task force’s only African 
member, recalled in an interview that the original draft of the report was:  
 
“… very free-market-oriented. Elliot Berg was very pro-free-market and very passionate. 
My contribution was to help moderate its prescriptions” (Amoako 2003).  
 
It also appears the World Bank was never fully in support of the Berg Report and subsequently 
turned its back on a number of the Report’s key positions, according to Green and Allison 
(1986)87. Helleiner (1983) also highlights at least two areas in the report where attempts had 
been made to soften the message on the need for African governments to change policy 
direction by inserting qualifiers recognising ‘wider political constraints and objectives’. Even 
commentators in support of the substantive proposals in the Report were forced to concede 
that attention was diverted away from these by the deficiencies in analysis and tone (cf. 
Ravenhill 1986). Publication of the Berg Report coincided with a major shift in World Bank 
policy, with Robert McNamara’s retirement as president heralding a new era of supply-side 
market orthodoxy that abandoned the Bank’s focus on meeting basic human needs (Ravenhill 
1986).  
 
Enter K.Y. Amoako 
Adedeji’s cordial relationship with Elliot Berg was severely tested when the World Bank sent 
Berg to Addis Ababa in 1980 to inform the ECA and OAU leadership that the Bank was preparing 
a study in response to the LPA. According to his official biographer, Adedeji was flabbergasted 
to learn of the Bank study, and urged Berg to allow Africa the space to implement the LPA’s 
                                                                                                                                                                
poverty or basic needs. Can all these issues have evaporated in Africa during the past few years?” (ibid p.260). The 
Berg Report was also lambasted for its voluntaristic conception of the African state, and in particular its reluctance 
to acknowledge the political constraints on government action.  
86
 According to Green and Allison (1986): “Professor Berg’s economic worldview is of a more robust and free 
competitive market-allocated, comparative advantage-led, neo-liberal, political-economic world than portrayed in 
[the Berg Report]” (ibid p.63). 
87
 Berg (1986) denied that the Report was becoming the ‘blueprint’ for post-McNamara WB Africa operations (see 
ibid pp.58-59).  
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provisions (Sanmi-Ajiki 2000). Accompanying Berg on that mission to Addis Ababa was K.Y. 
Amoako, a Ghanaian economist who had joined the World Bank as a young professional in July 
1974 after completing a PhD in econometrics at Berkeley. In an interview, Amoako recalled the 
tense nature of the meeting:  
 
“I remember that Adedeji was very upset that the World Bank had been asked by 
African governments (via their Executive Directors) to produce a report. He thought it 
was insulting. I was asked to do some consultations in Africa. I came to Addis Ababa with 
Elliot Berg to meet with the OAU and ECA. I remember coming to meet with Prof. 
Adedeji in what is now the [ECA] Operations Room. In those days, there was a large 
roundtable in the room. I remember Elliot and I going into the […] room and seeing ECA 
division chiefs sitting around the table, and seeing Prof. Adedeji enter the room. During 
the whole meeting, he totally ignored me. I got the sense that he was trying to 
communicate to me that [as an African] I should be ashamed of being a part of this. We 
then had lunch. After that, we went to the OAU and they refused to see us. We went 
back to Washington” (Amoako 2003). 
 
Adedeji (2006) remembers being outraged that the World Bank should send an African staff 
member to help sell its ideas and communicate its intentions to the ECA.  
 
Beyond signifying the intensity of the battle of ideas provoked by the LPA and the Berg Report, 
and the charged emotions of the time, the meeting between the ECA and the World Bank 
marked the beginning of an intellectual rivalry between two African thinkers that endures 
today. Adedeji was an imposing figure whose stewardship of the process leading up to the 
launch of the LPA put him centre-stage in the battle for Africa to be the prime agent of its own 
development. Amoako was a rising star at the World Bank who had just had his first taste of the 
politics of policy- making in Africa’s development regime. Some 15 years later, Amoako would 
be head-hunted by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali to lead the ECA, and would 
move to Addis Ababa to occupy the same seat that Adedeji had made his own for close to two 
decades. Whilst Adedeji and Amoako had much in common – including a passionate belief in 
the idea of a modern, developed Africa, and a shared conviction on African agency in realising 
this idea – their styles of intellectual leadership and policy entrepreneurship were radically 
different.  
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Once the Berg Report was released, the World Bank made strenuous efforts to minimise the 
rupture and demonstrate to sceptics how close in thinking the two plans were. Stanley Please, 
until 1983 senior adviser to the Bank’s senior operations vice president, noted in a paper that: 
 
“[o]n issue after issue the ECA and the World Bank are in accord not only about general 
development objectives but about means to achieve these objectives” (Please 1984, 
pp.91-92)88. 
 
Two years later, Please teamed up with Amoako to co-author a chapter entitled “OAU, ECA and 
the World Bank: Do They Really Disagree?” The two set out to move beyond the polarised 
debate (which they dubbed the “flow of words”) and focus on what they considered to be the 
facts
89
. On a number of issues, the authors tried to show consensus between the Berg Report, 
the World Bank and the LPA90; on others, they conceded a variance of views. On a few issues, 
they admitted that the Bank could have been more explicit or clearer in its arguments. 
However, nowhere did they admit the Bank was wrong.  
 
The Please–Amoako collaboration should be seen as part of a wider World Bank strategy to 
advance the policy prescriptions contained in the Berg Report while at the same time 
minimising the rupture between Africa and the Bank that the Report had provoked
91
. Indeed, 
the World Bank was highly pro-active in seeking to convince African leaders and policy 
intellectuals that its ideas represented the best way forward for Africa, beyond the ‘crisis’.  
                                                  
88
 See Please (1984, pp.92-93) for an extensive list of the areas of agreement in question, as well as a list of a few 
areas of disagreement.  
89
 They focused their discussion on the issues raised by African Governors of the World Bank at their Dakar 
meeting in March 1982; a report of the 8
th
 meeting of the ECA Conference of African ministers responsible for 
economic development and planning (Tripoli April 1982); and articles in a special edition of the Bulletin of IDS. 
90
 The issues Please and Amoako choose to take on are: food-self sufficiency; export agriculture; industrial policy; 
pricing policy; roles of the private sector and of government; and regional and sub-regional integration.  
91
 The Bank’s post-Berg-Report strategy to win acceptance for its ideas was far-reaching. One initiative to this end 
was the creation in 1983 of the Special Program of Assistance to Africa (SPA) as a World-Bank-chaired donor forum 
to mobilise quick-disbursing funding to support Sub-Saharan African countries implementing Berg-Report-
prescribed reforms. Another was the launch of the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) in the mid-1980s, intended to 
provide a space for Africa and its development partners to engage on wider political factors (such as conflict and 
governance) affecting economic development. The SPA was re-branded the Strategic Partnership with Africa in 
2006, and now includes African countries as members. The GCA was deemed to be no longer viable and shut down 
in 2007. 
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Official African Reaction to the Berg Report 
African policy-makers had been reluctant to criticise the Berg Report openly, as many of their 
countries received significant Bank funding. A task force made up of the ECA, African 
Development Bank (ADB), and OAU, was initially set up to review the Report. The task force 
produced two papers that set the stage for the official response from African leaders (Ake 
1996). The first official African reaction came at the Addis Ababa OAU Council of Ministers 38th 
ordinary session (22 February – 1 March 1982). After debating the Report, African Foreign 
Affairs Ministers concluded that it was not only unnecessary but also antagonistic to the LPA. A 
‘Report of the Secretary-General on the World Bank Report’, issued at the end of the meeting, 
stated:  
 
“[T]he proposed outward-looking, external-oriented concept of development proposed 
for our countries in the [Berg Report] is indeed a suggestion that we continue to do 
what we have been doing all these years. The only difference is that we lose the 
independence to set our goals, adopt our strategy and determine our policies. Added to 
this is the glaring arrogant paternalism in the report with no concern shown for the 
need to increase the capacity of our countries to do in the near future what outsiders 
are doing for them now” (OAU 1982, Appendix II, p.3)
92
. 
 
Next, at a meeting in Dakar, Senegal in early March 1982, African Governors of the World Bank 
and IMF – who had requested the study that generated the Berg Report – rejected its focus on 
domestic factors, opposed its concentration on agriculture rather than industry, and expressed 
scepticism about whether it would deliver the financing promised. They also lamented its lack 
of interest in regionalism and its dissatisfaction with the public and parastatal sectors. 
However, their major complaint was about its focus – the attempt to blame Africa for its own 
condition – which they asserted placed insufficient importance on external, global conditions 
beyond Africa’s control (Shaw 1985). 
 
                                                  
92
 Annexed to that document was a technical response produced by the ECA, the African Development Bank (ADB) 
and OAU Secretariats, which asserted the viability of the LPA over the Berg Report (Ravenhill 1986). 
108 
 
A third opportunity arose in April 1982 when the ECA convened Africa’s Ministers of Planning 
and Economic Development for their 8th Conference in Tripoli, Libya. According to Adedeji’s 
official biographer, the World Bank sent a large team to Tripoli to prevent any criticisms of the 
Berg Report. At a closed meeting with African Ministers, Adedeji threatened to resign from the 
ECA unless African countries came out openly in support of the ideas they had signed up to 
(Sanmi-Ajiki 2000, Adedeji 2006). The Declaration of Tripoli on the World Bank Report Entitled 
‘Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action’, released at the end of 
the conference, rejected the Berg Report, stating unequivocally that the goals and objectives 
defined by African countries for themselves in the Monrovia Strategy, the Lagos Plan of Action 
and the Final Act of Lagos remained the authentic and authoritative goals and objectives for 
Africa (Ake 1996).  
 
The African Priority Programme 
By 1984, natural disasters and harmful weather patterns arising from drought and 
desertification had spread to 36 of the OAU’s then 51 member states. In the same  year, 
devastating global economic recession was manifest in the collapse of commodity prices, 
unprecedentedly high interest rates, sharp exchange-rate fluctuations, increased protectionism, 
chronic balance of payments deficits, mounting external debts and steady declines in real terms 
of aid. This was the worst economic situation in modern times in Africa, particularly Sub-
Saharan Africa (Adedeji and Shaw 1985).  
 
Three years earlier, in April 1981, a closed meeting during the ECA Conference of Ministers had 
been convened to consider a confidential paper submitted by Adedeji entitled ‘Africa’s Rapidly 
Escalating Crisis – Proposals for a Short-Term Immediate Programme of Survival’. This proposed 
an emergency programme of action in the critical areas of food and drought, energy, and the 
balance of payments. This emergency plan was not meant to replace the LPA or Third UN 
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Development Decade, but to lay the necessary foundation for the successful implementation of 
the LPA93.  
 
This effort to respond to the food crisis marked a period of consultations among African leaders 
and experts, convened by the ECA, OAU, AfDB as well as by sub-regional economic 
organisations
94
. During this period, Adedeji and the ECA were the prime movers, devoting 
significant analytical resources and a series of meetings to addressing different aspects of the 
economic situation. The ECA set the pace for the OAU and informed the positions taken under 
its umbrella by Africa’s leadership (Asante 1991). 
 
The state of Africa’s economies came to the attention of the UN General Assembly, which in 
Resolution 39/29 (3 December 1984) spoke of Africa’s “critical economic situation”. In 1985, the 
UN agreed to convene a special session of the General Assembly to discuss ways of moving 
Africa beyond the impasse, onto a sustainable development path. In advance of the special 
session, and with substantial ECA involvement, African countries prepared a document entitled 
‘Africa’s Submission to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Africa’s 
Economic and Social Crisis’. This contained analysis and detailed proposals to: accelerate 
implementation of the LPA and Final Act of Lagos; improve the food situation and rehabilitation 
of agriculture; alleviate Africa’s external debt; establish common platforms for action at sub-
regional, regional, continental and international levels; and counter the destabilisation policy of 
South Africa on the economies of Southern African states (OAU 1985). African leaders adopted 
these proposals, known as the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 
(APPER), at an OAU summit in Addis Ababa on 20 July 1985. In 1986, APPER was adopted by 
ECA Planning Ministers and OAU Foreign Ministers.  
 
                                                  
93
 Adedeji argued that, even if there had been no drought, the African food crisis had been in the making since 
independence. He saw the food crisis as the result of a conjuncture of three different crises: a technical crisis; a 
development crisis; and a political crisis (Adedeji and Shaw 1985). 
94
 It is important to note the high levels of co-ordination between key ICEs in Africa’s development regime – whose 
experts worked closely together in developing the technical basis for leadership positions in response to the 
various ‘crises’ Africa’s policy and political leadership sought to respond to.  
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As Asante (1991) notes, the Special Session of the UN General Assembly in May/June 1986 was 
the first time a session had been convened to discuss the problems of a single continent. It was 
also the first time an entire continent had pledged itself to a programme of economic reforms 
with a view to getting support from the international community. Effectively, the Special 
Session internationalised Africa’s economic plight, as it constituted “…recognition by African 
governments that internal reform was required, and by the international community that the 
reforms could not be carried out without external help” (ibid p.147). On 1 June 1986, based on 
APPER, the session adopted the UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and 
Development (UN-PAAERD).  
 
The APPER was a clear attempt by African countries to renegotiate the terms of their 
engagement with the international community, amidst tough times and bearing in mind the 
structural adjustment programmes a number countries had already signed up to. Although it 
began with unstinting commitment to the principles of the LPA and Final Act of Lagos, and 
although it retained the strong language of the LPA when it came to the decolonisation agenda, 
the overall tone of the document was altogether more conciliatory. Furthermore, both APPER 
and UN-PAAERD appeared to prioritise a number of areas highlighted by the Berg Report, 
leading one commentator to declare the emergence of APPER as a defining moment in the 
“formal surrender” by African countries who largely embraced the critical assumptions and 
strategies of the Berg Report while discarding those of the LPA95 (Ake 1996, p.24).  
 
According to this view, African leaders recognised that their countries were in an invidious 
position, and realised it was futile to try to pursue the African development agenda without the 
co-operation of the West. The APPER was therefore tailored to resonate with the World Bank’s 
views to avoid another clash that Africa would surely lose (Ake 996). Adedeji saw things 
somewhat differently, and pointed to subsequent World Bank reports as a sign that the World 
Bank had indeed moved closer to the ECA position on several key issues (Adedeji and Shaw 
1985). Does APPER represent a seminal moment in the subordination of Africa’s development 
                                                  
95
 For his supporting arguments, see Ake 1996, p.28. 
111 
 
regime, as Ake (1996) argues? The idea that APPER may have been part of a utilitarian approach 
to securing sorely needed aid speaks to a recurrent theme in Africa’s evolving development 
regime – whether accepting the dominant development discourse should be seen as an act of 
complete submission or rather as a pragmatic strategy to gain concessions towards clawing 
back power. I unpack this question further as this dissertation unfolds. 
 
In any event, if Africa’s leadership expected that APPER and UN-PAAERD would result in 
magnanimous debt relief and increased aid, they were to be sorely disappointed (Adesina 2005, 
Ake 1996, Kankwenda 2008). The expectation had been that, of the $128.1 billion estimated to 
be the cost of implementing UN-PAAERD, $82.46 billion was to come from domestic African 
sources, and $45.6 billion from external sources (Asante 1991). However, although African 
countries were found by a 1990 ECA study to have made significant headway in implementing 
the agreed reforms, resource flows to Africa declined in real terms in 198796 (ibid). 
 
At an ECA-organised conference held in Abuja, Nigeria (June 1987), in collaboration with the 
ADB and OAU, participants highlighted the series of reforms undertaken by African countries in 
line with APPER and UN-PAAERD. They lamented that the collapse of commodity prices, lack of 
additional aid and increased debt-servicing burden had exacerbated balance of payments 
problems, forcing some 28 African countries to embark on structural adjustment reforms 
designed to correct financial imbalances. They warned that, unless SAPs were more directly 
related to the wider objectives of APPER and UN-PAAERD, and unless more funding could be 
mobilised, the programme would have a negative impact on growth, employment, living 
standards, social development and political stability (ECA 1987). What stood out most clearly 
however, as the first recommendation, was that, to sustain domestic policy reforms and 
improve economic management, African countries must continue to pursue structural reform 
measures (ibid). Although reference was made to the need to minimise the adverse social and 
                                                  
96
 Although net resource flows to Africa increased from $17.9 billion in 1985 to $19.9 billion in 1986 and $22.9 
billion in 1987 in nominal terms, measured in real terms, resource flows were lower in 1986 than in 1985. Export 
credits to Africa declined in 1986 and 1987, while other private commercial flows remained negligible since 1983. 
At the same time, there was a net transfer of financial resources from Africa to the IMF – estimated at close to $1 
billion annually in 1986 and 1987 (Asante 1991, pp.153-54). 
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human impact of adjustment, the Abuja Statement provided the clearest indication yet that 
Africa had largely chosen to follow a path prescribed by Washington. 
 
Concerned by the lack of a favourable response to APPER from the international community, 
the ECA and OAU fought to keep Africa’s economic recovery as a priority on the international 
agenda. In December 1987, at the end of an Extraordinary Summit, African leaders in Addis 
Ababa demanded a resolution to Africa’s spiralling debt97. The ‘African Common Position on 
Africa’s External Debt’ called for an international conference to find a solution, and included 
proposals ranging from debt conversion (into grants), to cancellation (OAU 1987). The ‘Common 
Position’ constituted another key moment in the shifting discourse among African leaders on 
causes of and responsibility for the economic downturn. While insisting that “…the present 
economic backwardness of our continent is the direct result of colonialism, the effects of which 
are still being felt” (OAU 1987, p.2), they also reaffirmed that “….the development of our 
continent is the primary responsibility of our governments and our peoples” (ibid).  
 
While I agree that by 1987 African leaders had accepted full responsibility for addressing the 
continent’s problems, an inevitability given the weak bargaining position of their countries, I 
submit that this may have been a discursive device to re-assert their agency, for external as well 
as internal reasons. The imperative for African countries will have been to re-establish new aid 
relations with the West to ensure renewed and stable resource flows of capital – an objective 
Van de Walle (2001) argues several countries achieved while only partially implementing 
prescribed reforms. At the same time, with the legitimacy of the state in question in many 
African countries – not least because of the state withdrawal mandated by SAPs but also 
because the hardships imposed by the World Bank/IMF prescriptions leading to ‘bread’ riots in 
the 1980s (cf. Olukoshi 1993) – African leaders were under pressure to legitimise their 
continued rule.  
 
                                                  
97
 Estimated to have reached $200 billon by the end of 1986, representing 45% of Africa’s combined GDP and 293% 
of export earnings (OAU 1987). 
113 
 
For its part, and in an effort to put the controversy that began with the Berg Report behind it, 
the World Bank was willing to admit that “the current African crisis, to a considerable degree, 
has its origins in the international economic environment” (Bujra 2002, p.18). However, the 
Bank continued to advocate structural adjustment reforms as the way forward for African 
countries. In 1988, the World Bank published ‘Beyond Adjustment: Towards Sustainable Growth 
with Equity in Sub-Saharan Africa’ which, despite emphasising previously ignored issues of 
distribution and other social factors, nevertheless reflected an enduring preoccupation 
throughout the 1980s with demonstrating the success of SAPs.  
 
This preoccupation crystallised in a subsequent report, ‘Africa’s Adjustment and Growth in the 
1980s’, published jointly by the Bank and UNDP in March 1989. In the Foreword, World Bank 
Africa Vice-President Edward (‘Kim’) Jaycox and UNDP Administrator Pierre-Claver Damiba 
stated:  
 
“Although it is too early to draw firm conclusions, the data in this report suggest that a 
strategy of adjustment with growth is viable in Africa. The evidence points to better 
overall economic performance in countries that pursue strong reform programmes than 
in those that do not” (World Bank/UNDP 1989, p.iii). 
 
These findings quickly sparked reaction from Africa. In April 1989, the ECA Conference of 
Ministers adopted a resolution expressing “deep concern” at the document’s conclusions, 
which were found to be at variance with the UN Secretary-General’s mid-term review of UN-
PAAERD. The Ministers requested the Executive Secretary of ECA to: 
 
“publish a paper highlighting the technical and statistical variances contained [in the 
World Bank/UNDP report] for an objective evaluation of the economic situation on the 
continent” (ECA 1989). 
 
The ECA duly published ‘Statistics and Policies: ECA Preliminary Observations on the World Bank 
Report’. In this rejoinder, the World Bank was criticised for, among other things: statistical one-
dimensionality and selectivity; hazy criteria for classifying countries as strong, weak or non-
performers; undue optimism on the impact of the SAP reforms and the road to recovery; 
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excessive focus on growth; and short-termism. ECA dismissed the World Bank/UNDP analysis 
and conclusions as “arbitrary and [exhibiting] stark manipulation of data to prove a 
predetermined position” (ECA 1989, pp.10-11). 
 
Africa’s Alternative Framework 
Concerns about SAPs were highlighted in UNICEF’s 1987 publication, ‘Adjustment with a Human 
Face’, a seminal report showing the programmes’ negative effects on human development. 
While Adedeji and the ECA had refrained from taking public positions on SAPs, as so many of its 
member states had signed up to implement them, a personal appeal by an ECA economist led 
to a change of tack:  
 
“Eventually I did confront Adedeji and tell him that Africa will not get out of its quagmire 
if we let these things go on like that – an idea which he bought” (Bugembe 2006).  
 
In 1988, the ECA commissioned a two-year, multi-country study to gather evidence on the 
impact of SAPs on Africa’s economies, involving 25 national experts covering 24 countries 
(Sanmi-Ajiki 2000). In addition to the country studies, the researchers produced a series of 
sector-specific impact studies. The ECA also organised an international conference in Khartoum, 
Sudan in March 1988, on ‘The Human Dimension of Africa’s Economic Recovery and 
Development’. The Khartoum Declaration issued at the end of the conference emphasised the 
negative impact of SAPs on human development, indicating the growing African preoccupation 
(first referred to in the Monrovia Strategy) with people-centred development. 
 
In July 1988, Adedeji convened an International Advisory Board of 20 eminent African as well as 
non-African personalities – including senior officials of the UNDP, World Bank and IMF, to 
provide input and advice on an African response to SAPs. The World Bank nominated its then 
Chief Economist for Africa, Steve O’Brien, to serve on the Advisory Board. Professor S.K.B. 
Asante, a leading expert on regional integration in Africa, and also a member of the Advisory 
Board, recalls that Adedeji: 
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“challenged the group to work for ‘novel ways to advance Africa’s long-term 
development without going back to the unrealistic and unsustainable period before the 
crisis: towards a new synthesis of stabilisation and self-reliance’” (Asante 1991, p.176, 
emphasis added).  
 
This was as clear a statement as any that Africa was willing to accept short-term stabilisation 
measures advocated by the IMF, whilst pursuing increasing self-reliance in the medium-to-long 
term.  
 
The ECA convened an international workshop of African economists in early January 1989, 
which peer-reviewed a zero draft of the research findings. A revised draft went to two inter-
governmental meetings of African experts from Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, held in 
Blantyre, Malawi in February and March 1989 – culminating in the adoption of the ‘Blantyre 
Statement’98. The following month, in Addis Ababa, the ECA’s 15th Conference of Ministers of 
Planning and Economic Development adopted the results of the paper, naming it the ‘African 
Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and 
Transformation’ (AAF-SAP). On 10 April 1989, and for the first time, African Ministers of Finance 
met alongside their Planning and Economic Development counterparts, and endorsed AAF-SAP.  
 
Key Tenets of AAF-SAP 
In contrast to the emphasis on short-term stabilisation that had marked nearly a decade of 
World Bank and IMF-directed SAPs, AAF-SAP set out to address questions of long-term 
structural transformation. Early in the AAF-SAP document, the structures of Africa’s political 
economy are identified as “[constituting] the most fundamental causes of its 
underdevelopment and retrogression” (ECA 1989, p.2). AAF-SAP lists several manifestations of 
these characteristics: the predominance of subsistence and commercial activities; the narrow, 
disarticulate production base with ill-adapted technology; the neglected informal sector; the 
degraded environment; lopsided urban versus rural bias; the fragmentation of the African 
                                                  
98
 The Blantyre Conference was historic for two reasons: for the first time, Africa at intergovernmental level 
collectively undertook a critical re-examination of the orthodox structural adjustment programmes prescribed by 
the World Bank and the IMF. Second, it was the first time that African Ministers, who normally met in Washington, 
D.C. at the World Bank/ IMF Spring and Annual meetings, convened in an African capital (Sanmi-Ajiki 2000, p.284). 
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economy; the openness and excessive dependence of Africa’s economies including external 
factor inputs; and weak institutions (ibid). 
 
In charting Africa’s journey towards its own development strategy, AAF-SAP reaffirmed the 
LPA’s emphasis on ‘self-reliance’ and ‘self-sustained development’. The Plan had three 
objectives:  
1. human-centred development, highlighted in the Monrovia Strategy and LPA but also 
reflecting growing support by the international community 
2. establishing a self-sustaining process of economic growth and development, involving 
maintenance of economic growth, transformation of Africa’s economic and social 
structures, and maintenance of a sustained resource base 
3. achieving national and collective self-reliance, involving the integration of Africa’s 
physical, institutional and social infrastructure, of the structures of production, and of 
African markets. 
 
A full chapter of the 59-page AAF-SAP document is devoted to a detailed deconstruction of 
stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes, which are attacked for their overwhelming 
focus on “…achieving external and internal balances and getting the prices ‘right’ through 
unfettered operation of market forces” (ECA 1989, p.8). An Alternative Framework is then 
spelled out, underpinned by the credo of adjustment with transformation and focusing on 
three macro-economic modules:  the operative forces or initial conditions; available resources, 
including human, natural endowments, domestic savings and aid; and needs to be catered for, 
including social consumption and production. The document then lists a series of more detailed 
major policy directions responding to the three modules
99
. 
 
Four of AAF-SAP’s overarching policy recommendations are acknowledged to address areas 
that form part of existing SAPs and on which there is broad consensus: improved financial 
management, efficiency and tighter financial accountability; improved agricultural incentives; 
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 For a comprehensive list of the major policy directions in AAF-SAP, see ECA 1989, pp.33-36. 
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export diversification, mainly in processed agricultural products; and improved external debt 
management (ECA 1989, p.32).  
 
AAF-SAP is considered groundbreaking for several reasons. One is that it introduces new or 
previously under-emphasised aspects into Africa’s development discourse. These include a 
concern that Africa’s social fabric and cultural values are in danger of collapse due to the 
deteriorating economic situation, and a concern that African citizens lack basic individual rights 
and freedoms. A third concern is with “overconcentration of power” as well as “poor 
accountability and policy discontinuity”. These concerns were born of the ECA’s growing 
recognition of endogenous factors that contributed, to a greater or lesser extent, to Africa’s 
economic malaise (Adesina 2005). AAF-SAP also bemoaned the narrowing space for 
independent African policy-making. This is blamed largely on the high transaction cost of 
protracted negotiations African economic managers were forced to undergo with bilateral and 
multilateral donors as a precondition for balance of payments support and debt relief100.  
 
Critically, and on the basis of evidence gathered from the country studies, AAF-SAP was keen to 
emphasise that, beyond its overall objectives, application of the general framework should be 
on a case-by-case basis – the antithesis of the early general World Bank/IMF prescriptions 
criticised for their ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to reform
101
. AAF-SAP recognised the uniqueness 
of each country, and argued that the mix of policy instruments should vary not only between 
countries but also at different times in a given country (Asante 1991). 
 
AAF-SAP’s renewed focus on Pan-African development – and in particular its advocacy of 
stronger intra-regional trade as a means of arriving at self-reliance and self-sustainment, 
                                                  
100
 Of significance is AAF-SAP’s finding that Africa’s public management institutions and culture “…have been 
increasingly burdened and dominated… by the increasing role of foreign experts and managers in national 
economic decision-making…” (ECA 1989, p.7).  
101
 As Adedeji writes in the Foreword, “It should be noted that the Alternative Framework is not a standard 
programme to be applied indiscriminately in all countries under all circumstances. On the contrary, depending on 
the peculiar characteristics of each individual country, AAF-SAP will be used for designing specific country 
programmes, selecting appropriate policy instruments and measures and adopting the relevant implementation 
strategy” (ECA 1989, p.iii).  
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including in food production – was generally applauded. AAF-SAP also emphasised regional co-
ordination of industrial, monetary and financial policies, including payments and clearing 
arrangements – reflecting the extent to which Africa was increasingly advocating a self-reliance 
underpinned by technocratic institutions (Adesina 2005). Regional arrangements of this nature 
remain a preoccupation today, with African leaders agreeing in 2001 to establish an African 
Monetary Fund, African Central Bank and African Investment Bank (AU 2001). 
 
While accepting that AAF-SAP retained some key African demands from the LPA and earlier 
plans, some commentators have asserted that it shared many of the core elements of the 
World Bank/IMF doctrine. However, the ECA maintained:  
 
“It should have become abundantly clear by now that, both on theoretical and empirical 
grounds, the conventional SAPs are inadequate in addressing the real causes of 
economic, financial and social problems facing African countries which are of a 
structural nature. There is therefore an urgent need for an alternative to the current 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes in Africa” (ECA 1989, p.25, emphasis added).  
 
Further:  
 
“...Africa has to adjust. But in adjusting, it is imperative that it is the transformation of 
the structures that fundamentally serve to aggravate the African socio-economic 
situation that constitutes the focus of attention. As such, adjustment and 
transformation must be conceived and implemented as inextricably linked and 
intertwined processes such that progress will be made simultaneously on the two 
fronts” (ibid p.32). 
 
What emerges clearly from the above excerpts is that the ECA, while criticising the current 
round of SAPs as ‘inadequate’, refrained from advocating a paradigm shift, and instead 
proposed that what was needed was an ‘alternative’ version of SAPs. This reading is consistent 
with views that while AAF-SAP sought to redress the excessive World Bank/IMF focus on 
‘adjustment with growth’ by emphasising the need for ‘adjustment with transformation’, it 
readily accepted adjustment as necessary (cf. Adesina 2005).  
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There are many examples in the AAF-SAP document of this technocratic pragmatism, an 
approach that I argue throughout this thesis can be read as a ‘project within the Project’ – a 
strategy hinged on accepting key tenets of the dominant political rationality whilst harnessing 
the same technologies of rule to create increased African policy space. Doctrinaire privatisation 
as evident in the World Bank model of SAPs is summarily rejected in favour of ‘a pragmatic 
balance between the public and private sectors’, while privatisation is seen not as replacement 
for the state, but as strategic bolsterer (Adesina 2005, p.12) 
 
Patrick Bugembe, the ECA econometrist who advocated for the ECA study that led to AAF-SAP, 
agreed that the Framework was not so much advocating an alternative paradigm as greater 
ambition: 
 
“What I must emphasise to you is that what got lost in the title was the word 
‘transformation’. What came out was the word ‘alternative’. So it became ‘African 
alternative to adjustment’, end of story, when the real story was ‘adjustment with 
transformation’” (Bugembe 2006).  
 
Bugembe notes that the official French title of AAF-SAP – ‘Cadre africain de référence pour les 
programmes d'ajustement structurel en vue du redressement et de la transformation socio-
économiques’ – does not include the word ‘alternative’, and in his view constitutes a more 
accurate representation of what the Framework was about. “What this means is that we did 
not want adjustment that undermined or was at the cost of transformation – to put it in a 
nutshell. It has come back to transformation today. We were talking about the same thing” 
(ibid). 
 
Sub-Hegemonic Power Play? 
In reviewing the content of AAF-SAP, the question again arises of whether the ECA’s explicit 
acceptance of the need for African countries to adjust constitutes some sort of victory for the 
World Bank and IMF. What seems clear is that the ECA (along with UNICEF and other agencies) 
was able to draw on evidence from ten years of SAP implementation to demonstrate that they 
were often not working. During that period, as well as after the publication of AAF-SAP, the 
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World Bank was forced to amend the content, scope and implementation modalities of its SAPs 
to reflect the evidence-based criticism from the ECA and others (cf. Mkandawire and Soludo 
1999, Tsikata and Kerr 2000). 
 
In my view, what occurred was typical of the process of ‘translation’ (described in Chapter 1 
above), whereby globally hegemonic discourses are hybridised to ease their acceptance in 
different localities. In seeking to become hegemonic, the dominant development discourse (as 
seen in the ideological prescriptions emerging from the Berg Report) was confronted by 
criticism emanating from transnational ICEs (including the ECA and its network of institutions 
and experts). Realising that the dominant discourse could not be dismissed overnight due to its 
overwhelming power (bolstered among other things by its ability to provide financing to back 
up its ideas), the ECA harnessed Africa’s expertise to take on SAPs on their own terms, speaking 
the same language.  
 
However, in the process of ‘translating’ adjustment into something more palatable to African 
policy-makers (‘adjustment with transformation’), the ECA succeeded in questioning significant 
elements of the fundamentals of SAPs, forcing the Bretton Woods institutions to revise their 
discourse substantially in order to keep their hegemony alive. From this perspective, AAF-SAP 
can be seen as a sub-hegemonic framework, in the sense that it sought to make SAPs more 
palatable by adding a human dimension and arguing for context-specificity. However, in the 
process, and as discussed in Chapter 1, sub-hegemonic ‘centres of translation’ (such as the ECA) 
may develop styles and ideas of their own. ‘Translation’ can thus sow the seeds for active 
struggles that may lead to re-calibration of power relations – in this case resulting over time in 
increased African policy space.  
 
A Consensus in the Making?  
On 10 May 1989, shortly before AAF-SAP was officially launched, and at the invitation of World 
Bank President Barber Conable, Adedeji and his team travelled to the World Bank headquarters 
in Washington, D.C. The ECA team held meetings with Conable, Africa Vice President ‘Kim’ 
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Jaycox, and senior staff from the Bank, IMF and several UN agencies. Asante (1991) regards the 
meeting as highly significant because it inaugurated an era of consensus on development 
strategy for Africa. Further, and despite the recognition of the areas of difference and 
disagreement, the meeting marked the beginning of a decisive shift in World Bank and IMF 
positions, towards some of the major propositions and premises on which AAF-SAP was based 
(ibid)
102
, as reflected in a joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting.  
 
A member of Adedeji’s inner circle, and part of the ECA team visiting Washington, recalled that 
in his view the meeting was more form than substance, and insisted that nothing of real 
significance happened that day. Furthermore, he reveals that ECA economists asked to provide 
technical support to a team of senior civil servants from Burkina Faso travelling to Washington 
subsequently to discuss a structural adjustment programme were excluded from a crucial 
meeting at the Bank (Bugembe 2006). Adedeji’s then Chief of Staff recalls that the World Bank 
routinely discouraged African delegations from including experts who were not government 
officials. The delegations of African countries using ECA’s expertise regularly briefed ECA 
experts on their return to the hotel and sought guidance from them on the agenda for the next 
day’s session with the World Bank (Senghor 2009). These accounts highlight the continuing 
tensions in the ECA/World Bank relationship, even as both sides internalised aspects of each 
other’s arguments, indicating that a consensus was indeed on the cards. Despite the 
appearance of ideological convergence, technocrats and policy-makers continued to engage in 
power struggles.  
 
In November 1989, the World Bank published ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable 
Growth – a Long-term Perspective Study’, a 300-page document that clearly demonstrates the 
extent to which the Bank had gone to reflect consensus. Asante (1991), dubbing the report 
                                                  
102
 Asante 1991 (p.187) highlights the following points of consensus that in his view reflect important components 
of the ECA’s AAF-SAP: i) adjustment must be seen as part of a long-term development approach taking full account 
of the human dimensions; ii) priority should be given to human resource development and national capacity 
building; iii) sustainable development and modernisation of agriculture should be central to Africa’s future growth; 
iv) conserving Africa’s natural resource base and protecting the environment are to be regarded as urgent 
priorities; v) the process of regional co-operation and integration in Africa should be accelerated (ibid). 
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“less polemical, more pragmatic and less theological” (ibid p.187), notes a broad convergence 
with Africa’s own perception of its development problems as articulated in the LPA, APPER, UN-
PAAERD and AAF-SAP, and identifies eight areas in which the Bank has “admitted” that the ECA 
and Africa were right103. Adedeji himself noted that the Bank report “represents a fundamental 
shift in a position hitherto held as sacrosanct [….and] a major contribution in the process of 
consensus building on the future of Africa” (Adedeji 1989). 
 
However, while the ‘Long-term Perspective Study’ appeared to reflect African views, the World 
Bank’s orthodoxy remained firmly glued to the sub-text – privileging the role of pricing policies, 
the free market, trade liberalisation, competitive exchange rate regimes and the private sector 
as key prerequisites for Africa’s recovery. As Saul and Leys (1999) point out, World Bank 
publications since the Berg Report, while advocating pro-poor policies and permitting a more 
active role for a transformed state, did little to change its overall policy offering. The ‘Long-term 
Perspective Study’ stands out as the first substantive engagement with politics by the World 
Bank in a major study – a function of the extent to which its views had converged with those 
expressed in African development plans since the mid-1970s. Indeed, commentators trace the 
birth of the ‘good governance’ discourse to the Study, arguing that it gave further credence to 
the assumption that African countries were in crisis because of the lack of good governance, 
decentralisation, accountability and reduced government intervention (Ihonvbere 1994, 
Mkandawire 2004)104.  
 
Further to the realisation by the Bretton Woods institutions that SAPs were not working, and 
that the deepening economic crisis was making development well-nigh impossible, the 1980s 
marked a realisation among African intellectuals that state–society relations (or governance), 
not ‘market distortions’, were the key constraint on African development (Mkandawire 2003, 
2004). This recognition led the World Bank to invite a group of leading African scholars to 
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 For a list of the eight issues, see Asante 1991, p.188. 
104
 In his Foreword to the Study, World Bank President Barber Conable notes: “A root cause of weak economic 
performance in the past has been the failure of public institutions. Private sector initiative and market mechanisms 
are important, but they must go hand-in-hand with good governance – a public service that is efficient, a judicial 
system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its public” (World Bank 1989, p.xii).  
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author background papers to the Study (ibid). These included Claude Ake, a renowned Nigerian 
political scientist; George Ayittey, a U.S.-based Ghanaian political scientist; Senegalese 
economist and thinker, Makhtar Diouf; and world-renowned historian Ali Mazrui, from Kenya 
(ibid). According to Mkandawire (2004), these African scholars exerted an influence on the 
World Bank, although the Bank and IMF later reduced their view of governance to the 
technocratic transparency-accountability mode it eventually assumed:   
 
“Thus, the actual use of the concept of good governance sidestepped the central 
concerns of the Africans and rendered the notion purely administrative. And all too 
often, it looked like a fallback position for failed policies” (ibid p.3)105.  
 
Reaffirmation and Resistance (1990-1995)  
Our historical analysis in this chapter concludes with a brief look at the first half of the 1990s. 
This period was defined by reaffirmation of SAPs, albeit revised, as the hegemonic development 
strategy of choice for African countries, and also by continued resistance, albeit largely 
rhetorical, by Africa’s trans-national policy- making community.  
 
The 1990s heralded an era of intensified co-ordination by the international community of its 
development policies towards Africa. One aspect of this was the debut of a single European 
market in January 1993 and the emergence of regional economic blocs around the world. 
Together with the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), these 
emerging arrangements gave new cause for concern to African countries, whose own historic 
push for regional integration had been largely ignored, and who feared that their growing 
reliance on income from exports would be stifled by the emergence of protectionism. These 
fears were only partly allayed by the coming into effect of the Lomé IV Convention (March 
                                                  
105
 According to Mkandawire (2003), concern by the African intellectuals with state–society relations and position 
against foreign domination led two of Africa’s leading social science research networks – CODESRIA and Third 
World Forum (highlighted above with reference to Samir Amin) – to conduct research on social movements and 
democracy. This research suggested that the forces of democratisation would be internal to African countries, and 
signified an interest in democratisation at a time when African research was mired in Afro-pessimism that saw no 
internal sources of change in Africa (ibid). See, for example, Ake (1993). Note that CODESRIA is highlighted in the 
conclusion to this dissertation as an institutional complex of expertise worthy of in-depth study.  
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1990), which provided for preferential trade between Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
and the European Economic Community (Asante 1991). 
 
As the development strategies and policies of multilateral and bilateral donors became 
increasingly co-ordinated and standardised, African governments found that wherever they 
turned they were faced by essentially the same conditionalities – inherent in revised SAPs with 
governance-related conditionalities added to the list (Bujra 2002). Further, the UNDP soon 
adopted ‘good governance’, followed by the rest of the UN system (ibid). The consensus was 
reflected in the first edition of UNDP’s Human Development Report (HDR), published in 1990. 
While affirming the importance of economic growth as a driver of development, the Report 
argued that what mattered most was how growth was managed for the benefit of the people. 
Reinforcing the consensus that development must be human-centred, HDR 1990 came up with 
a new composite index for measuring human development, which included social indicators 
that went beyond GNP measures and succeeded in entrenching the human development 
discourse in the development lexicon. 
 
The World Bank published two studies reflecting the continued preoccupation with learning 
from the experience of SAPs, and revising them to make them more palatable to client 
countries whilst retaining their fundamental economic prescriptions. In ‘Adjustment in Africa: 
Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead’ (March 1994), the Bank sought to establish the extent to 
which the 29 African adjusters had changed their policies in line with the prescriptions, assess 
whether these policy reforms had restored growth, and chart the future of adjustment. It 
concluded that countries that maintained or ended up with fair or adequate macroeconomic 
policies did better than countries with poor or very poor policies. It also claimed that countries 
with limited government intervention in markets experienced positive growth, whereas 
countries where governments continued to intervene in markets suffered a drop in growth. The 
report re-emphasised the need to move ahead with aspects of adjustment on which there was 
consensus – notably getting macroeconomic policies right.  
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‘Adjustment in Africa’ also argued for a re-think on areas lacking consensus – identified as 
privatisation and prudent financial reform (World Bank 1994). It was therefore no surprise that 
the next Bank report, ‘Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government 
Ownership’ (1995), focused on privatisation of state enterprises. Arguing that privatisation was 
key to lifting people out of poverty, the report identified the most successful state enterprise 
reformers (Chile, Mexico and the Republic of Korea), the least successful (India, Senegal and 
Turkey), and those that fell somewhere in between (Egypt, Ghana and the Philippines). 
Predictably, the report ended by proposing ways in which the World Bank could help ensure 
more efficient and effective privatisation.  
 
While these two reports reflected refinements of the World Bank’s arguments, the Bank 
remained “…almost congenitally tied to the core argument of the Berg Report with its faith in 
the market and a minimalist view of the state” (Mkandawire 2001, p.292). According to this 
view, the Bank had retreated to its more familiar market-based ideological terrain (ibid). 
 
Despite the clear acceptance by Africa of the need for its countries to continue to adjust in 
order to stand a chance of developing, Adedeji rued the failure by African countries to 
implement the provisions they signed up to in the LPA, APPER, AAF-SAP and other leadership 
plans. In his view, this was because of their “…excessive external dependence, their narrow 
political base, and their perennial failure to put their money where their mouth is” (Adedeji 
2002, p.4). Adedeji had more or less reached the end of the road, burned out by the epic battle 
between the ECA and World Bank, and disillusioned by the fact that, while the ECA could offer 
only ideas, the Bank was able to back up its own ideas with funding (Adedeji 2006). In July 1991, 
after 16 years at the ECA’s helm, he retired, left Addis Ababa and returned home to Nigeria. 
  
With the end of the Cold War came pressure on African countries to adopt multi-party 
democracy, in many cases as a condition for future support. This was compounded by pressure 
from within – as African citizens demanded that their governments do something to arrest the 
socio-economic decline. As Shaw (1991) notes, democratisation in Africa took two forms: 
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formal participation, calling for state-sanctioned processes of organisation, election, decision 
and protection at the level of politics; and informal participation, involving the establishment of 
extra-state patterns of participation (ibid)106.  
 
Against this backdrop, the ECA and the UN system organised an international conference on 
‘Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa’, held in Arusha, 
Tanzania (February 1990). An ‘African Charter for Popular Participation in Development’, issued 
at the end of the conference, asserted the crucial importance of people’s participation in the 
development process (ECA 1990). Arusha took the ECA’s ideas about people-centred 
development further by articulating what amounted to an African vision of good governance, 
according to which democracy was seen as a key prerequisite for, as well as the outcome of, 
development (Anyang’ Nyong’o 2004).  
 
It is no coincidence that the Arusha Declaration emerged at around the same time as non-
governmental African intellectuals had taken an interest in democracy (as asserted by 
Mkandawire (2003) with respect to CODESRIA and Third World Forum). As the preamble to the 
African Charter states, more than 500 people took part in the Arusha Conference, many drawn 
from a wide range of non-governmental organisations (ECA 1990). It is therefore reasonable to 
assume that African intellectuals of all kinds were present at the Conference and influenced, as 
well as were influenced by, the proceedings.  
 
In July 1990, African leaders meeting in Addis Ababa issued a ‘Declaration on the Political and 
Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World’. 
The Declaration reflected the concern that Africa’s economies continued to decline, and that a 
rash of conflicts, including civil wars, had broken out throughout Africa. Critically, it reaffirmed 
that “…Africa’s development is the responsibility of our governments and people”, adding:  
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 Since informal democracy occurs at the level of society and not the state, it exploits and encourages state 
shrinkage under adjustment, in the process reinforcing shifts in the political economy of Africa away from state-
centrism towards more open politics and economics (Shaw 1991). 
127 
 
“We are now more than ever before determined to lay [a] solid foundation for self-
reliant, human-centred, sustainable development on the basis of social justice and 
collective self-reliance, so as to achieve accelerated structural transformation of our 
economies (OAU 1990, p.3, emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, while retaining its core structural underpinnings of ‘collective self-reliance’ and ‘self-
sustainment’, Africa’s development regime, had evolved to take on ‘human-centred 
development’, ‘structural transformation’ and ‘social justice’. Each of these concepts can be 
traced back to the earlier development plans, prepared by African experts. The plans 
themselves influenced international development thinking, and were themselves influenced by 
ideas such as ‘Basic Needs’ and Dependency Theory.   
 
The Declaration also stated: “democracy and development should go together and should be 
mutually reinforcing” (OAU 1990, p.4). This was the first time that an African leadership 
statement had made an explicit link between democracy and development and expressed a 
preference for the type of political system sovereign member states should adopt (Bujra 2002). 
This can be partly attributed to the wave of democratisation sweeping the world after the Cold 
War. Internal African demands from citizens in the face of the economic downturn also 
constituted a key point of pressure on Africa’s leadership.  
 
In June 1991, African leaders signed the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community 
(AEC). The Treaty committed signatories to deepening sub-regional and continental economic 
co-operation in a six-stage process to take place over a period not exceeding 34 years. The 
Abuja Treaty, as it came to be known, once again reflected the strong desire among African 
policy-makers and experts, evident since independence, for a blueprint to advance regional 
integration –as both a bulwark against dependent capitalism, and an African development 
strategy. Barely a month later, the UN General Assembly passed the New Agenda for 
Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF), the second in a series of UN-sponsored 
strategies to address Africa’s under-development. UN-NADAF included “…heavy doses of good 
governance as a sine qua non for Africa’s economic recovery” (Anyang’ Nyong’o 2004, p.3). 
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In 1995, African leaders issued the ‘Cairo Agenda for Action for Relaunching Africa’s Economic 
and Social Development’, which noted that for years the OAU had adopted many development 
plans, strategies and programmes that had not been adequately implemented by the majority 
of countries (OAU 1995). It emphasised the centrality of people and popular participation to 
development. Although it reaffirmed the OAU’s commitment to the LPA, the Cairo Agenda 
reflected the leadership consensus of the 1990s
107
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Conclusion 
Following from the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter 1, this chapter has interrogated 
key discursive moments in the evolution of Africa’s development regime. In undertaking in-
depth analysis of Africa’s development strategies and plans from independence to the mid-
1990s, I have sought to provide a clearer understanding the workings of development’s power. 
As well as locating the key discursive continuities and shifts over time, I have also provided a 
window, through the testimonies of leading experts involved in developing these plans, into the 
agendas underlying the evolution of Africa’s development discourse. 
  
I have argued that, at the dawn of independence, African nationalists keen to assert indigenous 
agency nevertheless relied on external ideas as well as foreign expertise to help chart their 
development strategies. This largely explains the high degree of continuity between latter-day 
colonial policy and the development strategies of African nations in the first 10 to 15 years after 
independence. I have also highlighted the influence of the Cold War on the constitution of 
hybrid sites of African expert resistance – in the form of rival U.S. and USSR schemes to 
influence African students, and as evidenced by the repression of intellectual activity by states 
aligned to one or other tendency. In the process, Modernisation Theory lost its salience by the 
1970s and was superseded by Dependency-influenced approaches – themselves largely 
                                                  
107
 This consensus encapsulated Democracy, Governance, Peace, Security, Stability and Sustainable Development; 
Food Security; Capacity Building and Human Resources Development; Structural Transformation of African 
Economies; Effective Mobilisation and Efficient Utilisation of Resources; and Regional Economic Co-operation and 
Integration (ibid). 
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discarded as the late 1970s and early 1980s marked divergent development directions, oil and 
debt shocks, and the onset of the African ‘crisis’ (Shaw 1991).  
 
As evidence of the downturn grew, African leaders began to strategise continentally and to 
issue collective common positions, inspired by the idea of Africa as a regional bloc first 
imagined by the Pan-Africanists. African intellectuals and development experts worked to 
identify the causes of the continent’s underdevelopment and propose solutions. The ECA, able 
to combine the capacity of its own staff with a wide network of national experts, emerged as 
the key ICE responsible for crafting an African development strategy. Informed by studies 
produced by the ECA and its network, Africa’s leadership signed up to a series of development 
plans – including the LPA, APPER and AAF-SAP.  
 
The LPA, heavily influenced by Dependency approaches, blamed external factors for the so-
called African ‘crisis’, and advocated an increasing inward focus for Africa. In response, the 
World Bank’s Berg Report blamed African governments for poor stewardship of their 
economies, and advocated a series of outward-looking policies, later the core of SAPs. This 
marked the start of a decade of polemical debate between the ECA and the Bretton Woods 
institutions, which finally ended when the two sides came to an apparent consensus, 
conditioned by structural factors. Pace Mkandawire (2003, 2004), I have argued that 
independent African intellectuals mobilised around CODESRIA and the Third World Forum were 
able to influence the espousal by the Bretton Woods institutions of politics as a variable in the 
success or failure of economic policies, only for the idea of ‘good governance’ to be 
instrumentalised into technocratic governance.  
 
To provide historical grounding in support of my argument about the nature of sub-hegemony, I 
have identified a number of key structural underpinnings of African’s evolving development 
regime. These include ‘collective self-reliance’ and ‘self-sustainment’, which first surfaced in 
the Monrovia Strategy and LPA. ‘Adjustment with transformation’ was a hallmark of AAF-SAP, 
reflecting Africa’s recognition of the need for adjustment as a means to transformation, as 
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opposed to growth alone. ‘People’s participation’, ‘human-centred development’ and ‘social 
justice’ were central to Adedeji’s evolving thinking as reflected in the ‘African Charter for 
Popular Participation in Development’, as well as in the 1990 HDR. ‘Good governance’ was a 
phrase introduced into the development lexicon by the World Bank, leading to the birth of a 
new technocratic sub-discipline. The link between ‘democracy and development’ was given 
new urgency by African protests over the continued economic downturn, as well as by winds of 
change originating with the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
 
On the basis of the evidence presented and reviewed, I have argued that the ECA, ostensibly a 
sub-hegemonic ‘centre of translation’ responsible for rendering the dominant development 
discourse more palatable to African countries, developed styles and ideas of its own. In the 
process, the ECA influenced significant revisions of the dominant development discourse. This is 
evident in the battle of ideas that started with the LPA and the Berg Report, and ended in the 
apparent meeting of minds evident in AAF-SAP and related documents. As will be seen in the 
next chapter, African experts continued to assert their agency after 1990 – albeit using a less 
confrontational approach. 
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Chapter 3: 
His Master’s Voice or ‘Manufacturer of Minimal Hegemony’? 
The ECA’s Tactical Shift (1995-2005) 
 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1 I highlighted how ‘geographic blocs’ of institutions exercise power through an 
interdependent process of articulation between globally hegemonic discourses and regional 
sub-hegemonic discourses. In Chapter 2, I sought to test my theorisation by identifying key 
discursive underpinnings of Africa’s development regime over a period of nearly four decades, 
as well as the policy effects brought about by the contestation over ideas during this period. I 
documented how the ECA, a leading continental ICE, resisted as well as reaffirmed the globally 
hegemonic development discourse. In doing so, I showed the complex articulation between the 
ECA’s role as a sub-hegemonic ‘centre of translation’ and its role as ‘manufacturer of minimal 
hegemony’ or, in other words, advocate for expanded African policy space in directing its 
development.  
 
In this chapter, to deepen my arguments about the reaffirmation and resistance inherent in 
sub-hegemony, I examine how the ECA’s approach to engaging and influencing the 
international development discourse shifted during the period 1995-2005108. I show how the 
ECA of this period consciously moved away from the adversarial stance of the previous two 
decades and adopted a more overtly sub-hegemonic approach.  
 
While such an approach could be read as reflecting the extent to which mainstream African 
development thinking had embodied self-discipline and fallen into line with neo-liberal 
governmentality, my main argument is that the ECA of 1995-2005 may have leveraged its sub-
hegemonic position to create space for greater African agency in determining the continent’s 
development path. In asserting this argument I am guided by Peet’s (2007) definition of sub-
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 My analysis of the ECA stops in 2005. However, the ECA’s role in the APRM, which extends beyond 2005, is 
discussed in Chapter 5. References to the post-2005 ECA are also made in Chapter 4.  
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hegemony as “…a process of rewriting and modification, but also independent discovery and 
creative adaptation” (ibid, p.22). In my view, the ECA’s sub-hegemonic approach was 
predicated on an acceptance of the overwhelming force of neo-liberal governmentality as a fact 
of life109, as evidenced by its intellectual output, which largely echoed the dominant ideology. 
However, in ‘translating’ the dominant discourse, opportunities arose for independent 
discovery, creative adaptation and the incubation of new styles and ideas. In the nexus 
between ‘rewriting/modification’ and ‘independent discovery/ creative adaptation’ lies the 
potential of sub-hegemony to recalibrate asymmetric power relations.  
 
To understand this argument, it is necessary to place the ECA in context. For a number of 
reasons, the 1995-2005 decade is highly eventful. First, it was during this period that the notion 
of ‘good governance’ became entrenched as part of the technocratic discourse and practice of 
Africa’s development regime. This was reflected in the work of the ECA, which began a far-
reaching programme of research to develop tools, standards and indicators for good 
governance in advancement of what it called the ‘capable state’. Second, the period marked 
the emergence of a new continental political organisation (the African Union), a new 
continental development plan (NEPAD), and a new trans-national governance and development 
framework (the African Peer Review Mechanism) – signalling an unprecedented shift in the 
discourse and practice of African development.  
 
Third, the period saw the unfolding of what has been described as a ‘new aid relationship’ 
between Africa and the international community, catalysed in part by a widespread perception 
that aid was not working (cf. Moyo 2009, Glennie 2008). The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness provided a blueprint for a new aid relationship between Africa and its donors, 
while the Monterrey conference on financing for development (2002) agreed to restore 
dwindling aid volumes. In parallel, the world’s adoption of the MDGs in 2000 heralded the 
arrival of a new global development consensus underpinned by poverty reduction and good 
governance.  
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 Cramer et al (2009) call this the T.I.N.A. (there is no alternative) syndrome. 
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Fourth, the decade also coincided with a period of profound change at the ECA, heralded by the 
appointment in 1995 of K.Y. Amoako as its chief executive. As highlighted in Chapter 2, Amoako 
had previously served as the only African member of the World Bank team that produced the 
Berg Report, and had visited the ECA with Elliot Berg in 1980 to put the Bank’s case to the then 
ECA Executive Secretary, Adebayo Adedeji. Amoako’s arrival at the ECA marked a major shift in 
the style of the Commission’s engagement, as well as substantive changes to the ECA’s 
programme of work.  
 
In light of the above, and with a view to locating the key shifts in the Commission’s tactics and 
arriving at new insights into the sub-hegemonic process, this chapter will review some key ECA 
initiatives during the decade in question. I will provide insights into the influential role played 
by the ECA in the advent of continental leadership initiatives, and reflect on the complex 
relationship between the ECA and AU.  
 
As explained in the Introduction to this dissertation, I was a senior adviser in the office of the 
ECA Executive Secretary from April 1997 to September 2003. The insights contained in these 
pages are largely informed – either directly or indirectly – by this experience. Therefore, in 
addition to discursive content from interviews and data cited from secondary sources, this 
chapter includes first-hand insights into key events and processes.  
 
A New Broom 
By 1990, a series of institutional reviews painted a picture of an ECA in decline, sorely in need of 
restructuring and reform
110
. These reports raised concern at UN Headquarters in New York. 
Boutros Ghali, worried that the ECA was on the brink and keen as the first African UN Secretary-
General to make his mark with respect to the continent, looked to appoint someone who could 
                                                  
110
 Among them were: a 1991 task force report commissioned by Diallo which concluded that serious problems of 
quality and efficiency were limiting the ECA’s impact; a 1993 report of the then UN Office of Inspections and 
Investigations confirming these problems; and an August 1995 UN Joint Inspection Unit evaluation which 
concluded that almost everyone agrees that ECA needs a ‘thorough review’ (ECA 1995, p.9). 
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turn the Commission around. K.Y. Amoako was a Ghanaian national recruited by the World 
Bank in 1974. He advanced rapidly in the World Bank’s hierarchy111 – an achievement few other 
Africans had been able to match in a difficult environment (Amoako 2004, Alibaruho 2006, 
Makonnen 2006). In his 21 years at the Bank, Amoako had gained wide-ranging operational 
experience in Africa and Latin America as well as in managing social-sector programmes. As 
Director of the Education and Social Policy Department (1993-1995), Amoako was responsible 
for leading the Bank’s programmes on poverty reduction, education, gender, labour markets 
and social protection.  
 
Amoako was considered a prime candidate for the ECA job and was invited to meet with 
Boutros Ghali in New York in December 1994. The Secretary-General told him he was the best 
man for the job but warned him that he would face a degree of resistance from a few African 
countries who had proposed their own nationals for the post (Amoako 2004). Amoako 
consulted widely within the World Bank on whether he should accept the job. People he spoke 
with included Africa Vice-President ‘Kim’ Jaycox, who recalled the battle of ideas between ECA 
and the Bank of the 1980s, and the antagonistic relationship with Adedeji. Jaycox told him:  
 
“I had been thinking of you as one of my senior staff members in the Bank’s Africa vice-
presidency. However, ECA as an institution is broken, and if there is any one person who 
can fix it, it is you. So go. It is potentially a very important institution for Africa” (Amoako 
2004).  
 
Having worked in the World Bank for his entire career, Amoako says he was compelled to move 
to the ECA by the challenge of Africa, his long-held Pan-African beliefs and the recognition that, 
since the World Bank considered the ECA to be an important African institution, he could make 
a major contribution. Additionally, UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali knew that appointing 
Amoako would create controversy in some African policy circles. Although he appeared to be 
referring to African Heads of State who might have put forward their own candidates for the 
                                                  
111
 Positions held by Amoako during his 21 years at the World Bank included Special Assistant to the Vice President 
for Human Resources: Resident Representative in Zambia; Country Director for Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Mauritius and Somalia; and Education and Social Sector Manager, Brazil, Venezuela and Peru.  
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post, there is a sense that, reading between the lines, Amoako’s World Bank pedigree may have 
made his appointment anathema to those who had lined up to oppose the Bank’s prescriptions.  
 
Once Amoako’s appointment was officially announced, and before taking up the job in July 
1995, he travelled to Addis Ababa twice (in February and May 2005) to meet staff and senior 
managers. Although he was enthused by the reception he received, not everyone welcomed his 
appointment. On the eve of the 21st ECA Conference of Ministers of Planning and Economic 
Development (1-4 May 1995), anonymous notes were pushed under the doors of Ministers at 
the Addis Ababa Hilton warning them that K.Y. Amoako was being sent by the World Bank to 
ruin ECA and urging them to petition the UN Secretary-General to reverse the appointment. 
This was confirmed by an ECA official close to the organisation of the conference who 
witnessed the events at first hand, as well as by Amoako himself (Amoako 2004, Todaro 2009).  
 
A group of ECA staffers was identified as being behind the campaign. Having worked with 
Adedeji, they were concerned that the arrival of Amoako would result in the ECA being 
subordinated to the ideas of the World Bank. This early resistance exemplifies the politics at 
play in a pivotal institutional complex of expertise in Africa’s development regime. As a 
complex, it is a heterogeneous combination of expertise, institution and interactions. However, 
and as indicated in Chapter 1, a complex does not denote a unity. Politics within and around the 
ICE is fluid, dynamic and characterised by crossovers in allegiance which prompt power 
struggles both within the ICE and between the ICE and others. 
 
Strategic Directions 
On his arrival to take up the post of Executive Secretary in July 1995, Amoako wrote a two-page 
letter to ECA staff in which he outlined his ambitions to renew and re-tool the Commission. This 
letter provided the basis for wide-ranging consultations with staff, in town hall meetings as well 
as smaller focus groups. In the months that followed, these ideas developed into ‘Serving Africa 
Better: Strategic Directions for the Economic Commission for Africa’, a detailed reform 
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manifesto prepared for the Conference of Ministers in May 1996
112
. The document articulated 
the desire by the new leadership to break with what it considered the polemics of the past 
while seeking to restore the ECA’s intellectual leadership on behalf of Africa.  
 
In ‘Strategic Directions’, the Commission sought to narrow its agenda strategically, based on its 
perceived priorities and comparative advantages – its regional focus and commitment as an 
organisation in and of Africa (ECA 1996). The reforms were to be guided by three principles: 
excellence, cost-effectiveness and partnerships. The new programme focus, aside from 
reflecting the scarcity of UN general budget resources amidst increasing responsibilities for the 
UN regional commissions, was informed by the international consensus that reducing poverty 
should be the overarching goal of development (ECA 1996, p.10). Two main policy priorities 
emanated from this consensus. The first was reducing poverty by promoting growth, investing 
in education and health, and safety nets for the poor. The second priority was to overcome 
structural problems, including distorted macroeconomies, weak capital markets, poor 
infrastructure, low skills base and regulations that discourage investment. The reform plan 
reduced ECA’s nine programmes in 21 different areas to five programme themes and two 
crosscutting issues.  
 
Two new issues were introduced to the ECA agenda: a focus on Development Management 
(which consisted primarily of work on governance but also on civil society); and Harnessing 
Information for Development. Issues that survived from the previous ECA programme, now 
given a different approach or renewed emphasis, included the advancement of women, long 
considered a priority but now elevated to the status of a full programme. Regional cooperation 
and integration, a long-standing ECA priority, also survived, as it “…offers tremendous 
opportunities for economic growth, enabling African countries to overcome the constraints of 
small national markets, increasing intra-Africa trade and providing dynamism. And it will bring 
economies of scale in production” (ECA 1996, p.10).  
                                                  
112
 Addressing experts at the April 1996 Conference of Ministers, incoming ECA Executive Secretary K.Y. Amoako 
said he believed that the continent was emerging from a period of stagnation and ECA needed to catch the tide 
(Amoako 1996). 
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Population, agriculture and environment, previously addressed as separate sectoral issues, 
were repackaged under ‘sustainable development’ and the ECA focus shifted to the nexus 
issues connecting the three. This was because the incoming leadership felt that separate 
organisational units for the different issues had duplicated the work of the UN’s specialised 
agencies and created self-contained silos, constituting a less than optimal use of resources. 
Popular participation in development, emphasised by the 1991 Arusha Declaration, was 
retained, with a new focus on enabling civil society to act as a check and balance on 
governments. The strategy was underpinned by the intention for the ECA to streamline its 
working, holding fewer meetings and producing fewer reports of consistently higher quality
113
. 
There were to be new networking arrangements: rationalisation of some 30 ECA-sponsored 
institutions throughout the continent, increased interaction with member states, enhanced 
South–South cooperation, and development of strategic alliances. 
  
The emphasis in ‘Strategic Directions’ on ‘good governance’, ‘safety nets’, ‘giving space to the 
private sector as an engine of economic growth’, and ‘civil society as a force for popular 
participation and democracy’ bore strong similarities to the dominant development approach 
espoused by the World Bank114. However, the ECA argued that its new priorities were in fact 
drawn from the OAU’s 1995 ‘Relaunching Africa’s Economic and Social Development: The Cairo 
Agenda for Action’, which it claims “…identified these priorities, and which reaffirmed Africa's 
primary responsibility for its own development” (ECA 1996, p.x). As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
Cairo Agenda for Action, though asserting the principles of ‘self-reliance’, ‘self-sustaining 
development’ and ‘popular participation’ enshrined in the LPA and subsequent African plans, 
largely reaffirmed the international development ‘consensus’ emanating from the Bretton 
                                                  
113
 During the period in question, ECA radically streamlined its portfolio of publications, focusing on a series of 
flagship reports, among them a revamped Economic Report on Africa (ERA), a new African Governance Report 
(AGR), a new Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA) report, and an African Women’s Report (AWR).  
114
 In a memo to the Board dated 21 January 1999 introducing his Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), 
World Bank President James Wolfensohn emphasised good and clean governance as a key prerequisite for 
sustainable growth and poverty alleviation. He identified civil society, in all its forms, as “…probably the largest 
single factor in development” (Wolfensohn 1999, p.25). Domestic and foreign private investment is seen as “the 
key to economic growth and employment” (ibid, p.27), and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises is 
advocated in many countries as “a significant element in sustainable growth and in balancing the budget” (ibid).  
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Woods institutions and the leading countries supporting African development. This being the 
case, the ECA’s referral to the Cairo Agenda as the inspiration for its policy priorities is entirely 
consistent with the evolution of the African development discourse. 
 
Some ECA experts were unhappy with the proposed shift in programmatic emphasis, and 
criticised ‘Strategic Directions’ for ushering in a new pro-World-Bank era at the ECA.  
 
“Rather than being identified with broad development paradigms, establishing 
institutions and putting in place the broad preconditions for development, the ECA 
shifted to where it could lead the charge based on its capacity. In doing so it ignored or 
replaced some of the heavy investment of the organisation intellectually and in terms of 
activities generated down the line by the member countries. These things seemed to be 
so fundamental that... the fact they were left out created something of a credibility 
problem for ECA. Whether it is really identifiable with a donor agenda, or because of 
lack of progress in the other areas, [the ECA] has abandoned its fundamental positions 
of the past – supporting regional integration, sectoral development, particularly 
infrastructure, energy, connectivity, technological transformation, sector institutions, 
higher education and so on. ECA withdrew even from there. So it looks like ECA was 
ignoring some issues and getting involved with others. And obviously that was not the 
correct thing”. (Suliman 2006). 
 
Nonetheless, in April 1996 the Conference of Ministers of Economic Planning and Development 
– in effect the ECA’s Board of Governors – endorsed the proposals contained in ‘Strategic 
Directions’. Amoako viewed like-minded African Finance Ministers115, pivotal actors in a 
complex trans-national politics, as key to his influencing strategy, and felt that he could act on 
behalf of Africa only if he had leading African policy-makers on his side. This effort to cultivate a 
group of like-minded senior policy-makers highlights a key feature of ICEs in Africa’s 
development regime. National linkages are critically important to substantiating and giving 
authority to continental development discourses, hence the constant need for the ECA to assert 
its relevance to its member states. While a detailed examination of the inter-play between 
national and trans-national actors, policy communities and expertise is beyond the scope of this 
                                                  
115
 These included Donald Kaberuka, then Finance Minister of Rwanda and later President of the African 
Development Bank. Kaberuka holds a PhD in Economics from Glasgow University.  
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study, I touch on aspects of the dynamics in different parts of the thesis, notably in the 
concluding section.  
 
Early Indications 
The ECA was able to use its dual status as a UN regional commission and Africa’s premier think 
tank to bring issues of African concern to the wider international community. In March 1996, 
the UN System-wide Special Initiative on Africa (UNSIA) was unveiled as a mechanism to 
coordinate all the activities of the UN system in Africa. As co-chair of the initiative, the ECA was 
designated to co-lead on two of the UNSIA’s four core programmatic themes – Informatics and 
Governance (UNSIA 1997), reflecting the priority attached to these areas of work in the 
revamped Commission. The ECA jointly organised the first African Governance Forum (AGF) 
with UNDP from 11-12 July 1997, which adopted a programme of action to assess the progress 
of reforms in various countries, and agreed that annual forums should be held.  
 
In the second AGF, held in Accra, Ghana from 25-26 June 1998, Amoako outlined seven steps to 
creating a capable state for a progressing Africa: ensuring sound economic management by 
fostering a leaner, more competent and effective public service; strengthening the institutional 
capacity of parliament; enhancing the independence of the judiciary; building stronger electoral 
systems; developing collaborative mechanisms to promote dialogue across parties; looking at 
how to rebuild collapsed states; and combating corruption (ECA 2000, p.157). In the same 
speech, he unveiled a new ECA governance initiative – ‘Setting Goals and Monitoring Progress 
in Governance in Africa’ – to develop norms and indicators for monitoring progress by African 
countries towards good governance, to be published in a periodic ‘African State of Governance’ 
report.  
 
As will be discussed below, the ECA programme on good governance was to lead to the 
creation of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). At this juncture, the strong similarity is 
noteworthy between the ECA’s technocratic discourse on ‘good governance’ and that of the 
World Bank. In my view, this was anything but coincidental. Indeed, an important plank of the 
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ECA approach was to try and influence the Bretton Woods Institutions as part of a wider 
strategy to articulate African views on the need to reform international aid architecture. Having 
come from the World Bank, and having maintained strong links with his former employer, 
Amoako retained privileged access to both the Bank and IMF. He was known to the Bank as a 
former employee and trusted by it. This knowledge of and insider access to the Bank enabled 
him to voice concerns in such a way that people in Washington D.C. would listen, and to wield 
significant influence.  
 
The joint World Bank/IMF Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, announced in 1996, 
provided an early opportunity to show the ECA’s leadership in this domain. Having worked 
behind the scenes to influence HIPC before it surfaced, Amoako went public in his criticism of 
the initiative. In a speech to the Sixth session of the Conference of African Ministers of Finance 
in Addis Ababa on 31 March 1997, the ECA Executive Secretary highlighted a number of 
concerns about the now-revised HIPC: its seemingly restrictive country-eligibility criteria, 
particularly the ranges of debt-to-exports and debt-service-to-exports ratios; its failure to 
consider the fiscal burden of debt as a central variable in debt sustainability analysis; the length 
of the work-out period, which could be as long as six years; and uncertainty about the 
commitment to adequate amounts of financing and appropriate timing, particularly on the part 
of key bilateral donors (ECA 1997). 
 
The focus on debt relief was consistent with long-standing desire among Africa’s leadership, 
discussed in the previous chapter, to address the debt crisis. However, whereas the past ECA 
approach had been openly confrontational, Amoako’s style of advocacy involved choosing his 
words carefully, avoiding political posturing, and putting forward technical arguments that he 
believed stood more of a chance of being taken seriously. A former adviser summed up this 
change of nuance as follows:  
 
“Our approach to engaging with the Bank and the Fund was that when we were 
discussing issues with them, we used words, channels and approaches that they would 
understand and respect. We could communicate with them through channels that were 
understood” (Makonnen 2009).  
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Such an approach can be categorised as sub-hegemonic, since the ECA’s objective was not to 
reject HIPC out of hand, but rather to improve it, to get the World Bank and IMF to deliver 
more effective debt relief. This put the ECA firmly in the camp of those who believed in 
incremental debt relief, as opposed to debt cancellation – a more radical alternative espoused 
by the OAU. However, in line with my theoretical argument about the fluidity inherent in the 
sub-hegemonic process, it is possible to conceive of the ECA approach as creating the 
conditions for an eventual HIPC initiative that would provide significantly more debt relief for 
African countries – and on better terms for the recipients – than the Bank and Fund had 
themselves envisaged.  
 
Claiming the Twenty-first Century? 
These early initiatives clearly showed that the ECA under Amoako was positioning itself 
differently from during the Adedeji years. Its approach was to refrain from being 
confrontational. Instead, it was overtly sub-hegemonic and sought to advocate from within the 
frame of the dominant development discourse. Within the constraints imposed by a dominant 
political rationality it had accepted and internalised, the ECA sought to ensure that any 
resultant policy prescriptions were more realistic and appropriate to the different contexts and 
needs of African countries. In the process, it hoped to position the ECA as a constructive and 
credible advocate on behalf of Africa’s development, one that could unlock access to the 
corridors of power and give Africa a greater say in determining its own development.  
 
In 2000, the World Bank, ECA, African Development Bank (ADB), African Economic Research 
Consortium (AERC) and the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) jointly published a research report 
provocatively titled ‘Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?’ This argued that, whilst many African 
countries had successfully undertaken economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, challenges 
such as deteriorated capacity, weakened institutions and inadequate infrastructure meant that 
major changes were needed if Africans and their children were to claim the twenty-first  
century. It called for 7% annual growth and a more equitable distribution of income to meet the 
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MDG goal of halving poverty by 2015. To arrive at this point, it proposed a ‘business plan’ 
conceived and owned by Africans, and supported by donors through coordinated, long-term 
partnerships (World Bank 2000, p.2). It highlighted a number of basic requirements for faster 
development: improving governance and resolving conflict; investing in people; increasing 
competitiveness and diversifying economies; and reducing aid dependence and strengthening 
partnerships (ibid). 
 
One critic wrote that the Report: 
 
“…essentially articulates the long term strategies of African development from the 
perspective of the World Bank and the rest of the donor community. It is expected to 
provide the intellectual inspiration to African policy makers when they formulate these 
development strategies” (Bujra 2002, p.20).  
 
The Report claimed to represent not only the view of the World Bank, but of four other 
institutions as well. The fact that it bore the names of Africa’s two leading development 
institutions as well as that of its leading network of economists seemed to indicate a clear 
coming together of the positions of African thinkers with those of the World Bank. However, 
the then ECA leadership insisted that the Commission had very little input into the Report, 
which therefore did not reflect an institutional position (Makonnen 2009). 
 
To understand this apparent contradiction, it is worth taking a brief look at the main actors in 
the research process leading to the Report. Six names appear in the Foreword as signatories 
and members of the Steering Committee: Ali Gader Ali, the then ECA Chief Economist; Tesfaye 
Dinka, then head of the GCA; Ibrahim Elbadawi, World Bank senior economist; Augustin Fosu, 
then AERC Director of Research; Alan Gelb, then World Bank Africa Chief Economist; and 
Kupukile Mlambo, ADB Principal Research Economist. Ali and Elbadawi, both Sudanese 
economists, collaborated on various projects as part of the AERC network. In the late 1980s, Ali 
worked as an ECA consultant and was involved in work leading to AAF-SAP. While at the World 
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Bank, Elbadawi
116
 took a five-year sabbatical to serve as Research Director at the AERC. Fosu, 
who was AERC Research Director after Elbadawi, later became the ECA Chief Economist, after 
Ali Gader Ali’s resignation and the dismissal of his successor.  
 
The World Bank’s Gelb was the overall head of the team that produced the Report. As 
highlighted in the previous chapter, the GCA, whose Dinka signed the Foreword, was created in 
1990 on the initiative of then World Bank Africa Vice President Kim Jaycox as a forum to replace 
the polemical debate of the 1980s with a more productive dialogue on development between 
African leaders and the international community. Another key contributor was Charles Soludo, 
a leading African economist who consulted for the ECA, the World Bank and other institutions 
in the late 1990s before serving as Nigeria’s Central Bank Governor from 2004 to 2009. Several 
other African experts peer-reviewed the Report. These included Tanzanian Benno Ndulu, who 
later became senior adviser to the World Bank Vice President for Africa; Louis Kasekende, later 
ADB Chief Economist; Delphin Rwegasira, later to become head of the AERC; Josue Dione, 
Director of Sustainable Development at the ECA; Abebe Shimeles, a leading Ethiopian 
economist and ECA consultant (who features in Chapter 4), and Lishan Adam, a well-known 
expert on ICTs in Africa, then at the ECA.  
 
Even if the ECA leadership did not play a high-level official role in scripting the content and 
policy line of ‘Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?’, as has been claimed, senior ECA staff 
members and consultants were clearly involved, either centrally or as peer reviewers. A 
number of leading African economists with links to the ECA, ADB and AERC were similarly 
associated in one way or another with the Report. This demonstrates the extent to which a 
diverse group of ICEs could be ‘enrolled’ to provide the appearance of ideological convergence 
– another key characteristic of sub-hegemonic strategy. 
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 Elbadawi worked for the World Bank before being seconded to the AERC for a period, and then returning to 
Washington and serving as a manager and lead economist before leaving in 2009 to join the Dubai Economic 
Council. 
144 
 
At the outset of the Amoako era at the ECA, it may have been a fair assumption for the Bank to 
assume that the ECA would be a compliant ally. However, I contend that Amoako – after nearly 
five years away from Washington D.C. and at pains to be seen as representing African as 
opposed to World Bank interests – had begun to view his and the ECA’s role as going beyond 
moderating World Bank and IMF prescriptions to make them more palatable to African 
realities. This role extended to pro-actively shaping Bretton Woods and wider aid policy, as well 
as preparing the ground for significantly stronger African agency in setting its own agenda. 
  
International Development Moves on 
By the mid-1990s, policies derived from the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ – which 
disciplined African countries into undertaking stabilisation, liberalisation and privatisation 
reforms – had palpably failed to bring about the promised growth and had instead wreaked a 
devastating socio-economic impact (cf. Mkandawire 2001, Stiglitz 1998, SAPRIN 2004). This 
failure brought about at least three significant effects: first, the recognition from within the 
World Bank itself that ‘getting the institutions right’ – in other words taking in account extra-
economic factors – constituted an approach more likely to succeed; second, the understanding 
that developing countries must have much more say in determining their development 
strategy, leading to the phasing out of SAPs and the advent of the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) process; and third, the onset of aid fatigue in an increasingly competitive global 
economic environment. 
 
The new international consensus was articulated in the Millennium Declaration, adopted on 8 
September 2002 by all 189 member countries of the United Nations General Assembly. Shared 
responsibility among all nations for managing worldwide social and economic development was 
listed among fundamental values for international relations in the twenty-first century. The 
Declaration identified development and poverty reduction as one of the key objectives needed 
to translate the shared values into action, and laid down the basis for the eight MDGs, which 
are overwhelmingly focused on reducing poverty and advancing socio-economic development. 
Africa was singled out for special focus. 
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Nobel Laureate and former World Bank Chief Economist, Joseph Stiglitz emphasised extra-
economic concerns when he conceptualised development as “transformation of society” 
(Stiglitz 1998). In a 1997 address to the World Bank Board of Governors titled ‘The Challenge of 
Inclusion’, President James Wolfensohn stated:  
 
“The message for countries is clear: educate your people, ensure their health, give them 
voice and justice, financial systems that work, and sound economic policies, and they 
will respond and they will save and they will attract the investment, both domestic and 
foreign, that is needed to raise living standards and fuel development” (Wolfensohn 
1997, p.5). 
 
On 21 January 1999, Wolfensohn proposed a Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)117 
to the World Bank Board and staff aimed at repositioning the Bank at the epicentre of efforts to 
reduce poverty and bring about sustainable development. The CDF was underpinned by four 
principles: long-term holistic vision; country ownership; country-led partnership; and a focus on 
results. As highlighted in this and the previous chapter, the World Bank was adept at 
accommodating dissenting ideas into its next-generation strategy – a key plank of its 
hegemony. In this case, and having learned from the Bank’s mistakes of the 1980s and 1990s, 
the CDF sought to replace the short-termism of SAPs with a long view that had long been 
advocated by the ECA and other institutions. The emphasis on country ownership and country-
led partnership emanated from the lesson learned that development could not happen from 
the outside (Stiglitz 1999). The CDF principles captured key elements of the international 
development consensus, and the Framework was formally endorsed in January 2001 as the 
basis for all World Bank work.  
 
                                                  
117
 Wolfensohn’s framework addressed four dimensions: structural, including good and clean government, an 
effective legal and justice system, a well-organised and supervised financial system, and a social safety net and 
social programmes; human, including education and knowledge institutions, and health and population issues; 
physical, including water and sewage, energy, roads, transportation and telecommunications, sustainable 
development, environmental and cultural issues; and specific rural, urban and private-sector strategies 
(Wolfensohn 1999). 
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Of major significance to African countries was the World Bank’s introduction in September 
1999 of the PRSP approach, which effectively replaced the SAPs of the 1980s and 1990s118. The 
PRSP was developed as the foundation for World Bank and IMF lending programmes as well as 
for the HIPC initiative discussed above. Poor countries wishing to access any new concessional 
funding from the Bank and Fund, and qualify for debt relief, now needed to prepare a national 
poverty reduction strategy in the form of a PRSP – which had to be approved by the World Bank 
and IMF Boards before any funds were released. The objective was to ensure that any 
additional resources going to poor countries would be used to reduce poverty. PRSPs were to 
involve wide-ranging national consultations including civil society119 and other non-
governmental actors in recipient countries. The PRSPs are underpinned by five principles similar 
to those in the CDF: national ownership and country leadership; results or outcome orientation; 
comprehensive recognition of the multidimensional nature of poverty; partnership-orientation; 
and taking a long-term perspective (Bretton Woods Project 2003).  
 
Even as the world rallied around the overarching imperative of tackling poverty, it emerged that 
aid, considered critical to making this happen, was on the decline. Relative to donor GDP, and 
since the mid-1990s, net disbursements of aid to Africa had dropped nearly 30% in real terms. 
As a result, the typical African country now faced a resource gap of more than 12% of GDP 
relative to the investments need of a growth rate likely to achieve the poverty reduction MDG 
for 2015 (World Bank 2000). The decline was attributed partly to the end of the Cold War, 
which led to a massive downturn in tied ideological aid, and partly to the recognition among 
donor and recipient countries as well as the multilateral system that aid was not working 
(Glennie 2008).  
 
                                                  
118
 The advent of the PRSPs was accompanied by a rebranding. The IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) was renamed the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF), while the Bank created a Poverty Reduction 
Growth Facility (PRGF) to finance PRSPs and complement its traditional adjustment lending (Bretton Woods 
Project 2003). 
119
 Since my focus is on a mainstream ICE in Africa’s development regime, I have deliberately refrained from 
engaging with the question of civil society in Africa. I discuss and provide an account of ‘African civil society’ in the 
Conclusion of this dissertation.  
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As a result, calls intensified for this trend to be reversed, leading the 2002 Monterrey 
Conference on Financing for Development to agree that, for poor countries to meet the MDGs, 
donors would need to increase aid volumes to 0.7% of their GDP120. Added to this were calls for 
aid to Africa to be made more effective, codified in the Paris Declaration (2005), and for the 
international trading regime to be reconfigured to allow African countries to trade their way 
out of poverty. Put together, this signified a change in how global development was 
constituted, an effective evolution of the international development regime. 
 
Influencing the Consensus 
With a conviction that Africa needed a stronger voice in the world, the ECA intensified its 
efforts to engage with the international discourse and practice of development in a bid to 
position itself as a credible interlocutor for Africa. A key modality of the ECA strategy was its 
ability to convene African experts and policy-makers around key themes, and create an 
environment in which they could discuss and agree common positions on the way forward. 
Convening constitutes a powerful ‘political technology’, harnessed by ICEs in Africa’s 
development regime, to enable trans-national conversations (Cooper and Packard 1997). It can 
be deployed to achieve genuine consensus, or instrumentalised to manufacture consent. As a 
continental think tank, the ECA’s role was limited to generating, aggregating and transmitting 
knowledge. It had no mandate to implement development policies within countries, the 
exclusive preserve of the UNDP and other specialised agencies in the global UN division of 
labour. As such, the ECA relied heavily on its convening power as a means of setting agendas 
and influencing others to implement them. 
 
Emblematic of this use of convening power was the ECA’s initiative on the PRSPs. In March 
2000, and in collaboration with the World Bank and IMF, it organised a workshop for African 
countries to discuss the content, process and implications of the PRSPs on African countries. 
While welcoming the PRSP as a successor to SAPs, participants tabled a number of operational 
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 In 2005, calls for doubling aid to low-income countries would be repeated, first by the UN Millennium Project, 
then by the Commission for Africa, and by the G8 Gleneagles summit which agreed that this would happen by 
2010. 
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challenges. Two months later, the ECA sent a high-level mission to several African countries at 
different stages of the PRSP process, to learn first-hand how these countries were adjusting to 
the process and addressing the practical challenges. The mission also met with Ministers and 
senior officials to discuss how the ECA might support African countries in the process (ECA 
2001).  
 
A key message emanating from the workshop and country visits was that SAPS had blunted the 
ability of African countries to systematically share experiences and articulate a strong African 
voice in the international community on the continent's experience (ECA 2001). As a result, and 
at the urging of African countries, the ECA established the African Learning Group on the PRSPs 
“as an African-owned forum that would facilitate African peer learning and serve as a 
mechanism through which Africans could ensure the relevance of the PRSP approach to Africa’s 
development challenges” (ibid, p.3).  
 
The Learning Group brought PRSP practitioners together each year to share experiences, assess 
the PRSP process, and determine how best to address the concerns raised. A key objective was 
to operationalise the discourse of ‘country ownership’ deemed so central to the international 
development consensus and the emerging new aid relationship121. African countries that had 
undertaken to prepare PRSPs presented country studies at the meeting. Independent African 
experts and academics participated as resource persons or observers, as did donor 
representatives. Non-governmental experts attending included African economists working for 
independent national think-tanks who were considered important players in the wider PRSP 
community122. Invitees included both those identified with the mainstream, and those with 
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 The Learning Group organised its work around five clusters of issues of concern to African countries 
implementing PRSPs: the content of growth strategies; PRSP-related financing and public expenditure 
management; legitimacy of the PRSP process; capacity requirements; and donor policies and modalities.  
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 Presenters and discussants at the first PRSP-Learning Group meeting included Jalal Abdel Latif, executive 
director of Inter Africa Group, an independent think tank specialising in Horn of Africa issues; Joe Abbey, executive 
director of the Centre for Economic Policy Analysis, an independent Ghanaian think tank, albeit close to 
government; Oumou Toure Traore, executive secretary of the Mali Women’s Organisation; Marie Memouna 
Shaba, head of the Association of NGOs in Tanzania; Prof. Fantu Cheru of the American University and a leading 
Pan-Africanist technocrat who had written on issues such as the African renaissance; Dr Samuel Wangwe, 
executive director of the Economic and Social Research Foundation in Tanzania; and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, a 
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critical views – and the ECA used its convening power to encourage the airing of dissenting 
views. This is consistent with my argument that sub-hegemony goes beyond simple ‘translation’ 
to involve creative adaptation influenced by multiple perspectives. 
 
The initial Learning Group meeting held in Addis Ababa from 5-6 November 2001 concluded 
that, for African countries to benefit from PRSPs, the process should be “focused on the 
articulation of growth strategies that are consistent with the broad development objectives of 
African countries” (ECA 2001, p.4). On off-budget aid, there were candid discussions on the 
largely political nature of such support, with a consensus that, in bypassing normal 
government-approval processes, such aid undermined accountability and transparency in the 
use of public resources. Subsequent Learning Group meetings took place in November 2002 
(Brussels) and December 2003 (Addis Ababa), deepening the focus on the five core themes. The 
ECA also established an African knowledge network and community of practice on the PRSPs, to 
facilitate ongoing sharing of experience.  
 
As a result of the studies and discussions associated with the first three Learning Group forums, 
African countries gradually shifted their emphasis away from the World Bank/IMF PRSP process 
per se, to advocate for second-generation national poverty reduction strategies (SGPRSs) which 
would be produced independently by each country. Furthermore, the Learning Group strategy 
had gradually evolved towards harmonising poverty reduction and MDG country strategies as 
reflected in the title of the fourth Learning Group meeting, in March 2006: ‘African Plenary on 
National Strategies for Poverty Reduction and Implementation of the Millennium Development 
Goals’. The success of the Learning Group lay in its combination of country evidence and 
facilitation of African voice – with the ECA’s ability to convene and amplify African perspectives 
a key factor. African policy-makers and the Bretton Woods institutions alike considered the 
Learning Group to have added value (Makonnen 2009).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                
private equity manager who had formerly served as head of UNDP’s Africa bureau and was later to become 
Liberian head of state (ECA 2001). 
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Another factor characterised the ECA approach – opportunism. Asked by the Strategic 
Partnership with Africa (SPA)123 to host a meeting of its Technical Group in Addis Ababa, the 
ECA scheduled the SPA meeting from 8-9 November 2001, a few days after the inaugural 
Learning Group meeting on 5-6 November. In between, the ECA arranged a one-day joint 
Learning Group/ SPA meeting on 7 November. The ECA thereby opportunistically created space 
for the African policy-makers and experts attending the Learning Group meeting to engage with 
the SPA donor representatives face to face. This created a precedent, with subsequent Learning 
Group and SPA meetings convened back-to-back.  
 
The outcome of this dialogue exceeded the ECA’s expectations. As a direct result of the meeting 
organised opportunistically by the ECA, the SPA agreed to restructure itself, from being a donor 
club to becoming a partnership involving African countries (Barder 2008). Its rationale was to 
ensure that the African voice on aid could be heard in a forum of equals that included the 
World Bank, European Union and leading bilateral donors. In 2006, the SPA changed its name 
from the ‘Special Programme of Assistance to Africa’ to the ‘Strategic Partnership with Africa’. 
Donors, however, despite having agreed to the partnership, complained that the character of 
the SPA as an informal grouping was altered by the inclusion of African countries. Many began 
sending less senior technocrats to participate in SPA plenary meetings. This sent a signal to the 
African membership that donors did not like the idea of an equal partnership, and led to 
declining interest in the SPA among its African membership (Amoako-Tuffour et al 2008).  
 
This reaffirms that power struggles do not end with formal, discursive agreements on equal 
partnership. The SPA’s discourse on a ‘partnership of equals’ reflected gains made by the ECA 
and other ICEs in pressuring donor countries to move beyond rhetorical commitments to 
expanded ‘African ownership’. However, African countries, having acceded to membership of 
the SPA, now had to fight for an equal stake and equal involvement within the forum. While 
proximity to the centre of power gave African SPA members greater leverage to determine aid 
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 Established by the World Bank in 1986 as the ‘Special Program of Assistance to Africa’, the SPA started out as a 
donors-only club with the mission of mobilising resources for cash-strapped African countries who has agreed to 
implement World Bank and IMF-directed reforms under SAPs. 
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policy on Africa, the threat by donors to de-prioritise the SPA as a forum for dialogue on aid 
policy also risked robbing Africans of a crucial and unique space in which to contest the power 
asymmetry in the discourse and practice of aid to Africa. This provides further evidence in 
support of my theoretical argument about the fluidity and inter-relatedness of resistance and 
reaffirmation in development regimes, resulting in no hegemonic claim ever being definitively 
or irreversibly actualised. Agrawal (1999) refers to this tendency towards fluidity as a ‘moving 
equilibrium’. 
 
The perceived success of the PRSP Learning Group and the reforming of the SPA led the ECA to 
launch the ‘Big Table’, a one-day, informal closed-door meeting bringing together African 
Ministers of Finance with OECD Development Co-operation Ministers. The first edition, on 19 
November 2000, brought together 11 African Ministers, 10 OECD Ministers and 5 high-level 
representatives from international institutions for a frank exchange on the international 
development goals and PRSPs (ECA 2000b). The second ‘Big Table’, held in Amsterdam from 14-
16 October 2001, focused on governance, making aid more effective, and African peer review 
(ECA 2001c). The third ‘Big Table’ (Addis Ababa, 18-19 January 2003) discussed the concept of 
mutual accountability, while the fourth edition (Addis Ababa, 16-17 October 2004) focused on 
how to stimulate private investment to Africa. At all these meetings, attendance was at the 
highest level – indicating demand for genuine dialogue.  
 
As well as attracting key policy-makers on development issues from both African and OECD 
countries, the ‘Big Table’ was significant for two other reasons. First, the ECA’s convening role 
meant it could use the forum to advance consensus on its key ideas – in the process inserting 
itself as a key interlocutor between Africa and its donors and creating the constituency for 
behaviour change. This again speaks to the power that convening confers on the convenor. 
Assembling others to dialogue implies a lead role for the convenor in preparing the agenda for 
discussion. Second, the ‘Big Table’ became a key privileged space in which ideological 
differences between OECD countries were played out. As the ECA principal adviser recalled:  
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“The Big Table was a place where [donors]] could work out their tensions with other 
donors, in a frank and open manner. I remember [then Secretary of State for 
International Development] Clare Short found the Big Table exciting because she was at 
the forefront of thinking and wanted to engage Rwanda in a 10-year partnership 
underpinned by predictable Budget Support. The U.S. was against Budget Support and 
opposed the U.K. in the Big Table. There was a blow-out between Short and Andrew 
Natsios, the USAID Administrator” (Makonnen 2009).  
 
In order to aggregate and represent the ‘African voice’ more fully, a different kind of forum was 
needed to bring a wider cross-section of actors to the table. This led the ECA to launch the 
African Development Forum (ADF) in 1999, an initiative designed: 
 
“to establish an African-driven development agenda that reflects a consensus among 
major partners and that leads to specific programmes for country implementation” 
(ECA 1999, emphasis added).  
 
The ADF’s objective was to foster new forms of partnership that could deepen and sustain 
emphasis on policy reforms and good governance. This was regarded as the reason for 
improvements in the economic performance of many African countries over the previous five 
years (ibid). 
 
The ADF is a multi-stakeholder conference convened in Addis Ababa and dedicated to a key 
development theme. Dialogue is informed by in-depth research, undertaken by the ECA and 
collaborating institutions and networks, the results of which is presented to ADF participants – 
drawn from African governments, civil society, the private sector, researchers and academics, 
intergovernmental organisations and donors. Based on evidence presented, participants are 
expected to come up with shared goals and priorities, design action plans and programmes, and 
agree on how to implement them. Four editions of the ADF were held during Amoako’s tenure 
at the ECA, and two under the subsequent leadership. Space available here permits only brief 
reflection on how the first four ADF editions were conceived as part of a wider strategic 
approach to setting an African agenda.  
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The first ADF, held from 24-28 October 1999, focused on the ‘Challenge to Africa of 
Globalisation and the Information Age’. This reflected the ECA’s strong espousal of information 
and communication technologies as a way for Africa to leapfrog some of its most intractable 
development challenges. ADF II (3-7 December 2000) zeroed in on ‘AIDS: The Greatest 
Leadership Challenge’. Although HIV and AIDS did not feature as a distinct work stream at the 
ECA, the selection of this theme reflected a widespread concern that the pandemic risked 
derailing Africa’s development progress. ADF II directly influenced the adoption by African 
leaders of the Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Infectious Diseases and 
the accompanying Abuja Framework, agreed in April 2001. Inspired by the ADF II outcomes, the 
ECA conceived the Commission on HIV/AIDS and Governance in Africa (CHGA)
124
, which was 
convened by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and chaired by Amoako. CHGA advocated 
scaling up the response to HIV/AIDS by combining data on macroeconomic modelling of its 
future impact on Africa’s development with high-level advocacy by CHGA’s commissioners, all 
leading figures in international development. 
 
From 3-8 March 2002, ADF III convened on the theme ‘Defining Priorities for Regional 
Integration’, reflecting a continuing preoccupation with a strong African aspiration. Among 
other things, the ADF IV Consensus Statement called for the proliferation of regional economic 
communities and arrangements – identified as a key obstacle to advancing regional integration 
– to be rationalised. This informed the first edition of the ECA policy research report ‘Assessing 
Regional Integration in Africa’ (ARIA), which undertook a detailed analysis of the impact of 
integration efforts to date and spelled out an agenda for accelerating progress.  
 
‘Governance for a Progressing Africa’ was chosen as the theme for ADF IV (11-15 October 
2004), reflecting the ECA’s core focus on defining an African governance agenda. Those 
attending included World Bank President James Wolfensohn, future President of Liberia Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf, and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who in his opening statement 
described the ADF as “the leading Forum for serious and intellectually rigorous discussion and 
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exchange of views on critical issues related to the development challenges of Africa,” adding: 
“Without good governance and the full respect of the democratic rights of citizens and all 
sectors of society, it would be impossible to put in place conditions for durable peace and 
stability” (Zenawi 2004). Among the invited participants were traditional African leaders such as 
the Asantehene, the monarch of Ghana’s Ashanti kingdom, who spoke passionately about the 
need to draw on traditional forms of governance in the African context.  
 
In summary, the ADF sought to do four things: (i) provide a space for Africans from across the 
spectrum as well as for Africa’s development partners to meet and agree on a practicable 
African development agenda; (ii) aggregate the African voice on a given theme; (iii) 
demonstrate to Africa’s international partners that its countries had internalised good 
governance and the necessity of continuing policy reforms as African agendas; and (iv) 
recalibrate the power asymmetry in international relations to position Africa in a lead role in 
conceiving of and pursuing its own development. The ECA’s strategy was to bring together a 
wide range of stakeholders and allow them to engage and arrive at a consensus. While many 
stakeholders were from governments, a significant number were drawn from independent 
African organisations, including think tanks, policy advocacy NGOs, academia, and other 
associational forms usually referred to as ‘African civil society’ (briefly discussed in Chapter 5 
and the Conclusion below).  
 
His Master’s Voice?  
As with much of the ECA’s strategy during the period under review, the ADF approach was to 
progress on the basis of ‘consensus among major partners’, and to focus on deepening ‘policy 
reforms and good governance’. This gives credence to the view of the ECA of that period as a 
Trojan horse for the international development consensus on how African development should 
proceed. Indeed, and over and above contributions to the UN General Budget, the ECA secured 
substantial extra-budgetary funding from several bilateral donors to support key modalities for 
delivering its agenda – including a grant from the UK Government of £2.25 million over three 
years starting in 2004 (ECA/DFID 2004).  
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The Commission was clearly able to extend the boundaries of ‘ownership’ by expanding policy 
space to foster stronger African agency in determining its future. I contend that this constituted 
part of a deliberate ECA strategy to move beyond a classic sub-hegemonic role by creating the 
policy space necessary for the emergence of an African-led development agenda. In Chapter 2, 
and drawing on Moore and Schmitz (1995), I argued that while in many cases development 
agency experts “must maintain their masters’ legitimacy” (ibid, p.11), as they cannot not openly 
dissent from the dominant discourse, they are “…purveyors of passive revolution, the 
manufacturers of minimal hegemony” (ibid). It is my view that the tactics described in the 
pages above conformed to this approach.  
 
In the period under review, the ECA sought to ensure that key multilateral and bilateral donors 
would support its ideas. It did this by ensuring its discourse echoed key structural 
underpinnings of the dominant international development discourse, effectively accepting that 
there was no longer any African effort to contest the modified neo-liberal Project. On this basis, 
it positioned itself as a credible interlocutor between Africa and its development partners. As a 
trusted institution able to take forward the international consensus on the need for ‘greater 
ownership’ of development among recipient countries, the ECA used its convening power to 
incubate and midwife strong African positions agreed by a cross-section of Africa’s policy 
community. By facilitating the agency of a diverse range of African stakeholders, the ECA 
ensured that the ‘passive revolution’ implied in these positions came not from ECA experts 
alone, but represented the views of African experts and policy-makers across the continent. 
Thus, the emphasis shifted away from overt contestation on ideological grounds, towards a 
technocratic sub-hegemonic approach predicated on creating and opening up African policy 
space. 
 
The ECA’s role as ‘manufacturer of minimal hegemony’ emerged gradually over the period 
under review. From 1995 to 1998, Amoako iterated ideas he had developed as Director of 
Education and Social Policy in the World Bank. World Bank and other international experts 
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were often involved – alongside African technocrats – in the peer review of ECA research 
studies. Amoako also travelled to Washington D.C. several times each year to meet with World 
Bank President Wolfensohn – who he admired (Amoako 2006) – as well as with other senior 
officials. These included his friend Callisto Madavo, a Zimbabwean who like Amoako had joined 
the Bank as a young African professional, and risen to the rank of Vice President of the Africa 
Region
125
.  
 
However, as the ECA became more credible and trusted, it consciously began to steer a more 
independent course. As a senior ECA adviser (also a former World Bank employee) recalled, 
while the World Bank was skilled at engaging with other institutions to influence their thinking, 
its overtures were not always welcomed. As evidence of this, she offered the following 
anecdote:  
 
“A delegation from the Bank came to ECA to work with us on the Commission on 
HIV/AIDS and Governance. The bone of contention was that they wanted to introduce 
anti-retroviral drugs in specific countries on a pilot basis. We at ECA argued that there 
would be no point in introducing anti-retrovirals on a pilot basis as the immune systems 
of those participating in the pilot would immediately suffer when the drugs were 
withdrawn. For us it was an ethical issue. [Amoako] had some very harsh words over the 
phone with a lady at the Bank who was leading the mission” (Makonnen 2005). 
 
The Compact for African Recovery 
The ECA had to maintain a delicate balance between its pro-active effort to influence the 
dominant development institutions and discourse, and the extent to which its work responded 
to the demands of its core constituents, Africa’s policy-making community. On 21 November 
2000, at the opening of the ECA’s 8th session of African Ministers of Finance in Addis Ababa, 
Amoako took the balancing act to new heights. In a speech, he tabled a far-reaching proposal 
under which donors would provide aid, debt relief and market access in return for Africa 
putting in place the necessary reform to ensure economic take-off.  
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 Some of Amoako’s visits to Washington D.C. were of a personal nature, since his family remained in the U.S.  
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Two sets of developments indicated that the time was right for such a compact, he argued. On 
the one hand, there was: 
 
“a growing recognition by international partners and reforming African countries that 
stabilisation policies are not the same as structural adjustment [and that] we [therefore] 
need to go far deeper to reposition poverty reduction at the centre of our development 
efforts” (Amoako 2000).  
 
On the other hand, Africa was at a crossroads: five African countries had adopted sustainable 
reforms and shown signs of structural diversification; 14 countries showed prospects of a 
sustainable take-off in the next 15 years; and on the political front, there was a deepening of 
democracy, more participatory development and greater local responsibility. To entrench these 
positive yet fragile gains, Amoako argued for: “…a bold and comprehensive plan for Africa’s 
irreversible emergence from its current fragile state” (ibid, emphasis in the original). 
 
On aid, Amoako proposed “a substantial, but carefully agreed and phased, injection of official 
development assistance, which would be linked to performance indicators agreed by both 
sides” (ibid, 2000). Since it was unlikely that donors would increase their aid overnight, he 
argued, progress would need to be made on debt relief. Trade was proposed as the third option 
for filling the financing gap and “as a critical part of moving from aid to self-reliance” (ibid). In 
return for enhanced market access, African countries would undertake to establish policies that 
encouraged exports, attracted private investment, and stimulated diversification.  
 
On the other side, and in return for action by developed countries on all three financing fronts, 
African countries should acknowledge the need for political reform and “forge ahead, in line 
with international consensus, to move beyond counting ballots to making the link between 
voting, participation, accountability, transparency and good governance” (ibid). As a final 
element of the proposed compact, Amoako argued in favour of “a reformed international 
financial system which serves all nations, with increasing regard to the poorest” (ibid).  
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The ideas contained in Amoako’s speech reflected how closely the ECA had adhered to the 
international consensus, whether on aid, debt relief, trade or ‘good governance’. However, 
there were clear signs in the speech of attempts to secure a better deal for Africa. On aid, 
Amoako proposed that donors be more predictable in their giving, and be held accountable for 
how aid was disbursed and for the kind of support given. On debt relief, he argued that 
Enhanced HIPC, whose predecessor he had criticised for not going far enough, was also flawed. 
On trade, his argument in favour of enhanced market access was consistent with positions 
tabled by the OAU, which traditionally took more radical positions. A significant difference, 
however, was that Amoako proposed that, in return for enhanced market access, African 
countries should agree to meet certain policy conditionalities consonant with the neo-liberal 
reform agenda – such as building export-oriented economies and attracting private investment.  
 
African Finance Ministers asked the ECA to develop the ideas outlined in the speech into a 
substantive document, and to consult with different actors to ensure that it could be 
implemented successfully. The result was the ‘Compact for African Recovery’. Published on 21 
April 2001, the ‘Compact’ was the ECA’s most far-reaching policy statement during the period 
under review. “We are at a critical moment at which lessons learned can be put to the best 
use”, the document stated, adding:  
 
“The Compact is therefore a timely instrument, drawing upon existing modalities and 
developing emerging best practices, to draw up a comprehensive response to Africa's 
development challenges. The Compact does not propose any new aid modalities or 
instruments. Rather, the intention is to exploit to the full the scope of what already 
exists and, by providing an African vision for enhanced partnerships, to stimulate a 
transformation in aid relationships including fostering public-private partnerships” (ECA 
2001, p.3). 
 
The Compact builds on the proposals in the 2000 speech, spelling out in some detail the key 
areas for joint action by Africa and its development partners, areas for improvement by Africa, 
and areas for donor improvement.  
 
The Compact contained four principles:   
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1. African ownership of visions and goals for national development, as well as policies and 
programmes for poverty reduction and the increased participation of African countries 
in the global economy;  
2. stable long-term resource flows to Africa and the predictability of long-term donor 
support;  
3. a transformed partnership based on mutual accountability to agreed development 
outcomes, including peer review and performance monitoring among both African 
countries and international partners;  
4. recognition of Africa's diversity, meaning that some countries can immediately benefit 
from the full range of measures outlined, while others need to make progress in 
governance and economic management before they will qualify (ibid, p.25). 
 
On African ownership, the Compact states:  
 
“[African] ownership entails leadership and capacity to define and implement strategies 
that ensure the economic and social wellbeing of the country's citizens. National 
identification of development priorities and strategies is the first and most essential 
step. Elected officials should promote broad-based consensus around national strategies 
and related policy choices. Following from this, public officials should be committed and 
able to govern the affairs of the country in an efficient and accountable manner” (ECA 
2001, par. 147, p.26).  
 
Additionally, African ownership implies: 
 
“…a willingness on the part of international donors to coordinate and channel their aid 
programmes in accordance with African-led agendas and approaches, support national 
institutions and processes that foster consensus-building and accountable economic 
management, and redirect technical assistance programmes towards long-term national 
capacity needs” (ibid, emphasis added). 
 
This clearly locates the primary responsibility of Africa’s own leadership in solving the 
continent’s problems, resonating with the sentiment in African leadership plans even before 
the LPA. However, what makes this definition all the more far-reaching is that donors are also 
given a responsibility for enabling African ownership by aligning their support around African 
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priorities. A measure of the success of the ECA’s sub-hegemonic approach between 1995 and 
2005 is that it was able to press such a claim for expanded African ownership, and command 
attention.  
 
On the second principle, stable long-term resource flows, the Compact cites trust as being 
central to a new aid relationship, which should involve a shift from excessive conditionality to 
longer-term predictable relations. To earn this trust, African countries should “[demonstrate] 
their commitment to manage their aid effectively for developmental outcomes and to take 
charge of their development efforts” (ibid, par. 161, p.28). In return, donors should be willing 
to:  
 
“…realign their aid policies and practices consistent with the spirit of African leadership 
and ownership of its development. This should include a greater move away from 
fragmented project support […] to long-term programme support channelled through 
the recipient country's medium term expenditure framework and a genuine 
commitment to prevent the diversions in aid relations that are triggered by ad-hoc 
incidents” (ibid, par. 162, p.28).  
 
This principle is important, as it was later to emerge as a key aspect of the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which articulated a powerful agenda around stronger 
recipient-country ownership and leadership, and reflected a commitment by OECD donors, at 
least on paper, to reform the aid system. The Compact added to the pressure on donors to cut 
out duplication, move away from project support, use more flexible aid instruments (such as 
budget support), and harmonise and align their aid around national priorities. The ECA was at 
the heart of negotiations on these sensitive issues. 
 
The third Compact principle calls for a transformed partnership, arguing that the phenomenon 
of upward accountability – whereby African countries are obliged to submit multiple reports to 
donors and undergo a proliferation of donor evaluations – must give way to a system of mutual 
accountability. This is described as “the shared commitment by African countries and donors to 
monitor progress towards agreed goals and to peer review” (ibid, par. 167, p.29). The idea that 
the two sides of the transformed partnership should be able to hold each other to account, and 
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should jointly develop mechanisms to do so, was an important proposal, as it forced a 
conceptual shift in how that aid was accounted for. In concrete terms, it led the NEPAD Heads 
of State and Government Implementing Council (HSGIC) to commission a review of donor 
performance, requesting the ECA to develop a framework for mutual review in collaboration 
with the OECD. This resulted in the annual Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness 
(MRDE)
126
.  
 
The fourth Compact principle recognises the diversity of countries and sub-regions, identifying 
three groups of countries: ‘enhanced partnership’, ‘limited partnership’ and ‘post-conflict’ 
countries. States labelled ‘enhanced partnership’ countries are those that fully meet criteria for 
governance, economic performance and commitment to poverty reduction “…and can 
therefore take full advantage of all the measures envisaged, and benefit from the resulting 
increase in quantity and quality of resource flow”. These countries “…should receive direct 
budgetary support in line with medium term expenditure frameworks towards agreed poverty 
reduction targets” (ibid, pp.5-6)
127
 Few countries can initially meet the standards laid down for 
‘enhanced partnership’, and these will “…need to make progress in governance and economic 
management before they will qualify” (ibid, p.4)
128
. 
 
Although the ECA refrained from publicly identifying which countries it considered to be in 
which category, the intention was clearly to promote the creation of an incentive-based system 
whereby Africa’s best-performing reformers would attract the lion’s share of aid. As will shortly 
be discussed, this selective approach set the ECA apart from the African Union, which staunchly 
pursued a ‘solidarity’ narrative predicated on all its 53 member states being given equal 
treatment and developing in tandem. The downside of such an approach could the effective 
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 The report looks at the policies and performance of both African countries and partner 
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challenges in agriculture performance and trade; trends in 
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both recipients and donors in the aid relationship, was developed at the ECA, and provided the central plank of its 
Compact for African Recovery, the most intellectually substantive contribution to NEPAD” (ibid, p.469). 
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creation of momentum for a “two-speed Africa” (Griggs, 2003, p.80), whereby good performers 
are rewarded and poor performers lag even further behind. Adedeji (2002) describes this as a 
shift from an ‘entitlement’ to an ‘effectiveness’ approach , arguing that the new approach is 
biased in favour of performance in key areas of the consensus reform agenda – macro-
economic policy, poverty reduction and the exercise of good governance. As I discuss below, 
the Compact tabled a series of innovative ideas that soon provided the basis for the next 
African continental development plan.  
 
From MAP and OMEGA to NAI then NEPAD 
As noted, the Compact document was developed at the behest of African Finance Ministers, 
who endorsed the idea at their Addis Ababa meeting in November 2000. The Ministers has also 
asked the ECA to consult widely with individuals and institutions inside and outside Africa on 
how best to deliver the proposals contained in the Compact. As the consultations got 
underway, news emerged that three African leaders – Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, 
Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria – were working on a new 
African development plan called the ‘Millennium Africa Recovery Programme’ (MAP).  
 
In a briefing at the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland on 21 January 2001, Mbeki 
told participants that the MAP was a declaration of a firm commitment by African leaders to 
take ownership and responsibility for the sustainable economic development of the continent. 
Its focus was to be on: creating peace, security, stability and democratic governance; investing 
in Africa’s people; harnessing Africa’s natural resources to lead development of industrial 
strategy; closing the digital divide; developing transport, energy and other infrastructure; and 
arriving at a financing mechanism (Mbeki 2001). Through these initiatives, the three African 
leaders hoped to accelerate poverty reduction efforts on the continent and increase domestic 
as well as foreign savings.  
 
As the prime mover behind the MAP, Mbeki used a series of speeches delivered from 1996 
onwards to argue that a political, socio-economic and cultural ‘African renaissance’ was in the 
163 
 
making. Meantime, another African leader, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, announced 
his ‘OMEGA Plan for Africa’, an ambitious proposal calling the development of Africa’s physical 
and human capital as the key prerequisites for sustained and balanced growth (Wade 2001). 
OMEGA – addressing the long-held aspiration of regional integration – would be presided over 
by a single international authority, and financed by foreign direct investment. 
 
Recognising the need to rationalise the two initiatives, African leaders meeting at an 
extraordinary AU summit in Sirte, Libya in March 2001 decreed that the OMEGA Plan and MAP 
should be merged. The ECA saw the need for facilitation of the technical merger of the two 
initiatives, and dedicated its 25
th
 Conference of African Ministers of Finance and Planning, held 
in Algiers from 8-10 May 2001, to the purpose. The ‘Compact for African Recovery’ was 
published as the issues paper for the conference, with a revised title signalling the ECA’s intent: 
‘Compact for African Recovery – Operationalising the Millennium Partnership for the African 
Recovery Programme (MAP). 
 
The Conference was highly charged. Senegal, under orders from President Wade to ensure his 
OMEGA Plan remained intact, sent a delegation of three Ministers, headed by Foreign Affairs 
Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio. It was the first time a member state had sent so many Ministers 
to an ECA Conference of Ministers, and the first time a Foreign Minister had attended a 
conference of Finance and Planning Ministers (Todaro 2009). There was tension about whose 
ideas would be most influential and decisive in reaching a new African development initiative. 
The first concern was the ECA’s Compact amid concerns that its profile was too high. Simba 
Makoni, Zimbabwe’s then Finance Minister and outgoing Chair of Bureau of the Conference of 
Ministers, made it clear that Africa could not afford three initiatives aimed in the same 
direction, with common development goals and the same noble intentions. He told the 
conference that, in the interest of achieving coherence, the ECA had agreed to “subsume the 
Compact into the initiative of the sovereigns” and offer the Compact as a technical 
implementation modality in support of the political vision as espoused by the MAP (ECA 
2001d). 
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Amoako was even more tactful in his opening statement in Algiers:  
 
“It is most fortunate that the development of the Compact has been carried out at the 
same time that Presidents Bouteflika, Mbeki and Obasanjo have shown bold leadership 
with their [MAP]. In meetings with Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo and with leaders of 
our host Government, we quickly agreed that the Compact should serve to help 
operationalise the MAP. I have also met with President Wade who has developed a 
parallel initiative known as the OMEGA Plan. I see very high potential for the merger of 
the MAP and the OMEGA Plan so that at the political level, Africa can speak with a 
united voice. In fact, I think we are well on the way to this point” (Amoako 2001).  
 
Due to sustained insistence by the Senegalese delegation that the OMEGA Plan constituted the 
most operational of the initiatives on the table, the conference was dominated by efforts to 
bring about convergence between the MAP and the OMEGA. The Conference Bureau, 
consisting of Algeria, Gabon, Mali, South Africa and Tanzania, reportedly met several times to 
discuss the problem, and there was a great deal of behind-the-scenes mediation (ECA 2001e). 
Although agreement was reached in principle, the actual merger of the two initiatives did not 
happen in Algiers. Instead, a process of negotiation was launched. Two planned workshops – in 
Abuja on the MAP and Dakar on OMEGA – were encouraged to proceed on the condition that 
they worked towards a merger. The ECA was handed an official role as facilitator and requested 
to convene a meeting, bringing together MAP and OMEGA technical experts as well as other 
African experts, “with the aim of arriving at a single programme that reflects the national, sub-
regional and regional dimensions” (ECA 2001f).  
 
Following the workshops, and shortly before the OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, Wade and a 
team of Senegalese experts flew to South Africa where they sat with Mbeki and his team and 
finalised the merger of the leadership initiatives (Landsberg 2002) – which were officially 
merged on 3 July into what became known as the ‘New African Initiative’ (NAI). On 11 July 
2001, the NAI was unanimously adopted by African leaders at the Lusaka Summit. While the 
document read in many parts like the MAP, the NAI strongly emphasised infrastructure, 
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remaining faithful to the OMEGA Plan
129
. In July 2001, Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo and Wade 
travelled to Genoa in Italy to present the NAI to G8 leaders – who responded by committing to 
working in partnership with Africa on the strength of the proposals in the initiative. African 
leaders also held meetings in the UK and Belgium to drum up support for the NAI. On 23 
October 2003, at the inaugural meeting of its 15-member Heads of State and Government 
Implementation Committee (HSGIC), the NAI was renamed the ‘New Partnership for African 
Development’ (NEPAD) and South Africa designated as the home for its Secretariat. 
 
I will revisit critiques of the NEPAD Framework in Chapter 5. Here, it is sufficient to note that 
NEPAD proclaimed itself “a new framework of interaction with the rest of the world, including 
the industrialised countries and multilateral organisations” (NEPAD 2001, p.10). It advocated 
for Africa’s equal participation in the globalised economy through a set of mutually binding 
partnership commitments with developed countries, and proposed a new compact between 
Africa’s rulers and ruled. NEPAD was hailed by one commentator as “potentially… the most 
important advance in African development policy during the past four decades” (Hope 2002, 
p.401), initiated by “…a new generation of enlightened African leaders” who “have now 
decided to stake Africa’s claim to the twenty-first century” (ibid, pp.387-88). Another wrote 
that it was “…perhaps the boldest new initiative in recent times on the appropriate path [that] 
the African continent should be taking towards its long-term development” (Olukoshi, 2002, 
p.1). However, the ECA/NEPAD philosophy soon clashed with the solidarity narrative of the 
African Union.  
 
Competing Narratives 
In July 2000 in Durban, South Africa, the OAU was laid to rest and its successor organisation, the 
African Union (AU), was officially launched. The aim of the AU was to revitalise previous plans 
for political and economic unity, and accord them a higher priority. This marked a major shift – 
                                                  
129
 That said, it is significant that Senegal’s President Wade became highly critical of NEPAD over time, and was 
quoted by the Senegalese News Agency (APS) on 28 June 2006 as stating during a two-day visit to Tehran, Iran: 
“NEPAD has failed. We did not choose the right people; they are not managers able to complete projects. NEPAD 
has not built a single mile of road” (Reuters 2006). 
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enshrining the right of the AU to intervene in a member state, respect for democratic 
principles, human rights and good governance, and promotion of social justice and gender 
equality130. The AU’s expansive mandate, as specified in the Constitutive Act (11 July 2000) 
signalled the intent of Africa’s leadership to position AU as the primary initiative not only on 
politics, but also on development (da Costa 2007).  
 
For many, the AU constituted an unprecedented opportunity for Africa to overcome the 
constraints of its multiplicity of borders and to have a stronger voice globally. One 
commentator saw the AU as part of the African response to globalisation, arguing that, whilst 
most individual African states were becoming irrelevant globally, as a unit the continent could 
potentially have a bigger voice (Abdul-Raheem 2006). Another commentator conceptualised 
the transition from OAU to AU as a radical shift that changed the broad existential motivation 
for having a continental organisation and ushered in a stronger commitment to development 
(Le Pere 2006). 
 
The AU and NEPAD shared the common goal of regional integration, and originated from the 
same pan-Africanist discursive imaginings highlighted earlier in this dissertation. NEPAD was 
launched a year after the Constitutive Act established the AU. Tension arose because, in a 
continent of 53 countries, characterised by multiple layers of supra-national structures with 
overlapping memberships and diverse agendas, both NEPAD and the AU stood out as totalising, 
hegemonic regional processes131. NEPAD’s proponents ruled that all other initiatives promoted 
by individual countries must be subsumed under the NEPAD process, with a view to having 
Africa “…speak with one voice and collectively and effectively cooperate with its development 
partners” (Hope 2002, p.399). Similarly, the AU was mandated to supersede all previous 
political, economic, social and cultural efforts at regional integration.  
                                                  
130
 Critically, the sacred cow of sovereignty enshrined in the OAU’s credo of non-interference and non-aggression 
was replaced by a new doctrine mandating the right to intervene to restore peace and security in specific 
circumstances – genocide, gross violations of human rights, national instability with cross-border ramifications, and 
unconstitutional changes of government.  
131
 Yet there is no mention in the Constitutive Act of NEPAD and hardly any references in NEPAD to the 
Constitutive Act (Adedeji 2002).  
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Formally, NEPAD was enshrined as a ‘mandated initiative’ of the AU. However, NEPAD’s key 
proponents – in particular Mbeki – were keen that it should not become subject to the slow 
and cumbersome procedures of continental decision-making (de Waal, 2002). This fractious 
dualism emanated from competing and contradictory narratives. While NEPAD predicated the 
development of Africa on solidarity with rich countries, many of them former colonial powers, 
the AU narrative sought continental solidarity with the South as a means of increasing Africa’s 
global bargaining power. The discursive dualism created divisions over development-policy 
options for Africa as a continent132 (Griggs 2003, p.77), sparking tensions between the AU 
Commission and the NEPAD Secretariat. As a result, African leaders that had signed up to 
NEPAD, meeting in Maputo, Mozambique in July 2003, agreed that the NEPAD Secretariat 
should move from South Africa to the AU’s seat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia within three years, or 
whenever the AU was ready to absorb the secretariat functions, whichever came first. 
Meantime, the AU granted the NEPAD Secretariat legal cover to operate temporarily from 
South Africa (AU 2003). 
 
The tensions led the then UN Resident Coordinator in South Africa to urge that NEPAD seek to 
become an agency of change and restraint, as opposed to a continental Ministry of Planning or 
Governance (Ohiorhenuan 2003). Nevertheless, and to date, the agreed-to integration of 
NEPAD and AU structures has not yet taken place and the NEPAD Secretariat remains in South 
Africa. This is partly because of the cumbersome process associated with implementing any 
decision taken under the auspices of the AU, but also because of fears that moving the NEPAD 
Secretariat to the AU’s Addis Ababa headquarters could expose the initiative to the AU’s 
bureaucratic inertia.  
 
 
                                                  
132
 Libya’s President Muammar Gadaffi, a key proponent of the South versus North discourse, proposed a ‘United 
States of Africa’ at the 1999 Sirte Summit of the OAU, and subsequently contributed more than US$1 million 
towards the OAU/AU transition. He was a vehement opponent of NEPAD, deeming it to be “a project of former 
colonisers and racists” (Griggs, 2003, pp.78-79). Zimbabwe’s Mugabe and Namibia’s Sam Nujoma were also 
vociferous in their rejection of any role in NEPAD for Africa’s former colonial rulers (ibid).  
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ECA’s Role Questioned 
NEPAD was also seen as duplicating the work of the ECA, which was deemed to possess a 
comparative advantage in socio-economic policy analysis. This perceived duplication was ironic 
considering the high degree of consonance between the ECA’s position, as stated in the 
Compact, and the NEPAD framework document. Nevertheless, and despite the ECA’s strategic 
repositioning of its Compact to reduce its profile, questions began to be asked about why the 
ECA should be allowed to speak on behalf of Africa, given the existence of the AU and NEPAD.  
 
These concerns represented a resurgence of older questions about the place of the ECA – an 
Africa-dedicated institution which was nevertheless a member of the UN family – in the 
institutional architecture of Africa’s development regime. As noted in Chapter 2, this concern 
was manifest two decades earlier in rivalry between the ECA and OAU, leading to the 
development of two parallel drafts of the Lagos Plan of Action133. However, in this instance it 
became clear that the ECA’s prominent role in shaping key African and international initiatives 
during the period under review
134
 had also pitted it against a handful of African leaders, who 
felt that it was their prerogative to take the lead in articulating Africa’s development discourse. 
The campaign to discredit Amoako on his arrival in 1995, which continued throughout his 
tenure, had sought to influence a number of African Heads of State, some of whom were 
concerned that the ECA was overstepping its mark. 
 
According to an ECA staff member close to the then leadership who attended the NEPAD HSGIC 
meeting on the sidelines of the AU Summit in Durban, South Africa, one of these leaders was 
Nigeria’s President Olusegun Obasanjo. Obasanjo publicly stated: “the ECA is not an African 
                                                  
133
 The origins of this concern will be revisited in more detail in Chapter 4. 
134
 This is evident in the numerous accolades bestowed on K.Y. Amoako during his tenure. These included: his 
naming as a member of several international commissions and task forces (including the Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health chaired by Jeffrey Sachs (2000-2002); the Commission for Africa established by U.K. 
Prime Minister Tony Blair (June 2005); Commissioner, the Commission on Capital Flows to Africa (2003); the Global 
Information Infrastructure Commission; the International Task force on Global Public Goods co-chaired by former 
Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo (2006); and the Commission on HIV/AIDS and Governance, established by then 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2003). In addition, Amoako was awarded an honorary Doctor of Laws degree by 
Addis Ababa University (2003); and an honorary Doctor of Letters degree by the Kwame Nkrumah University of 
Science and Technology, Ghana (2005). He was also invited by Tony Blair to 10 Downing Street to deliver the 
Millennium Lecture (2001).  
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institution”, and so should not be a major institutional player in implementing NEPAD (Jarrett 
2009). Former ECA Executive Secretary, Adebayo Adedeji was appointed a member of the 
APRM Eminent Person’s Panel, which he later chaired; this fuelled the tension, as Adedeji was 
known to be close to Obasanjo and had openly opposed Amoako as his successor at ECA 
(Adedeji 2006).  
 
During the Amoako era, the ECA maintained good relations with its smaller African member 
states, among them Rwanda, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania. However, the bigger states, 
mainly Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt, were much more ambiguous about the extent to which 
the ECA should lead in informing African development strategy (Jarrett 2009). Nigeria and 
South Africa, the two most influential powers in Sub-Saharan Africa, possessed stronger 
technical capacity than the smaller countries, and often felt that they did not need continental 
institutions such as the ECA to do their thinking for them. In Nigeria, this was seen as part of the 
rejection of external expertise in the early post-independence period (as discussed in Chapter 
2). In South Africa, this point is supported by the major contribution to MAP of South African 
economists, providing a strong developmental basis for Mbeki’s doctrine of ‘African 
renaissance’ (Maloka 2006, Landsberg 2006).  
 
Despite these concerns, the ECA was mandated as one of the three strategic implementing 
partner institutions of NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism (see Chapter 5)135. To mitigate 
the growing tension with the AU, the ECA sought to ensure stronger collaboration, and to be 
seen to be working more closely with the continent’s premier continental organisation. This 
resulted in the AU being given a prominent role in organising and staging the third ADF held in 
March 2002. Similarly, the ECA’s first edition of ‘Assessing Regional Integration in Africa’ (ARIA) 
was co-signed by Amoako and AU Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konaré. The ECA and African 
Development Bank (ADB) also resolved to stage their legislative meetings back-to-back, and 
annual meetings of the chief executives of the ECA, ADB and AU were re-instated, to develop 
                                                  
135
 Alongside the UNDP and AfDB. 
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common positions. These initiatives notwithstanding, the rivalry between the AU and ECA 
intensified.  
 
Beyond this, there was growing concern among senior policy-makers in a number of African 
countries – documented in a review of the ECA’s policy impact – that little was known of the 
ECA’s work (ECA 2006). This perceived loss of ECA brand recognition at country level can be 
largely attributed to the fact that, before 1995, the ECA’s work had been organised along 
sectoral lines, with annual conferences on industry, agriculture, science and technology and so 
on. These conferences were attended by sectoral ministers, rather than the Finance and 
Planning Ministers in the front line of the aid relationship following SAPs. Within their 
countries, these sectoral line ministries felt the frustration of no longer being able to determine 
their own budgets and expenditure, and directed their frustration at the Finance Ministry, 
which had now assumed a lead role in the management of the national economy. Amoako’s 
rationalisation of the ECA intergovernmental machinery to improve efficiency and reduce 
wastefulness had a direct impact on the line ministries who no longer met under the ECA’s 
auspices. As a former senior adviser to the then ECA Executive Secretary explained: 
 
“The result was that although during Amoako’s tenure there was not a single Finance 
Ministry in Africa that did not know of him and of ECA’s work, it was hard to find name 
recognition of ECA in many of the sectoral ministries. When a team went into the field 
to conduct a review of ECA’s effectiveness in 2004, people told them ‘we don’t know 
what ECA is doing’. In addition, [since] the AU was now responsible for convening the 
sectoral ministerial meetings, many of which ECA had dropped, those sectoral Ministers 
naturally sided with the AU” (Makonnen 2009). 
 
In June 2005, having served the statutory two five-year terms as UN Undersecretary General 
and Executive Secretary, Amoako stepped down from the ECA. Shortly before leaving Addis 
Ababa, he visited AU Chairperson and former Malian President, Alpha Oumar Konaré. As 
Amoako recalled:  
 
“I said to Konaré that I had come to bid him farewell as I was leaving ECA. His response 
was to the effect: ‘good riddance. You have done Africa a great disservice and I am 
happy that you are leaving’” (Amoako 2006).  
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The ECA under Amoako had increased its visibility and profile on Africa to such an extent that it 
was considered a threat by Africa’s premier continental political organisation. Konaré – whose 
staff had once told their ECA counterparts that the ECA should not issue any utterance or 
organise any conferences related to Africa without getting clearance from the AU first – clearly 
felt that the ECA had usurped the AU’s sovereign right to speak on behalf of Africa and broker 
African positions. That Konaré should explicitly tell Amoako that he had ‘done Africa a great 
disservice’ implies that he believed the ECA under Amoako to have been a Trojan horse for the 
transmission of external agendas to African countries136.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate how the ECA’s tactics shifted significantly from 
1995 onwards, and to shed light on its sub-hegemonic strategy. During the 1980s and early 
1990s, the Commission openly confronted the World Bank and IMF. By contrast, from 1995 
until 2005 it adopted an approach that involved building consensus within Africa around the 
continent’s key challenges and securing international agreement on the basis of this consensus. 
Whilst the ECA under Adedeji harnessed its expertise to contest external ideas, the ECA under 
Amoako saw expertise as the key to building common ground between Africa and the 
international community, and to the ECA becoming credible and trusted. Despite these 
generational differences in tactics, it is my view that the ECA of the 1990s and the ECA of the 
New Millennium both operated as sub-hegemonic ICEs.  
 
I have argued that the ECA’s expected role during the period under review was to receive, 
repackage and transmit the dominant development orthodoxy to its 53 member countries. It 
adopted key tenets of the contemporary dominant development orthodoxy, notably the 
emphasis on ‘poverty reduction’ and the advocacy of ‘good governance’ as a key condition for 
                                                  
136
 Amoako stood for election for the post of African Development Bank president in August 2005. He was widely 
considered the favourite, but was voted out of the race early, losing the post to Rwanda’s then Finance Minister, 
Donald Kaberuka. It later emerged that AU Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konaré had actively campaigned against 
Amoako, persuading a number of African countries to vote against him (Amoako 2006, personal conversation). 
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reducing poverty and accelerating Africa’s development. However, while the ECA was clearly 
working within the frame of dominant ideas, and beyond its status as a sub-hegemonic ICE 
helping to manufacture consent, it consciously pioneered a new, more overtly technocratic 
African engagement with the international community – one it hoped would give Africans more 
of a say in external policies designed for implementation on the continent.  
 
The ECA advanced this modified sub-hegemony by using its convening power to assemble a 
wide cross-section of stakeholders in African development, by packaging the consensus reached 
after discussion, and transmitting that consensus to international forums as evidence of a 
stronger and more assertive African voice that needed to be heard. In the process of convening, 
it exerted a strong guiding influence on the African positions it sought to incubate. Based on 
these positions, it exploited its status as a trusted and credible interlocutor to speak for and on 
behalf of Africa, and to advocate on the continent’s behalf.  
 
Through innovations such as the African Learning Group on the PRSPs and the ‘Big Table’, the 
ECA was able to influence the content and future trajectory of the international development 
discourse. It did not bring about a decisive paradigm shift. Indeed, my argument is that it did 
not pretend to challenge the prevailing political rationality of modified neo-liberalism. Instead, 
it developed new political technologies in its effort to give voice to diverse groups of African 
stakeholders. For example, the ECA significantly influenced the shift away from the PRSP 
process led by the World Bank and IMF, towards nationally owned poverty reduction strategies. 
In doing so, the ECA sought to leverage the idea of ‘African ownership’, on the face of it a 
largely rhetorical discourse, into a concrete African strategy for redressing asymmetries of 
power. 
 
The ECA’s role therefore came to transcend that of simply a sub-hegemonic ‘centre of 
translation’. Undoubtedly, the ECA also espoused and disseminated key tenets of the 
hegemonic development discourse. However, to dismiss the ECA of the time as a neo-liberal ICE 
(as happened with ECLAC in the 1990s) would be a grave over-simplification. In my view, the 
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ECA developed a creative new approach to challenging power, born of pragmatism. It 
understood that confronting the hegemonic development orthodoxy in adversarial ways would 
be unproductive. Instead, it believed that shifts in power could be better produced by 
intellectual output recognised by experts everywhere to be of consistently high quality, using 
this output to win recognition and credibility, becoming trusted by the powers-that-be, and 
then harnessing that trust to advocate for changes in the status quo.  
 
The ECA saw the key struggle in Africa’s development regime as the battle for ‘African 
ownership’. Its success in appropriating this largely rhetorical discourse and pushing for its 
actualisation can be measured by the space it opened up in international forums, and the 
footprint of its technocratic arguments on changing donor behaviour in the Paris Declaration 
and elsewhere, plus the extent to which its ideas resonated within Africa.  
 
By way of conclusion, it should be re-emphasised here that my conceptual framework is not 
deterministic. As argued in Chapter 1, an important characteristic of development regimes is 
that the outcomes of power struggles are often indeterminate. Accordingly, what I have not 
done in this chapter is to argue that the ECA’s strategy led to a definitive and irreversible 
levelling of the playing field. As will be seen, while the locus may have shifted in recent years 
towards stronger African agency, a palpable asymmetry of power remains. As the ECA has 
demonstrated throughout its history, resistance and reaffirmation co-exist and no struggle over 
power is ever sewn up.  
 
  
174 
 
 
Chapter 4: 
 ‘African-ness’ and the ‘West’: Identity as Techno-Politics in 
the Quest for Expanded Expert Agency  
 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I discussed the centrality of expertise to the generation of the development 
discourse, the exercise of hegemonic power and the reproduction of development regimes. I 
argued, following Mitchell (2002), that development regimes reproduce themselves by 
harnessing expertise to simplify complexity and counterpose science against nature. The 
tension emanating from this process creates two things: scientific expertise and politics. Thus, 
what Mitchell describes as ‘techno-politics’ produces and re-produces itself by representing the 
exercise of modern power as a neutral, objective technical field that sits apart from reality. 
Expertise maintains this illusion through a self-perpetuating cycle of legitimisation. 
 
In discussing policy regimes, Peet (2007), argues that “…the ideologies that lend consistency, 
cohesion and believability to policy regimes are constructed over long time periods by experts 
residing in geographic centres of ideological power, with new regimes thought up in 
prestigious, elite institutions” (ibid p.5)137. Based on this notion of ‘institutional complexes’ – 
influenced by the Foucauldian idea of the ‘development dispositif’ or ‘apparatus’, and 
consonant with the Latourian view of agency as a composite of human and nonhuman factors 
in Actor Network Theory – I constructed the notion of ‘Institutional Complexes of Expertise’ 
(ICEs) as composites of experts, institutions and networks of relationships.  
 
In Chapter 3, I showed how the ECA as sub-hegemonic ICE could simultaneously serve as a key 
agent of hegemony as well as an incubator of new styles and ideas. In the Introduction to the 
                                                  
137
 While old and new institutionalist theorists consider an ‘institution’ to be an organisational entity, located in a 
space, with a mission and declared purpose, backed by command over some kind of resource (ideas, expertise, 
money, connections), ‘institution’ can also be viewed in the Foucauldian sense of a ‘community of experts’, an elite 
group controlling an area of knowledge and expertise, and forming the base for a policy regime or discursive 
formation (Peet 2007). 
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thesis and in Chapter 2, I asserted identity as a key component of ‘techno-politics’ as pursued 
by experts in Africa’s development regime. I suggested that understanding how experts invoke 
identity – whether on geopolitical, epistemological or other grounds – is key to understanding 
sub-hegemony. I further asserted that African experts constructed and harnessed at least two 
significant identities – their ‘African-ness’ and their membership of an international community 
of development specialists – to argue that they are  best-placed to forge technocratic policy 
solutions to Africa’s development challenges.  
 
In this chapter, drawing on interviews with experts using life-history methodology, I explore 
and analyse the different constituents of these expert identities and draw a number of 
conclusions in relation to sub-hegemony and the quest for expanded policy space. I present life 
histories of some leading intellectual figures with particular emphasis on their intellectual 
make-up. This follows from my account of actor networks and the constitution of ‘actors’, as 
presented in Chapter 1. To provide critical context to the life histories and testimonies of the 
experts, I begin by briefly examining the ECA’s origins and locating some of the tensions that 
shaped its evolution.  
  
Contested Beginnings 
After the Second World War, a growing convergence of U.S. and European interests around the 
need to generate development through technical assistance programmes was important in 
fostering the creation of a series of international organisations during the late 1940s and early 
1950s (Cooper and Packard 1997). The World Bank and IMF were established in the late 1940s, 
along with specialised agencies of the United Nations system (including FAO, WHO, UNICEF and 
UNESCO). The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) were established in 1947, followed by the Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East (ECAFE, later ESCAP) in 1948
138
.  
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 ESCWA, The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, was set up in 1973. 
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Whereas the advent of these regional commissions was uncontroversial, there was 
considerable political resistance to the idea of a regional commission for Africa from colonial 
powers, who felt such an entity would interfere in the management of their colonies (Berthelot 
2004, D’Sa 1983). The ECA’s establishment was contested on three grounds. First, it was 
argued, since the idea of the regional commissions had been to facilitate post-war 
reconstruction, and most of Africa had not been badly damaged during World War II, it 
therefore did not need a dedicated body. Second, North Africa and Ethiopia, the only African 
territories that had been severely damaged, could be covered by the regional commission for 
Europe. Third, it was argued that much of Africa was still under colonial rule and the region 
therefore did not qualify. France, Great Britain, Portugal, Belgium and Spain were strongly 
opposed to the idea of an economic commission for Africa, arguing that they did not foresee 
any rapid increase in the number of independent African states, which was only four at the 
founding of the UN in 1945 (Adedeji 2004, ECA 2008).  
 
In 1947 at the 4
th
 session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), an Indian delegate 
tabled a draft resolution for the establishment of a special Economic Commission for North 
Africa and Ethiopia. The North African countries and Ethiopia had been placed on an interim 
basis under the Economic Commission for Europe. India’s thinking was that, since most of these 
countries were independent, and since independence would eventually follow in the rest of 
black Africa, an Economic Commission for North Africa and Ethiopia would form the basis for an 
eventual economic commission for Africa. However, this resolution failed to gain traction, 
mainly because its geographic scope was limited. Doubt was expressed over whether North 
Africa and Ethiopia could be regarded as a region. Calls at the UN for a regional commission for 
Africa were repeated in 1950, 1951 and 1956, to no avail. Those opposing argued that, since 
Africa was not a homogeneous continent, a regional commission for the entire territory might 
not be able to cope with the complexities of the region (Adedeji 2004). It was only ten years 
later, at the dawn of its independence, that Ghana tabled a draft resolution – supported by 28 
other UN member countries – for the establishment of the ECA. The resolution was adopted as 
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GA Resolution 1155 (XII) on 26 November 1957. This led to the establishment of the ECA on 29 
April 1958 (ECA 2008). 
 
As with ECLA in Latin America, It was agreed that colonial powers could be full members of the 
ECA, and their colonies associate members should they so desire. In Africa there were fewer 
than ten independent countries at the time of the ECA’s creation. So the ECA’s initial 
membership included eight independent African countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, 
Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia) as well as seven colonial powers (Belgium, France, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, the U.K. and the independent white settler colony, the Union of South Africa). 
As there was no continental political organisation at the time, the ECA’s primary focus in its first 
decade was on the struggle for decolonisation (D’Sa 1983). The hostility of African members to 
apartheid in Southern Africa led to South Africa refusing to participate in ECA activities and 
meetings, and to its suspension from ECA membership in July 1965 – a situation that endured 
until the advent of majority rule in 1994 when it was re-admitted139.  
 
ECA membership of non-regional countries was another continuing tension. In 1961 the ECA 
considered a proposal that colonial powers should cease to be members of the Commission and 
instead participate in a consultative capacity. While this was rejected by the UN’s ECOSOC, 
France, the U.K. and Spain later agreed to become associate members, along with their colonies 
(D’Sa 1983, Berthelot 2004)140. Consequently, the ECA and ESCWA (the Economic and Social 
Commission for Western Asia) are the only two regional commissions in which France, the U.K. 
and the U.S. are not full members today (Berthelot 2004). The battle over whether only African 
countries could be ECA members was consistent with the contemporary fight to end 
                                                  
139
 As discussed above, given the imperative of decolonisation in the late 1950s, the ECA took on a political agenda 
to end colonialism and bring about African self-rule. In this endeavour, and although decolonisation was on the UN 
agenda, the ECA acted as an exclusively African institution. Indeed, the inclusion of ‘social development’ in the 
ECA’s mandate implicitly signalled its intention to oppose colonial and apartheid forces on the African continent. In 
economic terms, the struggle was against the practices of the colour bar and forced labour, both of which were 
widespread in Africa and were viewed as tools of colonial economic exploitation (D’Sa 1983). 
140
 The three countries later ceased to be members when the African territories they had colonised attained their 
independence. Portugal was expelled from the ECA’s membership on 24 July 1963 for refusing to accept a change 
in status from full membership to associate membership (D’Sa 1983).  
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colonisation. However, it also raises an enduring question: as part of the global UN system
141
, to 
what extent can the ECA be considered truly ‘African’? This question has persisted despite the 
fact that the ECA membership became exclusively African, and its work is focused on Africa142. 
As highlighted in previous chapters, there has been episodic rivalry between the ECA and OAU, 
with some perceiving that the international community had worked through the ECA to impose 
a particular worldview
143
.  
 
Mandate 
The regional commissions were created as regional arms of the UN. Their mandates derived 
from Articles 1.3 and 1.4 of the UN Charter, and initially responded to the challenge of 
reconstruction after World War II. The regional commissions were asked to:  
 
“i) Initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic 
reconstruction (and development) of [the region], for raising the level of economic 
activity, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of the member 
countries of [the region] both among themselves and with other countries of the world; 
ii) Make and sponsor… investigations and studies of economic and technological 
problems and development [within the region]…; and iii) Undertake or sponsor the 
collection, evaluation and dissemination of such economic, technological and statistical 
information as the Commission deems appropriate” (from UN Charter, cited in Berthelot 
2004, p.15). 
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 The ECA is a UN agency, an organ of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) through which it reports to 
the UN General Assembly, which finances its regular budget. All ECA staff members are employees of the UN, 
appointed by the UN Secretary-General. As such, it is not simply a regional body but part of the global system, 
meaning that African governments do not have the last word in its affairs (Adedeji 2004) 
142
 Adedeji (2004) points out that, as a result of the stand-off over membership, the ECA is not one of the West’s 
most popular regional commissions. In his view, the Cold War made it impossible to resolve this problem. Now that 
the Cold War is over, he proposes that the sensitive issue of membership be revisited with a view to putting the 
ECA at the same level as ECLAC and ESCAP – in other words to allow non-regional countries as full members. For a 
detailed discussion of the reasons why the ECA is not considered an independent African institution, see Adedeji 
(2004, pp.243-244 in Berthelot 2004). 
143
 Within Africa, questions periodically arose as to whether the ECA was indeed committed to advancing African 
self-reliance, or whether it served as a Trojan horse for continued colonial dominance. As noted, this was because 
it was a UN institution which included former colonial powers among its membership until well after the OAU was 
founded. There were also concerns among a growing number of African countries as to whether its output – which 
consisted of gathering economic data, producing surveys and providing limited technical assistance – was 
adequate to meet the pressing demands of Africa’s newly independent nation-states for concrete development 
projects (D’Sa 1983).  
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This generic mandate did not take into account the different contexts in each region, leading 
then UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, to confer a clearer mandate at the ECA’s first 
session, held in Addis Ababa from 29 December 1958 to 6 January 1959. This was to: facilitate 
co-operation between and among member states; design strategies and plans for Africa’s 
economic development; undertake research into questions of common concern; act as a hub 
for the generation and exchange of knowledge; and work in collaboration with other UN 
agencies and programmes (ECA 2008). 
 
Although social development was not a UN priority after World War II, the ECA and ECWA (later 
ESCWA), were asked by the UN General Assembly to “deal as appropriate with the social 
aspects of economic development and the inter-relationship of economic and social factors” 
(Berthelot 2004, p.16). The ECA later began to provide technical assistance when it was invited 
(along with ECWA) to “perform such advisory services… as the country or region may desire”, 
with the caveats that such services should be provided “within available resources” and on 
condition they did not overlap with the work of the specialised agencies (ibid). In the 1970s, the 
clamour for a NIEO (see Chapter 2) led the UN to embrace decentralisation, and in January 1979 
the General Assembly passed Resolution 30/202 giving the regional commissions the status of 
executing agencies in their own right, for inter-sectoral, sub-regional, regional and inter-
regional projects. They were later given the right to co-ordinate the UN’s development work in 
their respective regions (ibid)144.  
 
Establishing Political Primacy 
Pan-Africanism provided an important if somewhat understated ideological justification for the 
establishment of the ECA (Adedeji 2006). Early engagement with the battle for decolonisation 
also meant that from its very beginning the ECA was involved in explicitly political struggle. 
With the advent of the OAU, the emphasis would shift towards a technocratic politics focusing 
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 In practice, the regional commissions have been unsuccessful in co-ordinating UN activities in their respective 
regions. The ECA’s efforts to assert itself as the regional arm of the UN system in Africa consistently sparked 
tensions, notably with the UNDP – which moved away from its original mandate of providing resources to other 
UN agencies to implement projects and programmes, and began to deliver technical assistance programmes of its 
own (ibid). 
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on the economic and social development of Africa and involving different tactics over time. 
Nonetheless, and particularly during the Adedeji era discussed in Chapter 2, the ECA as ICE 
sought to advance Pan-Africanism – viewed by the West with suspicion – as a technical field. 
Whereas the OAU explicitly embraced political dimensions of Pan-Africanism, the ECA focused 
on regional integration as a means of overcoming the constraints of the market size of Africa’s 
constituent states – many of which were considered geographic and economic absurdities.  
 
The founding of the OAU in 1963 erased any doubt about which institution was to lead Africa’s 
continental political agenda. Significantly, it was in the ECA headquarters that African leaders 
met in May 1963 to establish the OAU. (The Summit Conference of Independent African States 
took place in the ECA’s Africa Hall, where there is now a stained-glass window entitled ‘The 
Total Liberation of Africa’ (1960), by Ethiopian artist Afewerk Tekle, commissioned for the 
OAU’s founding conference. Also in Africa Hall is a mural depicting Africa’s leaders at the 
moment of independence.) After early institutional rivalry, sparked by the inclusion in the 
OAU’s mandate of a strong focus on economic and social development objectives
145
, the two 
institutions agreed to work together and began to co-sponsor a series of joint ministerial 
conferences addressing trade and industry, science and technology, telecommunications and 
other development issues. After 1965, and recognising its capacity limitations, the OAU focused 
primarily on political questions including ending apartheid in South Africa. The OAU therefore 
relied on the joint ministerial conferences, with ECA heavily involved in their organisation, to 
establish its policy on economic and social development (D’Sa 1983).  
 
The inclusion in the OAU Charter of economic and social objectives sent a strong signal to the 
ECA that it should restrict its focus to the technical aspects of economic and social development 
issues. Nonetheless, a key part of the early ECA agenda was establishing the institutional 
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 The Charter emphasised the need for African countries “to co-ordinate and intensify our co-operation efforts to 
achieve a better life for the African peoples” (OAU 1963, Article II [1] [b]). Five specialised commissions, including 
an Economic and Social Commission, were set up. In addition, the OAU General Secretariat included an Economic 
Development and Economic Department (EDECO) and a department that dealt with education and health issues 
(ESCAS). Over the years, the OAU significantly increased the size and scope of its work on economic and social 
development (D’Sa 1983). 
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infrastructure to support a regional development strategy
146
. The ECA was also instrumental in 
establishing a host of technical institutions, many in collaboration with the OAU (ECA 2008)147. 
This demonstrated that, although the two institutions were competitors in some senses, they 
shared a common desire to develop Africa that made collaboration inevitable148.  
 
’Africanising’ the ECA 
Non-African experts featured prominently among ECA staff in the early decades. According to 
Samba Jack, who joined the ECA in 1967, this was because of the lack of capacity within Africa:  
 
“We’re talking about some 30, 40 years ago. Most [African experts] who were trained 
abroad went home and worked in their national governments. But those who could 
came to regional organisations. But then [the ECA] needed the staff, and therefore 
expertise that existed outside Africa was brought in. And then of course the ECA was 
also a UN agency” (Jack 2006).  
 
In its early years, the ECA was the most diverse of all the regional commissions (Senghor 2009). 
However, by the early 1970s, an explicit policy to recruit more African experts led to a growing 
number of African professionals joining the ECA’s ranks. Robert Gardiner, the then Executive 
Secretary, sought to arrive at a capacity of 75% of the Commission’s expertise being drawn 
from African countries (Jack 2006)149. Over the years, it was common for a large number of 
professional staff to remain in the same duty station for their entire UN career. This was 
because the ECA began life as a headquarters-only think tank based in Addis Ababa, and for 25 
years had no field offices. As part of the wider UN Secretariat, the ECA could source staff from 
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 The ECA was pivotal in establishing several regional institutions, notably the African Institute for Economic 
Development and Planning (IDEP, 1962), set up to train African planners and first headed by Samir Amin (discussed 
in Chapter 2), and the African Development Bank (AfDB, 1963), which was housed at the ECA Secretariat in Addis 
Ababa until it moved to its substantive headquarters in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. The idea of setting up IDEP, the 
AfDB and indeed the OAU itself came from the Monrovia Conference in 1961. 
147
 For a comprehensive list of the ECA-sponsored institutions and a detailed discussion, see ECA (2008, pp.33-39). 
148
 According to Berthelot (2004), the ECA’s commitment to regional co-operation never wavered, although it was 
criticised for setting up too many institutions (for a list of these, see Adedeji 2004, p.250 in Berthelot 2004).  
149
 An interesting sidebar to this discussion is the split between Anglophone and Francophone staff members at the 
ECA during Gardiner’s tenure. According to Magee (1971), the postcolonial split between former English and 
French colonies was reflected in tensions in the ECA Secretariat. Gardiner, a Ghanaian, was accused of 
discriminating against Francophone staff members and of using the ECA to promote Anglophone interests. On the 
other hand, Anglophone staff accused their Francophone counterparts of being largely incompetent and of being 
deliberate allies of France in its efforts to downgrade and sabotage the ECA and African unity (ibid). 
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UN headquarters in New York and rotate staff to either New York or other outposts of the UN 
Secretariat. However, the lack of a mandatory mobility policy meant that a large number of ECA 
experts did not leave150. Given that new posts were scarce, this effectively limited opportunities 
for promotion, making career progression difficult for many staff members151.  
 
In 2000, recognising that the mobility problem had created a pool of ECA experts no longer at 
the cutting edge of their respective fields due to their lengthy tenure in a single institution, the 
ECA management launched a far-reaching recruitment campaign to renew ECA staffing and 
embed a more merit-based human resources regime. Vacancy announcements were widely 
circulated in a bid to identify potential candidates. The goal was to ensure that by mid-2004 at 
least half of the ECA’s professional staff complement of roughly 220152 would have been 
recruited in the past four years (ECA 2004, p.4). The recruitment campaign attracted an 
unprecedented number of experts of African descent, many previously working at universities 
and think tanks in Europe and the U.S.153 This helped swell the ranks of African professionals at 
the ECA further, with the result that they currently predominate (Allimadi 2009). Many of these 
newer recruits feature prominently below. 
 
Life Histories of African Expertise 
I now turn to the perspectives of two generations of African experts currently or formerly 
working at the ECA. The selection of interview respondents (Annexe I) was random, in two 
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 The creation of five sub-regional offices (known as MULPOCS) by the time of the ECA’s silver jubilee in 1983 did 
little to ease this problem, as only a handful of positions (25% of the overall professional staff complement) were 
available in these offices, a proportion of which were recruited locally (ECA 2008). 
151
 Mandatory staff rotation at the ECA was introduced only in 1997, four years after a report by the UN Office of 
Internal Oversight had identified professional isolation, the need for skills upgrading and staff rotation as key 
issues limiting the ECA’s quality, efficiency and impact (ECA 1996). 
152
 The staff complement of the ECA in 2006 was estimated at 1,100, of which between 220 and 240 were 
professional staff (either economists or other social scientists) and the rest administrative support staff (Todaro 
2009). 
153
 Zeleza (2005, p.223) cites compelling data to show that African residents in the U.S. constitute the most 
educated population, trumping even native-born Americans. “The irony cannot escape anyone: Africa, perhaps the 
least educated and most underdeveloped continent in the world, has the most educated population in the world’s 
most developed country” (ibid). This “gaping mismatch”, he argues, can potentially be turned in Africa’s favour if 
connections can be established between African migrant professionals and their countries or regions of origin 
(ibid).  
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categories. The first group consisted of senior staff members either still at the ECA, or recently 
retired. As older staff members or retirees, these respondents had greater liberty in reflecting 
on their work experience objectively, making their views highly credible. The second group was 
current staff members, whom I considered a key means of understanding the evolution of 
expert strategies of reaffirmation and resistance. Interviews were open-ended and effected 
with the aid of a semi-structured questionnaire (Annexe II). To represent respondents’ 
perspectives as faithfully as possible, I use discursive content with limited paraphrasing. Mostly, 
I defer in-depth analysis of the views presented to the concluding section of the chapter. 
 
Diverse Pathways to Addis Ababa 
Samba Jack, a Gambian national, joined the ECA in 1967, after securing a BSc in Economic 
Geography from Cambridge University. He later obtained a Masters degree in Development 
Economics from Pittsburgh University in the U.S. and worked at the Commission for a total of 
36 years, until his retirement as a Director in 2003. Jack recalls his views on development in 
Africa being initially shaped by theories and concepts designed in the West, including Rostow’s 
‘stages of development’ theory and Arthur Lewis’s theory of ‘development with unlimited 
resources’. On arrival at the ECA, Jack viewed his role as one of a planning expert implementing 
the theories he had learned:  
 
“When I joined ECA at that time countries were just emerging from independence, and I 
couldn’t but be influenced by thinking from within ECA itself. At that time we were 
concentrating on explaining the process of development, what it is all about, where it 
should be leading. The work of ECA was explaining the theory of development and how 
it should be applied to the urgent problems of the day. At that time there was a spate of 
development planning in most African countries. And [since] you cannot plan without 
statistics, the development of statistical capacity in the region was a major priority in 
the work programme. We also had the national development plans, four years, five 
years, and ECA was very much at the centre of helping African countries with this 
development planning, in the late 1960s, most of the 1970s. At that time the UN came 
up with development decades. And again that was an umbrella under which we worked 
to help member states” (Jack 2006). 
 
In 1965, an ECA Training and Fellowships Programme for Africa was established to provide 
graduate and undergraduate training of short and medium duration for Africans in fields 
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considered critical to advancing progress. During the decolonisation period the programme was 
used to provide statisticians and planners from non-independent states with the skills required 
to manage a modern state (Adedeji 2004). Trainees were awarded fellowships for study in 
institutions within as well as outside Africa. In 1979, a special component of the programme 
was set up in collaboration with the UN Institute for Namibia to train Namibians in 
development administration and management skills. According to Adedeji (2004), trainees from 
this scheme later formed the top echelons of independent Namibia’s administration. More than 
3,000 Africans benefitted from the programme (ibid), including a number of young ECA 
professionals such as Jack (cited above), who went abroad on sabbatical for further study. 
 
Owodunmi Teriba, a Nigerian national, obtained a BSc in Economics from the University of 
Ibadan (1962) before pursuing his MSc and PhD in Economics at the University of Manchester 
(1962-1966). After returning to Nigeria to teach at the university, and serving as Associate 
Professor at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor (1972-73), he arrived at the ECA for a one-
year sabbatical (1980-81), was recruited as a regional adviser, later became a staff economist, 
and retired as a Director in 1998. Unlike Jack, who came to work at the ECA directly from 
university, the majority of national experts who had studied abroad returned home to work in 
their national governments:  
 
“[At the University of Ibadan] every year, the top-level performers were sponsored to go 
abroad. The funds came from the university itself. My own Masters and PhD at 
Manchester were funded entirely from the University of Ibadan – you must of course 
remember the Naira [the Nigerian currency] was much stronger against the [British] 
Pound then. We were not made to sign any bond. I left Manchester three days after 
graduating – what would I be doing staying there? I went straight back to Ibadan. At that 
time, when I went back, I was being asked by the Central Bank to work there. The 
[Economics] Department [at Ibadan] had also asked me to come back. I had about three 
job offers. That is not the situation now. Whatever sector I wanted to work in I could 
make a contribution. The Central Bank was paying more than the University but I 
decided to stay in teaching and research. My generation more or less left [Ibadan] later 
on, but the majority of the [current] lecturers are the people we taught, and they have 
produced other students, PhDs and so on, and they are still there” (Teriba 2006). 
  
Once home, African experts espoused varying degrees of radicalism. According to Teriba:  
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“You couldn’t divorce the economics, the public administration policies [or] the 
development policies, from the politics. In the realm of nationalists who were experts, 
intellectuals, academics, the debate went on as to how to rise up to the multilateral 
institutions [such as the World Bank and IMF] so that they stayed in the background – 
particularly in the realm of development. The ECA at that time was not known, and 
would have been seen by many as a colonial tool to keep Africans down. And that was 
why the OAU was principally [established], to fight and support African countries to 
become independent. The ECA therefore had to really justify its existence” (ibid 2006).  
 
As a result, few experts in Africa’s independent nation-states considered the ECA as a potential 
employer (ibid). 
 
Like Teriba, Yousif Suliman came to the ECA after a stint in his native Sudan. Before joining the 
ECA as an economist in 1980, he served as Director of the General Planning Administration of 
the Ministry of Planning of Sudan. He holds a BSc in Economics from the University of Khartoum 
(1968), a Postgraduate Diploma in Development Planning from the Kuwait Planning Institute 
(1972), a Postgraduate Diploma in Economics and Statistics from the University of Birmingham 
(1975), and an MSc and PhD in Economics from the University of Wales (1977 and 1989). 
Suliman, who was later involved in the drafting of AAF-SAP, believes his academic influences, 
far from limiting his ability to think independently, provided him with tools that enabled him to 
criticise structural adjustment and develop alternatives:  
  
“I studied standard macro- and micro-economic theory. I did development economics, 
statistics, econometrics and also had some exposure to mathematical economics – to 
assist with the analysis, not in its raw form, but used extensively particularly in relation 
to input–output analysis. In the MSc I tried to explore the evolution of pricing systems. 
Normally it was handled as either a micro issue or something in general that prices are 
made because of demand. But then I tried to develop a system to figure out how prices 
evolve in an economy and their relation to technology. So I developed a large structure 
of price formation in Britain and subsequently tried to apply the technique for 
developing countries – [specifically] Kenya, again using statistical techniques and input–
output analysis. This provided me with a good background [on] how an economy works, 
and under what conditions an economy responds to external shocks that have 
implications for price policies, and through that technique how the obsolescence of an 
economy will affect the price system. It helped me to understand… what the constraints 
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are of a developing economy, and how to handle the issues independent of the 
conventional wisdom” (Suliman 2006). 
 
Patrick Bugembe, a Ugandan economist who joined the ECA in 1978 and served as a key 
member of Adebayo Adedeji’s team (see Chapter 2), attested to being profoundly influenced by 
his academic training – which included an undergraduate degree in Statistics and Development 
Economics (Makerere University, Uganda 1969) and a PhD in Econometrics from the London 
School of Economics (1973). He recalls being fascinated by time-series tools, which enabled him 
to use data from the past and present to project into the future. After a short time as a lecturer 
at Makerere – ended by the political crisis during the rule of Idi Amin – he was forced to leave 
Uganda in 1977, when he joined the secretariat of the East African Community (EAC), a regional 
economic community. He recalls:  
 
“[At the EAC] I looked at industrial development in an East African context. That also 
had an impact on me. The EAC was actually dying – it had died, but the East African 
Development Bank (EADB), to which I went, had survived. It was the only Community 
institution that had survived. The issue in the EADB was why countries could not 
develop. We had the money to give to entrepreneurs, but the entrepreneurs were not 
there to credibly take these loans from the Bank and propose credible projects. This 
shook me. I had to think about the culture affecting development, on dimensions that 
had not featured in the development literature at that time. [This was] because most of 
the development literature was based on thinking from Latin America. We talked about 
various models – the Schumpeter model, the entrepreneurial model, the Arthur Lewis 
surplus model. We studied a number of models, but these models were always coming 
up to explain what never seemed to be captured” (Bugembe 2006).  
  
George Alibaruho, also a Ugandan, earned his undergraduate degree in Economics at Makerere 
University, formerly a constituent college of the University of London (before Uganda’s 
independence in 1962), as a result of which its early curriculum was influenced by more 
philosophical ideas of economics associated with the British academy. However, during 
Alibaruho’s time at Makerere (1965-1968), a shift occurred: 
 
“The situation began to change rather rapidly when I was an undergraduate, because 
we started getting American teachers and professors. So the orientation of the 
programme really changed, became more quantitative, more operational and less 
economic-history-focused. I should say it became less philosophical, more operational. 
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The development of American economics was influenced very much by hard science 
subjects. So as a result of exposure to the American orientation to economics, and 
having quite a few Americans on the staff, we started reading a lot of books... from top 
American economics schools – MIT, Berkeley, Harvard” (Alibaruho 2006). 
 
Attracted by the more quantitative approach of American economics, Alibaruho applied to the 
University of California at Berkeley, where he was admitted to the doctoral programme in 1968 
and awarded his PhD in 1973. Four of his lecturers were later awarded the Nobel Prize in 
Economic Sciences either individually or jointly
154
, and he admits being deeply influenced by 
them. Like Bugembe, Alibaruho returned to Uganda to teach economics at Makerere, only to be 
forced out by the onset of political unrest in 1974. After a spell as a lecturer and researcher in 
agricultural economics at the University of Nairobi Institute for Development Studies in 
neighbouring Kenya, he joined the East African Community Management Institute in Arusha, 
Tanzania (1975), and moved to Washington, D.C. in the following year as a research fellow at 
the newly created International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Alibaruho then joined 
the World Bank’s Africa Region as an agricultural economist (January 1979), spending significant 
periods of his career in African countries (notably a secondment to the Sierra Leone 
Government from 1985 to 1990). He left the World Bank in 1997 to join the ECA, where he 
worked as principal adviser to the Executive Secretary until his retirement in 2006.  
 
Thoko Ruzvidzo, acting Director of the ECA’s African Centre for Gender and Development 
(ACGD) at the time of interview, holds a BSc in Sociology from the University of Zimbabwe, a 
Postgraduate Diploma in Agricultural Economics from the London School of Economics, and an 
MSc in Policy Studies from the Southern African Institute for Policy and Economic Studies 
(SAPES). Before Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, and after her graduation, she worked for 
the Women’s Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Community Development, and later became a 
prominent NGO activist in the Zimbabwean women’s movement. She joined the ECA in the 
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 These were Alibaruho’s lecturer in mathematical economics Gerald Debreu (1983), game theory lecturer John C. 
Harsanyi (1994), second-year lecturer in advanced economics theory Daniel McFadden (2000), and first-year 
graduate adviser George Akerlof (2001). 
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recruitment drive that started in 2000, and is one of the few senior staff members who is not an 
economist by training. 
 
Ruzvidzo recalls that, since no universities offered degrees in gender studies when she was a 
student, she was compelled to learn from practical experience. With respect to her discipline, 
the dominant framework of the time, the Women in Development (WID) approach, had 
emanated not from academic institutions, but from the United Nations, a pioneer in the move 
to empower women. However, Ruzvidzo soon questioned the WID framework and joined a 
movement of advocates who later espoused the more radical Gender and Development (GAD) 
approach that guides her current work at the ECA. 
  
“We were not part of the UN’s [Third World Conference on Women, Nairobi, June 
1985], but we were caught in the aftermath of the conference in terms of 
implementation. Nairobi was basically [influenced by] the WID approach, which at that 
time was the strongest external influence on [gender issues in Africa]. [Its focus was] on 
very specific women’s projects [such as] income-generating projects.[…] It was basically 
about community development. But then, we and other black African feminists started 
interrogating the gender relations of power, as our cultures subordinate women, albeit 
not totally. So the African feminist movement started revisiting our cultures and asking: 
‘What is it that we can take from our culture that empowers the woman? What is it that 
disadvantages the woman? What are the social relations that exist between the male 
and female? How do we look at those and make them advantage the woman?’ So we 
started looking at Gender and Development. And by the time we went to [the Fourth 
World Conference on Women in Beijing, 1995], the [imperative to] mainstream gender 
had become paramount. It’s a radical approach we are using to pave the way for 
promoting gender equality… not only for women. This really is the main difference 
between the GAD and WID approach. The GAD approach is more holistic and strategic. 
It includes addressing women’s specific needs, but it goes beyond. It addresses the 
social construction that is really at the heart of any gender inequality, which in fact 
hampers poverty reduction programmes and development prospects for Africa. And I 
think there is a lot of evidence, mounting evidence, showing the close linkage and 
interaction between gender inequality and poverty in Africa” (Ruzvidzo 2006).  
 
‘No Room for Marxist Demography in our Class’ 
Amson Sibanda, 39 at the time of my fieldwork, is Zimbabwean. After pursuing an 
undergraduate degree in Geography and a Masters degree in Population Studies from the 
University of Zimbabwe (1993), he secured a Ford Foundation scholarship that enabled him to 
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study for a PhD in Demography at the University of Pennsylvania in the U.S. After obtaining his 
PhD in 1997, he pursued a postdoctoral fellowship at the same university, before becoming a 
research associate at Brown University. He then returned to Pennsylvania University as an 
associate professor, and joined the ECA in July 2003 – as a result of the expanded recruitment 
drive.  
 
Asked whether, as a Ford Foundation grantee, he was ideologically influenced by American 
ideas of demography and population, he explained the subtle but real pressures facing students 
from developing countries: 
 
“No. Not necessarily. But it is interesting because… most of the African scholars or 
Chinese scholars, who came to study at the University of Pennsylvania benefited from 
these scholarships. The United States, through USAID, was very much fascinated about 
trying to discover what was happening in Africa. We did not have any solid demographic 
statistics or population statistics. Some countries never had any… so [the U.S.] 
embarked on a massive data collection exercise through what is called the World 
Fertility Survey and the Demographic and Health Survey. Now, you find them on almost 
every continent. They do them in pretty much, in fact, in each country. That provided 
the wealth of information they needed to monitor the population issues, obviously [for 
reasons of] political interest. I remember a guy from the CIA who came to try and recruit 
us. He came saying they wanted to recruit demographers. They conduct recruitment 
drives at campuses. For us, we were all fascinated, and asked ourselves why. And 
obviously the take of the U.S., at that time, was… they were worried about youth 
unemployment in Southern societies and the revolutionary component that you find… 
obviously, that radical element, if you combined it with their high rates of population 
growth, it was perceived as a threat. Now, of course, they’re looking at the same issue, 
but from the Middle East perspective” (Sibanda 2006). 
 
It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which this ideology-motivated effort to enrol can be 
generalised. However, the pivotal role of U.S. non-profit foundations in proliferating 
demography in the post-war period, and influencing an American vision of population studies 
that eventually became a global vision, has been well documented (Sharpless 1997)
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 U.S. foreign aid programmes rolled out into the developing world as part of Truman’s Four Point Plan became 
increasingly concerned with ‘the population problem’ (Sharpless 1997). The Rockefeller Foundation, prompted by 
its founder, John D. Rockefeller III who led a small group of scholars and population activists, founded the 
Population Council in 1953 – a special purpose foundation that allowed Rockefeller, Ford and other foundations to 
fund research in demography and reproductive biology whilst remaining distant from any political controversy. 
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institutionalisation of population studies and codifying of demographic knowledge took place 
not only in the U.S. and Europe, but also across the developing world. The 1950s saw the 
development of a worldwide network of ‘population experts’, using a core body of knowledge 
and a common mode of discourse. These experts codified a shared set of assumptions about 
how population dynamics worked, how the phenomenon was to be studied, and most 
importantly the terms under which intervention was appropriate (ibid).  
 
Sharpless (1997) also highlights how links between foundations, government agencies and 
university research programmes in the 1950s were exploited by U.S. Government security 
agencies, which all employed social scientists including demographers, during the Cold War. By 
enmeshing the language of social science with Cold War ideology, professional demographers 
were able to achieve “…the final link in the process of transforming social scientific knowledge 
into the discourse domain of foreign policy and political action” (ibid p.196).  
  
According to Sibanda: 
 
“The foundations never put pressure on the schools that we were aware of in terms of 
the ideological orientation of the programme. But to some extent, you would find that 
your professors wanted some kind of an image of the graduates they were producing. 
Most of these professors were Western. Literature from Marxist-leaning demographers 
was not popular at all… you [would] never find it in class. And if you espoused those 
views, you were more likely to end up not graduating. I grew up Zimbabwe, at a time 
when our country was socialist. If you look at the population programme in Zimbabwe, 
it was established by the Population Council [with funding from] the Ford Foundation. 
And they brought Western experts to come in to put the programme in place. And 
obviously, their key aim was to train a group of Zimbabwean experts who would go and 
work in the Family Planning field. So, as a population control thing, but obviously, if you 
believe in Marxism then that was perceived as trying to control the black population. So 
it wasn’t popular” (Sibanda 2006). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
Underpinning this research was the view, propagated by conservative elements including Rockefeller himself, that 
population growth posed a serious challenge to social and economic progress in developing countries (ibid). The 
Population Council and Ford Foundation sponsored a network of population studies centres in the U.S. This helped 
ensure that by the end of the 1950s, there were few major universities that did not have a programme in 
population studies (ibid). 
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Sibanda recalled that he and his fellow African researchers faced considerable pressure from 
their sponsors, and inducement in the form of small grants, to return to their countries – largely 
because there was an expectation that they would occupy their place as part of a global 
network of demographers advancing a particular worldview156:  
 
“What they had in mind was…they trained you and be an expert then you go back in to 
your country. They have never expected Africans to just stay and work in the United 
States or… anywhere else. So, the pressure for you to go back was so huge. And the 
reason was you became their local contact, expert. But all the major projects they want 
to do in Zimbabwe would be run by them, [via] their former student based in Zimbabwe. 
So, it’s like they will encourage you to go, they give you small grant as a settling in 
research grant… things like that. But in terms of overall research they will be controlling 
everything… But you are their main entry point in that society. And they have done that 
well in most African countries. However, the new breed of demographers pretty much 
revolted against that. I refused to go to become somebody’s [local representative]. I had 
my own ideas and I wanted to get a couple of years of experience in the U.S., teaching, 
doing research. Once I had [acquired a] some solid background, a solid reputation as an 
academician, then I could go home. But if I had gone to Zimbabwe [immediately after 
graduating] I really would just have been a consultant. And once you do that and you do 
not have the solid reputation, you cannot challenge the views of these guys. They are 
too influential in the field. You never become independent, and they call the shots. So, a 
lot of us, you know, the bunch of demographers who were trained in the ‘90s, whether 
from Nigeria or Ghana, we all revolted. We fraternised and refused to go back” (Sibanda 
2006). 
 
Sibanda successfully applied for the job of Population Affairs Officer at the ECA after being 
challenged to return to Africa by a student in a class on Population and African Development he 
was teaching at Pennsylvania. As an acknowledged demography expert, he could then leverage 
this status back in Africa to resist further the domination of global ideas in furtherance of an 
African demographic agenda. This mode of resistance is consistent with my theoretical 
conception of sub-hegemony. A worldwide system of expertise created to advance the 
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 Sharpless (1997) points to this emerging international division of labour in population science when he 
highlights a consistency in methodology, analysis and language formed by a small but impressive network of 
scholars located primarily in the U.S. but also in Britain, India and Asia more broadly. This network was extended to 
the far reaches of the Third World through scholarships awarded by Rockefeller, Ford and other foundations to 
promising young African scholars of demography. An important precondition for the success of this approach was 
that students returned home to take up their places at the periphery of the global network responsible for 
generating, developing, transmitting, circulating and thereby institutionalising a hegemonic worldview of 
demography. 
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hegemony of a particular system of thought must necessarily build expert capacity in the 
periphery as well as the centre, leaving it open to contestation from the inside.  
 
Scholarships from U.S. foundations enabled students such as Sibanda to achieve the highest 
levels of education in the techniques of this system of thought. However, because of the 
context in which he was born and raised, he questioned the prevailing rationality of rule and 
worked himself into a position where he could challenge it and bring into play new ideas about 
demography in Africa. In this way, despite being schooled in the epistemes of the dominant 
demographic regime – indeed precisely because he had mastered the rationalities, techniques 
and technologies of power – he was able, as an ECA expert working for and on behalf of Africa, 
to transcend a classic sub-hegemonic role and help create increased policy space for African 
thought leadership.  
 
Kavaeuza Katjomuise, a Namibian in his late 30s, joined the UN in 1999 after spending three 
years as an economist with the Bank of Namibia advising the Governor on the conduct of 
monetary policy. He started his UN career with ECLAC working in the Caribbean on trade policy 
issues, looking at the implications of multilateral hemispheric trade agreements. In 2000, 
attracted by the recruitment campaign, he applied for a lateral transfer and joined the ECA’s 
Sustainable Development Division, before being promoted to the Economic and Social Policy 
Division in 2003. Katjomuise holds undergraduate and Masters degrees in Economics, the latter 
from the University of Western Michigan, focusing on international trade and finance. In 
Katjomuise’s view, while U.S. universities emphasised classical economics in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, the orientation changed to become essentially neo-liberal, focusing on 
liberalisation, open markets and free trade. As such, he found himself in an uncomfortable 
position as a Masters student: 
 
“Unlike most of my fellow students I was a bit critical, because I was an African. And at 
that time a lot of African countries were implementing neo-liberal policies. I went to the 
U.S. in 1989, finished my undergraduate in 1992, and then I went to do my Masters in 
1993 to early 1995. Namibia became independent in 1990. To be honest, Namibia did 
not implement any IMF-supported programme. Because the paradigm had shifted, the 
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Soviet Union had collapsed, and no one was talking any longer about the Socialist 
systems as an alternative, everyone pretty much accepted that the only way to go was 
through market economics and liberalisation. So what Namibia did was implement what 
they called a home-grown macro-economic stabilisation programme. If you look at the 
elements, it was pretty much comparable to SAP, because it emphasised privatisation, 
reducing the role of the state in the economy, etc. The only difference is that countries 
that were implementing the SAPs had some indicators, some benchmarks, some targets 
to meet and financial assistance was conditional on that. Namibia fortunately did not 
have to meet any targets, because this was a home-grown programme” (Katjomuise 
2006). 
 
‘We Know Where the Shoe Pinches’ 
Experts interviewed during fieldwork were asked whether being African or of African origin 
made their engagement with development issues different from that of other international 
experts with whom they shared the same academic training.  
 
Elene Makonnen, an Ethiopian, began her undergraduate studies at the Haile Selassie 
University in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia before being forced to move to the U.S. by student unrest. 
There, she earned her BA in Economics (1972) and MA in Economics (1975), both from Howard 
University. She subsequently joined the World Bank in 1977 as Advisor in the Office of the 
Executive Director. In 1986 she took a career break to attend the Harvard University Kennedy 
School of Government, where she was awarded a second Masters degree, this time in Public 
Administration with a focus on Economics (1987). After that she returned to the World Bank, 
where she worked in the Strategic Planning Department, Education and Social Policy 
Department, and Population and Human Resources Department as a policy officer. She left the 
World Bank in 1995 and served as principal adviser to the ECA Executive Secretary until 2006. In 
her view, the difference between African experts and their non-African counterparts lies in the 
fact that African experts are more sensitive to the concerns of African countries.  
 
“The difference shows up in this way: when policy packages are being discussed, as an 
African you have more sensitivity to some of the constraints that the African 
governments are facing. In some cases, yes it’s emotional because you’re African. But in 
[other] cases a lot of these people have served in government ministries so they have 
practical experience as to what can and cannot happen in these countries. So they know 
where the shoe pinches. It’s from that. Now, on the other hand, in many of these 
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institutions that are offering these policy packages, for example the Washington 
Consensus, the high-fliers are guys who came in as Young Professionals. They have not 
sat behind a government bureaucracy.  
 
“You and I know that we have a difference even in policies that we share with, for 
instance, our colleagues in DFID. But why does the difference show up? Because we feel 
the constraints much more than others do. To me that’s what it is. So I think it would be 
a wrong premise to say that you have the same beliefs. By definition you don’t. Why you 
can be effective is that you have proven yourself in the arena that they cherish. You 
have gone to their Ivy League schools. You have gone into these institutions that they 
cherish and done your best and demonstrated your capability. Therefore the power of 
your idea has some weight. There’s something that sets you apart. And in a sense it’s 
your African-ness” (Makonnen 2006).  
 
Patrick Bugembe argues that the heated debate over structural adjustment revealed 
fundamental differences between African experts at the ECA and non-African World Bank 
experts: 
 
“One was an issue of conviction, in that an ECA expert at that time was committed to 
the African development more than the World Bank was committed to African 
development. The World Bank person tended to be more committed to Bank positions. 
An ECA person was looking at Africa – whether in transport or other areas. Two, they 
had a global agenda which we did not have to have. You must know that by the 1980s 
Reaganomics and Thatcherism had come up front, and there was clear new thinking as 
to how economics should be run. All this was driven by a certain global view which 
constrained the World Bank and defined its vision, while it did not constrain us. Maybe, 
in hindsight, this is where we came to a head” (Bugembe 2006). 
 
Demographer Amson Sibanda believes that the agendas of African experts are necessarily 
different from those of their counterparts because their reality is different: 
 
“Some aspects of Western Family Planning ideology are good. However, being an 
African, having grown up [in] a family of nine, [with] the little money that my father had, 
how much of it would then go into better child quality issues – sending us all to school, 
graduating and so on? Obviously my sister suffered because [she had older brothers]. So 
it’s possible to believe in what some of the Western scholars say that if you reduce 
family size, then child quality goes up. But if you look at Namibia or Botswana… they are 
well-endowed in terms of resources, but they have less than two million people each. 
That’s less than the city of Philadelphia, right? So, will a couple of more million people 
be hurtful to the society? No!” (Sibanda 2006). 
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‘These are Realities I have Lived’ 
Isatou Gaye, a Gambian national, applied in response to the 2000 recruitment campaign and 
joined the ECA as an Environmental Affairs Officer. She holds a BSc in Biology from the 
University of Lagos, Nigeria (1986), an MSc in Environmental Microbiology from the University 
of Benin, Nigeria (1987), and a Postgraduate Diploma from The Netherlands in Environmental 
Science and Technology majoring in Environmental Resource Management and Impact 
Assessment. She believes a better grasp of context is key to expert agency: 
 
“As an African expert, knowing African realities, having worked in Africa at the country 
level and at the regional level, I have the comparative advantage, if I’m working 
anywhere else outside of Africa, to come to the table with the region-specific issues and 
realities. These are issues that I know, these are realities that I’ve lived, am engaged in, 
are involved in and are deeply convinced about. And there are issues I’ve worked on, 
that have been resolved, some wholly, some partly, some not resolved but still in the 
process of coming up with solutions to problems we have. But then the background 
information is there, a region-specific context” (Gaye 2006). 
 
For George Alibaruho, his African background was instrumental in determining his PhD research 
topic and influencing his line of inquiry:  
 
“I was working on a very exciting topic – supply responsiveness of cotton farmers in a 
multi-crop setting using dynamic expectations models developed by Mark Nerlove at 
Harvard. The idea was to establish the responsiveness of farmers not just to price – and 
you can see how they adjust to price when the other factors change. For example, with 
cotton farmers in Central Uganda you find a completely different reaction to farmers in 
the North where the crop is also grown, and in West depending for example on the 
infrastructure density, depending on crop substitutes, and also rainfall reliability. There 
was this view that Africans react adversely to price incentives. The so-called backward 
rising supply curve of labour – give them more money and they’ll work less. So there 
was a whole generation of research that was devoted, including mine, to showing that 
this was bullshit, that African economic agents engage as rationally as anybody. That if 
you fail to understand the factors that explain why they don’t do certain things, it’s your 
failing as a researcher. So don’t say that it’s a paradigm, and say ‘pay them less because 
if they get their target income they’ll go away to drink’. No!” (Alibaruho 2006).  
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In stark contrast to this stridency as a student, and as a World Bank official later on, Alibaruho 
was struck by the contrast between the sense of agency he felt as an African expert and the 
apparent powerlessness of experts in African countries he worked in.  
 
“[It was very frustrating] working in the Bank and working on our countries, to see how 
helpless those countries that I worked with seemed to be almost resigned to the full 
power of the Bank. But at the same time you are in the Bank, and while the Bank is 
working for member states there is a contradiction because sometimes when you see 
the Bank taking a position which you think is really ridiculous, it’s like militaristic. You 
cannot go on the other side. You have to toe the party line. There was a mission I led to 
Liberia. As country economist for Liberia I could constitute a mission using staff from 
different parts of the Bank. There’s a fellow I had sourced from the Central Services 
Division. We as country economists have a relationship with the country officials, we’re 
always there. So this fellow was trying to talk down on people, and I said ‘no, you can’t 
do it’. So he said, in the midst of a meeting: ‘Are you working for the Bank or for 
Liberia?’ You know what I told him? ‘Please get out of this meeting and go back to the 
hotel – we shall talk later’. He thought I was joking but I got him out. It may sound 
anecdotal, but this is the truth. In Operations, there’s this [mentality] that ‘these people, 
we have to tell them what to do’. And you see, Africans being what they are, even when 
they know better, since there’s money they just keep quiet. I can tell you the sigh of 
relief many of us breathed when we came [to the ECA], recognising that we could now 
actually work with our people’ – They are the same African ministers of finance that the 
World Bank works with – and see whether we cannot really do the African thing” (ibid).  
 
‘I Felt there was Something Missing...’ 
Emmanuel Nnadozie studied Economics, initially at the University of Nigeria and later at the 
Sorbonne in Paris, where he was awarded a PhD in Economics in 1987. Next, Nnadozie worked 
in both the public and private sectors before emigrating to the U.S., where he joined the 
University of North Carolina and then Truman State University in Missouri, rising from assistant 
professor to full professor. He joined the ECA in 2004, yet another African from the Diaspora 
that responded to the 2000 recruitment campaign:  
 
“While I was in Europe, I remained interested in studying African problems from an 
economic perspective. I wanted to figure out how to solve these problems and how to 
make a contribution. So I remained African – not just in heart or by birth or by nation. I 
was also concerned about making an impact or making a contribution [to] the continent. 
So, that never left me. During nearly 20 years in the United States, I still was focusing 
and thinking about how to come back to the continent and make a contribution. 
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Because I felt that, that was where… it was my responsibility, number one, as an 
African-born person not to abandon my continent and its dejected condition. If I chose 
to study Financial Markets in the U.S., build some models and all that I would have 
made tons and tons of money. But instead, I just… didn’t allow that to happen. I’ve had 
that sense of responsibility… [t]hat’s really what made me come back. I was fired up by 
moving to ECA. I felt that it was a place where I could make an impact that would not 
just be simply concentrated on one particular area, but continent-wide. And that this 
would give me the opportunity to use the skills that I had developed over time, the 
knowledge that I had built over time, in a very productive and effective way” (Nnadozie 
2006). 
 
Kojo Busia, 43 years old at the time of my fieldwork, was recruited by the ECA as a governance 
expert, at around the same time as Nnadozie. Beforehand, he worked as a senior official in the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Of Ghanaian origin, he holds 
undergraduate, Masters and Doctorate degrees from Cornell University in the U.S. For him, 
what sets African experts apart is their agenda, the pressure to register impact, and their 
ownership of the problems and solutions at hand:  
 
“At one level, I do not think there is anything African about development policy or 
someone’s training or someone’s expertise. We are no different from any Westerner 
because we are all schooled in the same theories and analytical work, frameworks and 
we have same mentors – I have colleagues whom I still keep in touch and we discuss 
issues at a very theoretical level and so on. But I think when it comes to agenda setting 
and prioritising Africa’s development issues, and articulating the African position and 
the African interest… being an African does add some value. And my own situation is an 
interesting one in terms of my trajectory professionally and also educationally… from 
undergraduate to PhD in one of the best universities in the U.S. I worked for the U.S. 
government directly, USAID. After ten years, I felt that there was something missing; 
that somehow my contributions were not necessarily not valued, but were not relevant 
[to changing Africa’s situation]. I questioned my own relevance in terms of contributing 
to African development from that angle of sitting in the West and enjoying otherwise 
very successful career, and I felt the need [to return to the continent].  
 
“So the sense of commitment, the sense of fulfilment, the sense of relevance, I think 
these were the motivating factors for an African expect located in the West, feeling the 
urge and the need to relocate and come and help to reconstruct Africa. But in terms of 
technical background, in terms of competence and capabilities, I think we all have the 
same. But obviously they have different agendas, different interests, a different sense of 
impact, and ownership also. Because expertise and ownership should also be sort-of 
somehow linked! Because here you are, African, bright, and so on, but you feel the 
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sense of lack of ownership in some institutions. That somehow you do not own the 
agenda. You do not own the priorities and do not… you know, maybe it is a 
psychological sort of thing that we all go through, but you always feel the gap” (Busia 
2006). 
 
 ‘To be Respected within Africa You have to be World Class...’ 
Ethiopian economist Abebe Shimeles was awarded a PhD in Economics from Gothenburg 
University, Sweden in 2006, with his thesis focusing on poverty, risk and consumption dynamics 
in Ethiopia. Before this, he gained an MSc in Economics at the Delhi School of Economics, 
University of Delhi, India (1991), and a BSc in Economics from the University of Addis Ababa 
(1986). At the time of my fieldwork he was working as a long-term consultant at the ECA. In his 
view, and with reference to the debates of the 1980s, ECA experts at that time may have had 
the right instincts about the need for structural transformation, as expressed in the LPA and 
AAF-SAP, but lacked the technical ability for rigorous data gathering, analysis and modelling on 
the basis of which policy recommendations could be made. This compared unfavourably with 
experts at the World Bank who could access significant resources for gathering and processing 
data. For Shimeles, agency comes with the quality of one’s ideas, the tools at one’s disposal, 
and from strong knowledge institutions:  
 
“Economic policy cannot be done in the dark. And if you don’t do it, somebody else will 
do it for you, and that somebody else maybe takes you backwards” (Shimeles 2006). 
 
Bartholomew Armah, from Ghana pursued his university studies in economics in the U.S., 
securing an undergraduate degree at Hope College, Michigan, and a PhD at University of Notre 
Dame (1990). Armah first took a three-month sabbatical from his post as tenure-track professor 
at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in 1998, returning to his native Ghana to work at the 
Institute for Economic Affairs, a local think tank. Stimulated by this experience, he returned to 
Ghana in 2000 to work for the Government in the National Planning Commission. Based on this 
experience, he vowed never to return to teaching, which he found frustrating. While in Ghana, 
Armah applied for the post of ECA regional adviser on poverty reduction strategies, the first 
post of its kind and a reflection of the ECA’s growing preoccupation with helping its member 
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states build capacity to take greater leadership and ownership of their agenda. He joined the 
ECA in March 2005. 
 
Armah agrees that agency and room to manoeuvre come from the intellectual capacity to 
produce high-quality work and the confidence to negotiate. In his view, influencing the 
discourse and policy of development is not about confrontation, but about good logic. Donors, 
he argues, respect Africans who are intellectually strong, and this is what allows African experts 
to push the frontiers and reduce the power asymmetry. He provides a concrete example from 
his experience with the poverty reduction strategy (PRS) process in Ghana: 
 
“When Ghana was doing its PRS, the idea for HIPC was to forgive debts, externally owed 
debts. Well, we stood back and said look, our external debts are certainly higher than 
our domestic debts. But our domestic debts are short-term [meaning that they] carry 
higher interest rates, so they are in fact a bigger burden on us than the external debts. 
So, it makes no sense to talk about external debt reduction without talking about 
reducing domestic debt, [as] you want to free up some resources for poverty reducing 
actions. Then after a lot of bartering they agreed that 20% of HIPC resources [made 
available to Ghana] would go towards settling the domestic debt. That is the way we 
have to negotiate…” (Armah 2006). 
 
While international academic training and international exposure are necessary, Armah 
believes that ultimately, for such experts to have optimal agency, they must work at the 
national level. For him, the difference between national experts who have never studied or 
worked abroad, and those who have, is the confidence that exposure brings. He believes that 
African experts have only begun to realise they hold significant potential to reverse the 
asymmetry of power in the struggle over who should lead the design of Africa’s development 
strategy: 
 
“Donors often come to the table with a very negative view of Africans, [thinking that] 
we just want money. And when they come across people who can think with them, 
think logically and think more intellectually, they in most cases capitulate. Of course 
there are limits, but the question is: how deep are we within our production possibilities 
frontier? I think there is more scope to further shift this asymmetry” (ibid).  
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As Western-trained experts in the ECA, a UN agency in which Western nations have a say as 
members of the UN and as funders (even if they are not members of the Commission itself), it is 
expected that experts like Armah will serve as sub-hegemonic ‘translators’ of the globally 
dominant development ideology. To an extent, experts trained in the West inevitably reflect a 
shared epistemology with their Western counterparts in their work at the ECA. In some cases, 
they consciously set out to replicate Western best practice – as with K.Y. Amoako when he 
moved from the World Bank to lead the ECA (see Chapter 3). However, it is precisely this 
association with the West and the familiarity with its rationalities, techniques and technologies 
of rule that provides sub-hegemonic agents such as Armah with the legitimacy to contest policy 
space.  
 
Sibanda also believes that, because many Africans have proven themselves in the most 
competitive arenas, this gives African experts significantly greater room to manoeuvre than in 
the past:  
 
“In Western societies in academia, in development agencies, in the Population Council, 
in whatever organisation, you will find a group of Africans there. So they have proven 
themselves to be effective developing these ideas. If those same experts come and work 
in Africa, you cannot say they are not good. They are working for you. Look at Nigeria, 
their [then] Minister of Finance [Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala]. She worked at the World Bank as 
vice-president. So they excelled at these places. So, you cannot turn around and say 
they are not good. So, in a way because there are so many of those people now in so 
many positions in Africa… it has given us some room to say we can push our own agenda 
and get some respect from these big, powerful agencies. I am an expert on Southern 
Africa, so whatever I say on demography, they all seriously look at it and say… you 
know, I think it’s worth looking at. They cannot just brush it aside” (Sibanda 2006).  
 
As I argued in the Introduction to this dissertation, Pan-Africanists, African leaders and 
intellectuals did not reject Western science, despite its having been harnessed to advance 
colonialism. Indeed, they recognised that the West offered the cutting edge of human 
technological progress. Where they differed with the West was that they sought to harness this 
science to advocate for Africa’s development on the basis of its own societal values and 
dynamics. This was the logic behind the search, beginning in the 1970s, for an African theory of 
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development. Thus, there was an implicit understanding that, in the reality of postcolonial 
relations, a degree of credibility and therefore legitimacy could be gained from the West, and 
then used to pursue a path convergent with the Western trajectory to development, while at 
the same time diverging from it in several ways. 
 
‘Out with Dominant Ideology, In with Pragmatism’ 
Governance expert, Busia believes that, while in previous decades experts were labelled by 
ideology, the current wave of globalisation allows for greater heterodoxy:  
 
“[T]he old frameworks were very stuck in terms of positions. You were either neo-liberal 
or a structuralist, or neo-socialist or Marxist. But now I think globalisation really allows 
relativity and a sense of specificity in the context of globalisation – partly because no 
paradigm really is supreme and also partly because of the data we are getting from 
different countries’ experiments. The role of China in the world is debunking a lot of 
things about the neo-liberal framework. Countries like Brazil, countries like India and so 
on. Now, more than before, African experts have many more opportunities to hold onto 
things that work in a more pragmatic fashion than to be caught up in the ideological 
debate. Because really there is no dominant paradigm anymore” (Busia 2006). 
 
Not all agree, however, that African experts have more agency than in the past. Some, for 
instance, believe that while African policy-makers maintain the appearance of having listened, 
they end up paying lip service to advice from experts in trans-national institutions within Africa, 
and ultimately toe the Bretton Woods line. According to Ugandan economist Alibaruho, who 
worked for the World Bank before joining the ECA, this is because the real power lies not with 
institutions that generate good ideas, but with those that are well-endowed with resources. In 
his experience, this ‘power of the purse’ frustrates African expert agency:  
 
“This frustration that I’m expressing is expressed by technical staff in the Ministry in 
Uganda. You have a got a few key people – which is the way the Bank operates – they 
pick a few key ones in the Ministry of Finance, and really take care of them. Financially 
they are better off than the ordinary technical staff who do not come directly into 
dealings with the Bank. Because this happens on missions, they get DSA [daily 
subsistence allowance], they are talking to Kim Jaycox [former Africa vice president] and 
others, and this gives them a sense of power over the rest” (Alibaruho 2006). 
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Furthermore, Alibaruho insists that, while money determines which ideas predominate, this 
does not mean that the dominant institutions are ready to give credit to the originators of the 
different ideas that have forced them to revise their prescriptions:  
 
“Most of these so-called new institutional economics that is embraced by the Bank – 
institutions matter, governance matters, capital is more than physical things, social 
capital, education, and so on – these are things we learned as undergrads. And it’s not 
that the profession forgot it. It’s just that the dominant political thinking, and 
particularly where research money is, determines what ends up as policy. If you do not 
couch your research proposal in a certain way, a framework that the funders are 
interested in, you are not going to get it funded. So in many ways, yes, our voices have 
found expression, but not in an agenda driven by us. It’s just that the dominant powers 
have in the end faced so much opposition and are alarmed at their own failure… that 
they are talking about the things others were talking about. But you see they’ll still not 
give credit that in fact they have turned around because of taking in these new ideas” 
(ibid). 
 
Samba Jack, the ECA retiree, strongly feels that although capacity is no longer the constraint 
today that it was in the past, African agency continues to be overwhelmed by structure: 
 
“We know about the African agenda, we know what needs to be done. We know that 
basically we should be working towards the fundamental transformation of our 
economies. But because of the way things are, that we are in this trap in the need for 
foreign aid, the debt issue, that there’s this stranglehold around our neck that forces us 
to look at the day-to-day instead of the long-term issues, we have not been able to 
come out of that box. That development should be home-grown as a vision, that we 
should be working towards a willed future, internalise the process of growth and 
development – whereas it’s there as a concept, something that we aspire to, the 
realities of the day have not allowed Africa and African experts to assert themselves, to 
redirect their programmes and to work purposefully towards that. It’s not a capacity 
problem. The capacity is there. We can do it, it’s do-able. It’s just the constraints of 
development, the way the process of development in this region is being influenced by 
outside forces” (ibid).  
 
For Nnadozie, African expert agency is not always constrained by the exercise of power from 
outside Africa, but often by leadership politics within Africa. As an example, he recalls working 
on the African debt issue. He and other economists at the ECA wanted to present a nuanced 
analysis of Africa’s indebtedness along with proposals on how to manage the debt to ensure 
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the savings gained could contribute to reducing poverty. However, they were told firmly that 
what was needed from them was the economic rationale to support the policy message Africa’s 
leadership wanted to communicate to the outside world, one of total debt cancellation:  
 
“Even though we were in favour of debt cancellation, we wanted African governments 
themselves to recognise that they needed to really seize the opportunity to improve 
governance, so that the aid windfall would have a positive impact in our countries… 
rather than just basically help us recycle back into debt. You bring up these issues, but 
what you see working in this kind of institution is that you’re faced with difficult 
constraints that sometimes limit what you can or cannot do or say. You are forced to 
present a technical blueprint in line with the political position of the African leaders. You 
can’t openly say that this is not the direction that we should be moving in” (Nnadozie 
2006). 
 
‘From Ivory Tower to National Level’ 
Patrick Osakwe is another of the young breed of ECA economists who joined after 2000. Of 
Nigerian origin, he moved to Canada after his undergraduate studies, and was awarded a PhD 
in Economics from Queen’s University in 1997. He then worked as a senior analyst with the 
Bank of Canada in Ottawa. At the time of my fieldwork he was leading the ECA’s work on 
Financing for Development. He believes African experts working trans-nationally are 
disadvantaged because their institutions lack the ability  to affect national policy.  
 
“Yes, we try to help African countries, but we don’t have any bearing on national policy 
per se. And that’s what is critical here. Most of the problems we face in Africa come 
from failures in national policy. There are little things that we can do for ourselves to 
make life more meaningful for our people that have nothing to do with Europeans or 
North Americans. These are little things [such as] getting access to clean water. We saw 
oil windfalls in the last two to three years in Nigeria. What is the ‘Nigerian] government 
doing it with it?” (Osakwe 2006). 
 
However, in some areas, it is possible to register an impact. An example cited is the ECA’s work 
in strengthening the capacity of African trade negotiators. Osakwe and his colleagues have 
been able to respond to pressing national needs by bringing actors from different countries 
together to forge common positions prior to negotiating in global forums such as the WTO. This 
is consistent with Armah’s view that continental African experts need to take their thinking to 
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national contexts if they are to make a real impact. Ultimately, he says, it is about “moving from 
the ivory tower to the ground, but not forgetting to take your ivory with you” (ibid). 
 
Unpacking Western Credentialism 
In support of my hypothesis on the co-deployment by experts of their ‘African-ness’ and 
Western academic credentials, a rich body of evidence has emerged from the oral testimonies 
of the experts interviewed. One significant finding is that respondents completed much of their 
advanced academic training in Western universities. Most studied in the U.S., several with 
scholarships from major U.S. foundations such as Rockefeller and Ford. Even those who 
completed their undergraduate studies in their home countries then  pursued advanced studies 
abroad. Older respondents tended to favour the U.K., given colonial links with their countries of 
origin. Younger respondents favoured studying in the U.S. and to a lesser extent France and the 
Netherlands. The long-standing desire to study in the West – even among experts like Teriba 
whose parent university, Ibadan, was considered to have equal status to leading centres of 
academic excellence in the West – validates my hypothesis about Western credentials being 
seen by postcolonial African experts as necessary to effecting transformational change back 
home. The legitimacy conferred by Western education enhances the ability of African experts 
to exercise technocratic power – both within Africa’s development regime and internationally. 
 
Those who studied economics and other ‘hard’ social sciences such as demography clearly 
value the growing emphasis, primarily but not exclusively in U.S. universities, on quantitative 
methods, as well on applying such methods in a more operational mode to elaborate and 
influence policy. The testimonies of Alibaruho, Sibanda and Bugembe bear out the growing 
importance of ‘hard’ economistic tools such as regression analysis in the fields of economics 
and development studies during their time as students. Ngartando Blayo, a now-retired ECA 
staffer, also spoke of having attended courses in quantitative economics at CRED in Michigan to 
supplement his analytical skill set (Blayo 2006). 
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Respondents agreed that the tools, methods and other knowledge acquired in Western 
universities were formative and provided an important theoretical base to their future work in 
advancing development. However, there are also varying degrees of scepticism, informed by 
experience, about the real-world applicability of many of the theoretical frameworks learned at 
universities. Many felt strongly that the Western conventional wisdom on how development 
should happen in African countries did not often resonate with the reality. Alibaruho, for 
example, used his training to debunk rational-choice-influenced theories about the torpor of 
African labourers. Other respondents (cf. Jack, Bugembe, Sibanda and Armah) also actively 
questioned the received theoretical wisdom at different stages of their careers. 
 
Some found the universities they attended in the West to be dogmatic and disciplinary in their 
approach to teaching, as discovered by Sibanda who found his university professors unwilling to 
brook deviation from the narrow confines of curricula that emphasised a Western worldview of 
science. Despite being in awe of his lecturers, four of whom later became Nobel laureates in 
Economics, Alibaruho strongly criticised the erroneous theoretical basis for some of what he 
had been taught, and maintained a stridently sceptical view of Western ideas – despite 
spending much of his career as a World Bank economist. 
 
Many scholars funded by U.S. foundations were bound by the condition that they returned to 
their countries. This was seen as a ploy to embed them as sub-hegemonic agents of a 
hegemonic, expert-led, ideological and disciplinary U.S. approach to science. This emerged 
clearly in the testimony of Sibanda, who remained in the U.S. to strengthen his academic profile 
in prestigious U.S. universities. This strategy of resistance was later validated by Sibanda’s 
recruitment by the ECA, considered by him and others to be a space in which an African agenda 
could be pursued. 
 
The experts interviewed were evidently shaped by their engagement as development 
professionals. Bugembe, who admitted to being strongly influenced by theoretical macro-
economic tools, began to grapple with the practical constraints of development only during his 
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first job working with the EADB. He was later compelled by what he learned as a young 
economist at the ECA to confront the Executive Secretary on the need to interrogate the impact 
of SAPs on African countries. These findings speak to the fluidity of sub-hegemony: Western 
epistemological training, combined with mastery of Western ‘political technologies’, serves to 
empower African experts to act as classic sub-hegemons whilst simultaneously pursuing 
creative and multi-faceted ‘techno-politics’ with the potential to bring about power shifts.  
 
A compelling finding – and one that bears out my hypothesis on the strategic leveraging of 
‘world class’ expert status to push for increased policy space – is that today’s generation of 
African experts consider themselves to be widely respected, whether working in national, 
regional or global institutions. As Sibanda suggests, the growing number of Africans working in 
mainstream as well as alternative-thinking institutions speaks to their increasing presence at 
the cutting edge of development theory, policy and practice. This is supported by the rise of a 
number of Africans to senior positions at the World Bank and IMF; some of them have also 
gone on to lead economic and social policy-making in their countries of origin
157
.  
 
While such examples of African success in the dominant institutions of the international 
development regime speak to the growing legitimacy of African experts, such respect is earned, 
and not bestowed. Makonnen attributes this to the current generation of African experts 
excelling in the same ‘Ivy League’ academies as their counterparts. Armah agrees, arguing that 
the key to agency is a demonstrated intellectual capacity, combined with a proven track record. 
It is this capacity, and not the rhetorical espousal by developed countries of the importance of 
‘African ownership’, that enables African experts to negotiate effectively the terms of Africa’s 
engagement with the outside world. As Shimeles asserts, it was a deficit of technical know-how 
and rigour that undermined attempts by ECA experts working under Adedeji to win the battle 
                                                  
157
 Most recently, Former World Bank vice president Ngozi Okonji-Iweala served as Finance Minister of Nigeria; 
while senior IMF official Antoinette Sayeh served as Finance Minister of Liberia. Ironically, both returned to 
Washington after stints in their country of origin to serve in even higher positions in the Bank and Fund 
respectively. 
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of ideas with the World Bank and IMF. Today, the assumption is that this technical know-how is 
now less scarce than it was in the 1980s or 1990s. 
 
Alibaruho’s insights on the paradigm shift in the teaching of economics – away from more 
philosophical approaches associated with European scholarship, and towards more quantitative 
techniques – resonates with the view on legitimacy. I found that younger ECA experts consider 
the mastery of such tools and techniques as key to more robust policy analysis. K.Y. Amoako, 
who joined the World Bank as a Young Professional, mastered regression analysis and related 
methods while pursuing his PhD at Berkeley. On his arrival at the ECA in 1995, he made it a 
hallmark of his tenure to improve the rigour of ECA reports (Amoako 2004, ECA 1996). As 
discussed in Chapter 3, this was because he believed that, in order for the ECA to gain 
credibility as an interlocutor between Africa and the international community, the quality of its 
technical work needed to be comparable to that of the leading ICEs in the world – notably the 
World Bank, where he had learned and plied his trade before joining the ECA. 
 
Overall, the testimonies garnered from the life-history interviews paint a picture of highly 
trained experts, fully conversant with Western theories and approaches to development. They 
possess the academic credentials, earned in the West, that legitimise their claim to 
membership of an elite community of ‘internationally recognised global development 
professionals’.  
 
Decomposing ‘African-ness’ 
In concert with this identity as ‘world class’ experts, and according to my theoretical 
conceptualisation of Africa’s development regime in Chapter 1, experts leverage their African 
identity, or ‘African-ness’, as a legitimising device to increase policy space. The testimonies 
featured above have provided compelling validation of this hypothesis, and thrown up various 
constituent dimensions of ‘African-ness’ worth unpacking here.  
 
208 
 
First, the interviews show the strong emotional attachment by these experts to their countries 
of origin. Older experts such as Teriba wasted no time in returning home after graduation, 
consonant with the strong nationalism common among Nigerian intellectuals in the immediate 
aftermath of their country’s independence from Britain, and the strong demand for newly 
qualified experts. In contrast, younger experts such as Sibanda – who earned his PhD more than 
three decades after Teriba – took strategic decisions to gain more experience in the West 
before returning home. In many cases, and particularly after the collapse of many African 
economies in the 1980s, this desire to remain in the West was born of a frustration with the 
relative under-development of the experts’ countries of origin and a conviction that they could 
make a better life away from home. However, some may have been motivated by the desire to 
return home equipped with tools to help develop their respective countries. Indeed, as has 
been shown in this chapter, many of my interview respondents had already succeeded in 
Western academies and returned home because they believed they could better contribute to 
the development of their continent by being there. Busia left a permanent position with USAID, 
which had taken him around the world, to join the ECA. Nnadozie left a lucrative teaching 
position in a U.S. university to come to the ECA158.  
 
In choosing to work at the ECA, Sibanda and his colleagues from the Diaspora, many concerned 
about the socio-economic and political problems in their countries, invoked their ‘African-ness’, 
appealing to the age-old notion of Pan-Africanism to justify their continued relevance not only 
to their direct country of origin but also to the greater African good. This speaks to the 
compelling imaginary power of the ‘idea’ of Africa discussed in the Introduction to this 
dissertation, and correspondingly of the ‘West’. While the notion of Pan-African regionalism 
was paid lip service in the aftermath of independence, it has regained currency as awareness 
has grown of the need to harness the idea of Africa to contest power against an international 
                                                  
158
 In making this argument I concede that the benefits of being an international civil servant (including the 
payment by the UN of 70% of school fees of staff members up to the end of first degree, and generous allowances 
covering cost of living, hardship and home leave, among others) may have provided an inducement that some of 
the returnees from the Diaspora could not resist. 
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development regime that has objectified the continent as an undifferentiated, homogeneous 
mass characterised by backwardness and poverty. 
 
Linked to this, a second dimension of ‘African-ness’ emerging from the life histories is the 
strong adherence by African experts to the ideology of development, and their desire to 
contribute to the development of their continent. As Busia notes, there is nothing intrinsically 
African about development or about the training and knowledge that experts possess, whether 
African or otherwise. The difference lies in the sense of commitment, fulfilment and relevance 
that African experts feel when working on issues pertinent to their continent. To this extent, 
and as evidenced by the fact that a large number of Diasporan Africans applied for posts at ECA 
in response to the 2000 recruitment campaign (Amoako 2004), ‘African-ness’ therefore 
emerges as a powerful force that impels development experts with a connection to Africa to 
return home. This emerges clearly in the testimony of Busia, Nnazodie, Bugembe and others.  
 
Third, African experts see their solid experience of working in different African contexts, and in 
particular national-level experience, as a key constituent of their African expert identity. As 
Makonnen notes, African experts, whether working in the World Bank, at ECA or in other 
agencies, “know where the shoe pinches” because many of them worked in their countries as 
national experts before moving into the trans-national domain. This is in contrast to the non-
African high-fliers in powerful institutions such as the Bank and Fund, many of whom were 
recruited as Young Professionals without experience of working in a government bureaucracy. 
In response, some might argue that there are many non-Africans with significant experience in 
African countries, and a number of Africans who joined international institutions with no 
national experience. On the basis of the above, a counter-argument would then be that, even in 
the case of young experts such as Sibanda, who never worked in Africa before joining the ECA, 
the fact that African realities are realities they have lived gives them the edge over their non-
African counterparts. 
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A fourth dimension of ‘African-ness’ elicited from the life histories is that the agenda of African 
experts is different from that of their counterparts. This is well articulated by Bugembe, who 
recalls two aspects of divergence between experts at the ECA and those at the World Bank 
during the days of confrontation between Africa and the Bretton Woods institutions sparked by 
the stand-off between the LPA and Berg Report. The first difference is that while ECA African 
experts cared about establishing social and economic development infrastructure, such as 
roads or education, their Bretton Woods counterparts were more detached and therefore less 
likely to question the agenda of their respective institutions. Secondly, and paradoxically, while 
World Bank and IMF experts were constrained by the global context, African experts were 
much less so. As discussed in Chapter 1, the institutionalisation of development has led to 
today’s specialised cadre of development professionals who have generated the international 
development discourse, and carved out technical domains of specialisation. Those working in 
the World Bank, even if assigned to a particular region, do not have the same room for 
manoeuvre as experts working at the ECA, which was established specifically to advance African 
development. This explains why, although it is part of a global system, the ECA is dominated by 
African expertise. These experts are as emotionally attached to the ‘idea’ of Africa as they are 
ideologically committed to development. In the World Bank, the first condition does not 
necessarily apply. 
 
A final dimension of ‘African-ness’ emerging from the life histories is the fact that African 
experts tend to have a better knowledge overall of their continent and its countries. As 
sustainable development specialist, Gaye asserts, this is because professionals like herself can 
bring the region- and country-specific context to UN-wide and other global initiatives on African 
development. This knowledge of the different African contexts – discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 
with respect to the shift from one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions to an understanding that 
development policy must be tailored to the specific context of each country and region – 
leverages all the other dimensions of ‘African-ness’ highlighted above.  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, with recourse to life histories gathered during fieldwork, I have sought to 
elaborate further my thesis on sub-hegemony by showing how experts leverage two 
constructed identities – their world-class credentials coupled with their ‘African-ness’ – to 
assert their primacy as the crafters and purveyors of technocratic solutions to Africa’s 
development challenges. According to my reading, ‘African-ness’ is not asserted by these 
experts as a corrective or alternative to Western ideas. On the contrary: the one constructed 
identity is not counter-posed to the other. They co-exist, being mutually constitutive and 
deployed in concert. Typically, the reasoning would be: ‘We are best placed to direct Africa’s 
development because we have world-class credentials and are well respected, and because we 
are of African origin’.  
 
The claim to increased policy space is therefore not asserted on the basis of African origin 
alone; indeed, implicit in the notion of ‘African-ness’ is the attribute of globally recognised 
credentials. One cannot assert ‘African-ness’ without being world-class. Academic and technical 
excellence is considered a prerequisite for expanded agency and legitimacy. These credentials, 
gained mainly in the West, enable African experts to create increased room for manoeuvre, in 
relation to their non-African counterparts, in crafting solutions to African problems. This speaks 
to the enduring imaginary power of the ‘West’ as a source of credibility and legitimacy for 
citizens of the Third World.  
 
The corollary to this has been the ‘idea’ of Africa, a powerful imaginary that has drawn on the 
power of Western science to objectify Africa, rendering its peoples and territory as powerless 
subjects and preparing the terrain for external intervention. I have shown how Africans took 
this Orientalist ‘idea’ of Africa and created its antithesis, a powerful vision of an independent 
Africa imagined by emancipating discourses of ‘Pan-Africanism’, ‘African renaissance’ and so 
on. In all this, the idea of the West as the apotheosis of scientific knowledge did not disappear. 
On the contrary, successive generations of Africans have considered the acquisition of Western 
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academic credentials as key to their future ability to challenge their Western counterparts and 
in some cases to win power struggles.  
 
A final, reflexive word on Actor Network Theory (ANT) and its relation to the life histories 
featured in this chapter. A key motivation in documenting aspects of the life histories of the 
African experts interviewed has been to explore the intersection between individual agency and 
structural conditions. ANT provides important insights into the constitution of subordinate 
actors as sub-hegemonic agents advancing as well as minimising hegemony. In more rigid 
accounts of domination as governmentality and/or hegemony, regimes of modern power are 
populated by a host of successful actor-networks that eliminate all resistance in the pursuit of 
‘social ordering’. These actor-networks combine human and nonhuman agents to manufacture 
and enforce consent.  
 
In Chapter 1, I explained theoretically why such consent is rarely, if ever, achieved. This is 
because, within a given actor-network, as in the pre-existing field of power inhabited by such 
networks or apparatuses, each actor is “renegotiating what the world is made up of, who is 
acting in it, who matters, and who wants what” (Latour 1984, p.40). Actor-networks seek to 
reinforce hegemonic power structures by overcoming resistance, but because structure itself is 
a site of struggle, it recursively reproduces itself in order to accommodate dissent and advance 
its hegemony. In doing so, it opens the door for various actors to resist. The power effects of 
‘ordering’ are generated and distributed in a relational manner (Law 1992). As a result, effects 
and outcomes generated by actor-networks may be random, and are radically indeterminate. 
Hegemonic projects can therefore be disrupted and the balance of power reconfigured. 
 
In this chapter, I have provided the evidence to support my hypothesis on the workings of 
power in actor-networks. I have done so by interrogating the sub-hegemonic strategies and 
tactics of individual agents who form part of institutional complexes of expertise, pivotal actor-
networks in Africa’s development regime. Through the life histories of the experts, I have 
shown how they seek to carve out increased policy space by invoking their ‘African-ness’ as well 
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as their Western credentials as a means of “creating… new sources of power and new sources 
of legitimacy, which are irreducible to those that hitherto coded the so-called political space…” 
(Latour 1984, p.40). Identity emerges as a key weapon in the complex game of ‘techno-politics’, 
one that affords these experts increased room to manoeuvre as they aspire to greater agency in 
directing Africa’s future development.  
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Chapter 5: 
The APRM: A Political Technology of African Power 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I offered a theoretical framework to aid in the deconstruction of Africa’s 
development regime. I identified two key dimensions of Foucault’s (1991) governmentality: a 
set of political rationalities – the thoughts and discursive representations (or meanings) 
involved when authorities define the field of intervention; and a set of technologies to deal with 
problems defined by political rationality. While rationalities are embedded in governmental 
discourse, technologies involve various tools and forms of knowledge, promulgated and 
managed by experts and institutions in the quest for hegemony (Salskov-Iversen 2000). With 
this in mind, I argued that a potential outcome of contestation of sub-hegemony is the 
recalibration of asymmetries of power. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I have demonstrated in concrete 
terms how this can happen.  
 
In this final chapter, and to provide further evidence in support of my hypothesis, I examine the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) – described respectively as “arguably the continent’s 
most innovative and challenging experiment to date” (Herbert and Gruzd 2007) and “arguably 
the most unique and original aspect of the NEPAD initiative” (Masterson 2005). The APRM 
stands out as the most visible form of knowledge, or ‘political technology’ power, in Africa’s 
contemporary development regime. Furthermore, its origins can be directly traced back to the 
ECA ICE, my case study. 
 
I advance three central arguments. First, while there are grounds for the APRM to be cast as a 
classic sub-hegemonic political technology aimed at entrenching the power of the dominant 
discourse on ‘good governance’, it simultaneously embodies significant potential to expand 
African policy space. Second, much of this potential lies in its ability to open up space within 
and above the African state, enabling a plurality of voices to influence the outcome of the peer 
review process as well as the policies of governments. Third, and in line with my hypothesis on 
the radical indeterminacy of development regimes, I argue that key outcomes of the peer 
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review process have exceeded the intention of the APRM’s founders. Before developing these 
arguments, I reflect briefly on the extent to which NEPAD, the APRM’s parent, can be seen as a 
sub-hegemonic political rationality abetting continued external domination of Africa’s 
development.  
 
NEPAD: Shining the Chains of Global Apartheid?
159
 
A wide body of literature has highlighted NEPAD’s reflection of key tenets of the neo-liberal 
international development regime
160
. Many argue that it accepts globalisation as an inevitable 
process that must be embraced, uncritically supports the integration of financial markets and 
promotes global capital inflows. Tandon (2002), for example, has asserted that while the 
NEPAD document recognises the potential for losers as well as winners in the globalisation 
process, it embraces integration into the globalised economy on the basis of the liberalisation 
of markets and the free movement of capital as its key strategy. Griggs (2003) has concluded 
that the new partnerships discourse as enshrined in NEPAD “…bridges the gap between the 
narratives of the North and the South” because it is cast within a neo-liberal discourse and 
includes an acceptance of many of the conditions that go with multilateral aid (ibid, see also 
Loxley 2003). 
 
While NEPAD acknowledges that reforms promoted by SAPs tended to remove serious price 
distortions, they gave inadequate attention to the provision of social services (NEPAD, 2001, 
p.5), critics have viewed this single substantive reference to SAPs as inadequate. NEPAD’s 
support for private-sector-led growth (cf. NEPAD 2001 pp.46-47) has been seen as further 
evidence of the dominance of the neo-liberal economic paradigm. At the same time, NEPAD has 
been criticised for its ambiguity on the role of the state, with one commentator asserting that it 
advocates for a neo-liberal type of state dedicated to adjusting national economies to the 
dynamics of a largely unregulated global economy (Randriamaro 2002).  
                                                  
159
 “In sum, if international capital and its various institutional foundations, including the Bretton Woods 
institutions and the WTO, represent the ‘chains’ of global apartheid, it is evident in what we have seen above that 
[NEPAD] has been reduced to shining, not breaking those chains” (Bond 2002, p.14).  
160
 For NGO critiques, see, for example, TWN-CODESRIA (2002), and the Bamako Declaration, Africa Social Forum 
(2001).  
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In my view, the significance of NEPAD’s advocacy of ‘African ownership’ as a new phase in 
Africa’s power relations with the outside world is not diminished by its espousal of policies 
deemed to be neo-liberal. As argued in Chapter 3, accepting certain principles identifiable with 
the dominant ideology can serve as a pragmatic manoeuvre to win trust and open up expanded 
space for the exercise of power by weaker agents. Although the phrase ‘African ownership’ 
barely features in the NEPAD framework document, it is pivotal to the initiative161. Ownership 
remains a highly contested concept, regarded by some as a colonising sub-hegemonic discourse 
used to help ‘normalise’ African citizens as global neo-liberal subjects, and by others as a 
potential means of reconfiguring the balance of power in Africa’s favour.  
 
How and on what basis would such a sub-hegemonic strategy work? The first step would be to 
recognise that African ideas do not stand in binary opposition to the dominant rationality. As 
shown in Chapter 1, the ECA of the late 1980s, having vigorously opposed SAPs, agreed to work 
on the basis of a new synthesis of stabilisation (identified as a key neo-liberal policy construct 
advocated by the Bretton Woods institutions) and self-reliance (a consistent underpinning of 
Africa’s development regime linked to Pan-Africanist discourses). By accepting that Africa’s 
economies did indeed need to stabilise, the ECA was able to gain recognition and 
accommodation of its main argument on the need for long-term social transformation and 
development, eventually leading to modified iterations of SAPs.  
 
In addition to signalling the desire for a recalibration of power between Africa and its external 
partners, NEPAD also implies a fundamental shift in the relationship between rulers and ruled 
within Africa. It offers the possibility of greater ownership by African citizens of state-led 
reforms, as well as “…participatory democracy, decentralisation of decision-making centres of 
power in both political and economic senses” (Amuwo 2002, p.8). According to this logic, 
ownership “…becomes a live political process, the product of contestations, bargaining and 
compromises which, once adopted, makes it easier for policy to be sustained and the populace 
                                                  
161
 In par. 42 on page 9, and in par. 47 on page 10. The concluding section of the framework document also states 
“Africa recognizes that it holds the key to its own development” (NEPAD, 2001, p.57). 
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to be mobilised behind the national, sub-regional and/or regional development project” 
(Olukoshi 2002, p.12).  
 
Ownership is thus a condition for legitimacy. Seen this way, the importance of citizen 
participation as a condition for progress, first acknowledged in the Monrovia Declaration, has 
remained a core structural underpinning of Africa’s development regime. NEPAD is also 
underpinned by appeals to ‘partnership’ and ‘mutual accountability’, notions that are 
problematic and require unpacking. Amuwo (2002) argues that because Africa’s structural crisis 
was initially engendered by a particularly debilitating external environment, there is too much 
of the West in Africa to allow Africa to design its future on its own terms, calling into question 
the notion of a “transformed development partnership” (ibid p.11).  
 
Even in the absence of formal accountability structures, partnership frameworks come with 
conditions that tend to be asymmetrical – particularly in traditional aid relationships where 
they apply more to recipient that donor (Maxwell and Christiansen 2002)
162
. Symmetrical 
accountability would require the conditions applying to the donors to be spelt out in more 
detail, with enforcement mechanisms and penalties applying equally to donors and recipients. 
Such ‘mutual accountability’ is a central feature of NEPAD, which proposes a multi-layered 
institutional arrangement to monitor and learn from the ‘new partnership’ that includes a 
NEPAD ODA Forum (NEPAD, 2001, pp.38-39). This feature, in tandem with the more positive 
readings of ‘ownership’ discussed above, means that NEPAD, while clearly within the frame of 
the dominant development paradigm, can conceivably be read as aspiring to a definitive break 
with past coercive aid relations163.  
 
 
                                                  
162
 The Cotonou Convention is asymmetrical in the sense that, while the European Union is not subject to any 
binding conditions, the developing-country partners are (Maxwell and Christiansen (2002). This asymmetry is 
evident in the emerging contestation over the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) mandated by the Cotonou 
Agreement.  
163
 Indeed, the renaming of the ‘ODA Forum’ as the ‘Africa Partnership Forum’ (APF) implies recognition that 
engagement between Africa and its development partners must necessarily move beyond a narrow focus on aid, 
to encompass wider African concerns and demands on the basis of equal partnership. 
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The APRM – Origins and Genealogy 
In Foucauldian terms, NEPAD stands out as a ‘political rationality’ of power, embodying 
discursive thoughts and representations promulgated by experts and deployed by African 
leaders to define their field and scope of intervention. In tandem, the APRM, a voluntary 
mechanism established by NEPAD Heads of State in 2003 to review and track progress in good 
governance in participating countries, can be conceptualised as a ‘political technology’ of 
power’, an expert-initiated technocratic tool harnessing particular forms of knowledge to 
advance an African governance agenda as a critical dimension of the continent’s development 
strategy. Through a detailed examination of the evidence, I now interrogate the extent to which 
the APRM is classically sub-hegemonic, in that it serves to advance the dominant development 
discourse and embed its prescriptions in the increasingly technocratic practice of African 
development. To what extent it is paving the way for African policy agents to act with greater 
effect in determining the continent’s future development path? 
 
The idea of African peer review was first broached in the ECA’s ‘Compact’ (discussed in Chapter 
3), which proposed that the NEPAD governing body, in collaboration with relevant and capable 
continental institutions, “establish mechanisms for the broad-based buy-in by African 
governments to peer review performance on issues of governance and economic management” 
(ECA 2001, par. 244, p.41). The ‘Compact’ suggested the OECD DAC (Development Assistance 
Committee) reviews of development assistance in member states as a possible model for 
African peer review, and proposed a new forum of African leaders to secure the high-level 
commitment needed to ensure follow-up within participating counties (ibid). 
 
At the request of the NEPAD Steering Committee, and in May 2002, the ECA published a 
document entitled ‘Codes and Standards for Good Economic and Corporate Governance in 
Africa: Summary of Key Issues and Declaration of Principles’. The ECA sought to focus on 
economic and corporate governance – areas it considered to be within its competence – and to 
avoid overtly addressing political governance – which fell within the AU’s mandate. 
Nevertheless, the document asserted good political governance as a prerequisite for good 
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economic and corporate governance and recommended that “a single peer review 
encompassing both the political and economic/corporate aspects of governance for a given 
country should be conducted where required” (ibid p.11).  
 
This informed the development of a continental peer review mechanism by the initiators of 
NEPAD. While existing mechanisms such as the OECD peer review process and IMF Article IV 
consultations164 are bilateral, between the peer reviewing organisation and specific countries, 
the APRM is both bilateral and multilateral. As such, it is the first peer review mechanism to 
combine country reviews with a continental forum for holding countries to account.  
 
The commitment by the initiating countries to good governance in all its dimensions was 
reflected in the ‘NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate 
Governance’, signed by NEPAD leaders on the margins of the inaugural AU Durban 2002 
Summit. In the Declaration, giving the rationale for the APRM, the NEPAD leaders reaffirmed 
their commitment to a host of previous declarations, plans and strategies adopted by the OAU 
– including the LPA (1980), The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development (1990) 
and the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (1991). Although the 
Declaration committed all African leaders to adhering to its provisions, it clearly stated that the 
NEPAD countries had “separately agreed to establish an African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) on the basis of voluntary accession” (NEPAD 2002, par. 28, p.10, emphasis added). 
 
Two things stand out from this text. First, the APRM, though established under the auspices of 
NEPAD, was created as a separate entity. Second, the APRM was designated a voluntary 
mechanism, meaning that only those countries wishing to be peer reviewed should sign up. 
According to the APRM Base Document, the Mechanism’s mandate is:  
 
                                                  
164
 Kanbur (2004) describes three other peer-review systems from which criteria for an assessment of the APRM 
can be drawn. The first of these is academic peer review. The second is the OECD peer-review process, which in his 
view comes closest to the APRM’s intention. The third is the IMF’s Article IV country consultations, which aim to 
hold countries to account for obligations entered into with the IMF. From these peer-review systems, Kanbur 
derives three criteria for assessing the APRM: competence, independence and competition. 
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“To ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed 
political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in 
the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. The 
APRM is the mutually agreed instrument for self-monitoring by the participating 
member governments” (NEPAD 2003a, p.2, emphasis added). 
 
The Base Document states that the APRM’s purpose is:  
 
“…to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political 
stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional 
and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and 
reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and 
assessing the needs for capacity building” (ibid, emphasis added). 
 
Finally, the document asserts that each country review exercise must be “technically 
competent, credible and free of political manipulation” (ibid, emphasis added). 
 
This text clearly signalled the intention of the APRM’s founders to ensure compliance by 
participating countries with the content and spirit of the Declaration. However, it was to be 
dedicated to the ‘sharing of experiences’, ‘reinforcement of successful and best practice’ and to 
‘identifying deficiencies’ and ‘assessing the needs for capacity building’. At the same time, it 
was to be voluntary and self-selecting. Furthermore, the principles for peer review called for 
technical competence, credibility and the absence of political manipulation.  
 
The desire to keep the mechanism free from political interference was born of a need to 
prevent politicking by participating countries that would interfere with the hoped-for 
impartiality of the APRM. However, this did not mean the APRM did not recognise the primacy 
of politics in national policy-making. As will be seen, the APRM country reviews, far from 
steering clear of previously sovereign issues, have directly engaged with political questions 
within countries. At the same time, as with all ‘political technologies’ of power, the APRM has 
been projected as a neutral, technical mechanism that does not engage in politics.  
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On the question of compliance, the APRM website clearly states that there is no conditionality 
attached to joining the APRM, although countries wishing to join must sign up to the mandatory 
principles laid out in the Declaration, as well as to the five stages of the review process. Experts 
closely involved in the APRM from its inception put forward two reasons for the voluntary 
nature of the APRM. One is that the political will for a more coercive mechanism simply did not 
exist (Nnadozie 2006, Busia 2006). Given the perennial difficulty faced by the AU (and the OAU 
before it) in compelling member states to meet their obligations, it would have been unrealistic 
to expect the APRM to include explicit compliance mechanisms. Added to this, and in light of 
the widely acknowledged failure of the externally imposed SAPs, Africa was keen to avoid new 
layers of conditionality imposed in return for new aid. As such, it was considered counter-
productive for the APRM to apply force to ensure compliance from its membership (Busia, in 
Gruzd 2009, p.6). I will return later in this chapter to the question of the lack of an enforcement 
mechanism in the APRM.  
 
Structure and Organisation 
Countries wishing to join the APRM are required to sign a Memorandum of Understanding. This 
commits them to adhering to the codes, standards and principles for peer review as laid down 
in the Declaration. Four types of peer review are envisaged: the base review, which in theory 
should be carried out within 18 months of a country’s accession to the Mechanism; ongoing 
periodic review, to take place two to four years after the initial base review; review requested 
by a member country (i.e. not part of the mandated process); and a crisis review initiated by 
Heads of State of participating countries to look into early signs of political and economic crisis 
in a member country (NEPAD 2003a, p.14). 
 
So far, only base reviews have taken place, and these consist of five stages.  
1. Self-Assessment, involving the preparation of background documents on democratic, 
political, economic, corporate and social conditions in the country under review, and 
conducted by the country itself with the assistance of the APRM secretariat.  
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2. Country Review Mission, a visit by a team drawn from the APRM Secretariat and 
selected experts to carry out consultations, clarify issues and build national consensus.  
3. Country Review Report, prepared by the visiting team, based on information gathered 
during the visit as well as on independent issues papers developed by the APRM 
Secretariat. On the basis of the Self-Assessment Report and the Country Review Report, 
the country then finalises its APRM Plan of Action which is submitted to a Panel of 
Eminent Persons (NEPAD 2003a).  
4. Peer Review, in a meeting of the APR Forum of Heads of State and Government, the 
highest body of the APRM. After a presentation of the Country Review Report by the 
Eminent Person responsible for leading the review in question, the leader of the country 
under review engages with his or her peers on key findings of the review, and a 
programme of action is agreed to correct problems identified (ibid).  
5. Publication of the Country Review Report, National Programme of Action (NPoA) and 
appropriate recommendations of the Heads of State. After being tabled formally at the 
AU Summit, the report is made public and also tabled at all regional and continental 
organisations, including the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, the AU’s Peace and Security Council and the regional economic 
community of which the reviewed country is a member (ibid). At this point, the findings 
of the peer review become public.  
 
The peer review process is facilitated by a multi-layered organisational structure. The APR 
Forum of Heads of State and Government, which meets twice a year on the sidelines of the AU 
Summit, is the APRM’s highest decision-making body. The Mechanism’s technical work is led by 
a Panel of Eminent Persons (EPP) responsible for directing and managing the APR process on a 
day-to-day basis. The EPP consists of between 5 and 7 Africans who “...must be persons of high 
moral stature and demonstrated commitment to the ideals of Pan Africanism”, and have 
distinguished themselves in careers considered relevant to the APRM (APRM 2003, p.3)165. 
                                                  
165
 The Panel’s mandate is to “oversee the review process to ensure the integrity of the process, to consider review 
reports and to make recommendations to the APR” (APRM Organisation and Process 2003, p.1). The Panel is 
nominated by participating countries, shortlisted by a Committee of Ministers and appointed by Heads of State of 
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Adebayo Adedeji, whose stewardship of the ECA’s fight for an alternative development strategy 
between 1975 and 1991 was documented in Chapter 2, was appointed a member of the Panel 
from its inception, and serves as the current Chairperson. As will be discussed, the procedures 
for appointing the EPP have been criticised by civil society organisations, which question the 
lack of transparency in the selection process and suggest that some of the panellists do not 
meet the high standards laid out in the APRM Base Document. 
 
An APRM Secretariat, based in Midrand, South Africa, serves as a technical hub and co-
ordinates the day-to-day running of the process. The structure also includes three ‘APR Partner 
Institutions’ – the ECA, AfDB and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Their role is 
to conduct the country technical assessments, after consultation between the country to be 
reviewed and the APR Secretariat and Panel. The ECA’s assigned role covers technical 
assessments in economic governance and management, while the AfDB focuses on banking and 
financial standards. According to the APRM Secretariat “[t]he two institutions will be the 
primary resource institutions in their respective areas of competence”, while the AU would be 
responsible for conducting technical assessments on human rights, democracy and political 
governance (NEPAD 2003b, pars 6.1 and 6.2, pp.7-8).  
 
This division of labour is instructive, particularly in light of the controversy over the ECA’s role 
with respect to the APRM. Indeed, the ECA had hoped that its pivotal role in elaborating the 
concept of African peer review and its work in developing a series of indicators for good 
governance in Africa would make it the natural home for the APRM secretariat. At the third 
Forum of APRM participating Heads of State (held in Rome Italy, on 11 June 2002), it was 
agreed that APRM Secretariat would be located at the ECA. However, barely six months later, at 
the fourth Forum meeting, the decision was reversed and the ECA’s role was limited to 
providing technical analysis (ECA 2008).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                
the participating countries. Panellists are supposed to serve for four years and retire by rotation. One member of 
the Panel is appointed Chairperson, to serve for a maximum of five years (ibid). 
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There were several reasons for this reversal. One was the view that had dogged the ECA since 
its establishment – that as a member of the UN family it was not a sufficiently African 
institution (Ikome 2008). Another was the perception, discussed in Chapter 3, that the ECA was 
pushing a neo-liberal agenda (ibid). A third reason may have been South Africa’s own 
hegemonic agenda which positioned it as the leading advocate of an ‘African renaissance’ and 
harnessed South African expertise to provide the technical underpinning to the discourse, 
leaving no room for the ECA or other ICEs. A final reason may have been that African leaders 
such as Nigeria’s Obasanjo and South Africa’s Mbeki, the leading proponents of NEPAD, were 
concerned that the ECA and its Executive Secretary were occupying too much space. 
 
Track Record 
From inception in 2003 to date, 29 countries166, accounting for more than two-thirds of Africa’s 
population, have signed the APRM Memorandum of Understanding, indicating their agreement 
with the APRM principles and process and their desire to be peer reviewed. Of this number, 12 
countries
167
 have completed the five stages of the review process, including the examination of 
their country report in APR Forums. The remaining countries are undergoing various 
preliminary stages of review
168
.  
 
The APR Forum is a closed meeting, with only Heads of State and Government and a restricted 
number of senior officials observing the proceedings. Consequently, the accounts that follow 
were gleaned from a combination of sources, mainly official country review reports and APRM 
annual reports, reports conducted by non-state actors based on in-depth research, personal 
communications with involved actors, and media reports. Whilst the highlights presented 
                                                  
166
 Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia (Source, APRM website – 
http://aprm.krazyboy.co.za, 22 July 2009). 
167
 In order of review, these are Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, Algeria, South Africa, Benin, Uganda, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, 
Mali, Mozambique and Lesotho (Gruzd 2009). 
168
 At the time of writing, Ethiopia and Mauritius and Tanzania had established national structures and were in the 
process of national sensitisation and data collection, but had not yet submitted their CSAR; Sierra Leone formally 
launched its APR Process in September 2008; and the following 13 countries that acceded to the APRM are yet to 
formally launch the APR process – Angola, Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Malawi, Mauritania, Republic of 
Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sudan, Togo and Zambia (APRM 2008a, 2009). 
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during APR Forums are couched in polite, non-adversarial language, the main text of the 
country review reports themselves are in parts very explicit and detailed about the problems 
found in a given country, although some reports are more forthright than others.  
 
Ghana, the first country to sign up to the APRM, was peer reviewed in late January 2006 at a 
meeting of the APR Forum held alongside an extraordinary AU summit in Khartoum, Sudan. 
Overall, Ghana was highly commended. The Country Review Report highlighted Ghana’s three 
successful elections and transfers of power since 1996, as well as unique institutions for 
stakeholder dialogue such as an Annual Governance Forum, the People's Assembly, and 
National Economic Dialogue, as good practice in deepening democracy. A number of concerns 
were raised – including a lack of technocratic and institutional capacity, gender disparities, 
persistence of corruption, slow progress on decentralisation, land issues, chieftaincy problems, 
unemployment, external dependence, and brain drain.  
 
Since the review, Ghana has set about implementing its NPoA. Several actions have been 
directly attributed to the APRM, including: the passing of a Whistleblower Act and Disability Act 
as well as the approval of a Freedom of Information Bill by Cabinet; a new Ministry of 
Chieftaincy and Culture; an upper limit on the number of Supreme Court judges; a slight 
reduction in the size of the Cabinet; a reduction in corporate tax; and efforts to integrate the 
NPoA with Ghana’s national development plan and to track expenditure (Bing Pappoe 2007). 
Ghana’s review and subsequent follow-up of the recommendations provides a good example of 
how the APRM has been able to create as well as entrench existing norms and good practice in 
African governance. 
 
In its review, Rwanda’s government was applauded for its dramatic recovery from the 1994 
genocide, putting in place the foundations for sustained socio-economic development, low 
levels of corruption, and effective decentralisation. The Gaçaca system of tribunals – a 
traditional form of transitional justice that also served in community dialogue, reconciliation 
and national unity – was held up as a best practice. Concerns were raised about the legitimacy 
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of the courts and their ability to win trust and confidence in dispensing justice while conforming 
to international human rights norms and standards. Rwanda was also criticised for maintaining 
an effective one-party system without sufficient space for different political groups to 
participate, and for a judiciary that lacked independence from the executive.  
 
Before the official review, during the country-visit stage, Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame 
questioned the composition of the expert review team, which included two ECA staff members. 
He enquired about the nationality of each of the experts, leading review team members to 
speculate that the he was concerned the process may have been biased (Busia 2006). As will be 
discussed below, the Rwanda review highlighted the APRM’s potential to raise national 
sensitivities, despite the insistence of its founders that it was a neutral, politics-free 
mechanism. 
 
Kenya’s review, which officially began in March 2003, suffered from delays due to protracted 
wrangling over the constitution of its National Governing Council, a problem that was resolved 
only when the government disbanded the structure at the end of 2005, replacing it with a 
mechanism that involved a more prominent leadership role for civil society actors (I revisit this 
below). At the APR Forum in Banjul in January 2006, the report on Kenya, presented by APRM 
Eminent Persons panellist Graça Machel, gave President Mwai Kibaki’s government high marks 
for: the political freedoms enjoyed by Kenya under his watch (more than 80% of Kenyans 
surveyed agreed with this); a low level of aid dependency (only 8% of Kenya’s budget was 
funded by external donors); consistent efforts at peace-making in Eastern Africa; kick-starting 
economic growth; and providing free primary education. However, Kenya was criticised for 
persistent corruption, economic inequality between regions, politics based on ethnic rivalries, 
and delays in constitutional reforms, for which Machel recommended AU mediation and 
support. Furthermore, and as discussed in more detail below, the APRM report identified a 
number of factors that fuelled the widespread political violence that was to erupt in December 
2007. 
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South Africa’s peer review process was dogged by controversy. One point of contention was the 
haste with which the government, on 13 September 2005, announced the start of the 
consultative process with only two weeks’ notice, and declared that the process would be 
completed within two months (Herbert and Gruzd 2006). It later emerged that government 
ministries has been asked to work on elements of the country self-assessment a full seven 
months before the two-month deadline given for civil society consultations. In what was a 
patently state-led process, national focal point, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, the Minister of 
Public Service and Administration, also served as Chairperson of the Independent National 
Governing Council, which included six government ministers. This raised repeated questions 
about government heavy-handedness. Fraser-Moleketi eschewed the research-based approach 
to peer review evident in Ghana and Kenya, instead opting for a broad-based country-wide 
consultative model and refusing to allow public scrutiny of the draft self-assessment report 
before it was finalised (ibid).  
 
Experts intimately familiar with the South Africa peer review have confirmed that, while the 
process was exemplary in terms of sensitisation and broad-based public participation, the self-
assessment exercise was not as thorough as Kenya’s (Herbert and Gruzd 2006). As a result, and 
in order to present a more accurate picture, the team of African experts conducting the 
external review had to conduct further research to fill the gaps (ibid). Part of the problem was 
that the South Africa report did not include proposals on how concerns identified in the review 
would be addressed as part of the country’s national development programme.  
 
Despite Adedeji’s glowing praise for South Africa during a visit in late 2006 in his capacity as 
focal point on the EPP directing the South Africa review, disagreements emerged between the 
EPP and the South African government. According to an authoritative media report, the draft 
country review report presented to President Mbeki’s cabinet by the Panel in November 2006 
highlighted violent crime as South Africa’s number one priority, listing 15 key threats to the 
country’s stability. Fraser-Moleketi was reported to be “spitting mad” at the report (Mbelle 
2009).  
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The APRM rules, to which South Africa signed up, state that while governments being reviewed 
can comment on the Panel’s report, they cannot alter it. The Report, presented during the APR 
Forum in Addis Ababa in January 2007, highlighted concerns that included high rates of violent 
crime, gender violence, unemployment, HIV/AIDS, land reform problems, brittle race relations, 
failures in the Black Economic Empowerment programme, and the enduring legacy of apartheid 
(APRM 2007). According to South African experts, a handful of issues raised by the APRM report 
– including the unregulated private funding of political parties and parliamentary floor-crossing 
– have been included among the Government’s list of reform priorities. However, few of the 
review’s recommendations have been acted upon, even as crime and gender-based violence, 
highlighted by the report, have continued to rise (Mbelle 2009). 
 
Algeria, which signed up in March 2003, was one of the first countries to accede to the APRM 
alongside Ghana, Rwanda and Kenya. The review process was conducted in 2006, with the peer 
review held at the APR Forum meeting in Accra, Ghana on 1 July 2007. The country review 
report presented at the Forum noted a number of strengths, including: political will and 
commitment of the leadership to see through agreed-to institutional, political and economic 
reforms; the development of human resources through free and accessible education and 
health; the presence of immense natural resources, especially hydrocarbons; the 
implementation of most MDGs and the capacity to meet the commitments made for 2015; high 
life expectancy among Algerians; and the large number of universities.  
 
On the downside, the Forum highlighted concerns including: the need for reform and 
modernisation of the Algerian state; the lack of gender equality and persistence of outdated 
socio-cultural traditions; high youth unemployment; poor stewardship of the environment; the 
need to extend the growth base, diversify economic sectors and contain inflation; the need to 
protect national reconciliation and consolidate peace; and the need to step up the fight against 
corruption and accelerate structural reforms. In January 2009, heads of state noted Algeria’s 
progress in anti-corruption efforts and its strategy to reduce reliance on hydrocarbons. 
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Benin’s peer review took place at the 8th APR Forum in Addis Ababa on 30 January 2008. The 
country was congratulated for instituting free pre-school and primary education programmes, 
and for plans to offer free healthcare to pregnant women and children under five. Benin also 
drew praise for its advances in economic development, sub-regional and regional integration, 
the President’s personal commitment to good governance and peace and stability after years of 
military dictatorship, and the abundance of natural resources to be developed, especially in the 
agricultural sector.  
 
Concerns tabled included: high levels of corruption; slow progress in the reform and 
modernisation of the state; the low level of women’s political representation and involvement 
in decision-making; widespread poverty; child trafficking; an underdeveloped private sector; 
and excessively large numbers of political parties and civil society organisations. The heads of 
state also shared Benin’s own concerns about the socio-economic impact of multiple political 
parties, the external financing of NGOs, corruption, the large size of the informal sector, and 
the exploitation of children. It was recommended that Benin focus on strengthening 
infrastructure, energy, agriculture and job creation for youth and women, as well as the role of 
women in decision-making positions (Badet 2008).  
 
Uganda, one of the first signatories to the APRM MoU (2003), was peer reviewed at the 9th APR 
Forum held at Sharm-El-Sheikh, Egypt, on 29 June 2008. The country review report identified 
the following challenges: high rates of poverty and worsening inequality; high population 
growth; the adverse effects of geography which imposed an additional burden to the cost of 
doing business; policy implementation gaps; land-related problems; conflict in the North; 
corruption; and overdependence on aid. Uganda was commended for: the prompt handling of 
election petitions following the first-ever multi-party elections of 2006; sound macroeconomic 
management as reflected by strong economic growth rates; a highly consultative budget 
process; universal primary education; and its response to HIV and AIDS (APRM 2008a).  
 
230 
 
In response to the review findings, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni highlighted additional 
positive developments, including the unprecedented growth rate averaging 6% per annum for 
almost two decades; single-digit inflation and economic liberalisation; the discovery of oil; 
industrialisation; transformation of the agricultural sector; and the promotion of gender 
equality. Museveni’s peers urged Uganda to: improve its management of multi-party 
democracy; reduce aid dependence; and follow the example of Botswana in creating a political 
environment that enabled it to maximise the benefits of natural resource availability while 
avoiding the problems (APRM 2008a). 
 
Nigeria was peer reviewed in two summits – at Sharm-El-Sheikh on 29 June 2008 during the 9
th
 
APR Forum, and on 25 October 2008 in Cotonou, Benin, at the First Extraordinary Meeting of 
the APR Forum. Key challenges noted by the country review report included: the management 
of diversity; oil dependency; ineffective implementation of policies and poor delivery of social 
services; management of elections and electoral reforms; discriminatory gender practices and 
the slow pace of advancement of women to key public sector positions. On a positive note, 
Nigeria was praised for: its role in conflict resolution in Africa; the provision of technical 
assistance to other African countries; and the establishment of the Council of State, the 
country’s highest national advisory body provided for in the constitution, consisting of former 
Heads of State (APRM 2008a). 
 
Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua agreed with the Panel’s assessment on issues such as the 
management of diversity, which he admitted had been the cause of intra-state strife, questions 
over the conduct of elections, and endemic corruption. He underscored his country’s 
commitment to promoting women’s rights and advancement in society, and insisted that, since 
its resources are inadequate compared to the needs of its 140 million people, Nigeria was not a 
rich country, but rather a ‘potentially rich country’. The Forum urged Nigeria to think about 
how best to ensure that oil emanating from Africa is refined within Africa, and argued for the 
need to increase domestic capacities. It also stressed the importance of corporate social 
responsibility, particularly for oil-producing regions such as Delta. Nigeria was praised for 
231 
 
signing up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which seeks the review and 
audit of proceeds of the oil and gas sector, and for demonstrated political will on developing 
infrastructure needed to deepen regional integration (APRM 2008a). 
10 
Burkina Faso was reviewed in Cotonou, Benin, at the First Extraordinary Meeting of the APR 
Panel in October 2008. Best practices highlighted included: the nation’s position as regional 
ombudsman and peacemaker in West Africa; anti-corruption committees in the police service; 
elements of sound public expenditure management; and the establishment of a National Youth 
Forum. Problems identified included: the dominance of the ruling party; widespread 
corruption; the lack of adequate involvement of women and youth in development; the 
absence of a long-term development vision; and the inability to maintain high and sustainable 
economic growth. The Forum stressed that the Burkinabe State should be focused on building 
institutions as well as its capacity to maintain law and order to protect the welfare of its people. 
It raised concern about classifying winning political parties in a negative light, and stressed that 
the promotion of a strong state and the process of ensuring a separation of powers were not 
necessarily mutually exclusive (APRM 2008a).1 
 
Despite the variation in review findings169 between countries, the APR process highlights  
several common challenges. Analysis by the APRM Secretariat of the reports of the first five 
countries peer reviewed identifies the following cross-cutting challenges: managing diversity, 
unemployment, capacity constraints and poor service delivery, land reform and corruption (in 
four out of five countries); violence against women/ gender inequality (in three out of five 
countries); and poverty and inequality, and external dependence (in two out of five countries) 
(APRM 2008b). All the issues identified fall under the umbrella of development; although the 
APRM focuses on governance, its ambit stretches to monitoring advances and shortfalls in 
socio-economic development, making its agenda considerably more all-encompassing than 
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 Details of the review findings for Mali, Mozambique and Lesotho, which were peer-reviewed during the 11th 
APR Forum held on the sidelines of the AU Summit in Sirte, Libya in June/July 2009, were not publicly available 
when this chapter was being drafted. Nor had country review reports for Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Uganda been 
published – contrary to the APRM guidelines on the fifth and final stage which mandate the timely and widespread 
dissemination of the reports.  
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narrow measures of economic and corporate governance. This makes the APRM a political 
technology whose power is potentially significant.  
 
Attributes of the APRM 
Commentators identify the main attribute of the APRM process so far as being its ability to 
widen political space within the countries reviewed, leading to increased pressure for greater 
accountability, transparency and popular participation. An unprecedented number and range of 
non-state actors have engaged as part of the APR process on issues of governance in their 
respective countries. Civil society organisations – defined in the APRM Base Document (2003) 
as including the media, academia, trade unions, business and professional organisations
170
 – 
have been involved in the process in all countries reviewed, although with varying level and 
scope of participation (see below)171. In Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, civil society experts 
working in think tanks have been intensively involved in conducting research, while civic 
groups, associations and networks have harnessed the APRM to advocate for policy and social 
change as key outcomes of the peer review process. In these and other countries under review, 
civil society significantly influenced the self-assessment reports, country review reports and 
national programmes of action.  
 
From these reports, and largely because of the role of non-state actors, the APRM is able to 
touch upon fundamental governance and development issues – among them political reforms, 
corruption, natural-resource management, gender equality and state-building. While the 
technocratic language of the APRM reports is deliberately non-adversarial, they by and large 
constitute a detailed and accurate record of the challenges and constraints facing acceding 
countries, and provide the basis for different societal groups to make claims. This has the effect 
of putting pressure on governments to address these claims, many of which they had previously 
failed to act upon. 
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 The APRM MoU commits signatories to “[ensuring] the participation of all stakeholders in the development of 
the national Programme of Action including trade unions, women, youth, civil society, private sector, rural 
communities and professional associations” (APRM 2003, p.5). 
 
171
 The APRM’s emphasis on the participation of a wide cross-section of national actors in the preparation of the 
self-assessment questionnaire has been hailed as one of its strengths (AfriMAP 2007a).  
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A second attribute of the APRM has been the peer pressure placed on African leaders 
participating in the process. A number of Heads of State may have signed up their countries to 
the APRM as a means of improving their credibility inside and outside Africa without 
threatening their rule. While the OAU had been dismissed as a club of dictators providing cover 
for each other, the questions raised in the closed peer-to-peer review process held during APR 
Forums provide an indication that African leaders are prepared to criticise each other, however 
politely (Gruzd 2009). As such, the peer review process has at least two unintended 
consequences for Africa’s leadership. One is to pressure leaders whose countries are under 
review to address issues they would otherwise not have dealt with as part of the follow-up 
process. Another is to apply pressure on the leaders conducting the peer review themselves. If 
a review report praises a given country for, say, making great strides in primary education, this 
sends a strong signal to reviewing Heads of State that they need to do better in their own 
countries.  
 
Given that the final stage of review is conducted by Heads of State alone, critics have argued 
that it may be difficult for the APRM to avoid the perception that it is replicating existing power 
structures (Herbert 2006). The role of the EPP goes some way towards making the peer review 
less circumscribed. Experts familiar with the process assert that the competence and credibility 
of the Panel is central to the effectiveness of the peer reviews (AfriMAP 2007b). A member of 
the Panel is assigned as lead panellist for each country review, and is at the forefront of 
engagement with the country under review, throughout the process and in ensuring follow-up 
“to ascertain progress being made towards achieving mutually agreed goals” (APRM 2003a). As 
part of this role, the relevant Panel member leads discussions with the government of the 
country under review to establish among other things whether there is “the will on the part of 
the Government to take the necessary decisions and measures to put right what is identified to 
be amiss” (ibid).  
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During the Kenya process, lead panellist Graça Machel delivered a series of strong messages to 
the Kenyan Government on the need to tackle corruption and increase political transparency 
(Manby 2009). As lead panellist for the South Africa review, Adebayo Adedeji was publicly 
critical of the Government’s reluctance to acknowledge the serious concerns tabled in the 
APRM country review report (ibid).The lead panellist is also responsible for presenting the 
highlights of the country review report to the participating Heads of State during the APR 
Forum, and it is on the basis of what is presented that the peer review takes place. Although 
the Heads of State make the final call, the eminent persons play a pivotal role in ensuring that 
the concerns in the report are discussed (Manby 2009). The credibility of the EPP is therefore 
crucial to the APRM’s legitimacy.  
 
In the event that “‘…the necessary political will is not forthcoming”, the APRM Base Document 
spells out steps to engage in “constructive dialogue”. If this dialogue turns out to be fruitless, as 
a last resort “…the participating Heads of State and Government may wish to put the 
Government on notice of their collective intention to proceed with appropriate measures by a 
given date” (NEPAD 2003a). While this text stands out as the strongest language in the 
document, there is no evidence so far to suggest that deadlines have been established or 
adhered to by the APR Forum to force reviewed countries to implement recommendations in 
the country review reports. Nonetheless, there is potential for the closed APR Forum as a space 
in which recalcitrant leaders can be persuaded to comply in a collegial manner, or be shamed. 
 
The review by peers takes on even greater significance when issues of political governance are 
raised – as has happened in every peer review conducted to date. That questions of politics are 
discussed by Heads of State in the APR Forum stands out as one of the outcomes of the APRM 
perceived to be positive. Herbert (2006) argues that, by its very nature, and despite projecting 
itself as a non-adversarial technocratic process, the APRM creates the space for political 
discussion and contestation of the status quo. This is due to a number of factors. One is that, as 
highlighted above, the high-profile country reviews have the potential to embarrass 
governments and leaders. Another factor is that peer review proposes changes to political 
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systems and how economic goods are allocated in a given country. In addition, the nature of 
the APRM process weakens the executive’s grip on power, as it allows a wide range of state 
institutions to participate in the debate about better government. Furthermore, the APRM’s 
track record of highlighting corruption in countries reviewed means it has the potential to alter 
political fortunes (ibid).  
 
The APRM has consistently addressed questions of politics. This is despite the fact that in 
October 2002, in response to mounting pressure from Western nations over the lack of 
collective African leadership action on the deteriorating political situation in Zimbabwe, then 
South African President Thabo Mbeki announced that the APRM would restrict itself to 
monitoring economic and corporate governance, and would not stray into sensitive political 
issues, which would be handled by existing mechanisms within the AU. In practice, this edict 
has not been adhered to – not least because the APRM questionnaire used to guide country 
self-assessments and review reports includes ‘Democracy and Good Political Governance’ as 
one of its four sections. The questionnaire includes detailed questions that serve as 
benchmarks against which countries can evaluate themselves and be evaluated, including in 
rule of law, democracy and other aspects of good political governance spelled out in the 
Declaration (AfriMAP 2007a).  
 
A third perceived attribute is that the APRM is a useful tool for diagnosing problems in 
countries. Emblematic of this is the extent to which the APRM foresaw the conditions that led 
to the post-election violence in Kenya that erupted in December 2007 (Gruzd 2009). Among 
other issues, the country report for Kenya highlighted as key concerns the marginalisation of 
the regions, regional imbalances, competition for access to resources, and the mobilisation of 
ethnic identities in political and economic power struggles as well as the ongoing constitutional 
crisis (APRM 2006). To address these and other challenges, the report proposed a number of 
measures. One was that the Kenyan Government “…as a matter of urgency, [...] adopt and 
implement redistribution and reallocation policies to enforce equitable access to, and use of 
land” (ibid p.16). Another was the establishment of a high-level eminent persons’ group under 
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the auspices of the AU, to facilitate a bi-partisan resolution of the constitutional crisis (ibid). As 
it turned out, the inability of the Kenyan Government to resolve the constitutional crisis and 
address enduring inequities, including over land rights, led to the outbreak of violence during 
the presidential and parliamentary elections of December 2007. 
 
The peer review process also predicted xenophobic violence against foreigners in South Africa 
that erupted in May 2008 (Gruzd 2009). Some 12 years after the end of apartheid, the South 
Africa country report warned that racism, particularly against black Africans from other 
countries, remained a major concern for South Africans. According to the report, the legacy of 
apartheid “…has also impacted on how South Africans view and treat foreign immigrants within 
their borders. Xenophobia against other Africans is of serious concern and should be nipped in 
the bud” (APRM 2007, p.27). The xenophobia was attributed to pressure for scarce jobs and 
services, In addition to apartheid. The report urged South Africa to do more to combat 
xenophobia, including through civic education programmes (ibid). In May 2008, barely a year 
after the APRM country review report warned of the xenophobia problem, racially motivated 
attacks left 62 people dead and several thousand displaced – the majority of them foreigners 
(IPS 2008). 
 
As noted in the summary of South Africa’s peer review above, the Government was reluctant to 
acknowledge the extent of many of the challenges listed in the country review report. One 
expert close to the process attributed this to a sense of denial that in her view permeated the 
official South African engagement with the APRM:  
 
“The Government simply didn’t want to admit that a country as advanced as South 
Africa had serious problems such as gender violence, crime and so on. The attitude was 
very much that, ‘although we were instrumental in establishing NEPAD and the APRM, 
peer review was not for us, but for those other African countries’” (Mbelle 2009)
172
.  
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 Arguing that the APRM was not taken seriously by the South African Government, Bond (2009) notes that, six 
months after taking over from Fraser-Moleketi as Minister of Public Service and Administration, Masenyani Baloyi 
“had not tackled even the much-diluted task he inherited from his predecessor” (ibid p.8). 
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This demonstrates the extent to which the APRM, much like NEPAD, plays into the hegemonic 
politics of the post-apartheid South African regime. According to Habib and Selinyane (2006), 
South Africa’s leading role in the creation of both NEPAD and the AU, and the promulgation of 
the ‘African renaissance’ discourse are all examples of the country’s hegemonic behaviour, 
which has involved the deployment of a combination of ideological, military, economic and 
technological power. This perspective sees two ways in which a state can choose to be 
hegemonic: extractive and impetuous; or by being a pivot that is systemically powerful and 
beneficial. For the most part, Habib and Selinyane (2006) assert, South Africa has conformed to 
the latter form of hegemonic behaviour which, while benefitting South Africa in a number of 
ways, has also been systemically beneficial to the continent
173
.  
 
I agree that Mbeki’s appeal to an ‘African renaissance’, and indeed South Africa’s lead role in 
the development of NEPAD, formed part of a conscious strategy to project South Africa’s power 
throughout Africa and beyond. The ‘African renaissance’ clearly emerges as a powerful 
discourse that responds to the perceived need for a creative ideology that can facilitate 
continental integration of African states (Murobe 2000, p.62). However, as Mbelle (2009) 
correctly implies, the South African approach to the APRM was conditioned by a sense of 
superiority derived from the country’s wealth, relatively high levels of industrialisation, and 
entrenched culture (via the African National Congress) of participatory democracy and policy-
making. As the evidence clearly demonstrates, this led to a singular reluctance by the 
Government to recognise many of the challenges highlighted by the APRM country review. 
 
Another perceived attribute of the APRM, at least in theory, is that participating African 
countries are primarily responsible for funding it. On paper, the main source of funding for the 
APRM is assessed contributions from participating member states (APRM 2003, par. 27, p.6). 
Countries that signed the APRM MoU agreed to “contribute fully to the funding of the African 
Peer Review Mechanism in order to affirm the African ownership of the Mechanism. This 
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 In their view, hegemons behave in systematically beneficial ways under three conditions: a shared history; the 
prospect of profit; and the existence of a competing hegemon – in this case Nigeria, which until South Africa’s 
independence in 1994 had been Africa’s most powerful and influential power (Habib and Selinyane 2006). 
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includes sourcing funds from African people, businesses and institutions” (APRM 2003, pars 19 
and 20, p.4, emphasis added). The rationale for this is to insulate the Mechanism from external 
influence, an important issue given the contested nature of ‘good governance’ – the APRM’s 
core concern. Nonetheless, the APRM’s initiators left room for external partnerships, stating: 
“…such partnerships could be welcomed if they are managed in a way that clearly respects 
African ownership of the APRM and all its processes” (ibid pp.16 and 17, emphasis added)
174
. 
 
At a minimum, countries under review are expected to fund the lion’s share of the in-country 
peer review process. As is to be expected, countries such as Nigeria175 and South Africa176, with 
sizeable economies that are not heavily dependent on aid, have had no major difficulties 
meeting this requirement. Smaller, more aid-dependent countries such as Rwanda177 and 
Benin178, which could afford to contribute only a fraction of the overall budget of their 
respective in-country processes, have tended to rely on funds channelled via UNDP Trust Funds. 
Funds channelled either via UNDP Trust Funds or UNDP projects have proved pivotal to the 
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 The document further states: “Support from external partners should be sought mainly for the implementation 
of the Country Programme of Action and capacity building to improve performance in the weak areas” (ibid). 
175
 Despite bureaucratic problems that delayed release of some of the funds, Nigeria covered all the internal costs 
of the APRM process (2004-2008), amounting to an estimated US$14 million, from the annual budget of the 
Presidency. Most of this was spent between 2007 and 2008, largely on the validation exercises and country review 
mission. UNDP also established a Trust Fund to support some of the national activities, though it is unclear 
whether this was eventually established and how much was raised (Jinadu 2008). 
176
 South Africa covered an estimated two-thirds of the domestic APRM costs, although a small proportion (roughly 
ZAR 1.2 million) was contributed by UNDP to pay for communication and PR/awareness-raising activities (Mbelle 
2009). 
177
 A Trust Fund was set up by UNDP Africa bureau for Rwanda in August 2004. The local UNDP office created a 
project for activities to support NEPAD, which was used to finance the Rwanda APRM process. Of the UNDP budget 
for 2005-2007 of US$426,050, only 50% was actually mobilised. The breakdown of contributors to Rwanda’s 
overall APRM process is instructive: US$100,000 was contributed by the Rwanda Government; UNDP $500,000; 
DFID $540,000; UNICEF $60,000; and UNIFEM $16,000 (LDGL 2007). 
178
 The initial budget for Benin’s APRM process is estimated at US$450,000, broken down as follows: $200,000 
contributed by the AfDB; $150,000 by UNDP; $50,000 by the Benin Government; and $50,000 by the ACBF. 
However, the actual amount raised, managed by a UNDP Trust Fund, was $350,000, broken down as follows: 
$150,000 (AfDB); $100,000 (UNDP); and $50,000+ (Benin Government). The German Hans Seidel Foundation 
contributed another $50,000 which it managed directly, providing support for seminars and public education 
throughout the process. The Government also provided an additional amount (not quantified) to support the two 
review missions (Badet 2008). 
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process, even in better-endowed countries such as Burkina Faso
179
, which financed more than 
55% of its country review. 
 
Separately from the individual country processes, the APRM Secretariat receives significant 
direct support from donor countries and institutions. The Secretariat’s annual report lists 
African countries’ contribution as US$3.65 million
180
 in 2008, compared to donor contributions 
of more than US$6 million181. Indeed, of the total of $9.88 million available to the APRM 
Secretariat on 31 December 2008, only 38% was contributed by member states, compared with 
62% from bilateral donors (APRM 2008a). While the trends show a sharp increase in 
contributions from both African countries and international doors, what is striking is that, in 
2008, international donors contributed nearly twice as much to supporting the operations of 
the APRM as did African member countries. This imbalance is attributed to the fact that African 
countries owe nearly $6.5 million in arrears (ibid), a problem that has long been the bane of the 
AU. Nevertheless, the official APRM position, as implied in the original documents, appears to 
be that, regardless of the extent of external donor contributions to the peer review process, its 
very nature makes it more or less impossible for non-Africans to dictate the APRM’s scope, 
purpose and implementation.  
 
Challenges for the APRM  
Experts following the APRM closely have identified a number of challenges as the process 
unfolds. These include fundamental weaknesses that, unless addressed, could ultimately 
undermine the practice of African peer review. One major challenge is how to deepen the 
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 Burkina Faso’s process was funded by the Government and UNDP. The Government contributed roughly 
US$860,414, while a UNDP project on capacity building contributed US$668,000 between 2006 and 2008 (Natielsé 
2009). 
180
 The total received from African countries from 2003 to date is $17,334,735. Predictably, the largest contributors 
from their date of accession to date are Africa’s biggest economies: South Africa with $5,946,914; Algeria with 
$2,500,000; Nigeria with $2,350,000; and Egypt with $1,300.000. These are the only countries that are fully paid up 
to date, and have in fact significantly exceeded the minimum contribution of $100,000 (APRM 2008a). 
181
 The largest bilateral donor is Canada, which has contributed $5,692,169 from 2003 to date, via a UNDP Trust 
Fund. The next largest is the UK, which has contributed $2,000,000 during the same period. Switzerland, which 
contributed $896,241, ranks third. Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland have contributed less than half a million 
dollars each. Aside from its Trust funding, UNDP has contributed $2,750,000, while the AfDB has donated 
$200,000. The Secretariat has received $315,426 from the W. Kellogg Foundation. 
240 
 
participation of non-state actors. Despite the various mechanisms stipulated in the APRM’s 
design to ensure wide stakeholder participation, the process has tended to be state-centred 
and dominated by the Executive. Overall, critics believe that stakeholder participation in 
countries reviewed so far has been less than optimal. In Rwanda, a number of CSOs were 
relegated to the fringes of the review process while others were forced by the Government to 
tone down their demands so as not to suffer reprisals (Déme 2006). While this suppression of 
civil society is attributed by some to the post-genocide trauma affecting all national 
stakeholders (ibid), the example of Rwanda is typical of how some governments have 
instrumentalised the participation of non-state actors in the peer review process.  
 
As Déme (2006) also notes, one distinctive characteristic of African civil society is the extent to 
which it overlaps with political society. In practice, civil society in Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya and 
Senegal has long been subject to co-optation by sitting governments (ibid). This tendency has 
replicated itself in the peer review process, with pro-government think tanks being selected to 
attend meetings during the country review process, at the expense of more rights-based CSOs 
(AfriMAP 2007a). The role of parliaments has also been less prominent than desired (ibid). 
Overall, this reflects an African civil society that is still a work in progress, although – as I argue 
in the concluding part of this dissertation – we should beware of trying to fit the diversity of 
African associational forms into narrow Western definitions of ‘civil society’. 
 
Herbert (2006) documents concerns among civil society actors in five countries182 that the 
government would fill positions on the national APRM governing council with pro-state 
nominees or sympathetic CSOs. Fombad and Kebonang (2006) have highlighted the challenges 
of involving civil society in the APRM, suggesting that African governments remain suspicious of 
NGOs and CBOs and find ways to neutralise their effective participation. In reality, the role of 
civil society organisations in the APRM process has varied from country to country. Policy-
oriented think tanks have played an important role in Ghana and South Africa. In South Africa, 
and as documented, the consultation process was open to all interested civil society actors, 
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 Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Mauritius and South Africa. 
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albeit within a Government-directed frame. In Kenya, civil society pressure led the Government 
to dissolve and reconstitute to the national institutional architecture for the APRM to allow for 
greater civil society involvement. 
 
A second challenge is ensuring that the key APRM institutions are optimally configured to act 
impartially and transparently. The APRM Secretariat is under-staffed, lacking in clarity in terms 
of its reporting lines, dogged by politics and at the time of writing was without an executive 
director (Gruzd 2009, Bing-Pappoe 2009, Tungwarara 2009). While the role of the EPP is 
officially to ‘lead and direct’ the process, panellists (and in particular the Chairperson) have in 
practice ended up involving themselves in matters that should have been led by the Secretariat 
(ibid). In light of the pivotal role of the EPP in driving the process, and the importance of an 
impartial Panel to the credibility, authority and legitimacy of the APRM, the Forum’s recent 
decision to request that procedures for appointments to the Panel be clarified by the Panel 
itself has raised concerns around conflict of interest (Gruzd 2009).  
 
In December 2008, three of the seven panellists – Dorothy Njeuma of Cameroon, Kenyan 
mediator Bethuel Kiplagat and Senegalese development activist Marie-Angelique Savané – 
stepped down at the end of their four-year terms. Savané’s tenure had been clouded with 
allegations that, while still a member of the EPP, she accepted a position as adviser to Benin’s 
President Yaya Boni starting on 1 January 2008 which included a monthly salary of US$8,000, a 
monthly pension contribution of US$1,102, expenses totalling US$4,000 a month, and a 
monthly housing allowance of US$800, even though she did not reside in Benin (Okungu 2009). 
There are concerns that replacement panellists are not sufficiently independent from 
government influence, with the appointment to the EPP in February 2009 of Domitille 
Mukantaganzwa, executive secretary of Rwanda’s Gaçaca courts system (mentioned above), 
raising questions due to her proximity to the Rwandese Government (Manby 2009)
183
. Given 
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 Fombad and Kebonang (2006) suggest that some of the seven panellists were still active in politics in their 
respective countries at the time of their appointment. In their view, a sub-set of panellists are political appointees 
who are readily vulnerable to manipulation. They point to evidence of such manipulation during the Rwanda peer-
review process, and assert that unless panellists are able to ensure accurate and independent assessments of the 
conditions in the countries being reviewed, the entire APRM could be compromised. 
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that the EPP’s credibility is a key condition for the integrity of the APRM, rules governing how it 
is composed and operates need to be clarified (ibid). Another concern is that Lead Panellist 
Adedeji is going beyond his role. Upon the resignation of the previous Executive Director of the 
Secretariat, Adedeji is said to have stepped in, hired a consultant to develop a new 
organisational structure, terminated the contracts of all existing staff from September 2009 and 
ordered that the vacancies be posted on the APRM website and advertised in the media 
(Manby 2009). 
 
Third, and despite evidence that the APRM is registering positive impacts in some countries, 
many critics consider the lack of an explicit enforcement mechanism as the APRM’s most 
significant challenge. They argue that this omission makes the APRM process effectively 
impotent, as no country is bound to implement what it has agreed. In the eyes of some, the 
lack of a ‘big stick’ reduces the APRM to a fig-leaf for corrupt and authoritarian leaders to look 
good while maintaining their status quo. Bond (2009) argues that the African political elites 
responsible for implementing the APRM are non-democrats who were involved in legitimising 
neo-liberalism, and who seem to have no commitment to fixing their countries’ economies. He 
asks: “Can the APRM help fix this, or is it just a vanity of politicians and middle-class NGOers but 
in reality a transmission line between Africa and neo-colonialism?” (ibid p.1). 
 
Despite the democratisation wave of the 1990s, Bond (2009) argues, coups carried out between 
1995 and 2001 have meant that most of the leaders currently in place are despots who have used 
democracy as a slogan to perpetuate their rule. According to one critic, and with the exception of 
Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal and South Africa, the majority of NEPAD Heads of State are leaders of 
neo-patrimonial regimes who do not regard their rule as temporary and do not adhere to 
institutional law (Taylor 2005, cited in Bond 2009). Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, 
appointed the current APRM Chair in 2007, is often held up as an example, as his government is 
accused of committing human rights abuses within Ethiopia in his bid to stifle political 
opposition, as well as sending Ethiopian troops to invade neighbouring Somalia (Bond 2009).  
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Earlier in this chapter I analysed the reasons why the APRM would have quickly arrived at an impasse 
had it included a coercive compliance mechanism. One of these reasons was the reluctance of 
Africa’s leadership to replace external conditionality, as seen in SAPs, with internal conditionality via 
the APRM. I concede that many of Africa’s leaders do not practice what they preach, and in some 
ways use continental initiatives such as NEPAD and the APRM to mask and legitimise their misrule 
domestically. However, this does not nullify my argument that, in line with my theorisation of the 
workings of development as governmentality, the APRM’s self-projection as a non-coercive, neutral 
technical mechanism affords it considerable potential power to effect change.  
 
Fourth, and related to the above, there is concern among observers that countries are not 
applying the lessons learned. Linked to this are questions about the extent to which acceding 
countries are committed to the APRM. In October 2008, only five of the 28 leaders who had at 
that time signed up for peer review attended an Extraordinary APR Summit in Benin (Gruzd 
2009). A significant factor in this perceived lack of commitment is the departure from the scene 
of two African leaders. Mbeki’s resignation as South African President in September 2008, and 
Obasanjo’s earlier retirement as Nigerian President in May 2007 mean the two prime movers 
behind NEPAD and by extension the APRM are now out of the picture. At a more practical level, 
the lack of commitment was evident in the multiple problems in kick-starting the process in 
some countries
184
. While the role of the EPP in driving reviews may have kept the momentum 
going and compensated to an extent, questions about variable leadership commitment 
continue to dog the APRM (Manby 2009).  
 
A fifth challenge faced by the APRM is the overwhelming focus on the review process itself. This 
has meant that considerably less attention is focused on addressing the challenges identified by 
the reviews and implementing proposals included in the follow-up NPoAs prepared by 
countries themselves. The initiators of the Mechanism have been at pains to insist that a given 
country’s peer review represents the beginning, and not the end, of the process. The APRM, 
they have argued, is an ongoing, rolling process that not only identifies governance deficits, but 
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works to rectify them. For this reason, in January 2009 the EPP proposed second reviews in 
Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya. Given a change of Government in Ghana and a political 
stalemate in Kenya, some of these second reviews are considered to be over-ambitious (Gruzd 
2009). Indeed, Kenya has reduced the scope of its second review and subsequently postponed 
it, and there are concerns that this will affect other countries marked for second reviews (Bing-
Pappoe 2009).  
 
Proponents see a key role for the APRM in focusing the national poverty reduction strategies of 
countries on key priorities. However, a sixth challenge is that the process has as yet failed to be 
authoritative in countries. This is because the process of developing and implementing NPoAs is 
still in its infancy. By and large, these NPoAs are seen as poorly costed, unrealistic and lacking in 
timeliness. As a result, countries are still grappling with a multiplicity of international 
instruments aimed at co-ordinating development actions at country level – among them the 
PRSPs, MDG plans and national development strategies. An ongoing study of six countries185 in 
2009 on behalf of the ECA is looking at the question of how the APRM can contribute to 
rationalising the multiplicity of planning frameworks at country level. The study finds that in 
some of the countries surveyed, existing poverty reduction planning commitments are 
reproduced in the APR NPoAs (Bing-Pappoe 2009). In Ghana, for example, some 50% of the 
country’s NPoA consists of recycled existing plans (Gruzd and Herbert 2009)
186
. The implication 
here is that the NPoAs need to be more firmly embedded as part of national development 
planning. This in turn requires that the APRM integrates NPoAs as a key element of the process. 
 
Institutional politicking over where the APRM sits constitutes a seventh challenge identified by 
commentators. One aspect of this relates to tensions between the between the AU, NEPAD and 
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 South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Benin, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. 
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 If the assumption is that much of the content of NPoAs comes from existing plans, then it follows that funding 
should come from similar sources, such as income from domestic revenues, aid and investment. Nigeria’s NPoA, 
costed at US$20 billion (which is estimated at 12.4% of its GDP of $161 billion) allocates 40% to socio-economic 
development, 25% to democracy and political governance, 20% to economic governance and management, and 
15% to corporate governance (Jinadu 2008). The $20 billion is to be apparently sourced from national and state 
budgets, contributions from the private sector and support from international development partners (ibid). In its 
NPoA, Benin, a much smaller country than Nigeria, has developed a budget of $2.6 billion to address the four areas 
of governance between 2008 and 2015 (Bing-Pappoe 2009).  
245 
 
the APRM
187
 over the continued location of the NEPAD and APRM Secretariats
188
 in Midrand, 
South Africa. The AU has argued that, in order to avoid duplication, and as AU initiatives, the 
secretariats should be housed within the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. Others have 
suggested that the continued presence of the two secretariats in Midrand is evidence of South 
Africa’s hegemonic intentions. Beyond administrative arrangements, a more significant point 
may be that the APRM has consciously tried to steer a course independent from NEPAD. From 
the beginning, argues one expert familiar with the debate, the APRM has tried to dissociate 
itself from the ideological content of the NEPAD Framework Document, and has instead 
focused on developing a technically sound APRM questionnaire (Manby 2009).  
 
To address the apparent fragmentation between the AU, NEPAD and the APRM, the AU Summit 
in Sharm-El-Sheikh in June–July 2008 ruled that “…APRM Structures, namely the APRM Forum, 
the APRM Panel and the APRM Secretariat shall be part of the processes and structures of the 
African Union” (AU 2008), and requested that the AU Commission negotiate a host country 
agreement with the South African Government to facilitate the continued presence of the 
APRM Secretariat in Midrand. The host agreement was signed in October 2008, giving the 
APRM Secretariat legal status in South Africa while reinforcing that it is part of the AU system 
(Gruzd 2009). Added to a 2001 designation of NEPAD as a programme of the AU, this leaves no 
room for doubt, at least on paper, about the institutional link between the continental body, 
the development plan and the peer review mechanism. 
 
Another dimension of the institutional politicking has been perceptions around the ECA’s role 
as a strategic APRM partner, with some viewing it as not sufficiently African and too close to 
neo-liberal institutions (Ikome 2008). In the Addis Ababa APR Forum in January 2007, President 
Thabo Mbeki, then chair of the APRM, prevented the ECA, UNDP and AfDB from participating in 
the Forum. Representatives of AU member states who had not acceded to the APRM were also 
excluded. According to the APRM Secretariat, their exclusion was because the Forum decided 
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 See Gruzd (2009) for a detailed discussion of the functional aspects of the AU/NEPAD/APRM relationship. 
188
 It should be noted here that the APRM Secretariat is in a separate building – signalling its aspired-to distance 
from NEPAD. 
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that the peer review should be a discussion only among peers, defined as Heads of State and 
Government. However, at the last meeting the Forum held in Libya in June 2009, this decision 
was partially reversed. Heads of the strategic partner institutions, as well as heads of 
delegations of countries whose heads of state are not in attendance, can now observe the 
meeting but will not be allowed to participate in discussions, which remain among peers 
(Change 2009). 
 
Analysis: A Neo-colonial Mask? 
In this section, I revisit my three key arguments, and discuss how external actors are seeking to 
instrumentalise the APRM as a means of entrenching the power of the dominant discourse on 
‘good governance’. I show how it embodies the potential for African experts to carve out 
expanded policy space in determining an African development strategy, albeit underpinned by 
a pragmatic acceptance of ‘good governance’. I assert that much of this potential lies in the 
APRM’s ability to open space for different actors, both within and above the African state. And I 
demonstrate that key outcomes of the peer review have exceeded the intention of the APRM’s 
founders.  
 
To what extent does the APRM help advance the ‘good governance’ consensus? 
Critics argue that, at best, the APRM was established by African leaders to demonstrate to the 
industrialised countries that Africa was taking ‘good governance seriously’. According to this 
view, the idea behind the APRM was for Africa to internalise conditionality previously imposed 
from the outside as a means of securing the additional resources (the US$64 billion quantified 
in the NEPAD Framework document) needed to finance its development. At worst, sceptics cast 
the APRM as a sub-hegemonic entity intended by its proponents to advance and disguise the 
continuing disciplinary effect of neo-liberalism, albeit modified, on African countries.  
 
Patrick Bond, a leading proponent of the second perspective, goes as far as asserting (after 
Fanon) that the APRM is a device to mask continuing neo-colonial relations between leading 
African powers and their former colonisers. In his view, “…if international financial institutions 
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and the ‘donor’ governments must continue to reproduce a neo-colonial system widely 
understood as damaging to the interests of the masses, then the first requirement is for elites 
to adopt good governance rhetoric” (Bond 2009, p.4). 
 
The evidence presented in support of Bond’s (2009) thesis that the APRM was set up with the 
explicit intention of perpetuating neo-colonial relations is less than compelling. I have argued 
earlier in this chapter that the dubious democratic credentials of many of Africa’s leaders do 
not detract from the APRM’s potential potency. That said, I do concur that spreading a credo of 
‘good governance’ is at the heart of the rationale for the Mechanism. Indeed, over the past two 
decades, and as I have shown in preceding chapters, Africa’s development discourse has 
consistently reflected a preoccupation with ‘good governance’.  
 
While I agree with Chabal’s (2009) assessment that “[t]oday, the [good] governance agenda is 
conceived and conveyed by Western donors and institutions [and] consists of a programme of 
governance that seeks to replicate the key tenets of political accountability and transparency in 
the West today” (ibid p.11), I contend that ‘good governance’ in the sense of better 
government and states able to advance the continent’s development agenda, has not always, 
and not exclusively, been a neo-colonial imposition. As highlighted in Chapter 2, African 
scholars articulated the importance of participatory democracy in the context of state-led 
development – a vision that the World Bank later instrumentalised to provide the basis of its 
technocratic, conditionality-based version of ‘good governance’. There is no contradiction 
between wanting to replicate aspects of Western progress on the one hand, and asserting an 
African agenda on the other. Indeed, the two are in many ways co-implicated. This is further 
borne out by how ECA experts consider Western academic credentials and mastery of Western 
techniques of rule as key to seizing power (Chapter 4). 
 
The assessments of Bond (2009), Chabal (2009) and others fail to elucidate the current and 
future pivotal role of the unfolding APRM process in redefining ‘good governance’ in and on 
Africa. I support the view that setting up an African mechanism for peer review was in part a 
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‘home-grown’ reaction by African leaders to what they considered as biased assessments 
carried out by donor countries with no participation from the countries being assessed 
(AfriMAP 2007b).  
 
Nonetheless, I do concede that there is potential for external actors to influence and indeed 
capture the APRM. On the one hand, industrialised countries as well as international agencies 
are now providing sizeable resources to support the APRM process, both within countries and 
at the Secretariat level. In as much as they rely on the APRM to give the impression that 
governance reforms are taking place, the APRM thus runs the risk of becoming a tool in the 
hands of the donors, who instead of exerting pressure through direct conditionality do so via 
the APRM by advocating for it to be more effective, and by funding aspects of the peer review 
process. According to Gruzd (2009), some donors have now shifted their funding from 
supporting the NEPAD Secretariat to funding the APRM Secretariat – an indication that donors 
perhaps see more value in the APRM as a means of advancing their agenda189. Despite the clear 
intention of its initiators to insulate it from external influence, the growing proportion of 
external funding could end up undermining the claim that APRM is African-only190. So far, there 
is little or no evidence that this is happening. 
 
However, evidence is emerging that donors are ready to instrumentalise African peer review to 
advance their own worldview of ‘good governance’. The EU–Africa Joint Strategy, for example, 
adopted in December 2007 by the Lisbon Summit, strongly endorsed the APRM. A key 
objective, as stated in Priority Action 2 of the Strategy, is “…a more efficient African governance 
architecture through enhanced support for the implementation of the outcomes of the APRM 
process” (EU 2007, cited in Gruzd 2009, p.10). This includes better anti-corruption efforts, 
improved public services and administration, and “enhanced awareness of the APRM process in 
                                                  
189
 The view that NEPAD is moribund is widely shared within Africa. As one African expert working in a South 
African think tank wrote: “NEPAD is often said to lack focus, and is accused of being unable to roll out concrete 
projects – deliverables that are part of its core mandate of engendering development and social well-being on the 
continent. Indeed, some have concluded that NEPAD is dead and only requires a requiem mass ahead of burial” 
(Ikome 2008, p.18). 
190
 To the contrary, it could also be argued that the AU, which unbendingly asserts African agency, similarly relies 
on the EU, DFID and other donors to finance a significant proportion of its budget. 
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African countries”. The plan expects as outcomes “the consolidation of an effective and 
functioning Pan-African governance architecture through ratification and enhanced 
implementation of its instruments; [and] improved cooperation on the implementation of the 
recommendations of the APRM process” (ibid).  
 
The EU has established a €2.7 billion tranche of ‘additional financial support to countries 
adopting or ready to commit themselves to a plan that contains ambitious, credible measures 
and reforms’ based on an ‘enhanced dialogue’ about governance issues (cited in AfriMAP 
2007c, p.1). This fund has gradually become more closely linked to the APRM. Furthermore, the 
EU has established governance profiles of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. While the 
African profiles rely heavily on data from the APRM, where they exist, there are concerns that 
the exercise will be conducted by EU civil servants with little participation from African 
constituencies (Gruzd 2009). In this way, the APRM does have some influence over donor 
priorities, albeit at a cost. 
 
The EC’s proposals on governance in the EC Communication on Governance in the European 
Consensus on Development (adopted in 2006) imply a pivotal role for the APRM as an entry 
point for dialogue on governance issues between the EU and African countries. The EU is 
proposing dedicated support to the peer review process in each acceding African country, if 
requested. In addition the EU is prepared to support the APRM Secretariat and regional 
institutions responsible for disseminating APRM reports. Furthermore, the EU wants reforms 
proposed in the APRM NPoAs to be integrated in existing co-operation agreements. Critics 
argue that the EU approach, while drawing on the APRM, ultimately relies on an EU-led external 
scoring of African countries for eligibility for EU assistance. Instead, they argue, the EU should 
align its assistance behind the APRM plans of action (AfriMAP 2007c)191. 
 
                                                  
191
 There are also concerns that the EU is instrumentalising the definition of ‘democratic governance’ in Africa to 
advance its own political agenda with respect to the ‘management of migration flows’. For a detailed discussion on 
the EU’s approach to migration and governance profiles in the context of the EU–Africa strategy, see AfriMAP 
2007c. 
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In summary, and in the spirit of the shift from ‘conditionality’ to ‘ownership’ specified in the EC 
Communication on Governance in the European Consensus on Development, the EU is willing 
to put considerable financial resources into the APRM process and support structures. This is 
largely because it wants to use the APRM as a means of strengthening existing co-operation 
agreements – such as the controversial Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) – with like-
minded content from the NPoAs. This effectively introduces, via the APRM, a new layer of 
conditionality. However, while the EU considers the APRM an important entry point for 
engagement with African countries on governance issues, it is not willing to rely on the APRM 
as an exclusive measure of ‘good governance’ in African countries that have been through the 
process. It is also unwilling to align its aid programmes on the basis of the APRM NPoAs. 
Instead, it is establishing a separate scoring system (albeit taking into account APRM findings) 
to determine which countries it will do business with.  
 
A second example lies in the exchange of letters in November 2002 between former South 
African President Mbeki and the then Canadian Prime Minister and G8 Chair Jean Chrétien. The 
Canadian leader had written to Mbeki on 1 November 2002 lamenting the fact that African 
leaders had effectively chosen not to intervene to address the deteriorating situation in 
Zimbabwe, and implying that this constituted a litmus test for Africa’s commitment to ‘good 
governance’ (Chrétien 2002). In a strongly worded response, Mbeki wrote that Africa remained 
convinced that good governance, in all its elements, was a fundamental condition for the 
achievement of the goals of NEPAD (Mbeki 2002). 
 
Although Manby (2009) points out that Chrétien’s letter was addressed to Mbeki as a key 
player in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as opposed to an initiator of 
NEPAD, the Canadian Prime Minister’s concern over Zimbabwe clearly speaks to the high 
expectations harboured by G8 countries that NEPAD and the APRM would relieve them of the 
need to pressure African countries such as Zimbabwe to improve their governance. The G8’s 
expectation was clearly that African ‘self-discipline’ and ‘self-rule’ would imply a faithful 
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transmission of the Western credo of ‘good governance’ in the form of collective African 
pressure on recalcitrant states.  
 
The APRM therefore stands out as a key site of struggle over African development. It provides 
compelling evidence in support of Foucault’s argument that politics will increasingly be waged 
through political ‘technologies’, as opposed to ‘rationalities’, of power (Foucault 1980). As has 
been shown, these technologies are conceived of, managed and deployed by expertise. In 
recognition of this power of expertise, Mitchell (2002) dubs the kind of politics discussed in his 
dissertation ‘techno-politics’. 
 
How does the APRM fracture power? 
In Chapter 3, I highlighted NEPAD’s dual ‘Compact’ – between Africa and its development 
partners on the one hand, and between Africa’s leaders and their citizens on the other. In 
similar vein, the potential of the APRM to reduce power asymmetries is closely linked to the 
fact that it has external and internal purposes.  
 
Because the APRM is restricted to Africans only, this leaves limited space for external 
involvement and influence. Almost without exception, the reviews have been conducted by 
teams of African experts and eminent panellists. The APRM Secretariat is fully staffed by 
Africans192. As such it provides the basis for the conception and practice of a ‘good governance’ 
that is uniquely ‘African’. A concrete example of this is the strong emphasis in the Ghana peer 
review on traditional institutions of governance, resulting among other things in the 
establishment of a Ministry of Chieftancy and Culture, with the mandate of harnessing 
traditional Ghanaian means of settling disputes in modern government. In line with my 
hypothesis, it is thus possible to view the APRM as a tool harnessed by Africa’s leadership to 
claw back power from the continent’s former colonisers as well as from other developed 
countries. By iterating an African version of ‘good governance’, the APRM has the potential to 
bring about fundamental shifts in the dominant international governance discourse.  
                                                  
192
 The only exception to this rule has been the occasional non-African expert provided via the ECA and UNDP, both 
UN agencies open to citizens of every UN member nation. 
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As discussed above, sceptics have insisted that, since the APRM is voluntary and lacks a 
mechanism for enforcing compliance, it is unlikely to be effective in strengthening internal 
accountability, which it is argued should be its core function. According to this view, the APRM, 
with all the associated problems and politicking, represents the latest example of so-called 
‘partial reform syndrome’ of the 1980s and 1990s, whereby the elites in African countries 
implemented only the economic reform prescriptions that would unlock additional donor 
funding. As evidence, proponents of this view point to the APRM’s heterodox membership, 
which includes states that are genuinely committed to reform, as well as states that barely pass 
as democratic and have joined APRM because they believe that paying lip-service to the core 
principles will elevate their credibility with donors and give them AAA ratings with private 
investors (Gruzd 2009)193. 
 
I do not dispute that a sub-set of countries that acceded to the APRM did so because they 
believed it would improve their image internationally. Because it is voluntary and open to all, 
the APRM lacks not only a credible threat of sanction, but also a means of selecting who can 
and cannot sign up. As discussed above, its initiators were keen to stress the non-adversarial 
nature of the APRM, which was deliberately marketed as a forum for ‘learning’ and ‘capacity 
building’. In my view, and given the dynamics of continental policy-making in Africa’s 
development regime and the continuing sensitivities over sovereignty, few countries would 
have signed up for peer review had the Mechanism included a threat of sanction. As it has 
turned out, 29 countries accounting for more than two-thirds of the continent’s population 
have acceded to the APRM, precisely because it is seen as a non-adversarial learning 
mechanism – a designation that paradoxically endows the APRM with greater potential power.  
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 Gruzd (2009) identifies the following weak or non-reforming countries, noting that they were among the first to 
sign up to the APRM: Angola, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo and Senegal. He notes that countries such as these 
took advantage of the fact that there was considerable political pressure on countries to sign up as a means of 
showing momentum behind the APRM. On the other hand, Botswana, considered a model democracy and 
economy, has refrained from joining APRM, arguing it has nothing to gain as it already attracts investment, 
manages its economy prudently and has low levels of corruption. According to Gruzd, in some cases, foreign 
ministers have signed up their countries for accession to the APRM, while their heads of state have not attended a 
single APRM summit (ibid). 
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Had membership of the APRM been restricted to countries able to satisfy a set of criteria (as 
the ECA ‘Compact’ proposal on ‘enhanced partnership countries’ discussed in Chapter 3, 
seemed to advocate), the Mechanism would have been severely limited. As things stand, since 
every country is free to join, there is room for a wider sample of countries to exert indirect peer 
pressure on each other. Furthermore, had the APRM included a means of enforcing behavioural 
change, impractical as this would have been, few countries would have signed up. Thus, a 
significant element of the APRM’s potential lies in its self-selecting, unrestrictive and non-
adversarial nature, which allows for unprecedented levels of peer pressure exerted between 
member countries, arguably introducing a new lateral dimension of competition leading these 
countries to act in ways they might otherwise have not.  
 
How does the APRM open up space for contestation of the status quo? 
In addition to institutionalising competition among member countries to improve their 
governance and development, another important element of the APRM’s potential to redress 
power imbalances is the space it has opened up for non-state actors to participate in debates 
and decision-making about development. Overall, and despite a number of weaknesses 
(discussed above), each of the review processes completed to date has opened up space that 
did not previously exist for national dialogue. This has allowed both national and trans-national 
actors to engage in specific countries in a way that was virtually unheard of before the APRM.  
 
As Herbert (2006) has noted, broad-based participation in the country review process is pivotal 
to building trust and consensus around national problems. In a review of lessons learned from 
the reviews of Kenya, Mauritius and South Africa, he highlights a wide range of approaches 
used in different countries to garner input from a range of constituencies, among them regions, 
ethnic groups, businesses, labour, religious bodies, women’s groups, various levels and 
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branches of government, and special-interest organisations concerned with particular social or 
governance issues (ibid)194.  
 
In each country, the model for civil society participation has been different. Ghana’s process 
was research-led, with independent think tanks commissioned to draft the country self-
assessment report based on desk research, a household survey, expert survey, focus groups 
and public meetings (Herbert 2006). In Kenya, the process of determining civil society 
representation was considered to be more open and transparent than in any of the other 
countries under early review. In South Africa, despite widespread consultation involving civil 
society, the Government directed the process from start to finish. In each of these three 
countries, there were strong civil society protests demanding enhanced participation. This 
speaks to the wide diversity across African nations in terms of the internal constitution and 
capacity of civil society organisations. This again supports my argument that there is a need for 
an account of civil society that transcends one-size-fits-all theorisations found in Western 
conceptions. 
 
Within acceding African countries, the APRM has created a new set of opportunities, however 
constrained, for non-state actors to engage on issues of governance and development, and to 
assert old and new claims. This is not to say that such engagement did not exist before the 
advent of peer review. Indeed, the past 15 years have seen the introduction of different 
mechanisms for public participation in national policy-making throughout Africa. For example, 
the PRSP process mandates the participation of civil society. In countries that have moved 
beyond the narrow confines of the PRSP per se, myriad national consultation and dialogue 
mechanisms have been established
195
.  
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 These approaches have included: ensuring broad representation on the national governing councils; procedures 
for decision-making and designating alternate members; multiple representatives per sector; providing separate 
funding for CSOs; ensuring the report format allows for a multiplicity of views to be expressed; organising public 
consultations; requesting written submissions; and conducting citizen surveys (Herbert 2006). 
195
 Before the PRSPs, during the wave of democratisation throughout Africa at the end of the Cold War, a number 
of countries, notably the DRC, saw the staging of elaborate multi-stakeholder national conferences. 
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The distinct feature of the APRM is that it is an African-designed and African-managed process. 
At the very least, this strengthens the arm of advocates within acceding countries, who are 
much more likely to assert their ownership of the APRM than, say, of the PRSPs. In the past, the 
focus was on advocating to external actors (the World Bank, IMF, donor countries) to push for 
change within countries. The APRM provides citizens with the means of pressuring their own 
governments, the key agents of social change, to meet their claims. In addition, and through 
participation in the country review process, citizens themselves assume increasing agency in 
determining what development path is best for their society. Indeed, some experts view the 
NPoA as a candidate future master-plan for national development, although it is still too early 
to assess whether the APRM and NPoA can indeed replace existing mechanisms for national 
elaboration and implementation of development policy. 
 
Beyond enlivening struggles over development within countries, the APRM is opening up new 
space above the African state. A growing movement of CSOs has made a strategic decision to 
influence the continental Pan-African space as a key site of struggle in ending poverty. While 
working at the grassroots level remains critical, there is a growing belief that only by engaging 
in policy advocacy at the highest aggregate level of decision-making on the continent can real 
and sustainable impact be registered in addressing poverty and injustice in Africa (da Costa 
2007). These movements operate as coalitions, bringing together national, sub-regional, 
continental and global civil society actors around key development themes or rights issues, to 
lobby the relevant organs of the AU system and other bodies.  
 
Emblematic of such coalitions is GCAP, the Global Call to Action against Poverty, which declares 
itself as “the world’s largest civil society movement calling for an end to poverty and inequality” 
(GCAP website)196. Since being established in 2003, GCAP has grown rapidly. In Africa, the GCAP 
network includes more than 25 national coalitions, which were instrumental in revising the 
movement’s policy platform to include a series of Southern demands197. GCAP Africa’s 
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 http://www.whiteband.org  
197
 These include debt repudiation, a focus on domestic in addition to external debt, a focus on repatriating stolen 
assets and funds, and a focus on the Economic Partnership Agreements (da Costa 2007). 
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members have been prominent among critics of NEPAD, which they have dismissed as a neo-
liberal construct. Instead, they have focused their energies on influencing the AU system, as 
evidenced by the recent establishment of an Oxfam International office in Addis Ababa 
dedicated to facilitating the AU-directed advocacy efforts of African civil society (Houghton 
2008).  
 
For many of these CSO advocates, the commitment to helping to realise the AU vision of an 
independent, self-reliant and self-sustaining Africa implies a focus on influencing the APRM. For 
example, the African Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP) was founded in 
2004 to provide space for African CSOs to shadow the APRM. AfriMAP monitors the compliance 
of African governments to their commitments in three areas: access to justice and rule of law; 
political participation; and effective public service delivery (Tungwarara 2006). AfriMAP 
publishes in-depth reports on the national peer review processes, researched and written by 
nationals of the countries in question. 
 
The APRM clearly emerges as a site of struggle, from the above discussion. By allowing for 
external perspectives within Africa to link with forces for change inside participating countries, 
the APRM is facilitating the mobilisation of new, trans-national configurations of power. That 
the APRM has become a focal point for the formation and capacity enhancement of civil society 
points to dynamics unleashed by governmentality that exceed Foucault’s formulation.  
 
What have been the unintended effects of the APRM process so far? 
In Chapter 1, I theorised that the outcomes of struggles over development are often 
indeterminate. This indeterminacy characterises both the ongoing struggle over whether 
external or internal policy actors should determine Africa’s development path, and interplay 
between legitimising public action by African leaders and claims from African citizens. In my 
view, the APRM provides unique insights into the indeterminacy implied by both struggles. 
Here, I briefly highlight three examples of emerging unintended effects. 
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One unintended effect already highlighted is the extent to which the APRM is opening up 
access to national spaces, an outcome that its founders can surely not have anticipated. As 
described above, the Mechanism is creating engagement by national civil society as well as 
trans-national actors in territories that were previously considered sovereign. The country 
review reports and NPoAs create new knowledge and awareness that leads to old claims being 
restated and new claims arising. Furthermore, the APRM is throwing up fundamental questions 
about political governance and national politics in ways that may never have happened before. 
 
A second unintended effect is the APRM’s potential to displace or supersede the PRSPs, MDG 
plans, medium-term expenditure frameworks and other national planning mechanisms. As 
arguably the only framework in-country that can be said to be truly ‘African’ in the sense that it 
emanates from a uniquely African process, the NPoA could potentially serve as an overarching 
planning framework. This would see existing planning mechanisms dispensed with or merged 
with the NPoA to achieve coherence198. Were this to happen, it would spell the return of 
central planning of national economies, dominant in the majority of African countries from 
independence until the onset of the so-called ‘African crisis’ – after which, as documented in 
Chapter 2, sovereign planning gave way to externally directed reform. While the APRM’s 
initiators clearly had it in mind to redress the power asymmetry governing conditions for aid, it 
is highly unlikely that they anticipated such a potential outcome. 
 
A third and final unintended outcome of the APRM is the effect it is registering on the 
continental architecture of leadership initiatives and institutions. As discussed, the advent of 
NEPAD sparked tensions among the membership of the AU, whose ‘solidarity’ narrative was 
threatened by a ‘selectivity’ narrative espoused by a select group among its membership. The 
establishment of the APRM raised similar concerns. The reaction of African leaders – to claim 
NEPAD and the APRM as AU initiatives – was intended to send a strong message about the 
need for continental coherence. In practice, it has paved the way for the APRM to become 
hegemonic. It is realistic to predict that, beyond the current list of adherents, and once more 
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 A multi-country study is currently underway, commissioned by the ECA, to look into the feasibility of the APRM 
NPoAs becoming the main planning instrument in African countries (Bing-Pappoe 2009). 
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country reviews have taken place, other AU member countries will be feel the peer pressure to 
sign up for review under what is now an official Mechanism of the AU. Those countries that 
refuse to sign up199 will have to find good reasons to stay away. Assuming the strengths 
detailed earlier in this chapter are built upon, and the challenges addressed, there is a real 
prospect of African peer review evolving into an increasingly powerful agency of restraint.  
 
Conclusion: 
This final chapter has undertaken an in-depth review and analysis of the APRM, the most 
prominent form of knowledge in Africa’s contemporary development regime. I have contended 
that the APRM is an African political ‘technology of power’, and have advanced and provided 
evidence in support of three main arguments to this effect. First, The APRM’s preoccupation 
with ‘good governance’ gives it the appearance of a classic sub-hegemonic technology designed 
to embed external ideas within Africa. However, it is largely a home-grown tool born out of 
frustration among African countries at having to submit to external conditionality with a 
contested basis; it is further designed to build a culture of self-discipline and self-conditionality.  
 
Second, the APRM has considerable potential to redress asymmetries of power – much of 
which lies in the Mechanism’s designation as a voluntary, non-adversarial process of lesson-
learning and capacity building. In the struggle between Africa and its donors over who 
determines Africa’s future, the APRM has the potential to reinforce and strengthen African 
power. The APRM has also opened new space for non-state actors, both within the state and 
above it, to press old and new claims. Within the state, I have highlighted the pivotal role 
mandated for CSOs and other non-state actors in the country review process. Above the state, 
the APRM has helped fuel a nascent Pan-African civil society taking the form of trans-national 
coalitions, advocating for changes in continental norms and standards as a means of tackling 
the structures that perpetuate poverty and inequality within African countries. Furthermore, 
the practice of ‘peer review’, an apparently non-adversarial learning process, has had the effect 
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 These include Botswana, which argues that its performance in the domain of governance and development 
make it a leading African nation that has no need for peer review, and Libya, which rejects the APRM as neo-
colonial.  
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of introducing competition between countries, be it in signing and ratifying the instruments to 
guarantee rights and rule of law, or in providing free universal primary education.  
 
Third, I have offered examples of how the outcomes of African peer review are at odds with the 
intention of the APRM’s initiators. One of these unintended effects is the way in which country 
review processes, far from resulting in the co-option of non-state actors in the forging of a 
national consensus, has created an environment in which more claims can be made and more 
struggles engaged in. Another is the potential that resides in the NPoAs as a hegemonic 
planning instrument. Yet another is the APRM’s profound impact on the continental 
architecture of institutions and initiatives.  
 
In the process of examining the APRM, I have provided compelling evidence in support of the 
Foucauldian assertion that politics will increasingly be engaged in through political technologies 
of power. The APRM holds significant potential to open up the policy space needed for a more 
‘authentic’ African political rationality to emerge. This is not to say that the emergence of a 
new, African development ideology is at hand. On the contrary, my argument all along has been 
that ICEs in Africa’s contemporary development regime have engaged in the battle to 
recalibrate power relations informed by a strong dose of pragmatism, eschewing ideological 
positions and preferring to iterate from within the dominant paradigm based on a sound grasp 
of the technologies of rule. The APRM manifests an important characteristic of Africa’s sub-
hegemonic development regime – the ability to internalise external rationalities as a pragmatic 
strategy to contest power. 
 
Finally, it should be emphasised that the APRM has many flaws, a number of which have been 
discussed above. Furthermore, it is a relatively new process, with less than half the acceding 
countries reviewed thus far, and second reviews yet to take place. Its evolving nature thus 
renders the APRM a somewhat controversial political technology of power. Much therefore 
remains indeterminate, and my purpose has not been to make arguments set in stone. Rather, 
and building on my hypothesis, it has been to identify and decode the signs that point to 
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impending power shifts in Africa’s development regime. Such an explanatory approach is 
necessarily at odds with accounts that characterise the APRM as ‘neo-colonialism’s mask’ and 
dismiss it out of hand. Only through an objective and nuanced assessment of the contingency of 
power and the indeterminacy of struggles over development can we arrive at an accurate and 
meaningful account of Africa’s development regime. 
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Conclusion:  
Notes on Resistance, ‘African Civil Society’ and  
a Future Agenda for Research 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation has had theoretical as well as empirical goals. Theoretically, and to enable as 
nuanced an account as possible of the myriad struggles by a multitude of agents over 
development underway in postcolonial Africa, I have constructed a working conceptual 
framework of an African development regime. Empirically, I have sought to decode agency and 
agendas of experts working continentally, who play a pivotal role in this trans-national domain. 
I have interrogated the role of African economists and other social scientists working in the 
continental space in generating and giving authority to development ideas. In doing so, I have 
attempted to explain how institutional complexes of expertise shape the African development 
discourse.  
 
This concluding part of the dissertation will undertake three final tasks. First, and drawing on 
the detailed literature review in Chapter 1, I summarise my key arguments relating to the 
workings of power in development regimes. Second, I revisit the African development regime 
conceptual framework, highlighting the supporting evidence provided in different chapters. 
Third, I reflect further on two important topics highlighted by the discussion – the positionality 
of resistance and ‘African civil society’. I will end by elaborating a potential agenda for future 
research. 
 
Theoretical Foundations 
In Chapter 1, and towards a better understanding of the workings of power in development 
regimes, I reviewed several blocks of distinct but inter-connected literature. These concerned: 
governmentality, development regimes and trans-nationality; the role of institutional 
complexes of expertise in generating the discourse, developing the policy and mediating the 
practice of development; explanations of agency as a complex of human and nonhuman 
elements; and African identity. 
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The review began with a discussion of Foucauldian governmentality. Two dimensions were 
highlighted: a set of political rationalities, or the thoughts and discursive representations 
involved when authorities define the field of intervention; and a set of political technologies to 
deal with problems defined by political rationality. Rationalities, embedded in governmental 
discourse, are not simply ideologies but embed themselves in our ways of thinking and acting, 
replacing discipline from the outside with self-discipline. Neo-liberalism-as-governmentality 
thus emerges as more than simply an ideology or political-economic reality, but as a political 
project aimed at creating a social reality it suggests already exists. Political technologies – tools, 
mechanisms and forms of knowledge, promulgated and managed by experts and institutions – 
help constitute ruling authority. Governmentality thus provides the basis for the modern 
exercise of power.  
 
With this in mind, I drew on Ludden’s (1992) argument that development is manifesting itself as 
regime or “institutionalised configuration of power within a […] system ideologically committed 
to progress that draws its material sustenance from the conduct of development” (ibid. pp. 
251-52). In addition to an official state apparatus, development regimes appear as a 
development policy mainstream constituted by institutions of education, research, media, 
technology, science and intellectual influence. For Ludden, as for Foucault, the regime’s power 
and authority reside not only in government but also in “…physical instruments of power over 
nature and in cultural instruments of authority over people’s minds and morality” (ibid).  
 
Development regimes, I then asserted, are trans-national, meaning that they operate across 
spaces and scales, from the sub-national to the global. While state regimes may exist, they 
interact, overlap with and are influenced by sub-national, sub-regional, continental and global 
development regimes. In the African context, a significant spatial and scalar dimension of the 
trans-national development regime is continental. As discussed in Chapter 2, this regime 
emerged as colonial governmentality in the nineteenth century and gave way to postcolonial 
governmentality in the 1960s.  
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Discourse has been the main unit of analysis throughout this dissertation. Discourse forms a key 
part of Foucault’s heterogeneous ‘dispositif’, ensemble or apparatus. Power works through 
discourse to incorporate its subjects, as objects, by appearing as ‘authorless’, by hiding its 
intent. Understanding development’s discourse, I have argued, is therefore key to 
understanding the power of development regimes.  
 
I then drew on Peet’s (2007) ‘geography of power’ to help explain how development sets out to 
achieve hegemony. I argued that the development discourse arrives in a pre-existing field of 
power, populated by different local agents with a host of agendas. Its hegemony is therefore 
contingent on persuading local actors to internalise its precepts. As such, and to embed it in 
particular localities, the globally dominant discourse is hybridised or ‘translated’ into more 
locally acceptable forms – a process known as sub-hegemony that involves constant 
renegotiation of interpretations and the incorporation of subordinate perspectives. In this 
engagement, I have argued, it is conceivable that local agency can produce new types of social 
and spatial differentiation, leading to reconfiguration of power relations.  
 
I then asserted that experts play a key role in directing the development process, generating 
ideas and empirical knowledge that are compelling to leading development actors in specific 
places and times, and ensuring that the regime constitutes a documented historic formation 
(Ludden 1992). I showed how the institutionalisation of development helped operationalise a 
rationalised discourse and intentional international activity around development after World 
War II. On this basis I argued that Third World experts, trained in the West, working in 
influential institutions and part of far-reaching epistemic networks, play a decisive role in 
generating discourses of crisis that create the constituency for expert intervention.  
 
Drawing on Mitchell (2002), I argued that the invocation of crisis triggers a self-perpetuating 
cycle of legitimisation, with failed policies ‘producing’ the rationale for more expertise, more 
calculation and more argument. I then asserted that these institutional complexes of expertise 
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are key agents of ‘classic’ as well as ‘modified’ sub-hegemony. Due to the disciplinary power of 
the dominant institutional complexes, sub-hegemonic experts often hide their contrary views 
as they cannot be seen to be openly dissenting from the dominant discourse. Nevertheless, 
they intentionally or immanently deploy tactics that can significantly alter the shape and 
trajectory of hegemonic projects.  
 
The notion of an institutional complex of expertise is consonant with Actor Network Theory 
(ANT), which theorises that power, far from operating through individual agency, works 
through the actions of actor-networks, heterogeneous entities made up of human and 
nonhuman agents including machines, texts, institutions and organisations, animals, money and 
architectures. What ANT describes as social ordering – the act of overcoming resistance – is 
akin to my understanding of hegemony. In Callon’s (1997) words, hegemonic projects are 
‘radically indeterminate’. Ordering and its effects are subject to contestation, with the result 
that a homogeneous social order is never achieved. Aside from validating the hypothesis on the 
fractured and contingent nature of power in a regime, ANT also accounts for the fact that, in a 
given field of power, some actors are more powerful than others.  
 
Having established the theoretical foundations of sub-hegemony, I have argued that sub-
hegemonic experts in Africa’s development regime appeal to two constructed identities to 
legitimise their quest for expanded policy space: one is their ‘African-ness’ and another is their 
membership of a global community of accredited, Western-trained development experts. 
Theoretically, I described ‘African-ness’ as a socially constructed identity firmly situated in 
Africa’s postcolonial historical and social context, one that is continuously under construction, 
and is by no means exclusively a function of race or geography. I identified the invocation by 
African experts of credentials afforded by the West as a second, key legitimising attribute in 
asserting agency. I argued that the education of these experts in Western academies confers 
added legitimacy in their quest to lead technocratic solutions to African development 
challenges. According to my theorisation, ‘global expert’ identity is deployed alongside ‘African-
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ness’ as a strategic tool to carve out increased policy space. As such, identity stands out as a key 
tactical weapon in the exercise of ‘techno-politics’. 
 
In summary, my key theoretical arguments are as follows: 
 
1. At variance with more rigid interpretations of governmentality and hegemony, my 
account has demonstrated the open-endedness of domination.  
 
2. I have shown how the intent to achieve total domination necessarily involves 
accommodation of dissenting perspectives.  
 
3. I have argued that, in the process of sub-hegemony, translational agents with contextual 
knowledge of, legitimacy, and credibility in their localities work to ease the hegemony of 
dominant rationalities.  
 
4. At the same time I have shown how, in the course of classic sub-hegemony, precisely 
because power accommodates dissenting perspectives as a strategy of rule, hegemony 
is disrupted. 
 
5. I have asserted that this happens immanently as well as intentionally as successive 
iterations empower subordinate actors with stronger valences of power.  
 
6. I have attributed this iterative engagement between hegemony and sub-hegemony to 
the ‘radical indeterminacy’ of actor-networks, leading such networks to fail.  
 
7. As a result – and precisely because of the slippery nature of domination in the first place 
– I have concluded that no totalising power project ever fully succeeds and hegemony 
remains a claim.  
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Matching Evidence to Theory 
Informed by the above arguments, I offered at the end of Chapter 1, a working conceptual 
framework spelling out key characteristics of an African development regime. I now revisit 
elements of the conceptual framework reflexively, referring to evidence from Chapters 2, 3, 4 
and 5. 
 
First, Africa is a ‘geopolitical space’ that is discursively ‘imagined’ by African leaders and 
intellectuals. In this space, development operates as a regime, or institutionalised configuration 
of power (Ludden 1992). The objects of the regime’s intervention are Africa’s geographic 
territory, the African economy, and the African population. However, ‘Africa’ is a lived reality, a 
‘field of power’ that pre-existed the arrival of development as an ideology of progress. As such, 
hegemonic development regimes are subject to contestation.  
 
In support of the above, I have shown how development, or the provision of welfare through 
governmental public action, has long constituted a powerful legitimising ideology, or political 
rationality of power. In the nineteenth century, development emerged immanently as a means 
of creating order from the disorder of rapid urbanisation, poverty and unemployment in the 
wake of the industrial revolution (Cowen and Shenton 1995, p.29). In the colonial period, it 
evolved into a trans-national mission aimed at ‘civilising’ colonies to optimise their contribution 
to the wider process of capitalist accumulation directed from the metropole. However, it was 
only after World War II that development became an intentional project underpinned by the 
ideology of Western science and aimed at improving the standard of living of the world’s 
poorer nations and peoples (Cooper and Packard 1997).  
 
In all this, and in past centuries, Africa has been an ‘invention’ of Western scholarship and an 
object of developers. It has suffered extreme forms of objectification and its discourses 
sidelined. Nonetheless, Africa has long aspired to the modernity of the developed world and 
sought to attain it through a politically distinct and culturally specific vision. Just as Europe is 
being constructed as an ‘imagined community’ (Shore 2000), so too have African intellectuals 
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re-imagined their continent as a distinct ‘geopolitical space’, deploying unifying discourses of 
‘Pan-Africanism’, ‘United States of Africa’ and ‘African renaissance’ to project an alternative 
African geography of power.  
 
My account of Africa’s development regime in historical perspective (Chapter 2) exposed in 
some detail the discursive strategies and tactics of rule of the globally dominant development 
rationality seeking to achieve hegemony in Africa. I have shown how this hegemonic project has 
been reaffirmed and resisted. External theories, such as ‘stagism’ and Dependency Theory, 
influenced the development strategies of early postcolonial Africa, with the latter assuming 
centre stage in the 1970s as the Cold War polarised countries according to their ideological 
allegiance. I have documented how African intellectuals resisted and rejected what they called 
‘failed inherited theories of development’ and sought to develop an African ‘alternative’. As I 
have documented, while this resistance may not have led to paradigm shift, it has gradually 
conditioned tangible revisions to the dominant discourse on development, as well as the 
policies emanating from this discourse.  
 
In Chapter 4, to explain the strategies and tactics deployed in the complex sub-hegemonic 
interplay between reaffirmation and resistance, and with reference to testimonies and life 
histories, I have demonstrated how experts harness their ‘African-ness’, along with academic 
and professional credentials earned in the West, to assert agency with a view to carving out 
expanded policy space and recalibrating asymmetries of power.  
 
Second, the African development regime is a heterogeneous apparatus, an ensemble of 
elements, including “discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions” (Brigg, 2001, p.3). It is not simply the collection of elements per se but also the 
“system of relations… established between these elements”, relations that can be 
conceptualised in terms of relations of knowledge, power, and subjectivity (ibid) The power of 
the dominant development discourse connects the elements of this apparatus and provides the 
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regime with continuity over time. This power does not overtly impose itself, but instead works in 
diffuse and complex ways. 
 
I have highlighted and discussed various elements of the heterogeneous African development 
‘apparatus’. These have included: discourses that have structured the regime over time 
(including ‘collective self-reliance and self-sustainment’, ‘adjustment with transformation’ and 
‘people’s participation’); institutional complexes coalescing around the (O)AU and ECA; African 
development plans such as the Monrovia Strategy, LPA and AAF-SAP; influential expert 
documents, among them the ECA’s ‘Compact for African Recovery’ and the APRM Base 
Document; and landmark philosophical propositions, exemplified by the discourses of ‘Pan-
Africanism’ and ‘African renaissance’. I have sought to describe the system of relations between 
the different elements of the African development ‘ensemble’ – with particular focus on 
relations between actor-networks spanning the ECA and (O)AU, the ECA and specific African 
countries, and relations between the AU, NEPAD and APRM.  
 
What has emerged is a complex and often contradictory engagement with the development 
project. I have shown how Africa’s political and intellectual leadership, frustrated with 
externally directed development, sought to pursue a socio-economic development strategy 
underpinned by ‘self-reliance’ and ‘self-sustainment’, exemplifying how development, 
conceived of as primarily a national project, had now become an overarching continental 
aspiration. This appeal to Pan-Africanism constituted a strategic manipulation of the perception 
by the outside world of Africa as a homogeneous, undifferentiated mass. In this way, by 
appropriating its external image, Africa projected an alternative geography of power. 
 
Yet, as has been clearly shown, Africa’s development regime is no less complex and contingent 
than other modern forms of power. This dissertation has highlighted the different dynamics of 
contestation within Africa’s regime – between ECA and OAU experts of the 1980s, between 
African experts working in the World Bank and those working in Africa, and between African 
countries with competing continental development visions. As the ECA’s tactical shift from 1995 
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onwards and the discussion of the APRM have shown, there is a clear recognition within the 
African development regime that classic sub-hegemony by no means closes the door to 
struggles contesting power. 
 
Third, Africa’s development regime emanates from discourses of crisis, which objectify problems 
and provide scope for expert intervention. Because the language of ‘crisis’ and disintegration 
creates a logical need for intervention and management (Crush 1995), the invocation of 
discourses of ‘failed states’, ‘chronic poverty’ and so on, serve to prepare the ground for public 
action.  
 
In Chapter 2, I described how the ‘crisis’ of latter-day colonialism led African leaders to espouse 
an ideology of ‘developmentalism’ that helped legitimise their stewardship of the newly 
independent former colonies. I documented how Elliot Berg, the lead author of the World 
Bank’s 1981 ‘Berg Report’, blaming Africa’s complex ‘crisis’ mainly on poor domestic policies, 
advocated a rolling back of the state, arguing that welfare should be determined by the market. 
This invocation of ‘crisis’ prepared the terrain for the World Bank’s introduction of neo-liberal 
SAPs, subsequently adopted by some two-thirds of African states.  
 
In the same chapter, I highlighted how Africa’s political and intellectual leadership harnessed 
the notion of ‘crisis’ to create the constituency for a continental response as well as to 
galvanise support from the outside world. From the 1980s to date, African development plans 
have routinely included phrases such as ‘food crisis’, ‘escalating crisis’, ‘economic and social 
crisis’, ‘debt crisis’, and ‘from crisis to sustainable growth’. Today, development institutions 
inside and outside Africa use discursive categories such as ‘failed states’, ‘crisis states’, ‘least 
developed countries’, ‘low income countries under stress’, ‘enhanced partnership countries’, 
‘limited partnership countries’ and ‘post-conflict countries’ to justify the need for corrective, 
expert-led intervention. 
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Fourth, the regime is ‘top-down’, emanating from self-declared ‘enlightened leaders’ as well as 
development institutions that view progress as a goal and consider the delivery of development 
as key to gaining, or maintaining, legitimacy. 
 
In conceptualising a trans-national development regime operating in a continental geopolitical 
space, I have sought to reflect the power of discourses emanating collectively from Africa’s 
political and intellectual leadership. As has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, the idea of a 
collective identity has been central to African struggles for emancipation – as evidenced by the 
founding of the Pan-Africanist movement in the Diaspora, the establishment of the OAU in 
Addis Ababa in 1963, and the launch of the AU in 2001. As key African development plans – 
among them the Monrovia Strategy, LPA, APPER, AAF-SAP, Arusha Declaration on Popular 
Participation and NEPAD – have shown, Africa’s leadership has honed the issuance of collective 
statements outlining the continent’s development ambitions and strategies into a strategic 
tool200.  
 
While some have dismissed such an approach as neo-patrimonial trans-state regionalism (Bøås 
2002), and however valid the concerns over undemocratic, kleptocratic national leaders 
banding together in a ‘club of dictators’, I have shown how this recourse to a continental 
discourse has served to project an alternative spatial power manifested by the idea of a 
collective will to develop Africa. This politics of legitimisation is evident in NEPAD, which 
promises a more accountable relationship between Africa’s rulers and the African people as 
one half of a dual ‘Compact’. 
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 African national leaders have long used the continental space as a forum for legitimising their national rule. 
Ideas personally developed or endorsed by particular African leaders have routinely been offered to the OAU and 
AU for endorsement and adoption. Among such initiatives has been the Conference on Stability, Security and 
Development Cooperation in Africa (CCSDCA, adopted by the AU as a special programme in 2000), an initiative of 
former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, who subsequently established his own think tank, the African 
Leadership Forum, to take his ideas forward. More recently, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has 
disseminated a monograph advocating for a new paradigm he calls ‘democratic developmentalism’ – underpinned 
by domestic rural democracy, predictable long-term aid, enhanced market access for African produce, and world-
class institutional and physical infrastructure (Zenawi 2006). This is reminiscent of the immediate post-
independence period (discussed in Chapter 2) when African’s fledgling national leaders engaged in and contributed 
significantly to debates about ideas, and indeed developed political ideologies of their own. 
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As has also been demonstrated, the top-down African development regime is lent coherence by 
African institutional complexes, who are key sub-hegemonic actors in the production, 
transmission and circulation, reception and appropriation of knowledge – four key stages in the 
‘knowledge continuum’ that underpins the process of hegemonic construction (Cooper and 
Packard 1997). The ECA has clearly been pivotal to development plans issued by Africa’s 
leadership from independence to the present day. Chapter 1 has documented the tensions 
between ECA and OAU experts that played out in the run-up to the summit that produced the 
LPA. Underlying such tensions, and as documented in Chapter 4, has been the fact that 
leadership politics has often served to constrain expert agency, in the sense that experts are 
often requested to provide technocratic justifications for approaches already decided at 
leadership level. This speaks to the central constitutive role that expertise plays in helping to 
advance certain forms of power. The rule of technocracy is bounded by a wider field of power 
in which expertise often reaffirms, as opposed to challenges, a hegemonic political agenda. 
 
As I also document in some detail in Chapter 5 with reference to the APRM, political 
technologies conceived of at leadership level have the potential to exceed the intention of their 
founders and open up avenues for a wide range of agents to act. In this way, and by mandating 
civil society participation, the APRM country review process opens the door for African citizens’ 
groups to press old and new claims on national leadership and the state apparatus.  
 
Fifth, and ostensibly, the regime is classically sub-hegemonic – working to institutionalise the 
dominant political rationality of rule (in this case underpinned by neo-liberalism) in specific 
African localities. The regime embodies and reflects global policy shifts in the discourse and 
practice of development while at the same time being context-specific in several ways.  
 
In documenting the successive iterations of Africa’s development discourse I have shown how 
the ECA ICE both influenced and was influenced by the dominant development rationality. 
Initially, the ECA of the late 1970s to early 1990s fiercely resisted the imposition of neo-liberal 
policies in African countries, documented the failings of SAPs and proposed an alternative. Over 
time, however, ECA experts engaged constructively with experts from the Bretton Woods 
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institutions, as documented in Chapter 2, being closely involved in efforts in the late 1980s to 
work towards a “new synthesis of stabilisation and self-reliance” (Asante 1991, p.176). This 
synthesis was codified in the 1995 ‘Cairo Agenda for Action for Relaunching Africa’s Economic 
and Social Development’, which reflected the consensus of the 1990s around issues such as: 
democracy, good governance, peace, security, stability and sustainable development; structural 
transformation of African economies; and regional economic cooperation and integration. 
 
Sixth, In Africa’s development regime, influential ICEs are sub-hegemonic, deploying hybridised 
iterations of the globally hegemonic development discourse to persuade local centres of power 
of their validity and applicability. In the process, these ICEs become actors in struggles against 
the very discursive and material orthodoxy they are themselves ‘enrolled’ to universalise.  
 
In Chapter 3, which focused on the period 1995 to 2005, I have documented how the ECA 
changed tactics to become more overtly and ostensibly sub-hegemonic by pursuing a strategy 
aimed at gaining the international community’s trust whilst simultaneously deploying a series 
of political technologies aimed at giving meaning to the largely rhetorical notion of ‘African 
ownership’. I have shown how the ECA used its convening power to incubate and midwife 
strong African positions agreed by a cross-section of stakeholders. In this way, the ECA was able 
to manufacture ‘minimal hegemony’, restricting the hegemonic depth and extent of neo-
liberalism whilst creating the space for greater African policy ownership and expert leadership 
of its development agenda.  
 
To further elaborate sub-hegemony, and with reference to detailed insights gleaned from life 
histories gathered during my fieldwork, I devoted Chapter 4 to exploring the strategies and 
tactics employed by ECA experts in leading on crafting technocratic solutions to the continent’s 
problems. I found that these experts deployed two complementary identities towards carving 
out the required policy space. One, described as their ‘African-ness’, was found to have at least 
four dimensions: an emotional attachment to their continent of origin; an ideological 
commitment to ‘developmentalism’; superior knowledge of the African contextual reality; and a 
273 
 
difference in agenda from non-African experts. World-class technical capacity was found to be a 
second identity deployed towards expanded African expert agency. As the life histories clearly 
reveal, in positioning themselves as the best-placed technocrats to lead the design of African 
development strategy, and alongside their ‘African-ness’, these experts value their Western 
educational credentials for conferring legitimacy.  
 
Beyond the ECA, there is a growing capacity, increasingly embedded within states but also 
positioned sub-regionally and continentally, to conduct the kind of iterative engagement with 
dominant development thinking that I have described. One such institutional complex of 
expertise is the African Economics Research Consortium (AERC), set up in 1988 with funding 
from Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC), to address a perceived lack 
of African institutional and human capacity to engage with the heavily technical agenda 
embedded by the World Bank and IMF from the early 1980s onwards (Rwegasira 2001). Its 
mission, underpinned by the belief that African development will occur only if there is sustained 
sound management of the economy, is to develop a strong cadre of professional African 
economists to conduct policy-relevant research in their respective countries. Headquartered in 
Nairobi, Kenya, the AERC conducts research and training, and serves as a leading network of 
national African experts learning and applying the most sophisticated macro-economic and 
micro-economic techniques
201
.  
 
In Chapter 3, I highlighted the role of the AERC as one of the three African institutions that in 
2000 co-published ‘Can Africa Claim the 21
st
 Century? – an attempt to stimulate debate on the 
modified reform agenda. Many of Africa’s leading economists cut their teeth with the AERC and 
remain active members of its network. While a handful of these AERC alumni have gone on to 
become leading critics of SAPs, scholars of heterodox economics and proponents of African 
alternatives, others have continued to work within the mainstream.  
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 Given the challenges of the time, the early AERC agendas focused on balance of payments management and 
domestic financial management. In the 1990s trade policy and regional integration were added to its priorities, and 
the AERC has gradually moved beyond a narrow focus on macroeconomics to embrace wider development 
concerns (Rwegasira 2001).  
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Overall, the AERC serves as an influential African institutional complex of expertise. Unlike the 
ECA, its experts are largely based within African countries, although it maintains strong links 
with economists outside Africa through collaborative research. Its approach is classically sub-
hegemonic, as evidenced by the ‘Explaining African Economic Growth Project’ (2008), a two-
volume study covering nearly 30 countries which sought to identify and analyse the major 
impediments facing Africa’s development. The study integrated conventional macroeconomic-
focused cross-country growth approaches with three Africa-specific approaches focusing on the 
political economy of government, private agents, and markets. Thus, the AERC and its 
collaborators came up with a series of technocratic recommendations from within the 
dominant paradigm.  
 
The ECA and AERC are among the dominant technocratic institutional complexes of expertise in 
Africa’s development regime today, with the former playing a pivotal role in generating the 
continental development discourse, and the latter successfully elaborating a nuanced, context-
specific approach from within the dominant development paradigm. Ironically, the need for 
policy based on context-specificity constituted a strident ECA demand during the stand-off over 
SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s. Linked to this, ‘African ownership’ and ‘self-reliance’, aspirations 
evident in the ECA and AERC alike, have served as constant discursive underpinnings of the 
continental development regime for several decades. The difference lies in how ‘ownership’ 
and ‘self-reliance’ are being pursued within the African development mainstream today.  
 
Resistance: False Dichotomy? 
In this dissertation, I have used the term ‘resistance from within’ as shorthand to characterise 
the tactics and strategies deployed by experts in the hegemonic process. I have not attempted 
to address what may be called ‘resistance from without’, or struggles by social movements and 
other civil society actors who contest the hegemony of the development apparatus from a 
position they perceive to be ‘outside’ of its zone of influence.  
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I fully accept that civic associations, NGOs, community-based organisations, organised labour 
and social movements can play an important role in negotiating, appropriating and disrupting 
hegemony. In previous chapters I have referred to the riots in colonial West Africa after the 
Second World War, ultimately leading to the end of colonial governmentality. More recently, 
the emergence of different modes of public action across the African continent in response to 
the economic crisis of the 1980s has been well documented (cf. Olukoshi 1993, Beckman & 
Sachikonye 2001, Obadare 2004a)202. 
 
However, in positioning themselves in binary opposition to the dominant development 
rationality, in this case neo-liberalism, these ‘civil society’ formations are paradoxically resisting 
on the basis of the very ideas they reject. To oppose neo-liberalism they must understand how 
it works and attack it from an informed perspective. The tactics deployed to fight neo-liberalism 
are often the same tactics deployed to advance its hegemonic quest. In essence, and although 
the alternatives offered – such as a developmental state or equitable growth – are the very 
opposite of neo-liberal prescriptions, they in some ways reaffirm that neo-liberalism exists and 
is a force to be reckoned with.  
 
This resonates with Foucault’s argument that future resistance is more likely to be waged with 
political technologies, as opposed to rationalities. Linked to this is the Foucauldian notion of 
‘strategic reversibility’, which enables ‘dissenting conducts’ or ‘counter-conducts’ throughout 
the history of governmental regimes of power. ‘Strategic reversibility’ implies that potential 
resisters, situated within the governmental regime, choose to align themselves with its political 
rationalities, and then use their proximity to and knowledge of the regime to challenge and 
disrupt it. By engaging with the dominant discourse, therefore, resisters are positioned within 
the sphere of influence of the development apparatus, not outside it.  
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 “One common factor in this remarkable upsurge was the role played by ordinary citizens who were partly 
inspired by developments in other parts of the world, particularly Eastern Europe, to challenge the existing 
economic and political order in their respective countries. Central to this radical momentum were women’s 
groups, which emerged as a formidable aspect of what was a general social movement for change” (Obadare 2004, 
p.2). 
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Civil society critics of NEPAD (Chapters 3 and 5) are as much part of Africa's development 
regime as are experts working in the ECA. These critics include African intellectuals who, like 
ECA experts, have PhDs from Western universities, but who have chosen to work in civil society 
as opposed to an inter-governmental agency. These self-styled ‘counter-experts’ attend 
workshops and meetings organised by the ECA, AU, NEPAD, APRM, WTO, World Bank and other 
institutional complexes. In these engagements, they are able to influence as well as be 
influenced. Therefore, institutional complexes of ‘counter-expertise’ are within the wider 
sphere of influence of the ECA and other ICEs. While they may not be at the heart of the 
mainstream, they cannot credibly argue that they are positioned outside the African 
development regime
203
.  
 
As Sinha (2003) has noted in his account of Indian social movements contesting World Bank 
global fishing policies, Indian fisher folk do not simply reject the development discourse – they 
use its logic productively to pursue their own projects. Domination and resistance are mutually 
implicated, necessitating a fluid reading of agency and agendas. If we accept this argument, the 
challenge then shifts from delimiting the precise positionality of resistance to decoding the 
multiple struggles taking place in and around a given development regime.  
 
‘African Civil Society’? 
There is considerable theoretical scepticism regarding the applicability of the idea of ‘civil 
society’ to Africa (Obadare 2004a). From different perspectives, a number of scholars204 have 
pointed to the danger of transplanting Western views of civil society to Africa’s complex and 
historically contingent reality. The notion of ‘civil society’ has been rejected by some as a 
foreign concept, and because it is not perceived to fit some basic elements of Africa’s socio-
cultural life (ibid). On this basis, Africa has been viewed as a cultural exception to the rest of the 
world.  
                                                  
203
 Space precludes the provision of evidence to support this argument. However, key institutional complexes of 
counter-expertise in Africa of the kind referred to include Third World Network–Africa (www.twnafrica.org) and 
CODESRIA (www.codesria.org).  
204
 See for example Orvis (2001), Chandhoke (2003), Darnolf (1997) and Mamdani (1997). 
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Yet radical dissent, expressed in a variety of modes, has long formed a part of Africa’s socio-
political history. As Obadare (2004b) rightly argues, it is crucial to distinguish between civil 
society as an idea and as a functioning reality. For him, and in its purest form, civil society 
provides the critical physical and conceptual space for African citizens “…to become part of the 
process by which their lifeworlds are ‘disciplined’” (ibid p.3). On this reading, the idea of African 
civil society, as well as its manifestation as a tangible movement, have emerged largely as part 
of the search for a more responsive social order by ordinary citizens in African countries. 
Obadare proposes an alternative genealogy according to which civil society is re-defined as “a 
space where groups and individuals can interact and organise social life”
205
 (ibid pp.13-14). 
 
Consonant with this view, Orvis (2001) argues that any workable definition of African civil 
society must be sufficiently inclusive to convey the impression of a public sphere of formal or 
informal collective activity autonomous from the state and family. For Orvis, ‘African civil 
society’ should include the so-called ‘traditional’ or ‘primordial’ sphere of ethnic organisations, 
patronage networks and even some ‘traditional’ authorities (ibid). While neo-patrimonialists 
see patron–client networks as inimical to progressive modernity, and while these client 
networks are not based on liberal democratic norms, Orvis considers them legitimate and 
crucially important elements in African civil society. Such an inclusive definition, he argues, can 
provide a bridge between the traditional Western conceptualisation of the term whilst allowing 
its application outside the West. 
 
Others have noted that civil society does not unanimously represent the public good, 
particularly in authoritarian states where civil society involvement is either severely 
constrained, or is instrumentalised and orchestrated from above (as in the Rwanda and South 
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 This alternative genealogy is made up of the following conceptual elements: in all societies there are values and 
practices that stem from below, some of which hold latent egalitarian and democratic possibilities; values of 
mutual support and solidarity exist throughout human history and form the basis of a challenge to the 
predominance of individual accumulation in capitalist development; and civil society has always existed in different 
forms in other societies (Obadare 2004b). 
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Africa APRM processes, discussed in Chapter 5)
206
. It has further been argued that the global 
neo-liberal project enrolled a kind of ‘organised civil society’ to provide support for its 
hegemony (cf. Ferguson 2006, Oya 2007). In the same vein, Brigg (2001) views NGOs as 
‘political technologies’ harnessed by neo-liberalism to discipline Third World subjects207. 
Another perspective argues that ‘professionalisation’ has created an African middle-class ‘civil 
society comprador elite’ for whom ‘civil society’ is an industry that provides yet another 
opportunity to gain a meal ticket (Obadare 2004a).  
 
While I agree that NGOs are subject to manipulation by specific interests, my point is that they, 
along with other entities usually lumped together under the rubric of ‘civil society’, are 
themselves agents of manipulation and subversion, sometimes for their own ends and 
sometimes for the greater societal good208. Such behaviour can be seen in the proliferation of 
‘civil society’ initiatives around NEPAD and the AU, prompting warnings to avoid being co-opted 
by “…agendas set by the new imperialism, which try to incorporate ‘civil society’ and ‘other 
stakeholders’ into mainstream programmes of domination such as NEPAD” (Nabudere, 2002, 
p.23)209.  
 
                                                  
206
 Obadare (2005) offers a detailed and credible account of how, between 1993 and 1998, the military regime of 
General Sani Abacha created its own ‘civil society’ – either by explicitly creating associations dedicated to the 
regime’s project of self-perpetuation, or by creating the enabling environment for the emergence of associations 
of kindred disposition. 
207
 Bond (2009), for example, urges that social movements avoid NEPAD and other such neo-liberally grounded 
initiatives. For him, resisting the neo-liberal project can only be effectively undertaken by coalitions of social 
movements. In contrast, Ngwane (2003) points out that ideas of NSMs and ‘civil society’ as leading the fight 
against globalisation can ring hollow. NSMs may lack a social base and suffer from distorted incentives, while ‘civil 
society’ can be even more problematic, extending to the business sector and to NGOs tendering for contracts for 
privatised government services. 
208
 In conceding that rent-seeking and the sustenance of patron–client networks are partly characteristic of African 
states, Zenawi (2002), for example, warns that much of the NGO and civil society community constitute “…a 
parallel network of patronage and rent-seeking activity that coincides and diverges from the state network 
depending on circumstances… oiled by funds and guidelines from abroad”, with leadership positions in such 
organisations used for personal enrichment and for the establishment of patronage networks. 
209
 According to Randriamaro (2002), although NEPAD-related ‘civil society’ consultations did take place, these 
were sporadic and small-scale, a ‘done deal’ meant to support the claims of inclusiveness and democratic 
participation of the NEPAD promoters. Some civil society activists have been seduced by the language of NEPAD 
and have taken its ‘pro-poor’ and ‘people-centred’ claims at face value.  
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Indeed, some (cf. Muchie 2003) have argued that, since the ultimate goal of African ‘civil 
society’ should be to emancipate the continent, it must necessarily co-operate with 
governments. This perspective sees the revival of Pan-Africanism and pursuit of African 
renaissance as a multi-stakeholder project involving all sectors of society. Formations 
combining national and sub-national grassroots movements with regional and international 
NGOs have recently emerged as important actors in the revived Pan-African project. Their 
approach has been to influence the AU and other continental power structures, finding ways to 
domesticate trans-national advocacy gains in different local contexts
210
. This view of the Pan-
African project stands in contrast to traditional views of civil society as a ‘third sector’ 
positioned either on the periphery of the African field of power, or outside or above it. In 
reality, African ‘civil society’ operates in adversarial as well as collaborative modes. In reality, 
sub-hegemony embodies contradictory positions and dubious alliances marked by frequent 
crossovers in political adherence (Peet 2003). 
 
Towards a Future Research Agenda 
This dissertation has highlighted the ambitions of Africa’s political and intellectual leadership to 
play a lead role in determining the continent’s future development path. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the ECA of the 1970s and 1980s responded to the demands of member states by 
working towards a development plan with an African philosophy of economic growth and social 
change. Over time, this quest for an African development strategy has given way to a more 
pragmatic approach, whereby African experts have more consistently sought to ‘translate’ the 
globally dominant development paradigm into more appropriate, context-specific and less 
disciplinary variants. Africa’s political and intellectual leadership appear to have decided to 
work within the dominant paradigm of ‘good governance’ and ‘poverty reduction’ because they 
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 Emblematic of such formations is the Solidarity for African Women’s Rights (SOAWR) Campaign, a coalition of 
30 African CSOs spanning the continent. SOAWR’s campaign around the AU Protocol on the Rights of Women in 
Africa led to an increase in the number of African countries ratifying the Protocol from 1 to 15 in the space of two 
years (da Costa 2007)
210
. The Protocol came into force in November 2005, making it the African human rights 
instrument that has taken effect in the shortest time. However, few trans-national civil society coalitions are as 
well organised and resourced as SOAWR. In any event, influencing continental standards and getting countries to 
ratify treaties and conventions marks only the beginning of the battle. The enduring challenge faced by such 
coalitions is how to domesticate the norms and standards and bring about social change within African states. 
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see no alternative. At the same time, they believe that pursuing a sub-hegemonic strategy may 
eventually provide opportunities for transforming the rhetoric of ‘African ownership’ into 
reality, and thereby to recalibrate power asymmetries between Africa and the developed 
world.  
 
Because of this pragmatism, today’s iteration of Africa’s development regime largely conforms 
to the global consensus on ‘good governance’, ‘poverty reduction’ and the MDGs. While neo-
liberalism has clearly not developed the continent, it is deemed to have become entrenched in 
countries that have registered economic gains after implementing neo-liberal policies (Harrison 
2006)
211
. This contradictory picture is further complicated by the growing African ambition – 
seen in NEPAD and the APRM – for real, as opposed to rhetorical, ‘African ownership’. I have 
argued that this discourse, while classically sub-hegemonic, holds the potential to reallocate 
power. Whether this will set the stage for an African alternative to the dominant development 
rationality, an aspiration dating from the 1970s, remains an open question and one I have not 
sought to explore in this thesis.  
 
Nonetheless, important questions are implied by my study that could form the basis for future 
research, and my conceptual framework could serve as a useful signpost. There is a need to 
build a more comprehensive account of the power of development in Africa. This will 
necessitate further work towards understanding the power dynamics within Africa’s 
development regime, including mapping the tensions, boundaries and fault lines as the regime 
continues to evolve. I end this dissertation by highlighting a few of these potential avenues for 
further research.  
 
Following from life histories analysed in Chapter 4, there is need for further research into the 
dynamics of African expertise. What are the epistemological influences of the emerging 
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 As Harrison (2006) points out, there are no signs that neo-liberalism has led to policy convergence among 
African states, and there are no neo-liberal success stories. However, he argues that a handful of African countries 
– notably Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and to a lesser extent Ghana, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia – have achieved 
moderate economic development after internalising the neo-liberal agenda. 
281 
 
generation of African expertise? To what extent is today’s expertise so well-schooled in neo-
liberal techniques and technologies that the door to alternative thinking is closed? Within the 
African regime, how does African expertise legitimise leadership ideas, and how does it contest 
such ideas? Is there anything approaching a ‘brain gain’ or critical mass of African development 
experts? Can more be said about the interplay between ‘African-ness’, Western credentialism 
and the politics of the Diaspora? What are the emerging dynamics of the intersections between 
African expertise and international expertise? How far is African development now being 
directed by African expertise? What are the markers of this expanded agency? 
 
Related to this, there is room for further study of the construct of institutional complexes of 
expertise in Africa’s development regime. For example, the AERC (discussed above)  mediates 
arguably the largest network of African macro- and micro-economists on the continent. An 
important dynamic of the AERC is its mastery of the techniques of neo-liberal accounting, and 
the capacity it has developed on this throughout Africa. What are the dynamics related to the 
heterodox community of non-African experts who participate in AERC plenary meetings and 
research projects? How far is the AERC’s agenda being shaped by these foreign experts, and 
how far has the AERC been able to ‘enrol’ them to advance its technocratic worldview on the 
need for context-specificity in researching African economies?  
 
Another important institutional complex in Africa is the African Development Bank (AfDB), 
which has ambitions to displace the World Bank as the premier African development financier. 
Originally an entirely African-owned and funded entity, the AfDB is now 40% owned by non-
regional members which include Africa’s main development partners. To what extent does this 
power dynamic affect the agenda and agency of the AfDB’s increasingly assertive stance in 
favour of expanded ‘African ownership’? How does its quest to be comparable to the World 
Bank play out in its discursive and operational strategies? To what extent does the AfDB’s 
current continental preoccupation with trans-national African infrastructure reflect a 
technocratic engagement with the age-old Pan-Africanist regionalist discourse?  
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As implied by the above discussion, an important area for future research could be to explore 
the nexus between Africa’s development regime and national as well as sub-national 
development regimes. My focus has been decidedly and intentionally on the continental 
dimension of Africa’s trans-national development regime, as an imagined and real category. I 
have suggested that there are different modes and valences of power operating in this regime. 
One important dimension of this complex exercise of modern power is how leading African 
nations have instrumentalised the continental space to project their ideological power through 
Africa and beyond.  
 
As Habib and Selinyane (2006) argue, South Africa’s leading role in the creation of both NEPAD 
and the AU, and the promulgation of the ‘African renaissance’ discourse are all examples of 
that country’s systemically beneficial hegemonic behaviour, which has involved deployment of 
a combination of ideological, military and economic power. In addition to the obvious 
hegemons (Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa), smaller African countries have also exploited their 
membership of the continental fraternity to overcome the constraints of their small size and 
limited influence. Further, there are strategic alliances between Africa and other countries or 
regions of the global South – for instance the Africa–China and Africa–Latin America axes. From 
a development perspective, decomposing the agendas and strategies of influence of such 
nations in wider fields of power is another important area for future research.  
 
Finally, ‘African civil society’ represents an important emerging dynamic worthy of in-depth 
study. Earlier in this conclusion, I provided a snapshot of how formations of ‘civil society’ are 
increasingly viewing the Pan-African project as a strategic site of influence. With this in mind, 
African and international NGOs are organising trans-nationally to engage with the project, and 
are investing considerable resources in creating representative coalitions – including on a 
thematic basis (for example around women’s rights). As argued, the concept of ‘civil society’ in 
Africa remains problematic and needs to be unpacked further. An important dimension of the 
phenomenon is the role of so-called ‘counter-expertise’ – highly trained civil society experts – in 
shaping Africa’s development regime and informing a strategy of resistance against the 
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hegemony of global power. For example, counter-expertise is involved in mobilising African 
citizens, governments and regional economic communities to reject the EU’s proposed 
Economic Partnership Agreements.  
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Annexe I - Respondents212 
 
 Name Title Date & Location Remarks 
1. Mr. Jalel ABDEL-LATIF Executive Director, InterAfrica 
Group 
25 May 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
2. Dr. Tajudeen ABDUL-
RAHEEM 
Deputy Director, Millennium 
Campaign/ Former Secretary-
General, Pan-African 
Movement 
19 June 2006 
London, UK 
Interview 
3. Prof. Adebayo ADEDEJI Former Executive Secretary, 
ECA  
06 Sept. 2006 
London, UK 
Interview 
4. Dr. George ALIBARUHO Principal Adviser, Office of the 
Executive Secretary, ECA 
16 March 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
5. Mr. Andrew ALLIMADI Communication Officer, ECA 18 July 2009 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Personal 
Communication 
6. Dr. K.Y. AMOAKO Executive Secretary, ECA 10 September 2003 
01 May 2004 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interviews 
7.  Dr. Bartholomew ARMAH Regional Adviser, PRSPs, ECA 22 May 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
8. Mr. Owen BARDER Director, Aidinfo 26 July 2008 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
9. Dr. Adotey BING-PAPPOE Independent Researcher on 
Governance and Development 
issues 
15 August 2009 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
Personal 
Communication 
10. Dr. Ngartando BLAYO Senior Economic Affairs 
Officer, ECA 
05 May 2006 
Addis Ababa 
Interview  
11. Dr. Patrick BUGEMBE Director, ECA Southern Africa 
Office. 
11 October 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
12. Dr. Kojo BUSIA Governance Officer, ECA 24 March 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
13. Ms. Evelyn CHANGE Coordinator for Corporate 20 July 2009 Personal 
                                                  
212
 It should be noted that not all respondents listed in this table have been cited in the dissertation. Titles 
appended are valid at the time of interview or interaction. 
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Governance, APRM 
Secretariat 
Midrand, South 
Africa 
Communication 
14. Dr. Jakkie CILLIERS Executive Director, Institute 
for Security Studies (ISS) 
23 August 2006 
Pretoria, South 
Africa 
Interview 
15. Ms. Isatou GAYE Environmental Affairs Officer, 
ECA 
23 March 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
16. Mr. Steven GRUZD Deputy Head, Governance & 
APRM Programme, South 
African Institute for 
International Affairs 
21 August 2006 
Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
Interview 
17. Mr. Ross HERBERT Senior Research Fellow, 
Governance & APRM 
Programme, South African 
Institute for International 
Affairs 
21 August 2006 
Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
Interview 
18. Prof. Adam HABIB Executive Director, Human 
Sciences Research Council 
25 August 2006 
Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
Interview 
19. Dr. Abdalla HAMDOK Deputy Director, International 
IDEA 
30 June 2006 
Banjul. The Gambia 
Interview 
20. Mr. Irungu HOUGHTON Pan-Africa Director, Oxfam GB 09 April 2008 
Nairobi, Kenya 
Interview 
21. Mr. Samba JACK Director, Programming and 
Planning, ECA 
21 May 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
22. Mr. Maximilian JARRETT Management Officer, Office of 
the Executive Secretary, ECA 
15 February 2009 
Addis Ababa 
Personal 
Communication 
23. Prof. Iqbal JHAZBAY Associate Professor, University 
of South Africa (UNISA) 
24 August 2006 
Pretoria, South 
Africa 
Interview 
24. Dr. Basil JONES Senior Programme Officer 
IDRC 
24 November 2006 
Nairobi, Kenya 
Interview 
25. Ms. Nancy KACHINGWE Economic Justice Advocacy 
Specialist, ActionAid 
24 May 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
26. Dr. Pascal KAMBALE Deputy Director, African 
Governance Monitoring and 
Advocacy Project (AfriMAP) 
18 September 2009 
Kinshasa, DRC 
Interview 
27. Dr. Chris LANDSBERG Executive Director, Centre for 
Policy Studies (CPS) 
23 August 2006 
Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
Interview 
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28. Dr. Garth LE PERE Executive Director, Institute 
for Global Dialogue (IGD) 
24 August 2006 
Pretoria, South 
Africa 
Interview 
29. Ms. Bronwen MANBY Senior Adviser, Open Society 
Institute (OSI) 
10 August 2009 
London, UK 
Interview 
30. Ms. Elene MAKONNEN Principal Adviser, Office of the 
Executive Secretary, ECA 
17 March 2006 
17 February 2009 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
Personal 
Communication 
31. Dr. Eddie MALOKA 
 
Executive Director, Africa 
Institute of South Africa (AISA) 
24 August 2006 
Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
Interview 
32. Ms. Nobuntu MBELLE Coordinator, Coalition for an 
African Court on Human and 
People’s Rights 
15 August 2009 
Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
Interview 
Personal 
Communication 
33. Prof. Emmanuel 
NNADOZIE 
Senior Economic Affairs 
Officer, ECA 
21 March 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
34. Dr. Francis NYAMNJOH Head of Publications and 
Dissemination, CODESRIA 
02 August 2006 
Dakar, Senegal 
Interview 
35. Ms. Rawda OMAR-
CLINTON 
Economic Affairs Officer, ECA 24 May 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
36. Dr. Patrick OSAKWE Economic Affairs Officer, ECA 22 May 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
37. Ms. Thokozile RUZVIDZO Acting Director, African Centre 
for Gender and Development, 
ECA  
24 March 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
38. Prof. Ebrima SALL Head of Academic 
Programme, CODESRIA 
02 August 2006 
Dakar, Senegal 
Interview 
39. Dr. Jeggan C. SENGHOR Former Director, IDEP and ECA 
West Africa Office/ Former 
Chief of Staff to the Executive 
Secretary 
June 2008 – 
November 2009 
Kinshasa DRC and 
Rotherham, UK 
Interviews  
Personal 
Communications 
40. Prof. Amson SIBANDA Economic Affairs Officer, ECA 23 March 2006 
Addis Ababa 
Interview 
41. Dr. Abebe SHIMELES Researcher & Consultant, ECA 24 March 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
42. Dr. Yousif SULIMAN Director, Planning & Human 
Resources/ Former Director, 
Regional Integration & Chief 
25 May 2006 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
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of Staff to the Executive 
Secretary, ECA 
43. Prof. Owodunmi TERIBA Former Director/ Senior 
Economist/ Adviser, ECA 
24 May 2009 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Interview 
44. Mr. Ali TODARO Chief, General Services/ 
Former Special Assistant to 
the Executive Secretary/ 
Secretary to the Commission, 
ECA 
14 October 2009 
Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Personal 
Communication 
45. Mr. Ozias TUNGWARARA Director, African Governance 
Monitoring and Advocacy 
Project (AfriMAP) 
4 August 2009 
Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
Personal 
Communication 
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Annexe II – Sample Interview Questionnaire 
 
1. Name, Age, Nationality, Institution or former Institution, Designation. 
 
2. Tell me a bit about your academic background – where did you study at university level, 
what did you study, and what did you specialize in? 
 
3. What about your professional career in development? Tell me about your role at ECA 
over the years. 
 
4. How has the institution evolved, and what do you consider to be the highlights in terms 
of its engagement with African development policy? 
 
5. How would you characterize the evolution of the African development paradigm since 
our countries achieved independence? 
 
6. From your vantage point at ECA, are there any moments you would consider ‘defining’, 
in the sense of having a major impact on subsequent policy and practice? 
 
7. Is there an extent to which it could be argued that African experts have a specific 
‘African’ agenda, as distinct from international development agendas? 
 
8. If so, and from your experience at ECA and from your observation of other regional and 
national policymaking institutions, how much room do you think African experts have 
had over the years in pushing a specifically African policy agenda? 
 
9. Where would you say the current power lies in determining international development 
policy as it is applied in African and other developing countries? Has there been a shift 
over the years?  
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10. If so, in what ways has the locus of power shifted? Has the dominant development 
paradigm been imposed, has there been collusion, have African experts been at the 
centre of generating such policies, or is it a negotiation? 
 
11. To what extent would you say African experts, whether in regional institutions or 
working at country level, are locked into the international development discourse and 
paradigm of the moment? 
 
12. What are your impressions of the relations over time between ECA and the OAU/Africa 
Union? What would you say have been the major complementarities and the major 
tensions in the relationship? 
 
13. How would you situate ECA’s role with respect to the major African development plans 
of the past few decades (Lagos Plan of Action, UNPAAERD, etc, all the way to NEPAD?) 
 
14. Are there any other insights you may want to share from your personal and professional 
life? 
 
 
 
 
 
